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This thesis is a study of the foreign politics of Charles James 
Fox and his political successors during the final decade of the Napoleonic 
wars. As such it is an account not only of the closing months of Fox's 
political life and the thought which moulded the foreign policy of his 
last government but also an evaluation of his legacy in foreign politics 
and its effect on the 'Whig' coalition which he willed to posterity. The 
thesis stops short of treating the mechanics of foreign policy. It is 
primarily a study of the effect which foreign developments had on the 
political fortunes of the Foxite-dominated Whig party.
I have not tried to sample the views of the ill-defined Whig party 
as a whole. Instead I have concentrated my efforts on the. personalities 
who determined policy: on the peers who constituted the Foxite hier­
archy; on frontbenchers in the Commons; on Fox's oldest supporters both 
in and out of Parliament; on political allies who disagreed fundamentally 
with traditional Foxite dogma; and to a lesser extent on those outside the 
party hierarchy who questioned and sometimes influenced the process of 
decision-making with their pens.
Within this framework, the thesis argues generally that Fox's 
fragile union with Grenville and Fitzwilliam was merely a tactical ma­
noeuvre designed to reestablish systematic opposition to the Crown, gain 
office, promote Anglo-French accord, and therefore facilitate de facto 
Whig unity by neutralizing the issue which had caused the disintegration 
of the party during the debate on the French Revolution. It argues fur­
ther that Fox's controversial behaviour in office was geared to the
attainment of this object; that his death and failure left his lieuten­
ants burdened with the problems which arose from a tactical coalition 
with former antagonists; and that the resulting delicate equipoise of 
agreement which at once maintained and undermined the Orey-Grenville 
coalition until its collapse during the hundred Days was a product of a 
fundamental contradiction in Foxite 'principles' which had arisen during 
the 1790's and which Fox had failed to remedy in 1806. This contra­
diction pitted the most identifiable feature of Fox's politics between 
1803 and 1806— coalition on a principle of 'men before measures' for the 
purpose of reestablishing systematic opposition— against the unpopular 
Foxite concept of politics which had broken the Whig party during the 
1790's.
These arguments, of course, are founded on a contention that Fox's 
general concept of the French Revolution and the European war continued 
to exert a powerful influence on Whig councils until the collapse of 
France's revolutionary government in 1815. The thesis therefore at­
tempts to explain this concept, to display how it influenced the foreign 
policy of the Ministry of All the Talents, and to establish its con­
tinuity by examining the reactions of key statesmen to the ups and downs 
of the European war, particularly the Spanish Revolution and the subse­
quent Peninsular War, the collapse of the French Empire, and the events
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
In citing manuscripts I have been as brief as possible. Except­
ing documents in the William Roscoe Papers and the Samuel Whitbread 
Papers (whose assigned numbers are the only reliable means of identifi­
cation) I have not cited folio numbers or other identification numbers 
unless a document is otherwise difficult to locate, either from faulty 
cataloging or the absence of a legible datemark. I have adopted this 
policy for two reasons. Firstly, so many collections (and especially 
the Holland House Papers) are in the process of constant re-arrangement 
that the citation of folio numbers is often misleading to the reader. 
Secondly, documents in the collections which I have used are otherwise 
easily located. All citations, however, identify the name of the col­
lection in which a document is located, and references to material in 
the British Museum include manuscript numbers.
Generally I have used standard abbreviations in my notes. For 
example, B.M., Add. MSS. «* British Museum, Additional Manuscripts; P.R.O. 
“ Public Record Office, London; Pari. Deb. “ The Parliamentary History 
(Parliamentary Debates), edited by William Cobbett to 1812 and by T. C. 
Hansard thereafter; and F.O. « Foreign Office, Public Record Office,
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CHAPTER I
PARTY REORGANIZATION AND THE ROAD TO OFFICE,
1803 - 1806
In the summer of 1803 Charles James Fox began a steady march back 
into the spotlight of British politics. He was older, fatter, and some 
said wiser than the man who had abandoned Parliament in 1797; nearly seven 
years of political inactivity had given him a new image. In Hay Thomas 
Creevey dined with him in the company of Grey, Lauderdale, Whitbread,
Lord Robert Spencer, and Lord John Townshend. 'You would be perfectly 
astonished at the vigour of body, the energy of mind, the innocent play­
fulness and happiness of Fox', reported Creevey. 'The contrast between 
him and his old associates is the most marvellous thing I ever saw—  
they having all the air of shattered debauchees, of passing gaming, 
drinking, sleepless nights, whereas the old leader of the gang might 
really pass for the pattern and the effect of domestic good order . ..'^ 
This was a new image indeed! Fox had toyed with historical writing, 
absorbed the beauties of Homer and Virgil, and wallowed on the grass at 
St. Anne's Hill for years. Given respectability by righteous living and 
fading memories he now stood on the brink of a final confrontation with 
George III. Yet the last three years of his life would have profound 
effects upon the fortunes of the Whig party at least until 1815.
The reason for Fox's revival of interest in politics is debatable.
__________ ot • >>
■ ■ ' ' ( OR
■'"Creevey to Dr. Currie, 7 May 1803, Sir Herbert Maxwell, ed.,
The Creevey Papers (London, 1904), I, 13.
9Grey attributed it to Mrs. Fox's social aspirations.* On the other 
hand, if Mrs. Fox's tedious journal depicts her true character one may 
surmise that her 'angel', though ever-devoted, was ready for a diver­
sion.^ Then, too, a visit to Paris in the fall of 1802 had whetted 
Fox's political appetite and bolstered his self-esteem. Napoleon had
flattered him and accepted him at Court; Fox had returned to England con-
3vinced that he alone could stabilize Anglo-French relations.
Probably of equal importance was the fact that sober reflection 
had made it impossible for Fox to escape from thoughts of the political 
failures of earlier days. While in retirement he had begun a serious 
effort to write a history of the early part of the reign of James II only 
to find himself bogged down in the perplexing constitutional questions of 
his own lifetime.^ He deeply lamented the rashness which had disinte­
grated the Whig party a decade earlier, and he longed for a political 
reunion with old colleagues. But above all else Fox harboured a deep- 
seated hatred of his adversaries— a hatred that could not be separated 
from his concept of politics— and it had not been tempered by his retire­
ment. The fall of Pitt's government in early 1801 had opened his eyes. 
This event and the subsequent appointment of Henry Addington's ministry 
had been a highly satisfying 'Whig' victory in the estimation of most
1Grey to Whitbread, 9 Jan. 1803 (Whitbread), 883.
^Diaries & Journal of Elizabeth Bridget Fox, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51476-51483 (Jan. 1806 - Dec. 1816).
Fox to Grey, 12 Dec. 1802, Lord John Russell, ed., Memorials and 
Correspondence of Charles James Fox (London, 1853), III, 385. John G. 
Alger comments on Fox's visit to Paris in Napoleon's British Visitors 
and Captives, 1801-1815 (New York, 2nd ed., 1970), pp. 28-33.
^Henry, Lord Holland, ed», A History of the Early Part of the 
Reign of James the Second by the Right Hon. Charles James Fox (London, 
1808). Also see the correspondence relating to this work in the Fox and 
Holland House Papers, B.M., Add. MSS. 47578 and 51510.
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Foxites for it had opened gaps in the ranks of the hated Pittite coali­
tion. Moreover, the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens had been a great 
personal victory for Fox, and his initial reaction to it had revealed 
the extent of his bitterness. '... the truth is,' he had written to 
Grey, '1 am gone something further in hate to the English Government 
than perhaps you and the rest of my friends are, and certainly further 
than can with prudence be avowed. The triumph of the French Government 
over the English does in fact afford me a degree of pleasure which it is 
very difficult to disguise.'^ Fox had predicted that such a treaty 
could be the only result of an attack on 'French liberties' at the begin­
ning of the war, and he had paid a heavy price for his views. In his 
opinion the Peace of Amiens had discredited the Crown and vindicated his 
own attitude; now, since there was to be no political liberty in the 
world, Napoleon was 'the fittest person to be the master'.^
Since 1801 time and circumstances had moderated Fox's passions. 
Grey, Lauderdale, and Sheridan had grown wiser and more prudent with 
age, and, in striking contrast with their behaviour of the 1790's, they 
had refused to tolerate Fox's pique and immaturity. This had worked as 
a check on his traditional carelessness and impetuosity, and the hero- 
worship of his adoring nephew Lord Holland and other young Foxites had 
inspired in him calculations of political advantage. Fox had been re­
minded that Burke was dead, that Portland and Shelburne were lost for­
ever, and that by a simple process of elimination he stood uncontested 
at the top. He had paused, feigned pessimism, encouraged Grey to act in 
his stead, and finally vented frustration by working on his book. Never *
*Fox to Grey, 22 Oct. 1801, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 349.
^Fox to T. Maitland, 1801, ibid., 345.
11
in his life had he shown the willpower, the staying-power, and the 
grinding application which make for greatness.^- His flights of genius 
had risen to the heavens, only to fall to earth gracelessly. The flame 
of his eloquence had attracted the attention of many, but it had flared 
and flickered; it had warmed a very narrow circle and invariably it had 
been stifled by its own smoke. Hitherto he had proved himself too ta­
lented, too vain to follow and yet too irresponsible to lead. The ap­
proaching campaign would be different. The events of the times had set 
Fox's mind in motion; he speculated on the means by which he could revive 
his party from the demoralizing effects of its rupture in 1792-1794 and 
the subsequent secession of 1797.
By 1803 Fox commanded a large personal following in Parliament.
The forty men who had supported him during the dark days of the 1790's
had been reinforced considerably by 6 June when Fox calculated his
2strength to be sixty-nine in the Commons and ten in the Lords. This 
party was composed of four identifiable groups. The first of these con­
sisted of Fox's oldest friends: Coke, Fitzpatrick, Francis, Sheridan,
Adam, Thanet, Adair, North, Byng, Jekyll, Courtenay, Lord William 
Russell, Lord John Townshend, and Lord Robert Spencer. These men were 
bound to Fox by friendship, lifetime association, and a sense of con­
sistency as Whigs; they formed a relatively conservative nucleus. Most 
of the debating strength of the party, however, came from the younger 
and more radical set of men who had rallied behind Fox's standard in the 
late 1780's or during the early debates on the French Revolution. Most 
prominent among this group were Grey, Lauderdale, Erskine, Whitbread, *
*Ian R. Christie, 'Charles James Fox', History Today, VIII (Feb. 
1958), pp. 110-118.
2Fox to Holland, 6 June 1803, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 222.
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Tierney, Burdett, and William Smith. Throughout the 1790's, and espe­
cially after 1797 when Burke's death and the partial secession of the 
Foxites from Parliament had eased tensions, young Whigs who saw oppres­
sion at home and did not feel their father's fears of Jacobinism abroad 
had gravitated towards Fox. This group was composed of youngsters who 
either had recently taken their seats or would do so in the early nine­
teenth century. Lord John Russell, William Lamb, George Keppel, 'Little 
Joe' St. John, J. G. Lambton, and Holland had crawled round Fox's feet 
as children and had learned to regard his every word as gospel. Lord 
Althorp, the son of Pitt's First Lord of the Admiralty, was becoming an 
admirer of Foxite politics at Cambridge. The lectures! of Dugald 
Stewart, the fire-eating of old Foxites like John Clark and James Gibson, 
and Pitt's extraordinarily harsh policies had made Edinburgh a Foxite 
stronghold and had given rise to a set of young men whose views would 
figure prominently in Whig politics.* Among these, Francis Jeffrey,
John Murray, and John Allen would serve the party out of Parliament with 
their pens; Francis Horner, Henry Brougham, and Lord Henry Petty would 
soon move to the Foxite frontbench. And young men like Creevey, Lord 
King, Lord Archibald Hamilton, Henry Grey Bennet, Lord Ossulston, and 
William Roscoe, captured by the aura of Fox, had committed themselves to 
his cause. Finally, the Irish Whigs as well as Burke's old admirers had 
decided that an active role in politics could only lead them towards St, 
Anne's Hill. As Holland noted, the 'natural laws of political gravita­
tion' had been at work in Whig circles for years and Fox had been the 
beneficiary.^ *
*H. W. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution (Glasgow, 1912).
2Henry Edward, Lord Holland, ed., Memoirs of the Whig Party During 
My Time by Henry Richard Lord Holland (London, 1852), I, 77-80.
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Notwithstanding this increasing strength, Fox was apparently con­
vinced that only through cooperation with non-Foxite groups could oppo­
sition be effective. In this his motives are unclear. One may speculate 
that he was painfully aware that he could not claim the allegiance of 
powerful borough patrons. As an eighteenth century Whig who leaned heav­
ily on traditional maxims of political manoeuvre, Fox was greatly dis­
turbed by this fact and inclined to remedy it. 'No strong Confederation 
since the Restoration, perhaps not before, ever did exist without the 
accession of obnoxious Persons', he wrote. By 'obnoxious' Fox meant in 
regard to political principle. The Crown had ever been his real enemy, 
and abridging its power had almost become an end in itself. Therefore, 
Fox held that such coalitions were a necessary evil to which all Whigs 
must subscribe in their unceasing conflict with the king. A refusal of 
coalition oft grounds of principle alone would 'make all resistance to the 
Crown more impossible even than it is'. The Whig could not afford such 
a luxury; to absorb the traditional supporters of the king was to weaken 
his influence.*-
This traditional eighteenth century concept of political manoeuvre 
was a striking departure from Fox's tactics of the past. After the dis­
missal of the Fox-North ministry in 1788 Fox had placed a steadily in­
creasing emphasis on the importance of Whig 'principles'. These were of 
two kinds, general and specific. Easily the most important general prin­
ciple was the maintenance of a group of honest, loyal politicians acting
9upon 'systematic' opposition, opposition to men as well as to measures. 
Pitt, the 'tool' of a renascent 'toryism', was the Immediate target of
*Fox to Lauderdale, 9 April 1804, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, IV, 39-40.
ft^Frank O'Gorman, The Whig Party and the French Revolution (London, 
1967), p. 29.
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this united party because theoretically he stood as the guardian of all 
that was evil in the land.-*- The circumstances which accompanied the fall 
of the Foxite government had established these maxims firmly in a very 
short period of time. They could be seen in operation at the large and 
riotous meetings of the Whig Club during the 1780's, and Fox, posing as 
the last of the Romans, had utilized them fully in whipping together a
group of men whose most identifiable 'principles' were fierce ethnocen-
2trism and personal opposition to Pitt.
After 1794, when Fox had found himself abandoned by traditional 
allies, these general 'principles' had assumed new significance. To ex­
cuse their own short comings the Foxites one and all had embraced a 
theory which held that all non-Foxite politicians were amenable to cabalis­
tic corruption. Fox himself had refused to read anything published 
against him, and he had surrounded himself with fawning young admirers at 
Brooks's and the Whig Club. With no hope of success in Parliament and 
little concern therefore for the responsibilities of political life, Fox 
and his friends had moved enthusiastically towards political isolation.
In time they had resembled more a social club than a political clique.
Many of them had revelled in their unpopularity, and most had been proud 
that theirs was a party of outsiders. They had gleefully swapped mis­
tresses and carriages and journeyed to St. Anne's Hill to 'Charley it' 
whenever Fox had beckoned. At Brooks's rakes and dandies had sat silent
iIan R. Christie, Myth and Reality in Late-Elghteenth-Century 
British Politics and Other Papers (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 27-54.
o^This thesis is laboured throughout L. G. Mitchell's Charles James 
Fox and the Disintegration of the Whig Party, 1782-1794, (London,~1971).
\ady Dorchester, ed., Recollections of a Long Life by Lord 
Broughton (London, 1909), I, 85.
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as Fox stalked nightly among his wide-eyed lieutenants, delivering his 
political creed as law and watching his admirers codify it. The Foxites 
had been proud of their insularity. To set themselves apart from other 
politicians, Lord John Townshend, Coke, the Duke of Bedford, and many of 
the younger Foxites had worn their hair a la guillotine, short with 
neither powder nor pigtail. In the same spirit Fox had once declared 
with an oath 'that there was no address at this moment Pitt could frame, 
he would not propose an amendment to, and divide the House upon.'^
This exaggerated emphasis on group loyalty and systematic opposi­
tion to Pitt had left important marks on the party. Firstly, it had 
chased away moderates. For example, Ayscough Boucheret, the M.P. for 
Great Grimsby who had supported Fox for years, deserted him during the 
1790's not on grounds of political theory but because of what he called 
a 'pure spirit of opposition ...'^ The Duke of Somerset and many other 
Whigs who felt the necessity of abridging the power of the Crown had re­
fused to abridge it on Fox's terms, and the situation had become so ex­
treme that even Lady Holland noted that Foxite tactics had thrown 'an 
unfounded popularity upon King and Ministers'.3
The desertion of moderates had had the effect of consolidating 
group consciousness. Of the Whig Club of the 1790's, the Foxite Morning 
Chronicle noted 'the perfect harmony and entire confidence which a body 
of men, engaged in a good cause, and freed from the contamination of 
those who only joined them for a time, from interest, must ever feel in
^•Quoted in Christie, 'Charles James Fox', p. 17.
2James Greig, ed., The Farington Diary (London, 1924), IV, 154-55.
^Earl of Ilchester, ed., The Journal of Elizabeth Lady Holland 
(New York, 1908), I, 177.
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a moment like the present.'"^ The Foxites of the 1790's had been a select 
club presided over by a talented and 'wronged' champion. Thriving on un­
popularity, they had spoken often and passionately of their sufferings, 
and this was a trait which would endure. Sheridan spoke the language of 
many of his colleagues when he addressed the electors of Westminster in 
1807:
His [Fox's] friendship was the pride and honour of my days. I 
never, for one moment, regretted to share with him the difficulties, 
the calumnies, and sometimes even the dangers, that attended an 
honourable cause. And now, reviewing my past political life, were 
the option possible that X should re-tread the path, I solemnly and 
deliberately declare that I would prefer to pursue the same course; 
to bear up under the same pressure; to abide by the same principles; 
and to remain by his side an exile from power, distinction, and 
emolument ...^
By the dawn of the nineteenth century group loyalty and hatred of Pitt 
had been the first tenets of the Foxite creed for almost twenty years, 
and, more recently, the opposition of the 1790's had added a cutting 
edge.-* These general principles, therefore, were fundamental in Foxite 
politics, and they stood in the way of coalition.^
Specific principles were yet another consideration. Prior to the 
debate on the French Revolution Fox had managed to dodge commitment on 
specific issues by promulgating ringing but adaptable generalities. How­
ever, the heat which had accompanied the schism in the Whig ranks after
^Note the interesting comments of E. Tangye Lean in The 
Napoleonists (London, 1970), pp. 223-24.
2F. Stainforth, ed., The Works of Richard Brinsley Sheridan (London, 
1879), p. 620. Also see Grey's Newcastle Speech, Morning Chronicle, 30 
Sept. 1814. For Lauderdale's comments on this subject see his letter to 
Lady Holland of 30 Sept. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51698 (Holland).
3For a good example of the continuing emphasis on the political 
maxims of the pre-1789 era see Lord Archibald Hamilton's Thoughts on the 
Formation of the Late and Present Administrations (London, 1804).
4Fox to O'Brien, 7 Aug. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47566 (Fox).
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1792 had forced Fox's hand and left him branded as the champion of poli­
tically suicidal causes from which he could not retreat gracefully. One 
of these was parliamentary reform.
Generally Fox had approached the issue of reform with great cau­
tion until well after the desertion of Portland and Fitzwilliam in 1794,^ 
but he had been discredited by his inability or unwillingness to control 
the rashness of the 'young ones' who supported him in Parliament. Then, 
too, though he had recognized and lamented the political indiscretions of
OGrey and Lauderdale, pique, disappointment, and despair had led him to­
wards a monumental tactical change after 1796. Isolated in Parliament, 
he had turned to 'the people' for support, and thereafter he had moved 
so progressively to the left that by 1797 reform had been represented as
Oone of his leading 'principles'.
There is ample reason to believe that Fox never considered the cry 
for reform as being more than a tactical manoeuvre in his crusade against 
Royal power.^ If so, he and his friends had gone too far in 1796 and 
1797. Much of their strength in the country at large hinged on their 
continued support of this issue. This was certainly the case in the
Fox receives kind treatment on this subject from Erick Eyck, Pitt 
versus Fox (London, 1950), p. 320. Also see the anonymous pamphlet, 
Speech of the Rt. Hon. G. J. Fox Containing the Declaration of His 
Principles Respecting the Present Crisis of Public Affairs, and on 
Reforming the Representation of the People. Spoken at the Whig Club 
(London, 1792).
^Fox to Adam, 13 Dec. 1793 (Adam).
Fox to Holland, 19 April 1801, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 190-91. Also see J. R. Dinwiddy, 'Charles James Fox 
and the People', History, LV, 185 (Oct. 1970), p. 343.
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, n.d. [1810], B.M., Add. MSS. 51697 
(Holland), ff. 88-90. Of importance on this subject was Sir Herbert 
Butterfield's Raleigh Lecture of 1971 at the British Academy entitled 
'Sincerity and Insincerity in Charles James Fox'. Also see J. R. 
Dinwiddy, 'Parliamentary Reform As An Issue In English Politics, 1800- 
1810', unpublished University of London PhD. thesis, 1971, p. 88.
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strongly Foxite conshW*;«^ of Middlesex and Westminster, and for this rea­
son Christopher VJyvill had exerted his considerable influence in defend­
ing Fox's sincerity before the nation.^ Moreover, many of Fox's friends 
in the Commons, especially Whitbread, Coke, and the Russells, regarded 
parliamentary reform as a leading tenet of the Foxite creed, and others,
such as Grey, Lauderdale, and Tierney, who were having second thoughts,
2had gone beyond the point of honourable retreat. Unfortunately, on this 
subject the Foxites stood alone in Parliament.
Exaggerated group loyalty, hatred of Pittites, and commitment to 
reform were damaging skeletons in the closet, but they were as nothing 
when compared to Foxite commitment on the leading political issue of the 
day, Anglo-French relations. Fox's definition of the French Revolution 
and the subsequent continental war had necessarily become the axis on 
which his politics turned during the 1790's. He had worked incessantly 
to codify his beliefs; he had succeeded in presenting a reasonable argu­
ment; and the hallmark of the Foxite Whig had become a desire for peace 
with revolutionary France.
It was this maxim above all others that Fox had drilled into the 
minds of his followers during those long nights at Brooks's. He had 
rested his case upon two general arguments. Firstly, English constitu­
tional balance was impossible so long as the government remained com­
mitted to the cause of despots. This, he had pointed out, was proved by 
the reign of reaction, the suspension of liberties, and the supremacy of 
the Crown which had coincided with the outbreak of hostilities. Pitt's 
duty had called for moderation and conciliation; instead he had added the
^C. Wyvill, Letter to John Cartwright (York, 1801), pp. 17-19.
^Grey to Whitbread, 1797 (Whitbread), 866.
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cant of wartime patriotism to an issue which was already straining the
moral and religious fabric of the nation. Moreover, Fox had ruled, Pitt's
policy had identified the cause of established power in England with the
same cause on the Continent, a cause with which it had little in common.1'
Secondly, even if Pitt's foreign policy were successful— even if the al-
✓lied powers succeeded in their campaign to restore the ancien regime— it 
could only end in the total disruption of the European balance of power 
for it was founded on faulty logic. 'However ... we may abhor the con­
duct of Frenchmen towards Frenchmen, whatever indignation we may feel 
against crimes at which humanity shudders, the hatred of vice is no just 
cause of war between nations', he had cried before the House of Commons. 
'If it were, good God! with which of those powers with whom we are now 
combined against France should we be at peace?' Peace, he had stressed, 
would be as secure as any that had been made with Bourbon France at any 
other time 'and more so than any that they, who would make no peace with- 
out the restoration of monarchy, can ever expect to make. In the event 
of the defeat of the French people and the restoration of the Bourbon 
Monarchy, he had speculated, would not Europe be returned to the former 
order in its entirety? Would not the good as well as the evil be de­
stroyed? In short, would not England give succour to her 'natural' 
enemy, help destroy the march of human progress, and plunge Europe into 
reaction, revolution, and a century of darkness?
... can it seriously be supposed [wrote one Foxite lady], first that
the French nation will ever receive a Monarch forced upon them at the *2
^See G. M. Trevelyan's excellent essay, 'Poetry and Rebellion', 
Clio A Muse and Other Essays (London, 1949), pp. 66-87.
2J. Wright, ed., The Speeches of the Right Honourable Charles 
James Fox in the House of Commons (London, 1815), V, 159 (Speech of 21 
Jan. 1794).
20
point of the bayonet by the allied armies, knowing that the incen­
tive that provokes those allies is the partition of France? And, 
2ndly, admitting the restoration were practicable, would the Kings, 
whose object would be popularity, venture to dismember their 
country?1
The war was ludicrous in the opinion of Foxites, and the impossibility of
a European settlement promoting both European and English interests had
been the axis on which their arguments about foreign politics had turned
osince before the English declaration of war.
The Foxites had promulgated an alternative policy. No war could 
be brought to a successful conclusion (indeed no conclusion at all), they 
had argued, unless a nation were motivated by just, clearly defined ob­
jectives which were announced to the world. Pitt's 'platitudes' on the 
necessity of maintaining the European balance of power would not suffice; 
England's objectives must be made clear so as to facilitate an eventual
cessation of hostilities. Surely the British Minister did not plan to
force a government on France against the will of her people. Surely he 
could not persist in his refusal to recognize a government which was
clearly a fait accompli. I€ he did, the time had come for the 'perni­
cious doctrine of confidence' to loose its hold on Parliament; the time
ahad come for the House of Commons to determine foreign policy.
Peace, the Foxites had stressed, depended wholly upon the willing­
ness of England and her allies to accept a situation which could not be 
altered by the force of arms. A war waged against ideas, against the
•^Lady Holland Journal, II, 51-2.
2^Robert Adair outlined these arguments in a pamphlet, A Whig's 
Apology for His Consistency, in a Letter From a Member of Parliament 
(London, 1795).
3There is a brief sketch of Fox's ideas on foreign policy in
A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792- 
1939 (London, 1957), pp. 27-34. Also of importance is Alfred Cobban, 
ed., The Debate on the French Revolution, 1789-1800 (London, 1950).
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desire of Frenchmen to improve their lot, against the force of a 'risen 
people fighting to be free' was both unprincipled and incapable of suc­
cess. English history proved this maxim; American history confirmed it; 
common sense maintained it. Only after the French Republic were recog­
nized could England hope to maintain the balance of power in Europe. 
French aggression and French internal politics were different matters 
altogether. The former was ever the business of England; the latter was 
not her concern. In the one case war was justifiable, in the second it 
was 'war without end', and if the continental monarchs could not separate 
these two considerations in their wartime objectives— if revolutionary 
France were their target— England should withdraw from the conflict.^
Thus Sir Philip Francis could ask the House of Commons:
Why is this island to be forever the victim of continental politics? 
The position that separates, ought to secure us. But systems are 
created to counteract nature. Our situation gives us no advantage.
We are insulated in vain. I would warn this country ... against 
plunging, as we have done too often, into a labyrinth of continental 
politics.^
Isolationism, therefore, had assumed a position of importance in Foxite 
dogma.
Unpopularity and removal from the mainstream of politics had given 
rise to no small amount of intellectual condescension. Fox and his 
friends had attempted to justify their failings by thinking of themselves 
as members of an international brotherhood of enlightened 'Whigs'. Of 
course, Hampden and Sydney had cast their shadows across this image, but 
of far more importance were the heroes of the American Revolution— heroes
•^Fox Speeches, VI, 455-65 (Speech of 3 Nov. 1801).
J^. Parkes and H. Merivale, eds., Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis 
(London, 1867), II, 292-93. (Speech of 1 Mar. 1792).
^Erskine's letter to Wright of 1 May 1815, though tempered, biased, 
and retrospective, is the best statement of Fox's foreign views of the 
1790's. Fox Speeches, I, v-xlviii.
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of Fox's lifetime who had shared the glory of his greatest triumph. 
Washington, whose disinterestedness had in many ways vindicated Fox's 
views on 'American Whiggism', had epitomized all that was good to the 
Foxite. Kosciusko also had been given praise, and the cause of his 
native Poland had become Fox's own principally because the partition of 
the country by Austria, Prussia, and Russia served as a splendid example 
of the profligacy of England's allies. In this spirit leading Foxites 
had opened a Mansion House Fund in 1792 to aid the Poles in their struggle 
against Russia.^ Lafayette, the 'father of two worlds', also had been 
singled out for praise. The Foxites had argued his cause in Parliament, 
and in 1798 Fitzpatrick had raised money to pay the Frenchman's debts.^
' ’ j , •. >5. . .•» ; . •' si,..
Along with these tributes to 'Whigs' the world over had been a new in­
gredient in Fox's concept of foreign politics. '1 am one of those who 
firmly believe, that the greatest resource a nation can possess, the 
surest source of power, is a strict attention to the principles of jus­
tice', he had told the Commons. 'I firmly believe that the common pro­
verb, of honesty being the best policy, is as applicable to nations as to 
individuals ...'** There had been a touch of Rousseau— a hint of the 
spirit of the Enlightenment— in Fox's passionate speeches, and as men *2
•^Fox Speeches, V, 172 (Speech of 21 Jan. 1794).
2Ibid., V, A04 (Speech of 24 Mar. 1795).
^See Fox's speeches of 13 Dec. 1792, 18 Feb. 1793, 21 Jan. and 6 
Mar. 1794, 24 Mar. 1795, 3 Feb. 1800, and 24 May 1803 for examples of his 
enormous emphasis on the partition of Poland. Ibid., IV, 457; V, 42-5, 
159, 198, and 404; VI, 396.
^Stuart J. Reid, ed., Life and Letters of Lord Durham, 1792-1840 
(London, 1906), I, 21.
^Lady Holland Journal, I, 208. Fox Speeches, V, 213 (Speech of 
17 Mar. 1794).
^Fox Speeches, V, 408 (Speech of 24 Mar. 1795).
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like Erskine and Whitbread nodded approval their leader had risen in de­
fence of the rights of man and of nations. Well might William Roscoe 
have remembered Fox as the father of internationalism:
Champion of Freedom! whose exalted mind 
Grasp'd at the general good of human kind!
Patriot! whose view could stretch from pole to pole,
And, whilst he bless'd his country, loved the whole.*
Equally well might Fox's enemies have labeled him a traitor. Un­
fortunately for the political fortunes of the Foxites there had been 
more than a grain of truth in the rumour that they admired Napoleon.
This admiration had not been personal, but instead based on the conten­
tion that the Corsican derived his strength from the spirit of the French
2people and the iniquities of kings. Fox had paid him the ultimate com­
pliment (while at the same time revealing what was probably the primary 
source of his creed) when he told the Commons that 'good, great, and 
unexampled as General Washington was, I can remember when he was not 
better spoken of in this House than Bonaparte is now.'^ One must suspect 
that the Foxites had felt that Napoleon was fighting the same enemy on 
the Continent which they were fighting in England. Busts of Fox and the 
First Consul had been placed side by side in the homes of Foxites, and 
Lauderdale once had remarked that he looked to Bonaparte and expected 
'redress from him at the head of 100,000 men'.^
The very unpopularity of this view of the war had been instrumental
^Roscoe's inscription adorned a temple built in Fox's honour on the 
banks of the Clyde. W. Whitten, Nollekens and His Times (London, 1829), 
II, 12. Possibly Erskine was closer to the truth when he noted that Fox's 
principles were 'a great legacy to the world— I say to the world, for as 
to John Bull I fear it is a lapsed legacy'. Erskine to Holland, 3 June 
1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51533 (Holland).
^S. Parr to Holland, 16 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS, 51651 
(Holland).
^Lean, p. 216, has interesting comment on this statement.
^Lady Holland Journal, I, 164.
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in making it the most fundamental tenet of what must be referred to 
loosely as the 'Foxite Creed’. It had complemented the image of martyred 
individualism which every Foxite had tried to project, and it had served 
as the most unifying principle of a group of men whose causes were many. 
Moreover, Fox's initial interpretation of the war (and his prediction of 
an increase of French power and a corresponding decrease of English lib­
erties) had been hailed throughout the late 1790's in an 'I - told - you 
so' manner by Foxites everywhere. Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, 
wrote in 1798:
Who, at one glance, took in the view of the French Revolution? Who 
saw its consequence and warned us of the inutility of opposing its 
progress? Will not posterity remember this and bless him? Will 
they not remember his merciful wishes on the condemnation of Lewis 
XVI, and the various times he would have checked (and it could have 
been done then) our wild career? Who has sacrificed even his 
darling popularity to his principles? His standard is in the hearts 
of men ... No, would I were a man, to unite my talents, my hopes, 
my fortune, with Charles's, to make common cause, and fall or rule, 
with him.-*-
Such testimonies were commonly heard at Brooks's, at the Whig Club, at 
the universities, and in Whig homes in the early years of the nineteenth 
century. Peace was more than a cause— one is tempted to label it the 
political raison d'etre of the vast majority of Foxites— and it was a 
principle from which Fox and his friends would never escape, coalition 
or no coalition.
Between 1801 and the summer of 1803 Fox's emphasis on coalition 
had been neutralized by the lingering effects of his party's 'principles' 
both general and specific. Negotiations with Addington had never got off
the ground in 1801, notwithstanding the new government's widely publi­
cized preliminaries for peace. This was owing primarily to four factors.
^Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, to P. Francis, 29 Nov. 1798, 
Francis Memoirs. II, 309. Also see R. Adair, The Letter of the Rt. Hon. 
C. J. Fox to the Electors of Westminster, With an Application of its 
Principles to Subsequent Events (London, 1802).
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Firstly, though Fox remained uncommitted, his friends placed unrealistic 
emphasis on the necessity of coming into office as a group with a clear 
majority in the Cabinet.^ Secondly, Addington had few admirers in the 
Foxite camp, and one must suspect that the character of the Addingtonian 
party was not to Fox's liking. It lacked identity (as was reflected by 
the absence of influential aristocrats in the ministry), and most Foxites 
probably agreed with Adam that the patch-work administration was merely 
'locum tenens for Pitt'.^ Thirdly, specific matters of principle pro­
bably held the parties apart. Thomas Grenville reported that Addington 
had rejected Grey's stipulation for repeal of the Treason and Sedition 
Acts of 1795, and in explaining the rupture Grey referred to the neces­
sity of 'the adoption of some great and leading measure' as part of a 
complete 'change of system'.^ Undoubtedly, Addington's aversion to the 
Catholic claims also alienated leading Foxites. Fourthly, old personal 
rivalries surfaced. One Foxite snubbed Addington with the remark that it 
was 'quite impossible for anything that is Pittish to restore the country 
to peace', and Moira ended the flirtation by demanding that Portland be
ousted from the Cabinet as the price of his support."* Three general con­
clusions can be drawn from the failure of the negotiations: the Foxites
as a group were ill-suited for cooperation even with a party favouring a *3
^Fox to Grey, 31 Jan. 1802, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox). Grey to 
Tierney, postmarked 31 Dec. 1801 (Tierney).
W^. Adam to C. Adam, 18 Feb. 1801 (Adam).
3Grey to Tierney, 16 Oct. 1801 (Tierney). T. Grenville to Grey, 
Dec. 1801 (Grey).
^Grey to Tierney, postmarked 31 Dec. 1801 (Tierney).
^O'Brien to Adam, 9 Mar. 1801 (Adam). Tierney to Moira, n.d. , and 
Bute to Tierney, 18 Nov. 1801 (Tierney). F. Lawrence to Fitzwilliam, 25 
Jan. 1802 (Fitzwilliam - Northants). Whitbread to Grey, 28 Jan., and 
Tierney to Grey, Feb. 1802 (Grey).
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pacific system; Fox himself was not interested in union with the likes 
of Addington; and Foxite demands were considerably greater than their 
bargaining power.
The refusal to join Addington had left the Foxites in an awkward 
position. Most party leaders were reluctant to attack Addington for fear 
of forcing Pitt back into office and thereby endangering the peace.
Until the renewal of the war in May 1803, therefore, Fox was forced to 
draw a distinction between supporting Addington's accommodation with 
France and his ministry as such, a dilemma which frustrated him greatly. 
'All opposition seems to be out of the question, perhaps forever', he 
wrote dejectedly in May 1802.^ His parliamentary support for Addington's 
peace strengthened a government which he had no intention of joining 
his parliamentary friends were showing signs of disunion; and a meaning­
ful shift in political alignments appeared to be out of the question.
Meanwhile Fox worked on his history as his friends tried to cheer him
3with yet another subscription for the payment of his debts.
In late 1802 disputes on the wisdom of peace among Pitt's old sup­
porters broke the political stalemate. While Pitt sat on the sidelines 
William,Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, William Windham, and several of the 
more warlike Pittites and old Burkian Whigs crossed the floor of the 
House and formed what came to be known as the 'New Opposition'. This 
gave politics a new complexion altogether. There were now four parties 
in Parliament, and, more significantly, Pitt's old coalition was divided 
into three distinct groups, a development which left Fox with the largest
^Fox to Grey, Mar. 1803, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 405. Fox to Grey, May 1802, ibid., 368.
^Fox to Grey, n.d. [early Dec. 1802], B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox), 
^Ld. R. Spencer to Adam, 1801 (Adam).
f. 65.
united personal following in the Commons. With his relative strength 
increased significantly, Fox saw the need to widen the breach in the 
Pittite ranks. Of course, the issue of peace continued to bind him to 
Addington, but now there was hope of securing more worthwhile allies.
He summoned his lieutenants to London immediately, claiming to see 'at 
least a possibility, if not a probability, of a state of politics aris­
ing ... that may make our party, weak and disbanded as it is, of some 
consequence ...1 ^
Fox's first priority was to break Pitt's strength; his second was 
to place himself in a position to secure allies as soon as they became 
available. In this he was handicapped by two facts: his party would not 
act in concert with anyone who refused to support the peace, and many of 
his followers were averse to the idea of coalition altogether.^ However, 
Fox was not discouraged. If Pitt joined Grenville for war the Foxites 
would support Addington and thereby drive the Prime Minister from the 
Pittites once and for all; if he joined Addington for peace the war con­
troversy would die, and the Grenvilles could, 'like all oppositions, come 
at length to popular measures, and then you might act with them ...' 
Finally, if Pitt remained inactive the Foxites would support Addington 
only so long as the question of peace remained an issue, and this could 
be no long period of time. Above all else Fox had his eyes fixed on the 
Grenvillites, a group who 'among all their faults ... had one good qual­
ity, viz. that of being capable of becoming good party men'.^ *23
‘'"Fox to Lauderdale, 26 Nov. 1802, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 372-73.
2At the Westminster election of 1802 Fox was greeted with cries of 
'No Coalition!'. L. Reid, Charles James Fox: A Man for the People 
(London, 1969), p. 380.
3Fox to Grey, 29 Nov. 1802, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 374-76. Also see Dinwiddy, 'Parliamentary Reform ...', p. 88.
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The 'New Opposition' had other good qualities. As a body Grenville 
and his friends constituted the most important 'swing group' in British 
politics. Spencer, who had distinguished himself while serving as Pitt's
First Lord of the Admiralty, was one of the most respected men in the
1country. Windham, who had served Pitt as Secretary at War, was not only 
the eloquent parliamentary leader of the remnants of Burke's old party 
but the personal representative of Fitzwilliam, the heir of Rockingham.
But Grenville himself was probably the brightest star. He was a cousin 
of Pitt; he had held office under him between 1786 and 1801; and he had 
resigned office with an unblemished political reputation. He was tal­
ented in both diplomacy and finance; he was logical and broad-minded; and 
his character and manners in polite society were so impeccable that an 
unbiased contemporary journalist once described him as 'the represents-
•ytive of the national aristocracy'. Grenville had the enormous influence 
of his family at his disposal, and he and his brothers could rely on the 
support of important peers like Carlisle, Stafford, Carysfort, and 
Auckland. Fox calculated Grenville's strength in the Lords at fourteen; 
in the Commons at thirty-six.-* The character of the 'New Opposition' was 
therefore most alluring to Fox. The thought of reunion with Windham and 
the Burkians brought him great personal satisfactionmoreover, *23
^Of interest on this subject is J. S. Corbett and H. W. Richmond, 
eds., Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer (London, 1913-24).
2Anonymous, Historical Sketches of Politics and Public Men, For 
the Year 1812 (London, 1813), p. 26.
3Fox to Holland, 6 June 1803, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 222. Fox's estimate of Grenvillite strength in the 
Commons was inflated. Grenville could depend on Althorp, G. Berkeley, F. 
Lawrence, Sir J. Newport, W. Poyntz, Lord Proby, Lord Temple, W. Windham, 
C. Wynn, Sir W. Wynn, and Sir W. Young. Others supported this group from 
time to time.
^Fox to Windham, 24 Nov. 1804, The Windham Papers, (London, 1913), 
II, 242-45.
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Grenville and his friends represented a huge proportion of what hitherto 
had been Pitt's 'weight in the country', a fact that was most important 
to a politician who was starved for aristocratic connexions.
There were solid reasons for optimism in late 1802. Firstly, 
Pitt's continued refusal to come back into politics would surely force 
Grenville to seek new allies. Secondly, Fitzwilliam and Windham had long 
since abandoned Pitt and begun a steady drift towards Fox on social if 
not political grounds. Thirdly, key Grenvillite peers (prominently 
Spencer, Carlisle, and Auckland) had stood with Fox against the Crown as 
young men, and in spite of political disagreement during the 1790's they 
had continued to admire him personally. Fourthly, Thomas Grenville had 
important connexions in the Foxite ranks, and in 1801 he had opened cor­
respondence of a political nature with Grey. Finally, Foxites, 
Grenvillites, and Burkians were in agreement on the issue of Catholic 
emancipation, an issue which separated them from Pitt.
Notwithstanding these points, Fox was separated from the 'New 
Opposition' on matters of political principle. As a group Grenville's 
friends opposed all mention of reform and stood firm in support of the 
war; most Grenvillite peers and every Burkian had broken with Fox on 
these issues during the 1790's. Grenville himself had served as Pitt's 
Foreign Secretary from 1791 to 1801, and throughout that period he had 
championed war to the knife with revolutionary France and regarded 
Napoleon as an usurper and a militarist whose very character threatened 
the security of Europe.^ Moreover, Grenville was ever loyal to Pitt. 
These considerations rendered coalition impossible so long as the issue 
of war and peace remained unresolved. 'With regard to men,' wrote Fox
-^E. D. Adams, The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy 
1787-1798 (Washington, 1904).
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in November, 'you know my inclination would rather be to the Grenvilles, 
as men of some spirit, but the line they have taken with respect to war, 
and their professed desire of reinstating Pitt make any junction with 
them impracticable for the present.'^
As Anglo-French relations deteriorated in early 1803 Fox experi­
enced very mixed emotions. His recent trip to Paris had convinced him 
that a renewal of war could only result from the stupidity of the British 
government,“^ so as war began to seem likely his support for Addington de- 
dined. Fox was looking ahead towards union with Grenville. He expected
a renewal of war to produce ’very unexpected jumbles in parties', so he
4practised a studied inactivity calculated to offend no one.
This strategy brought chaos. Grey, who was leaning heavily toward 
the 'New Opposition', executed a complete about face on the issue of the 
war. He wrote that Napoleon
Appears to me to be determined to make us drink the cup of our dis­
grace to the very dregs: to omit no opportunity of studied aggra­
vation and insult and to push us point by point til at last we shall 
be compelled to take some measure which may give him a pretence for 
the hostilities which he meditates. I hope I am mistaken in this 
opinion ... But I am very much afraid that even supposing a more 
favourable disposition in the Governt of France than appears to me 
to belong to it, there are circumstances in the state of the two 
countries with respect to each other, and still more in the state of 
Parties here which would render the Preservation of Peace nearly im­
possible at least for any length of time ...
The only caution I should recommend wd. be that of avoiding any 
appearance of indifference to the Power, still more of any thing *2
^Fox to Grey, 29 Nov. 1802, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 374-76.
2Fox to Adam, 28 Dec. 1802 (Adam).
"T. Lawrence to Fitzwilliam, 9 Mar. 1803 (Fitzwilliam - 
Northants).
^Fox to Holland, 23 Mar. 1803, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 217. Fox to Fitzwilliam, 22 April (1803), 
(Fitzwilliam - Northants).
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like approbation of the measures of the French Governt.^
Adair, upon whose foreign views Fox placed great importance, also refused 
to sanction talk of peace and argued that warlike bravado alone would 
discourage French encroachments.^ These opinions presented Fox with the 
unenviable chore of refuting reports of French aggression (which he at-
'itempted), but before he could lay out his arguments he was beseiged by 
Sheridan, Tierney, and others who argued that the withdrawal of Foxite 
support would throw Addington into the arms of Pitt.^
The party was sadly divided. Petty noted that 'altho' the greater 
number are ... determined to oppose the war, and not the ministers, others 
wish well to the ministers, yet do not approve the w a r ' ' P e a c e  or war—  
some system must be adopted by us for the sake of our characters— ', Fox 
emphasized to Grey, 'and I can adopt none, especially in case of war, 
without you. Hy belief, but it is only a belief, is that war might have 
been, may still be avoided ... In either event there will be a great 
cry ... against leaving the power in the present [Addington's] hands. How 
far we ought to join in that cry is a question quite open to us— and in­
deed I have been particularly cautious not to say a word that would pre- 
elude me from either joining it or resisting it. Fox's game, therefore,
^Grey to Fox, 5 Dec. 1802, copy (Carlisle).
OFox to Adair, 1802, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, III,
38A.
3Fox to Grey t6] and 12 Dec. 1802 and 17 Jan. 1803, ibid., 380, 
387-88, 396.
^F. Horner to T. Thompson, 23 May 1803, Leonard Horner, ed.,
Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, M.P. (Boston, 1853), I,
220-21.
5Petty to Holland, 6 June 1803, B.M., Add. MSS. 51686 (Holland).
6Fox to Grey, Mar. 1803, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence,
III, 403.
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was up. He continued to support peace, but this stance undermined his 
ideas on the subject of political allies. In the end he backed away 
from the dilemma and threw the question upon his lieutenants. In their 
hands only one result was possible. When war came, Grey and Adair swal­
lowed their opinions and followed the will of the party in opposing the 
declaration upon the ground that peace could have been preserved. This 
stance alienated both Grenvillites and Addingtonians; when the smoke 
cleared in June Fox and his party were as politically isolated as they 
had been in 1794.
Between 1801 and the summer of 1803 Fox's political aspirations 
had been thwarted completely by the demands of his 'principles'. It was 
not surprising, therefore, to see both him and Grey temper their views. 
Grey's reversal oh the issue of the war had been too extreme for Fox to 
countenance, but nevertheless Fox had stepped towards the middle ground.
In December 1802 he had ruled that if England were driven to war, 'why 
then I say that, if we are driven to it by the enemy, we must support, 
and support it in earnest; but if, which is far more likely, we are driven 
into it by the folly of our own government, we must support it also, but 
with a constant advice of negotiation and peace.'1 This opinion was a 
departure from those of the past, and it may be attributed to his desire 
for coalition with Grenville. The outbreak of hostilities with France in 
May 1803 furthered this moderation on the issue of war and peace.
Between June and December 1803 Fox's first priority was union with 
the 'New Opposition'. On 26 June he laid out his views in a letter to 
O'Brien:
• V f ; * v  r -V i ; *• -•**> f 0- A  *. fe- {i  «» r; y  r ^  ¥ \
You will not suspect me of denying that we have sufficient cause of 
complaint against the Grenvilles; but alas, against whom have we not?
1Fox to Grey, 12 Dec. 1802, Ibid.. 387-88.
33
and is this the moment, when the Court is in direct and bitter hos­
tility to them, and when moreover Pitt and They seem to be every day 
getting further distant from each other, — is this the moment for us 
to attack them? ... I am very far from wishing to make Coalition at 
this time, but neither would X throw unnecessary impediments in the 
way of any future one with any persons who are capable of acting in 
real opposition.
This opinion was contested by many Foxites, primarily by Sheridan,
Tierney, and the Prince. According to Fox, the fundamental problem was 
that 'the bias of many of our friends being more against Pitt than the 
Doctor [Addington], it is to be feared that many will follow Sheridan 
whom we should be sorry to lose'.^
For one of the few times in his life Fox refused to tolerate in­
subordination. In a letter of 6 June to Fitzpatrick he threatened 'to 
have it marked in the strongest manner, that the first step to a junction 
with or support ojf ... the present Ministry is an open breach with me'. 
Though Tierney ignored the pressure from above and joined Addington's 
government (a decision which would cripple him for fifteen years) Fox's 
firmness proved effective. In July the Prince promoted a union with the 
'New Opposition', and by August Fox was telling Grey that Grenvillite 
speeches were 'not against peace in general; and the very words of their 
resolutions ... are inconsistent with the notion of the sort of war talked 
of by some ...’^  In October he stated firmly that the only alternative to 
inactivity was the formation of a 'party against the Court, composed of 
the old and new opposition ...' To effect this union he was prepared to
dodge the question of the war for a time and to base his politics on
^ o x  to O'Brien, 26 June 1803, B.M., Add. MSS. 47566 (Fox).
^Fox to Grey, 19 Oct. 1803, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox).
%ox to Fitzpatrick, end. 6 June 1803, B.M., Add. MSS. 47581 (Fox).
^Fox to Grey, July and 9 Aug. 1803, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 417, 422.
Catholic emancipation, which he saw as the only issue capable of both 
uniting the various wings of opposition and holding Pitt at bay.* Fox 
was aware of his party's reluctance to merge officially with the 
Grenvilles so he dodged formal agreement in hope that concert would grow 
out of debate, rather than be antecedent to it.^ He was delighted to 
find himself in agreement with Fitzwilliam, and he was determined 'to 
give Windham a lift, and Sheridan a rub, and deal very much in generals'. 
In December he put his views before his contacts in the Grenvillite camp 
and reported to Fitzpatrick that old prejudices prevented a formal union, 
’but when public business is brought before us, we give similar opinions, 
which, if afterwards shaped into a question, must of course have the sup­
port of each party'.-*
Fox's activity struck a chord in the camp of the 'New Opposition'. 
Grenville had waited for Pitt's return to politics for nearly three years. 
The former Prime Minister had disappointed him on numerous occasions dur­
ing that period, and now Grenville was experiencing difficulty in justi­
fying the existence of his party. Hitherto the cohesion of the 'New 
Opposition' had been assured by opposition to the Peace of Amiens and by 
a feeling that Pitt's return to power (which was anticipated daily) alone 
could assure British security.^* Both tenets were under fire by late 1803.
*Fox to Grey, 19 Oct. 1803, ibid. , 430. Fox to Grey, 27 Nov. 1803,
B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox).
^Fox to Fitzpatrick, 2 Dec. 1803, B.M., Add. MSS. 47581 (Fox).
This tactic would be employed in every attempt to bring party harmony 
until 1815.
qFox to Fitzpatrick, 2 Dec. 1803, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 431»
^See Grenville's speech of November 1802 in William Cobbott, The 
Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 
1803 (London, 1819), XXXVI, 938-939.
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The resumption of hostilities with France and the inactivity of 
Pitt had caused great frustration and disillusionment among the 
Grenvillites, and there was reason to fear either political isolation or 
the splintering of the group.^ Fitzwilliam and Windham had one foot in 
Fox's camp. Grenville's brothers, Thomas Grenville and Lord Buckingham, 
believed that equivocal conduct on Pitt's part had destroyed his parlia­
mentary influence,^ and Temple, Grenville's nephew, detested Pitt.^ By 
December 1803, therefore, Grenville faced a serious dilemma. He could 
ally with neither Pitt nor Addington; his party was disintegrating; and 
Fox, his traditional antagonist, was his only alternative.
On the last day of 1803 Grenville practically begged Pitt to come 
forward and promote 'an understanding between the considerable Persons in 
the Country, forgetting past differences, and uniting to rescue us from a 
danger which is not the less fearful because it may not be quite so im­
mediate as those which we had the good fortune to escape this year'.
If we all remain looking at each other, and forbearing to act 
separately lest we should render future cooperation more diffi­
cult, or should contribute to the success of something that we 
may think not the best, the consequence must be that new circum­
stances will arise to make all cooperation impossible, and that 
in the end no man or description of men will find themselves strong 
enough to do the country any real service in or out of office.^
There was a hint of desperation in this letter. Grenville was eager to
reconstruct a strong coalition under the leadership of Pitt for the purpose
^Grenville to Buckingham, 20 Oct. 1802, Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos, ed., Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III (London, 
1852-54), III, 211-12. Grenville to T. Grenville, 25 Oct. 1802, B.M.,
Add. MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
2T. Grenville to Spencer, 19 July 1803 (Spencer).
qWard to Mrs. Stewart, [late Jan. 1806], S. H. Romilly, ed.,
Letters to 'Ivy' From the First Earl of Dudley (London, 1905), p. 34.
^Grenville to Pitt, 31 Dec. 1803, P.R.O. 30/58/4 (Dacres Adams).
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of turning out Addington and forming a new ministry. What were his mo­
tives? Firstly, Grenville's patriotism is incontestible. He thought 
Addington was less competent than others to manage the war, and he was 
convinced that an amalgamation of parties under Pitt's banner could best 
serve the country."^ Secondly, he probably shared his family's notorious 
love of offices and emoluments. Thirdly (and probably most importantly), 
the Grenvilles put great stock in the political respectability of the 
family name, and they were anxious to avoid almost certain political iso­
lation. Three years in opposition had reduced the magical effects of 
Pitt's name at Dropmore and Stowe, and this was reflected by the new lan­
guage of 'measures before men'.
How did Grenville propose to achieve this goal? Simple arithmetic 
(and probably the views of Fitzwilllam and Windham) rendered Fox's inclu­
sion in the proposed coalition imperative. Thus one sees an ever- 
increasing emphasis on the necessity of 'forgetting past differences' for 
the sake of the country— noble language founded on the shaky assumption 
that the political polarization of the 1790's on the issue of the war 
could be overcome. Grenville's scheme became a Rockingham Whig. From 
the first it contested the rigidity of the balance of power which had 
characterized English politics for over a decade.
On 10 and 11 January 1804 Grenville laid his plans before Pitt in 
London. His hopes were dashed when Pitt refused to act not only with Fox 
but with the 'New Opposition'.^ This forced Grenville to choose between
■^'Lord Grenville's Narrative' (pf a meeting with Pitt at Walmer), 
Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, III, 288. Grenville to Pitt, 16 April 
1803, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of 
J. B. FortesQue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore (London, 1910) [hereafter 
cited as H.M.C. Dropmore], VII, 161.
^Grenville to Buckingham, 11 Jan. 1804, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T.
Grenville).
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political isolation and new allies. He did not hesitate. Immediately 
upon returning to Dropmore he suggested a meeting of the leaders of the 
'New Opposition' at Stowe for the purpose of considering an overture to 
Fox. In late January Fox received an offer to participate in the forma­
tion of 'a systematic opposition, for the purpose of removing the 
Ministry, and substituting one on the broadest possible basis'.^ Fox had 
been awaiting such an offer. As his friend Francis noted at a later day, 
after January 1804 Fox's march resembled that of 'a powerful horse over a 
ruined road; at all events ... there was no time to be lost ...'^
As late as 1801 Fox had maintained that opposition could gain 
strength only 'from movements out of doors and not in Parliament', and 
he had asserted that he and his party were bound to the cause of parlia­
mentary reform. In early 1804 he argued that 'some bold measure, sup­
ported even tolerably, in point of numbers, in Parliament is the only
chance', and to effect this new strategy he was prepared to coalesce with
3men who were opposed to reform and who were unpopular in the country.
In March 1803 he had told Grey that he was determined to be 'honourably 
distinguished from the other politicians and parties of the day, who so 
evidently make war and peace mere engines of attack upon a Ministry whom 
they dislike.'^ After January 1804 he was determined to dodge his tra­
ditional views on the war for the sake of coalition with politicians who *2
^Fox to Grey, 29 Jan. 1804, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 449-52. Also see Richard E. Willis, 'Fox, Grenville, and the 
Recovery of Opposition, 1801-1804', The Journal of British Studies, XI,
2 (May 1972), pp. 24-43.
^Francis Memoirs, II, 449-50.
"^ Fox to Holland, 19 April 1801, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 190-91. Fox to Holland, 18 Jan. 1804, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 47575 (Fox).
AFox to Grey, 12 March 1803, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, HI, 397.
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remained honourably distinguished for their consistency in opposing 
peace. Grenville assured Pitt that cooperation with Fox brought neither 
'compromises of former opinions', nor 'engagements for future arrange­
ments' ;^  yet Fox criticized Lauderdale for being unwilling to compromise 
the 'principles' of the 1790's for the sake of a more important objec- 
tive. The explanation for these discrepancies lies in Fox's traditional 
concept of politics. He saw the political shuffle as a game of chess.
His board strength had been increased greatly by the accession of 
Grenville, Spencer, Windham, and Fitzwilliam. Addington, who was de­
ployed, and Pitt, who was in reserve, guarded the king. In 1804 the fall 
of Addington was his goal. 'Why then there is an inroad upon the power 
of the real Enemy, I mean the Court, happen what may afterwards. Give me 
for once a little credit, I am sure we are going right . ,.'3
Throughout early 1804 Fox climbed over the remonstrances of his 
dearest friends in his attempt to merge the various wings of opposition. 
Finally, on the Irish Militia Bill, Pitt's desire to appear consistent 
forced him to vote with Fox, Windham, and Grenville. Addington resigned, 
and by 7 May Pitt was forming his last government. Realizing his weak­
ness, the Prime Minister was willing to include both Fox and the leaders 
of the 'New Opposition' in his Cabinet, but the king wrecked the scheme 
by refusing to admit Fox. As Fox had anticipated, Grenville stood firm 
against the prejudices of the king and refused to take part in any govern­
ment that did not Include 'all the talents' of the country. On this 12
1Grenville to Pitt, 31 Jan. 1804, P.R.O. 30/58/5 (Dacres Adams).
2Fox to Lauderdale, 9 April 1804, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, IV, 39-40.
•*Fox to Lauderdale, 5 Mar. 1804 and 30 Sept. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 
47564 (Fox).
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ground the old alliance between Pitt and Grenville was broken forever. 
Windham joined Fox in a triumphal shout: 'The division of parties and 
politics is made as it ought to be: Hr. Pitt and the persons of his 
creation, pure and unmixed, on one side, and all the rest of the public 
men on the other.'1 Events had allowed Fox to deliver Pitt a crippling
blow. A weakened Prime Minister alone guarded the Closet, and by
even t -^noV Mei” v) i s i w u i i i ^
December Fox was discosslnc^^ what he called a 'checkmate'.
Though Grenville had refused to take office under Pitt without 
him, Fox had not achieved de facto union among the various groups which 
sat on the opposition benches. Grenville and Spencer retained confidence 
in their old leader as a wartime minister; Windham and Fitzwilliam de­
tested Pitt but agreed fundamentally with his view of foreign politics;
and the Foxites, with the exception of Grey and Fox's oldest friends,
3distrusted Grenville and Windham and were reluctant to compromise. 
Realizing that success depended upon his ability to mould a coalition on 
grounds of principle, Fox expressed interest in Windham's scheme for a 
complete reorganization of the country's militia while at the same time 
pushing Grenville on the question of Ireland. Over the cries of many he 
insisted on presenting the Catholic petition of early 1805 on the grounds 
that it was the 'great publick question on which the component parts of 
Opposition most consistently and cordially concur', and Holland recalled 
at a later date that it was Fox's and Grenville's 'authority and inflexi­
bility, rather than their reasons ... which prevailed on their adherents 123
1Windham to Mrs. Crewe, 6 Jan. 1805, Windham Papers, II, 250-52.
2Fox to Holland, 12 Dec. 1804, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, IV, 66.
3For example, see Creevey to Dr. Currie, 21 Dec. 1803, Creevey 
Papers, I, 19-21.
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to support the motion in Parliament.'*
All this achieved little. Fox himself had realised as early as 
evjen
October 1803 that/\the Catholic question could not unite opposi-
2tion, and with Pitt in power this was certainly true. The war and the 
entire structure of Britain's foreign relations had been the most funda­
mental points of difference between Foxites and Pittites since 1792; 
these same issues represented both the key to opposition unity and the 
fount of what little strength Pitt enjoyed in 1804 and 1805. Positioned 
squarely between Grenville and Windham on the one hand and his own party 
on the other, Fox avoided past controversies and spoke generally of the 
need for 'a revolution ... in the system and principles of Government', 
without which Britain could 'never hope ... to be upon the whole equal to 
the French'. This system was formed 'with a view to very distant pros­
pects' and it called for retrenchment, military reform, an end to con­
tinental subsidies, and strictly defensive warfare until national en­
thusiasm roused the nations of Europe to hostilities against France. 
British security demanded it; European independence hinged upon it; and 
the balance of power could not be maintained without it. These views 
were consistent with those that Fox had laid down in Parliament between 
1791 and 1794, but they were far removed from those which had crept into 
Foxite politics during the late 1790's. As such they were responsible 
and, with fifteen years of continental defeats as a footnote, they repre­
sented a realistic alternative to Pitt's idea of saving Europe by British
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, I, 196-98.
2Fox to Grey, 19 Oct. 1803, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
III, 430.
3Fox to Holland, 9 Jan. 1804, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, III, 233-34. Fox to Windham, 18 Nov. 1804, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 37847 (Windham). Fox to Adair, 6 Oct. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 
(Fox).
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example. However, rumours of Pitt's Third Coalition excited Windham and 
Grenville and crippled Fox's efforts. In this position Fox could do 
nothing but stand on his principles and wait on European developments to 
make or break him. He studied the continental situation closely, smiled 
broadly, and told Grey that it was 'full as well for the country, and 
infinitely better for us that Pitt should disgrace himself more & more: 
which he undoubtedly will do ...'^
Throughout 1805 Fox straddled the middle ground as Pitt swung his 
great effort into motion. In June, knowing full well that the king's 
prejudices prevented his inclusion in the government, he pleased 
Grenville by paying tribute in Parliament to 'the splendid talents' of 
Pitt, and by calling for the formation of a government to comprehend 'All
Othe Talents' of the country. When his followers protested against this 
obvious offer of coalition he professed himself mortified because 'it is 
hard after so many years of trial they should not have confidence enough 
in me to give me credit for not intending to do wrong until they see me 
do it . Fox's strategy was set. He realised that his political fate 
rode with his traditional view of the war, and he was satisfied with such 
a contest. In the meantime he made prodigious efforts to lay the founda­
tion for a better understanding among the members of opposition.
In these circumstances Holland House became a catalyst for the 
merging of parties. Lady Holland's dinner books record the presence of 
old Foxites, young liberals, reformers, and the Foxite editor James Perry. 
Alongside these were the Grenvillites, Charles Watkin Wynn and Thomas
^ox to Grey, 30 June 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox).
^J. W. Ward to Mrs. Stewart, 21 [June 1805], Letters to 'Ivy', 
pp. 28-9.
■^ Fox to O'Brien, 23 June 1805, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, IV, 81.
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Grenville, and Windham, who had long wanted 'a more extensive and per­
manent agreement'."^ Fox was everywhere at once. He was at Brooks's 
soothing the ruffled feelings of Sheridan and Tierney; at the Whig Club 
promising to his more radical allies consistency in the principles of 
the 1790's; at Camelford House tempering very real points of difference 
with the Grenvillites; at Carlton House reassuring the Prince of his im­
portance and, of course, at the home of his nephew delighting an audi­
ence composed of traditional enemies. The motive behind these activities 
is clear. As he told Wyvill, 'there should not appear too much either of
Aristocracy or Democracy, but something between the two'. He aimed at
returning the Whig party to the balance it had lost in 1793 and 1794.3
Strategically Fox's view of the war had not changed; tactically, 
he had adjusted that view to meet the demands of the political world 
around him. He admitted the necessity of checking French power while at 
the same time feeling privately that the crusade of kings had been sole­
ly responsible for its growth. Above all he retained his faith in the 
utility of peace. 'I do not know any thing we could do to prevent the 
other evils of the war,' he wrote, 'but we might, 1 still think, either 
get a peace, aye, and a peace to which the continental powers might be 
parties; or at least show all the world that we have done all in our
power for that purpose.' Fox was no pacifist. Though by 1805 he doubted
Napoleon'8 motives, he accepted his sovereignty as ruler of the French.
As in 1792 he was willing to fight only after 9erious negotiation had
^Holland House Dinner Books, entries of 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51950. Windham to Fox, 2 Feb. 1804, B.M., Add. MSS. 37847 (Windham).
^Creevey to Dr. Currie, 2 June 1804, Creevey Papers, I, 28-9.
^Fox to Wyvill, 23 Dec. 1805, quoted in J. R. Dinwiddy,
Christopher Wyvill and Reform, 1790-1820, Borthwick Papers, no. 39 
(York, 1971), p. 15.
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clearly defined the objectives of war. But his tactics had offended the 
sensibilities of even his dearest friends, and his reputation in the 
country had been tarnished to some extent. This had been necessary. As 
he told Gray, 'Opposition seems now restored, at least to what it was be­
fore the Duke of Portland's desertion, and the other adverse circum­
stances of those times.' This had been his immediate goal. He now aimed 
at the destruction of Pitt, whom he regarded as the last bastion of royal 
strength, and he was sure the Prime Minister would sink with his con­
tinental allies.^
The march of the Austrian and Russian armies towards the little 
town of Austerlitz during November and early December 1805 brought on 
what was seen at St. Anne's Hill as the final confrontation of Pittite 
and Foxite theories. At stake was Pitt's scheme of British leadership in 
continental coalition; to be decided was the old issue of whether Britain 
would accept the accomplishments of the French Revolution and agree to 
negotiate for a lasting peace with Napoleon's government.
Seldom have men had more faith in their principles. Upon hearing 
that Austria had moved on the French army without the concert of her al­
lies, Fox ended his hedging on foreign politics and told Grey that he re­
garded peace and the abandonment of Pitt's system of continental alliance 
as sine qua nons to coalition with Grenville. 'At any rate,' he wrote, 
'however desirable union may be, these are points too important to sacri­
fice even for that object: at least I feel them so: and could not an­
swer it to myself if I did not make some effort to stop a system which, 
if it goes on two years longer, must end in making Bonaparte as much in 
effect monarch of Germany as he is of France.' But Fox reserved such *2
■'■Fox to Grey, 17 Dec. 1804, Russell, Memorials and Correspondence, 
IV, 70-71.
2Fox to Grey, 3 Dec. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox).
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language for his closest friends. Though he felt that Pitt's policy of 
goading Europe to war would destroy 'all possible means of continental 
resistance' and make Britain 'odious to all mankind', he was confident 
that Austrian defeat would mark the moment when Windham and Grenville 
would 'come nearly right'.’*'
He grew more vindictive daily. Upon hearing that the Prime
Minister was desperately ill, he confided to Lauderdale that he 'should
be very sorry to have Pitt escape in such a manner from the complete dis-
2grace that must at last fall upon him.' Anticipating that the disgrace 
of Pitt would also be a defeat for the wartime principles of Windham and 
Grenville, in early December he stressed to his followers that talk of 
peace was futile and that political prudence demanded that 'we ought more 
than ever to deal in retrospect rather than prospect.' With Grey he be­
gan serious efforts to win Windham and Tom Grenville. 'I am sure Fox 
cannot fear less than you do the power of France, or think differently 
with respect to Bonaparte's ambition', Grey assured Windham. 'He may 
think ... that the Continental war is more likely to destroy all future 
means of resistance than to set any limit to his power. Peace, there­
fore, must be his wish and mine. But it must not be inferred from this 
that we abandon all future resistance.'^
In early December Fox discussed wartime strategy with Windham and 
the Grenvilles at Dropmore. Windham reported:
I was at Dropmore on Saturday last & met Fox there to talk over, as 
far as can be done now, the course of our campaign ... We shall 2
1Fox to Holland, 21 Sept, and 7 Nov. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47575
(Fox).
2Fox to Lauderdale, 17 Dec. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47564 (Fox).
2Fox to Holland, 7 Dec. 1805, Russell, Memorials and 
Correspondence, IV, 124-25, Grey to Windham, 13 Dec. 1805, Windham 
Papers, II, 266-67.
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have to move X think in somewhat separate columns, not less than 
three probably, but all supporting each other, & terminating 1 
trust in the same point. Ld. Gr. supporting hostile confederacies,
& slow to pronounce, notwithstanding the event, that this has been 
ill-formed. I equally a friend to hostile confederacies, & equally 
ready to admit, that one must not judge merely from the event, but 
inclined violently to suspect, that this has been ill-formed, & 
founding that suspicion less upon the event, than upon the characters 
of the persons concerned ... Fox equally disposed to this supposi­
tion, but having more disinclination to any attempt in resistance by 
force, and carrying that disinclination to an extent which I confess 
fills me with alarm.1
Being certain of allied defeat, Fox felt that his success depended upon 
his ability to represent the Third Coalition as a final test for the 
utility of continental alliance. For this reason he was pleased by the 
context of his differences with Grenville because Grenville's faith in 
Pitt's strategy was so unqualified that failure would disarm him com­
pletely. On the other hand Windham was by no means prepared to place all 
his eggs in Pitt's basket. Therefore, in the political manoeuvring of 
mid-December great pressure was exerted on the old Burkian to concede 
that, regardless of disagreement on this point, the failure of Austria 
and Russia would create a need for a period of recuperation in both 
Britain and Europe. It was in this spirit that Grey told him pointedly 
on 13 December that 'all questions respecting Continental alliances will 
be decided for us.'^
As Fox had anticipated, reports of allied folly had an enormous 
impact on the Grenville camp. By 15 December Tom Grenville became con­
vinced that Fox's views would be made consistent with his own, 'either by 
any great reverse to the successes of the French, or by such a continua­
tion of them as should close the contest upon the Continent by negotia­
tions for peace.'* 3 And during a conference at Droptnore he convinced
■^Windham to Grey, 9 Dec. 1805 (Grey).
^Grey to Windham, 13 Dec. 1805, Windham Papers, II, 276-77.
3T. Grenville to Grenville, 15, 18 Dec. 1805, H.M.C. Dropmore, VII, 
321, 323. '
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Carlisle and Stafford, two of Grenville's leading adherents, of the logic 
of Fox's views.^ By late December Fox had succeeded in reducing the 
question to the context he desired; his political fortunes rode with 
Napoleon.
On 2 December 1805 the French crushed the Austro-Russian armies at 
Austerlitz. Austria was left helpless, and on 6 December she signed an 
armistice which, by the 26th, became the humiliating Treaty of Pressburg. 
The linking point of Pitt's triple alliance had been smashed. Word of 
these events began to filter back to London during the days after 
Christmas, and it had the effect of a bomb on British politics. 
Nesselrode, the Russian Ambassador, wrote that 'All hope of effective 
resistance seems to me to be destroyed and lost forever.' General 
Stamford, an agent of continental coalitions, noted that 'God has for­
saken this unhappy continent.' Pitt rolled up the map of Europe.'*
Fox had succeeded in holding his young followers at bay during 
December, but the news of Austerlitz produced a spirit of vindictiveness 
that was difficult to check. Erskine was self-righteous in referring to 
'stupid, undone Europe', as if he had played a part in the French vic­
tory, while Holland and Petty called for strong censure in Parliament and 
insisted that 'these events & their necessary & immediate consequence 
[of] a peace on the Continent change the whole state of the question ...' 
Fox was equally anxious to step forward as the acknowledged saviour of 
his country, and his initial reaction was to throw all his strength *2
Carlisle to T. Grenville, 25 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 
(T. Grenville).
2Herbert Butterfield, Charles James Fox and Napoleon. The Peace 
Negotiations of 1806 (London, 1962), p. 2.
Erskine to Holland, 12 Jan. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51533 (Holland) 
Holland to Fox, 30 Dec. 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47575 (Fox).
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behind a motion of censure.^ However, he never lost sight of the feel­
ings of Grenville and Windham. He thought that the magnitude of the al­
lied defeat would end all controversy on Britain's role in continental 
crusades, and he favoured a strong amendment and division in Parliament 
'unless we should have reason to know that a soft one will gain us a 
dozen or two in numbers.' 'I had a letter from Windham about a week ago 
and I was sorry to see a disposition in him upon any even slight appear­
ance of Success, to form new hopes for the Coalition', he wrote on 1 
January. 'However, that evil must be now quite done away, and his desire 
to blame Ministers is as strong I think as that of any of us.' Fox was 
prepared to wait until Pitt's total defeat was indisputable. In the mean 
time he advocated an attack on Pitt's failure to raise a respectable army 
a point on which he knew the Prime Minister was vulnerable and one which
was certain to appeal, not only to Windham and Grenville, but to
2Addington (now Lord Sidmouth) as well.
On 3 January Fox wrote to Tom Grenville, whom he knew to be a weak 
link in Grenvillite resolution:
Perhaps you are now convinced that there might be something worse 
than even a rickety peace. However, I will not triumph too much on 
my foresight. But surely as ideas of encouraging or discouraging 
continental war, for the present, are not now in question, you can 
none of you have any objection to attacking the Ministry ... Pray, 
pray consider this question, all of you, abstractly, as far as you 
can, from former discussions. The cases are wholly dissimilar, and 
the more a man is inclined to continental alliances, the more re­
sentment he ought to feel against those who have extinguished every 
hope of renewing them to any advantage; the more a man feels the 
desirableness of lowering the power of France, the more indignation 
ought he to feel against those who have so enormously aggrandized 
her. ^ 2
^Fox to Lauderdale, 3 Jan. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 47564 (Fox).
2Fox to Holland, 1 Jan. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 47575 (Fox). Fox's 
party almost to a man wanted a frontal assault on Pitt. Holland criti­
cized his uncle severely. Holland to Fox, 3 Jan. 1806, ibid.
Fox to T. Grenville, 3 Jan. 1806, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets,
IV, 6-7.
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These were strong arguments, and by 6 January Tom Grenville and Windham 
desired to attack the government.^
By the 7th Lords Grenville, Buckingham, and Spencer were under 
attack in their own camps, for they stood practically alone in resisting 
Fox's ardour. Primarily because of hatred of Pitt, the Burkians were 
firmly attached to Fox's view, and Tom Grenville was not alone among 
Grenvillites. Temple was violent in his denunciation of Pitt, and simi­
lar views were held by the Wynns, Stafford, Carlisle, Essex, and 
Ebrington. Grenville conceded that Austerlitz represented the 'final 
overthrow' of Bourbon pretensions to the French throne, and he admitted 
the logic of Fox's reasoning. But he saw no alternative to Pitt. A Fox 
Grenville coalition would shatter on the issue of war and peace, he told 
Buckingham on the 7th, and a Fox-Sidmouth coalition would pursue peace 
and ruin the country.^ Fox was immobilized by these doubts, and his dif 
ficulty in controlling his own party increased hourly. On the 10th he 
stressed to Grey that Austerlitz rendered an attack on Pitt unnecessary 
because the Burkians and Grenvillites had abandoned the idea of con­
tinental campaigns. This fact guaranteed political coalition, he argued 
Grenville only needed time to admit the error of his ways. Above all» 
hollow attacks on Pitt were to be avoided because they would only dis­
grace and infuriate Grenville.* 23
During January Fox pressed these views on his unhappy lieutenants 
at the Whig Club, at Brooks's, and at St. Anne's Hill. Finally, on 12 
January, he met with Tom Grenville and conceded that, however much he 
condemned the origin and conduct of the war, he considered that the
^T. Grenville to Buckingham, 6 Jan. 1806, ibid. , IV, 5-6.
2Grenville to Buckingham, 6, 7 Jan. 1806, ibid., IV, 5, 8-10.
3Fox to Grey, 10 Jan. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 47565 (Fox).
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interests and honour of Great Britain now required that it should be 
pursued with vigour and that all engagements with foreign allies should 
be strictly observed.^ This concession was hollow at the moment it was 
made because Fox felt that Austerlitz had opened the door for a European 
settlement which Great Britain could not ignore. In spite of reluctance 
on the issues of peace and continental alliance Grenville gave way. Fox, 
Windham, and Tom Grenville had actually agreed on a strong resolution of 
censure when Pitt died on 23 January.
tao sigu  
ûlst'irv -
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 12 Jan. 1806 (Spencer). T. Grenville to 
Buckingham, 12 Jan. 1806, Court and Cabinets, IV, 10-12.
CHAPTER II
FOX AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 
FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER, 1806
The defeat of the Third Coalition and the death of Pitt signalled 
the political triumph of Fox. Though the rump of Pitt's old party re­
tained the support, if not the confidence, of a majority in the Commons, 
without Pitt it was unable to meet the attack of the coalition which had 
been raised against it in Parliament. The Pittite leadership thought that 
it would be foolish to go on, and the king, faute de mleux, summoned 
Grenville in early February 1806, and this time raised no objection to 
Fox. Thus was born the Ministry of All the Talents, a collection of hawks 
and doves which would hold office for little more than a year. Fox was to 
live only until September; this fact would profoundly influence the poli­
cies of the government and the character of the Foxite party.^
Fox's first priority was the consolidation of Whig power under his 
banner. In agreeing to coalesce with Grenville, he undoubtedly put great 
stock in the fact that the old Pittite's parliamentary strength lay in 
the Lords, and that Grenville was willing to leave the affairs of the 
lower house in the hands of the Foxites.^ Fox looked to Petty, a young 
man whom he greatly admired, as his eventual successor in the Commons,
4he Ministry of All the Talents has been virtually ignored by 
recent historians. A. D. Harvey has outlined, though most inadequately, 
the accomplishments of the ministry in 'The Ministry of All the Talents: 
The Whigs in Office, February 1806 to March 1807', The Historical Journal, 
XV, 4 <1972), pp. 619-48.
^Grenville to W. Wickham, 24 Mar. 1806 (Wickham). For Grenville's 
views on the Lords see Grenville to T. Grenville, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 
41853 (T. Grenville), ff. 234-35.
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and also as a symbol of Whig reunification. Supported by such powerful 
orators as Sheridan, Whitbread, and Tierney, Lansdowne's son would have 
little trouble dominating the small and aging Grenvillite party in the 
years ahead. Old Lord Grey was made an earl so as to give his son a 
more respectable title. The new Lord Itowick, whose days in the Commons 
were numbered by the age of his father, was Fox's favourite and his 
choice for the lead of the party. Though he would be outnumbered tem­
porarily by Grenville's adherents in the Lords, Howick was easily 
Grenville's superior in debate, and the age of most Grenvillite peers 
assured the Foxites of future dominance in the upper house.^ It was for 
these reasons that Fox demanded the Exchequer for Petty over the remon­
strances of Grenville, and the Admiralty for Howick.
Also paramount in his scheme was the strengthening of ties with 
Whig grandees. The desertion of Portland and Fitzwilliam in 1794 had 
left Fox largely unsupported by men of rank and influence, and the Whig 
leader was certain that union with Grenville would improve this situa­
tion. Grenvillite property holdings were immense and the family con­
trolled eight seats in Parliament. Their political connexions were 
equally imposing. In alliance with Fitzwilliam, the Grenvillites mus­
tered upwards of fifteen votes in the Lords, and as the kinsman and 
former Foreign Secretary of Pitt, Grenville could be expected to attract 
influential Pittites.
It was clear that the Grenvillite party was aristocratic in com­
position and that its political reputation promised to calm the fears 
and secure the support of the many aristocrats whom Fox had frightened 
during the previous decade. Consequently, Fox offered the odious 
Buckingham Cabinet rank, backed Fitzwilliam for the office of his
1Horner to D. Stewart, 23 Jan. 1806 (Horner).
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choice, and made a great production of offering the Duke of Devonshire 
carte blanche in the new administration. After short and astonishingly 
cordial discussion, it was agreed that Fox, Windham, and Spencer would 
be secretaries of state, Erskine Lord Chancellor, Howick First Lord of 
the Admiralty, Petty Chancellor of the Exchequer, Fitzwilliam Lord 
President of the Council, and, as a concession to the tender feelings 
of the Prince of Wales, Lord Moira Master of the Ordnance. Grenville 
nominally headed the government as First Lord of the Treasury, but Fox 
had the Foreign Office. As the strongest of the coalesced parties the 
Foxites got the lion's share of lesser offices in government. All 
things considered the Foxites had come to power on most advantageous 
terms.^
However, the demands of coalition narrowed the scope of policy. 
The views of the men with whom Fox took office were hardly consistent 
with the domestic policies he had advocated during the 1790's. Windham 
and most Grenvillites were violently opposed to parliamentary reform; 
Erskine and Sidmouth, who could soon join the government, rendered 
Catholic relief impossible; and Grenville,whose family fortune was 
largely derived from sinecures, took care to stress a policy of economy 
'not in the little things only but much more in the great features of 
our Expenditure ... ' Then, too, Grenville was a hard pill to swallow 
on any terms. Fox could not disguise the fact that his new ally had 
been responsible for most of the arbitrary policies against which the 
Foxites had protested so passionately during the final decade of the 
eighteenth century. The same was true of Fitzwilliam and Windham, both 
of whom remained true to Burkian ideology.
Grenville's defensiveness about Pitt and his policies accentuated
1Anonymous, The British Cabinet of 1806 (Liverpool, 1807).
2Grenville to Grey, 17 May 1812 (Grey), recalling his language of
1806.
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these problems. Upon coming to office, Grenville maintained that no 
good could be done unless the political animosities of the past were 
buried with his old chief. He warned of leading the country to 'great 
intestine divisions' and argued that an attack on past policies would 
reopen 'questions on which we should have differed in opposition, and 
during Pitt's life, and on which therefore there is no chance that we 
could agree now.' Grenville feared Fox's party and made it clear that 
he was prepared to resign if his allies could not show restraint."*’
This was a realistic stance and Fox knew it. The government was there­
fore formed upon a rigid agreement 'to administer the affairs of the 
country without retrospect to former differences ...' Well might the 
Foxite William Strickland have noted that the coalition was 'devoid of 
any union of sentiment or principles' and 'replete with more political 
depravity than any struggle for power I have witnessed in my llfe'.^
But older men had seen it before. Above all else, the Ministry of All 
the Talents represented an attempt to overcome deeply entrenched poli­
tical and personal animosities by the same tactics which had formed the 
Fox-North coalition of 1783. Fox was well aware of the challenge; he 
was betting that his reputation and his accomplishments in office could 
overcome the effect of his tactics in getting there.
^Grenville to Fox, 19 April 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 107-08. 
Grenville to T. Grenville, 24 Jan 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. 
Grenville).
^Grenville to Windham, 4 June 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 174. 
Lady Bessborough to Ld. Granville Leveson Gower, 10 May 1806, Castalia, 
Countess Granville, ed., Lord Granville Leveson Gower Private 
Correspondence, 1781 to 1821 (London, 1916), II, 195-97, Memoirs of 
Sir Samuel Romilly, ed. by his son (London, 1840), II, 255-56.
3Dinwiddy, Wyvill and Reform, p. 13. Perry would not admit 
that the union of Fox and Grenville was a coalition. Ivon Asquith, 
'.James Perry and the Morning Chronicle, 1790-1821', unpublished 
University of London PhD. thesis, 1973, p. 187.
Upon entering the Foreign Office, Fox's political priorities 
were quite similar to those which he had voiced during the early stages 
of the French Revolution. He was displeased with the war because he 
felt that the spirit in which England had entered and pursued it was 
contrary to international law, the inalienable rights of man, and, most 
importantly, Whig interests. He remained convinced that Pitt's system 
of goading the 'lifeless despots' of Europe to war against the national 
zeal of France only enhanced French power; he was sure that Pitt's re­
fusal to recognize the natural course of events in France promised war 
without end; he felt that the personal hatred of Napoleon which had led 
to an uncompromising stance in past negotiations for peace had only 
strengthened and corrupted the French Emperor and disgraced Britain in 
the eyes of the world; and he had been borne out in his prediction that 
such a war would subvert English liberties. Fox saw the war as an in­
terruption of the natural growth of the constitution; so long as it 
raged on the terms to which Pitt's foreign policy had committed England 
liberality, toleration, and improvement were impossible. For this rea­
son Catholic relief and reform were politically inexpedient and there­
fore should be delayed until the source of Britain's woes- the war- 
had been ended. Accordingly, Fox pressed moderation on the
reforming element of his party^ and, over the strong protests of even 
his adoring nephew, told Catholic leaders that they must 'decide between 
a friendly ministry without immediate discussion of their claims, or an
■^ Fox pointed to peace as a prerequisite to reform in a letter 
to Wyvill and in turn Wyvill outlined this view in a letter to Lofft. 




immediate discussion of their claims with a hostile ministry.'1
Fox had seen at last that office, political respectability, and 
a united Whig party freed from the shackles which the war had placed on 
it alone could promote his ideas. Though Austerlitz had greatly increased 
the power of France , Trafalgar had hardly weakened Great Britain, 
and Fox was confident of peace. But whether war or peace was to be the 
policy of his government, he was determined to erase the guidelines of 
Pitt's foreign politics, to force Napoleon to stand on his own merits 
as a ruler whether in harmony or discord with Britain, to pursue either 
course with vigour towards a clearly defined object, and thus to re­
store constitutional balance to his country. These views had repre­
sented the covenant of Fox's political creed between 1792 and 1794; as 
Foreign Secretary in 1806, he would devote his every waking moment to 
their fulfilment.
On 18 January William Cobbett stressed to his readers that 'The 
questions of peace and war are now questions entirely new, to be dis­
cussed with reference to a set of circumstances entirely new.'^ This 
was undeniable. By late January when Fox, Grenville, and Windham began 
to discuss seriously the structure of their government's foreign poli­
tics, news from the Continent had confirmed disasters which were unpre­
cedented. Austerlitz on 2 December had been followed immediately by
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1,213. Also see George 
Pellew, ed., The Life and Correspondence of the Right Ilonble Henry 
Addington (London, 1847), II, 435-36. There is reason to believe that 
Fox was reluctant to delay the Catholic question. He told Windham that 
the Catholic cause had been the only reason he had returned to 
Parliament in 1802. This testimony, however, conflicts with his state­
ment of motives of November 1802, in which he pointed to nothing but 
the cause of peace. Fox to Windham, n.d. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 37843 
(Windham), ff. 241-42. Fox to Duchess of Devonshire, 1 Nov. 1802, Earl 
of Bessborough, ed., Georgiana: Extracts From the Correspondence of 
Georgians, Duchess of Devonshire (London, 1955), p. 254.
^Political Register, II, 96.
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the retreat of the Russian Emperor, and the Treaty of Vienna between 
France and Prussia on 15 December and that of Pressburg between France 
and Austria on 28 December had laid Europe at Napoleon's feet. Pitt's 
lavish war expenditure had strained Britain's national credit; his recent 
policies towards the United States threatened an interruption of trade if 
not war; and his Irish policies had brought the Act of Union under attack 
to such an extent that rebellion was inevitable and French invasion pos­
sible. In this situation British relations with the Continent were non­
existent, and Englishmen looked with anxiety to the coasts of Ireland 
and Kent whereas a year before they had focused their attention on the 
Danube. Fox's bargaining power at home was therefore greater than even 
he had anticipated, and in the conferences of late January and early 
February he got his way.
As Fox had hoped, events in Europe had settled the question of 
continental alliance, and Grenville was emphatic in calling for a hus­
banding, defensive system. 'To waste our means when others would not 
use theirs I thought both Quixotism & folly', he recalled at a later 
day.'*' Consequently, Fox had little difficulty in pushing his European 
views through the Cabinet. It was agreed that Pitt's system of conti­
nental subsidy would be abandoned altogether, 'unless any particular 
nation was fighting out of its own territory for a common object in com­
bination with our own & other states; but not to take upon ourselves the 
whole burthen of defending any state.' Britain would not bribe or 
encourage a power to make war; in accordance with Fox's views of the 
1790's, France would be allowed to dominate Europe so long as a lack of 
national spirit in Austria, Russia, and Prussia allowed her to do so.
^-Grenville to C. W. W. Wynn, 16 Oct. 1813 (Wynn).
^Erskine to Spencer, 8 Jan. [1809] (Spencer), recalling the agree­
ment of 1806.
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The British Minister at Vienna was cautioned that his country was pre­
pared to follow, but that she would no longer lead. The quarrel and 
the cause had to be Austrian, 'and if she were not, from a sense of her 
own wrongs and dangers, prepared to make a national war against France, 
it was neither our interest nor our wish to engage her in hostilities.'^
This shift in policy was accompanied by a new stance on potential 
negotiations for peace. Though Fox admitted that circumstances rendered 
a British offer of negotiation unwise, he succeeded in holding the door 
open. Grenville and Windham accepted the argument that an honourable 
peace would facilitate a plan of reorganization, retrenchment, and re­
building, and it was agreed to secure the country 'by Peace if Peace be 
practicable, & if not by strictly defensive war, & by economy ...'" 
Grenville envisaged a buildup of British strength in the Mediterranean; 
Windham toyed with plans for the expansion of British trade; Spencer 
placed emphasis on a policy of increasing British naval superiority; and 
all were agreed that conciliation and appeasement should be practiced in 
Ireland and in relations with neutral nations, especially the United 
States, whose prosperity was 'Britain's own'. These policies were to be 
complemented by efforts to sooth political and religious animosities at 
home. Plans were also formulated for a long-range system of wartime fi­
nance and a reorganization of army recruitment. Generally, the Cabinet 
was willing to accept Austerlitz and to capitalize on Trafalgar, to with­
draw from a continent which offered nothing, and to assure British secu­
rity and prosperity by consolidating the strength of the British Empire.
Though Fox enjoyed a tactical victory in 1806, the Cabinet was
Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II, 95. See also, Holland to 
Adair, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 51609 (Holland), ff. 29-32.
^Grenville to Grey, 17 May 1812 (Grey).
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by no means unanimous in its view of the ultimate goal of the war.
Most of Fox's closest friends were prepared to accept Napoleon's sover­
eignty in France and desired a lasting peace on that basis. Thanet pro­
bably summed up the feelings of many Foxites when he applauded the new 
system and quipped that if the war could be made purely defensive, 'the 
people might grow tired of it - for the losses would remain without the 
victories This was far removed from the ideas of Pitt's old
supporters. Windham and Fitzwilliam gave way to Fox only because there 
was no alternative, and both of them continued to see Napoleon as a 
usurper whose destruction was prerequisite to European stability. 
Moreover, though Fox gained Grenville's endorsement for a policy of 
peace with honour and the abandonment of continental alliances, he 
never convinced him to repudiate the goal of Pittite foreign policy: 
the overthrow of Napoleon and a return to the European balance of 1789.
As the old Pittite noted later, 'we wished to reserve our exertions for 
that period which we were confident must arrive when the insolence of 
France would unite against Her all the Powers by whose disunion alone 
she had triumphed.' Fox got his way on wartime tactics, but the funda­
mental differences of the past were dodged altogether. As Grenville re­
called, ' the most distinct reserve was expressed on both sides as to 
former opinions to which we still adhered respecting past transactions.'2
Fox was aware of this fundamental disagreement, and he found the 
division of the Cabinet between Pitt's old supporters (Grenville,
Windham, Spencer, and Fitzwilliam) and those upon whom he could depend to 
echo his views in foreign affairs (Howick, Erskine, Petty and himself) 
unsatisfactory, for though Moira leaned towards the Foxites, he was a
■''Brougham to Roscoe, n.d. (Roscoe), 455.
^Grenville to Grey, 21 Oct. and 24 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
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military man who could not be trusted. Fox therefore backed the in­
clusion of Sidmouth. This stance, though unprincipled in the eyes of 
both contemporaries and posterity, was sound. Fox had never disagreed 
with Sidmouth's view of foreign relations, and in 1804 he had restricted 
his criticism to charges of mismanagement. Both men agreed that 
Britain's adherence to justice was her greatest strength, and Sidmouth's 
administration, with its policies of peace, retrenchment, home defence, 
and conciliation of neutrals, had been almost identical to the scheme 
which Fox proposed for his own ministry.^ There were other reasons for 
Sidmouth's inclusion. Both Fox and Grenville feared the king and were 
eager to disarm him by bringing either the Sidmouths or the Pittites in­
to the government. Faced with a choice between the two parties, even 
Grenville favoured the former.2 Not only were several of Sidmouth's 
supporters competent administrators who would be content with minor 
office, but also the party was far more compact and manageable than 
that of Pitt. For these reasons Fox and Grenville defied the preju­
dices of practically every one of their supporters in bringing Sidmouth 
and his friend Lord Ellenborough into the Cabinet as Privy Seal and 
Lord Chief Justice respectively, the latter being a flagrantly uncon­
stitutional breach of the independence of the judiciary. This exposed 
the ministry to a torrent of abuse,^ but the addition of Sidmouth and 
Ellenborough gave Fox the mobility he needed in the field of foreign
^This opinion is Holland's. Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party,
I, 210.
2Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 24 Feb. 1806, Grttn.ville 
Correspondence, II, 179-81.
2John Allen Journal, entry of 3 Feb. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 
52204A-I.
^For example, see T. Grenville to Spencer, 7 Feb. 1806 (Spencer).
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affairs. 'It will stop up all the earths', he confided to Holland.^
Fox found the Foreign Office in sad disarray. Auckland, a 
Grenvillite who was bound for the Board of Trade, noted that the diplo­
matic papers of Pitt's government were 'more observable for what they 
omit than for what they contain.' There was no way to determine what 
part of the Austrian and Russian subsidies had been remitted, or how 
much Britain was still bound to pay. In addition, there was in the 
papers neither trace of British influence in the alliance nor allusion 
to any plan of British cooperation.2 in sorting this out, Fox was 
aided by only fifteen subordinates at the Foreign Office, and he 
was bound not to criticize Pitt's government. On the other hand, the 
continental wreck gave the new Foreign Secretary great latitude in the 
formulation of policy. Adair, who was given the legation at Vienna, was 
astonished by Fox's language when he reported to the Foreign Office for 
instructions. 'I have none to give you,' said Fox. 'Go to Vienna and 
send me yours.'J The death-like silence on the Continent gave Fox carte 
blanche in his relations with foreign powers; from the first the only 
restrictions on him came from the Cabinet and from the distrust of esta­
blished power and middle class opinion. In this position he buried him­
self in work. One of his aides noted that 'whilst light remained Fox 
never seemed tired.
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, I, 209-10.
Auckland to Grenville, 10 Feb. 1806, li.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 26-7
3George Thomas, Earl of Albemarle, Fifty Years of My Life (London 
1876), I, 228-29. This is the more surprising when one considers that 
Fox regarded Austria as a natural ally, and as the key to the establish­
ment of the balance of power. Holland to Adair, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 
51609 (Holland), ff. 29-32.
^D. M. Stuart, Dearest Bess (London, 1955), p. 138.
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With European diplomacy at a standstill, Fox's initial efforts 
went towards relaxing the alarming tensions in Anglo-American relations. 
Prior to 1805 British commercial regulations had been aimed at prevent­
ing only direct intercourse between enemy colonies and their mother 
country, and Sir William Scott’s exposition of the law, which created 
'neutralization' through the 'broken voyage' doctrine, had protected 
America's lucrative carrying trade. But even Scott's liberal regula­
tions were evaded often enough to raise a furore in Britain, and these 
evasions led, in the spring of 1805, to an alteration in the practice 
of British law courts which damaged American trade greatly. In the case 
of the American ship Essex, the Prize Appeal Court of the Privy Council 
declared the vessel and its cargo forfeited, in spite of the fact that 
the ship had complied with established procedure. The precedent was 
adopted quickly by two others on the Admiralty Court, and the 'broken 
voyage' doctrine was therefore superaeded.^
This new interpretation was not accepted gracefully in the United 
States. It joined with the already present indignation fostered by the 
British practice of impressing American seamen on the high seas to 
arouse a great deal of popular feeling, and this led eventually to an 
embargo of British imports. In Britain, the economist James Stephen 
fanned the fire of national self-righteousness with the publication on 
Trafalgar Day of his book, War in Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral 
Flags, a bitter but brilliant denunciation of American pretensions. In 
its struggle for political survival Pitt's government had increased this 
resentment. Young Pittite orators such as Canning, Perceval, and
Castlereagh had made political capital with blistering, patriotic
________.1 : , i h >v -l-.-
^Eli Hecksher, The Continental System (Gloucester, Hass., 1964), 
pp. 105-08.
invective which appealed to the prejudices of country gentlemen and 
high tories, and the editorials of Daniel Stuart, the editor of the 
Courier, had given these feelings what was considered generally as 
government approval. In January 1806 Anglo-American relations were at 
their lowest point since the trying days before the Jay Treaty of 1794.*
The new government found this situation intolerable. Fox had 
always stressed the importance of a firm Anglo-American bond, Sidmouth's 
ministry had acted on the same principle, and Grenville had proved in 
the past that he was capable of suppressing his disdain for republi­
canism in order to conciliate a nation which he regarded as an exclu­
sively British market. 'With the friendship of America,' wrote the 
Prime Minister, 'we might rest a husbanding & defensive system on the 
basis of an extensive Commerce, & so might still survive the storm - 
Without such a resource what hope have we?'2 with a semblance of unity 
in the Cabinet, Fox turned towards the west enthusiastically.
On 25 February James Monroe, the American Minister in London, ap­
pealed to Fox to 'heal the wound' caused by differences about impressment, 
neutral rights, and ill-defined boundaries. In a series of meetings over 
the next month the American was delighted to find the Foreign Secretary 
willing to discuss these problems without reserve. Simultaneously 
Auckland advocated an adjustment of the Navigation Laws to allow a 
'natural' commercial intercourse between the British West Indies and 
the United States. Inconsistency in British commercial policy in the
^Wilson H. Elkins, 'British Policy in its Relation to the 
Commerce of the United States of America From 1794 to 1807', unpublished 
Oxford University H. Phil.thesis, 1936.
^Grenville to Grey, 23 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
"^Monroe to Fox, 25 Feb. and 31 Mar. 1806, P.R.O., F.O. 5/51. 
Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 
1805-1812 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), p. 103. Grenville to 
Auckland, 4 Mar. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 47-8.
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West Indies long had been a sore point in Anglo-American relations.
The Navigation Laws forbade all trade in foreign bottoms to British 
colonies, but from 1788, when British statesmen first admitted that 
American shipping was necessary to supply the West Indies, colonial 
governors had been authorized to admit American ships whenever they 
felt that English bottoms could not handle the load. This arrangement 
had obvious disadvantages. Corruption and the inability of honest 
governors to control the cheaper American shipping made the Indies a 
virtual American monopoly. In such circumstances, some governors, who 
apparently felt endangered by the inconsistencies of English law, found 
it safer to exclude Americans altogether, and this policy infuriated 
the Americans. Convinced that in time of war British shipping could 
not be depended on to supply the colonies regularly, Auckland and Fox 
saw a way both to concede a point to America as a display of goodwill 
and to reform a situation which experience had proved to be disadvantageous. 
Their solution was the American Intercourse Bill. By early March the 
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade were moving unmistakably towards 
concessions to the United States.
This drift met with immediate resistance. Grenville remained 
very uneasy about abandoning the Foreign Office to Fox and on 18 
February he horrified Auckland with unbending language on American com­
mercial claims. This unexpected attack was accompanied by Windham's 
strong objection to tampering with the Navigation Laws and a judgement 
from the Admiralty Court on 14 March which refuted American claims on 
the 'broken voyage' doctrine. Auckland's remonstrances calmed Grenville 
and Windham, but the stance of the court spread alarm at the Board of 
Trade and Foreign Office. Auckland warned of a 'strong sensation'
1Parl, Deb.. VI, 593-94 (31 Mar. 1806).
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being aroused by the reaffirmation of the Essex decision and recommended 
'an immediate and very solemn consideration.' But before further dis­
cussion Sir John Nicholl, the King's Advocate, assumed the offensive on 
20 March by defending the Essex decision in a memorandum to the Board of 
Trade. At this point it became obvious to Fox and Auckland that the 
Admiralty Court stood between them and rapprochement with the United 
States. They accepted the challenge. After a Cabinet meeting of 31 
March Auckland, in a burst of praise for the United States, brought the 
American Intercourse Bill before the Lords. Essentially, it proposed 
the transfer of the colonial governors' discretionary power to the seat 
of government in London. It was the first step in the ministry's ef­
fort to relax tensions with the United States.'*'
The bill was greeted by a storm of hostility. Public opinion, 
especially among the mercantile community, was adamantly opposed to the 
measure. Lord Hawkesbury protested solemnly that it was the first at­
tempt to relax the Navigation Laws by a legislative act, and the right 
wing of the opposition rose up in arms. Castlereagh, Perceval, and 
Canning trumpeted Hawkesbury's views in the Commons and objected strongly 
to any unsolicited attempt to appease the United States. Lord Sheffield, 
a government supporter whom Fox was on the verge of appointing as his 
new minister to the United States, declared open opposition to the bill 
and it was reported that he was running about town with 'a long string 
of about thirty motions This resistance only hardened the re­
solve of ministers. Auckland represented the American question as 'the
^Grenville to Auckland, 18 Feb. 1806 and Auckland to Grenville,
15 Mar. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 36-37, 57-58. Perkins, Prologue 
to War, pp. 83-4.
^Parl. Deb., VI, 1038; VII, 339, 725-26. Auckland to Grenville,
23 April 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 112-13.
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most important of the moment' and on 9 April he called for concessions 
'as soon as possible, in the form of an avowed suspension of the gene­
ral [commercial] system Fox agreed perfectly. On 20 April
Erskine told the! Speaker that Fox regarded the judgements of the 
Admiralty Court as mischievous, and that the Foreign Secretary was con­
vinced 'that America must be made our friend . ..'^ Encouraged by 
» .Auckland and *nfuriated by the opposition s advocacy of mercantilist 
commercial theory, Grenville supported Fox vigorously.
Notwithstanding this resolution, the government backed away from 
an open conflict with both the courts and public opinion, and discussion 
centred around compromise in the Cabinet meetings of early May. Serious 
consideration was given to a scheme of establishing British consular 
tribunals in American ports before whom merchants could establish the 
legality of their cargoes, but it was dropped for fear of alienating 
the American government further. Finally, Fox and Auckland agreed on a 
plan of manoeuvre. On 16 May a strongly worded Order in Council de­
clared a blockade of the entire northern coast of Europe from Brest to 
the Elbe but concluded meekly that it would be enforced rigidly only 
from the Seine to . Ostend. Thus the ministry attempted to reassure 
Englishmen that the war was to be fought with vigour while at the same 
time delivering an open invitation to American merchants to visit enemy 
ports if they did not carry contraband or goods owned by the enemy, and 
if they neither came from nor were bound for other enemy ports.
Grenville had doubts about the legality of such a sweeping, 'paper' 
blockade, and Nicholl, who was not amused by the manoeuvre, wrote
^Auckland to Grenville, 7 and 9 April 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore,
VIII, 85, 87-88.
OCharles, Lord Colchester, ed., The Diary and Correspondence of 
Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester (London, 1§M), II, 51.
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Auckland a terse letter which outlined the frauds of the neutral flags.-* 
But the primary objective of government had been achieved. 'On a first 
view it appears to me highly expedient & useful - affording indeed the 
only satisfactory solution I have yet heard proposed', wrote Grenville. 
'With respect to America ... you will see that you open to her for the 
carriage of Colonial produce (whether Enemy's or not, for after actual 
importation into the U.S. they are indistinguishable) not only the 
ports of the Atlantic & Mediterr’n but also those of Holland 6 Flanders - 
& I think in the present state of commerce it will be right to do so.'"*
In effect, the government had weakened the effects of the Essex deci­
sion without arousing the fears of public opinion.'* Perplexed, Monroe 
reported to his government that the blockade 'imposed the suspension 
desired, but in a manner wh. seemed as if it intended to mask the ob­
ject from view!.^
By early June Fox had succeeded in bolstering his position at 
home to such an extent that he could meet the Americans on comparatively 
favourable ground. The American Intercourse Bill was progressing 
smoothly and in no danger of defeat in Parliament; the neutral question 
had been placed in a proper perspective; impressment had been put under 
tighter control largely because British commanders were uncertain of 
Fox's views; and, owing greatly to the efforts of Auckland, the Cabinet
^Grenville to Auckland, 9 May 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 138. 
Auckland to Howick, 3 May 1806 (Grey). Nicholl to Auckland, 9 May 
1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 34456 (Auckland).
2Grenville to Auckland, n.d. [May 1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland), ff. 194-95. Also see Auckland to Grenville, 31 May 1806, 
H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 164-65.
A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution 
and Empire, 1793-1812 (London, 1893), II, 269-70. Also see Ilecksher,
The Continental System, pp. 105-08.
^Perkins, Prologue to War, p. 106.
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was united behind the Foreign Secretary. The spirit of Fox's govern­
ment had not gone unnoticed in the United States. Monroe's despatches 
to Washington had been optimistic, and in May Jefferson had described 
Fox as one in whom he had 'more confidence than any man in England.'^ 
Both governments looked forward to fruitful negotiation. In Britain,
Fox found Selkirk's views on the neutral question incompatible with his 
plans, vetoed his appointment as minister to Washington, and sent in 
his stead young David Erskine, the Lord Chancellor's son, whose con­
nexions, habits,and political views were consistent with a policy of 
conciliation. From the United States came a fellow negotiator for 
Monroe: the Federalist William Pinckney who had played an important 
role in the Jay Treaty twelve years before. When Fox fell ill in late 
June, he was preparing a revolution in Anglo-American relations.
These developments were paralleled by a new approach to continen­
tal affairs. On 20 February, shortly after the initial conferences 
with Monroe, Fox was approached at the Foreign Office by a Frenchman 
who proposed the assassination of Napoleon. After deliberation, Fox 
confined the would-be assassin and sounded the Cabinet on the propriety 
of reporting the matter to the French Government. This curious pro­
posal surprisingly met with no opposition and Fox promptly communicated 
the plot to Talleyrand in most cordial terms. This opened correspond­
ence of a pacific nature between the two ministers. Talleyrand sent 
Fox a copy of the French official gazette in which Napoleon expressed a 
wish to make peace with Great Britain on the basis of the Treaty of 
Amiens, and the British reply, which had the endorsement of the Cabinet,
^■Jefferson to Monroe, 4 May 1806, Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert 
E. Bergh, eds., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, 1903-04), 
XII, pp. 4-5. Also see Russell King to Sir Francis Baring, 30 Sept. 
1806, enclosed in Baring to Howick, 30 Nov. 1806 (Grey).
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gave assurances of a desire to negotiate for peace, but only in concert 
with the Russian Emperor.^
It appears that these preliminaries produced no disagreement in 
the Cabinet. Though Fox's cordiality had opened the correspondence, 
talk of peace had come first from Talleyrand and neither Grenville nor 
Windham was prepared to thwart the Foreign Secretary. This was not the 
case with the king. The uu-Hv. Talleyrand raised the
ire of George III. 'His reply,' Fox told Grenville on 8 March, 'is as 
unpleasant as p o s s i b l e . B u t  Fox's blood was up and throughout March 
he laboured to unite the Cabinet behind him. In this the compromises 
on foreign policy upon which the ministry had been launched proved in­
valuable. An honourable peace in no way threatened British security; 
indeed, peace would facilitate a system of retrenchment and home de­
fence! Above all, Great Britain could not appear altogether averse to 
peace. These were points upon which Fox would not bend and he made it 
clear that he would resign if he did not get his way.
All this got results. Auckland told Grenville t h a t l o r e f W t a  S 
Comiftuvn seemed 'to reduce our speculations to the possibility of an in­
secure and expensive peace, on the ground of a mutual retention of con­
quests', and Tom Grenville argued that if peace could be made 'without 
present loss, I do not know that in abstaining from war, we lose upon 
the whole, any such advantage as justifies the cost and risk of it.'-* 235 
As in December and January, Fox carried his argument by pointing to the
^H.M.C. Dropmore, VII, xx. Butterfield, Charles James Fox and 
Napoleon, p. 6.
2Fox to Grenville, 8 Mar. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 50.
3Auckland to Grenville, 9 April 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 87.
T. Grenville to Buckingham, 15 July 1806, Buckingham, Court and
Cabinets, IV, 49.
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effects of Austerlitz and by appealing to the warlike prejudices'; of 
his new allies. 'My opinion of our prospects in War', wrote Grenville 
at a later date, 'is such that I should most cordially rejoice in the 
conclusion of a truce (for such of course it could alone be considered) 
that would give us a little breathing time & a chance of events to im­
prove a state of things that hardly could be made worse.Windham, 
Fitzwilliam, and Spencer gave a silent nod to this logic, and though 
there was considerable disparity of motive, the Cabinet again presented 
a united front by 23 March.* 2 On the 26th the king was assured that the 
principal object in opening negotiations was, on the one hand, 'to 
guard your Majesty's Government from the imputation, which the enemy 
endeavours to cast upon it, of being averse to peace on any terms; and 
on the other to shew that, in discussing that important subject, your 
Majesty will never be forgetful of the dignity of your Majesty's crown, 
of the honour and interests of your Majesty's allies, or of the general 
welfare of Europe,^ This language hardly expressed Fox's motives, but 
it opened doors for him. The king yielded to the unanimous advice of 
the Cabinet after it had become a question of his acquiescence or their 
resignation.
News of these developments aroused the deepest fears of British 
public opinion. Fox's language of the 1790's had branded him a paci­
fist, if not a traitor, and this reputation formed his greatest stigma 
upon coming to office. He was crippled by it in the early stages of 
the American negotiation, and he was forced to calm fears by his
■'■Grenville to T. Grenville, 18 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 
(T. Grenville).
2Fox to Grenville, 23 Mar. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 63-4.
■^Cabinet minute by Grenville, 24 Mar. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, 
VIII, 65-66.
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strongly-worded blockading decree of 16 May. He faced the same problem 
in opening negotiations with France, but this time, suspicion came from 
the king and Cabinet as well as from the public. Here the folly of 
Prussia allowed him to assert his virility. On 15 February Napoleon 
had forced Prussia into a defensive alliance through the Treaty of Paris, 
an agreement which guaranteed future Anglo-Prussian discord by closing 
the North Sea ports to British commerce and by ceding Hanover to King 
Frederick William. Though the Prussians represented these arrangements 
to the British Government as a sacrifice made for the patriotic purpose 
of excluding the French from north Germany and assured London that they 
were taken under compulsion, that they were contrary to the wishes of 
the king, and that they were quite temporary in nature, Fox showed un­
characteristic hostility.
On 5 April William Wilberforce visited the Foreign Secretary and 
noted that he appeared to be 'rather yielding to Grenville's foreign 
politics against peace'.1 Fox refused to listen to the perfectly under­
standable Prussian pleas, and he called for an immediate declaration of 
war. Before the Commons on 23 April he argued that by a declaration of 
war government could 'avoid the giving our sanction to that principle 
which has been lately adopted, of transferring the subjects of one 
prince to another, in the way of equivalents, and under the pretext of 
convenience and mutual accommodation'.2 He urged the Czar to punish 
Prussian bad faith by annexing Prussian Poland; he represented Hanover 
as being as dear to British hearts as Hampshire; and after the block­
ading decree of 16 May, British squadrons blockaded the mouths of the
1Robert Isaac Wilberforce and Samuel Wilberforce, The Life of 
William Wilberforce (London, 1838), III, 267.
2Parl. Deb., VI, 886-93.
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Ems, Elbe, and Weser and captured 250 merchant vessels.
This behaviour was startling to those who looked on Fox as a man 
of peace and as a perpetual enemy of the king, and many Foxites were 
sadly disappointed. 'Plumb down he drops ten thousand fathoms deep', 
wrote one of his aides at the Foreign Office. 'Had he hunted for a 
place or a pension, he could not have taken up the defence of Hanover 
with more zeal ... or loaded his gracious sovereign with greater pro­
fessions of attachment, and what did he gain by it? To be suspected, 
if not convicted, of insincerity by every man of sense and spirit in the 
kingdom.'1 There was much truth in this. Though Fox's language against 
the system of annexation was true to past views, his defence of Hanover 
and his sycophantic tributes to the king alarmed men like Coke, Francis, 
Sheridan, and even Ilowick. Then, too, though the loss of Hanover and 
the closure of Prussian ports demanded strong protest, the circumstances 
behind these events hardly called for so violent a reaction. The ex­
planation lies in Fox's precarious position at the Foreign Office and in 
the priorities of his foreign policy. His speech on Prussia quickly be­
came the talk of society and it strengthened the ministry in public 
opinion. It disarmed parliamentary opponents; it soothed the injured 
feelings of the king; and it delighted the war faction in the Cabinet. 
Windham went from house to house expressing great satisfaction with 
Fox's 'war whoop' and even Buckingham caught the infection. But above 
all else, it strengthened Fox's position for negotiations with France, 
both at home and in the Tuileries.
Meanwhile, the British refusal to negotiate for peace without 
the concert of Russia had produced a hitch at Paris. Justifiably, 
Talleyrand had pointed out in early April that his government could
•^Francis Memoirs, II, 444.
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not prevent Britain from making alliances against it, but at the same 
time that Britain could not expect Napoleon to assist her in holding 
such combinations together. This stance had threatened to end the nego­
tiation before it began because Grenville and Windham demanded Russian 
cooperation. However, in late April, before his speech on Prussia, Fox 
was both astonished and delighted to learn that Russia was involved in 
separate negotiations with France.'*' The Russian Chancellor was pursu­
ing a policy of pacification independently of Great Britain for he 
feared French designs on the Ottoman Empire. He had developed counter­
plans which called for the establishment of a powerful, independent 
Balkan state under Russian protection to provide a barrier against 
French expansion. Paramount in this scheme was peace, or at least a 
truce with Napoleon, and the Russians were prepared to recognize French 
conquests to attain it, with or without Britain. However, by mid-May 
common interest had led to a semblance of Anglo-Russian accord, and the 
British Minister at St. Petersburg was informed that the Czar aimed at 
the independence of Naples and at the exclusion of the French from 
Istria, Albania, and Dalmatia. Uninspired by these objectives, Fox 
left the task of securing them to Russia, but found common ground on 
Sicily, the independence of which the two governments agreed to demand 
in negotiations with France.2 In response to the Emperor Francis’s 
appeal, in early June the Russian Chancellor sent d'Oubril to Vienna to 
discuss the whole question with the Austria Government. Meanwhile in 
Britain Fox studied these developments with interest and continued his
^Talleyrand to Fox, 16 April, and Fox to Talleyrand, 20 April 
1806, F.O. 27/72.
2Ld. G. L. Gower to Fox, 17 May, 19 June 1806, F.O. 65/65. For 
Grenville's emphasis on Sicily see Grenville to Windham, 12 April1806, 
H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 96-97.
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warlike harangue against Prussia.^
At this point Talleyrand took the initiative. Improved relations 
had enabled Fox to obtain indulgences for British subjects detained as 
political prisoners in various depots throughout France. Among these 
was Lord Yarmouth, a close friend of the Prince of Wales and an old 
drinking and gaming colleague of Fox. Early in June Talleyrand sent 
this nobleman on a secret mission to London. Upon reaching the Foreign 
Office, Yarmouth reported enthusiastically that France had reconsidered 
and was ready to break her long silence. Not only was she prepared to 
begin joint negotiations with Britain and Russia; she also offered
Hanover, expressed no desire for Sicily, and proposed what Fox and
2Grenville understood to be a basis of uti posseditis. Of course, this 
offer was as unofficial as it was unbelievable and Lady Holland noted
Othat 'much doubt was entertained of [Yarmouth's] accuracy in reporting.'J 
But it could not be ignored. Undoubtedly Fox realized that the diplo­
matic situation was unique and that fruitful negotiation hinged on per­
sonal as well as diplomatic finesse. At his insistence the Cabinet ac­
cepted the proposal immediately. Yarmouth, who had no diplomatic train­
ing or experience, who was personally unfit for the task, but whom Fox 
knew to be on friendly terms with Talleyrand and anxious for peace, was 
returned to Paris authorized to discuss informally terms of peace on the 
basis apparently offered. Though Yarmouth was instructed to consider 
nothing without the cooperation of Russia, Grenville's other ideas were 
overridden and not one word was said of obtaining a written avowal
■'■Fox to Adair, June 1806, F.O. 7/80.
2Communications made by Yarmouth to Fox, 13 June 1806, F.O.
27/72, printed in Pari. Deb., VIII, 109-10.
3Lady Holland Journal, II, 164.
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of the basis of negotiation.
As soon as Yarmouth returned to Paris, Talleyrand demanded Sicily 
(pretending to have discovered its importance only recently) and offered 
the Hanseatic towns as compensation for the Sicilian monarch.“ This develop 
ment had an enormous impact on the British Cabinet. Prior to receiv­
ing Yarmouth’s despatch of 1 July, Fox had been plagued by the reluc­
tance of his political allies. Though his pleas for peace negotiations 
had gained the tacit approval of men like Grenville, his brother Tom, 
Windham, and Fitzwilliam, they had approved only reluctantly, and 
Grenvillite peers had not concealed their distrust. Stiff opposition 
had come from Grenville’s own family. Buckingham's Bourbon sympathies 
had led him to threaten a political separation and Temple had predicted 
'the probable ruin of the County, & the complete & certain destruction 
of the objects & interests of our family.'-*
This pressure had led Grenville to advocate policies which re­
sisted the spirit in which Fox wished to enter the negotiations. On 22 
June, when there was every reason for optimism, Grenville had insisted 
on pushing uti posseditis to its very limit by including Spain; he had 
stressed British responsibilities to Russia after it was clear that the 
Czar had proceeded without consultation with Britain; and he had advo­
cated garrisoning Sicily and placing Sardinia under British protection 
so as to 'make all these islands in the Mediterranean an important 
chain of stations highly useful to us in war and c o m m e r ce . O n ly  the *3
■^Grenville to Howick, 3 Jan. 1807 (Grey).
^Yarmouth to Fox, 1 July 1806, F.O. 27/72, printed in Pari. Deb.,
VIII , 114.
3Buckingham to Grenville, 29 June 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII,
208-09. Buckingham to Temple, 26 June 1806, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 36-37. Temple to T. Grenville, 10 May 1.806, B.M., Add.
MSS. 41854 (T. Grenville).
^Grenville to Fox, 22 June 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 195-96.
warlike stance towards Prussia, the reported liberality of the French 
Government, and the desire of Windham and Fitzwilliam to cooperate with 
the Foreign Secretary had given Fox latitude. But at a moment when 
Talleyrand's diplomacy signalled the opening of serious negotiations 
Fox fell so violently ill that he was put to bed at St. Anne's Hill.
The character of the French negotiation changed overnight. Concurrently, 
the developing entente with the United States lost its momentum as 
Monroe and Pinckney found only confusion in Downing Street. After 1 
July the Foreign Office was adrift.
Though diplomatic correspondence continued to be carried on in 
Fox's name, Grenville moved quickly to the position of de facto leader 
in foreign affairs. On 4 July Fox's proxy assured Cabinet unanimity by 
endorsing Grenville's plan which called for the despatch of 6,000 
troops to Sicily and instructed Yarmouth to 'recall the French Govern­
ment to the basis on which alone the negotiation was opened, in which 
Sicily was by express deliberation included, and with which its sur­
render would be wholly inconsistent; and, if he should find this impos­
sible, that he should then return to England In a word, the
Cabinet refused to negotiate. There had been no basis, indeed no for­
mal negotiation prior to 4 July, primarily because Fox had held the en­
tire matter to informal, low-key discussion. Thus the new instructions of 
the Cabinet completely ended Yarmouth's utility in Paris because it 
ended informal discussion; it contradicted the spirit of the entire 
affair; and it bound Britain to an avowed sine qua non, the one thing 
which Fox had studiously avoided.
However, Yarmouth adhered to his initial instructions and
^Minute of Cabinet (copy), 4 July 1806 (with enclosure), ibid., VIII, 
217-18. The severity of Fox's illness on 4 July is open to debate, but 
his endorsement of Grenville's ideas leads to obvious conclusions.
75
76
continued discussions without producing his full powers. On 7 July he 
closeted with d'Oubril (who had proceeded from Vienna to Paris), found 
him less unbending than his own government, and hit upon a plan of sur­
rendering Sicily in return for Albania and Dalmatia as compensation for 
the deposed king. Talleyrand cautiously approved of this scheme and 
shortly both Yarmouth and the Russian Minister in London were urging 
the Foreign Office to display more latitude.^ They were unsuccessful, 
primarily because Grenville opposed any scheme which tore Albania from 
the Ottoman Empire. Thus convinced that the British stance was incom­
patible with his own instructions and terrified by threats of French 
expansion to the east, on 20 July d'Oubril concluded a separate peace. 
This mortified Yarmouth. Fearing British isolation, he produced his 
full powers and entered into formal negotiations determined to sign a 
treaty within 48 hours. He found Talleyrand most obliging and when the 
Frenchman produced a draft Yarmouth eagerly began to scribble out vari- 
ous projets which ignored Sicily altogether.-*
In London, both Foxites and Grenvillites became alarmed. The 
news of the Russian treaty angered Grenville considerably, and he and 
his brother were so sure of 'the total debasement of all European 
courts' that they saw no hope of the Czar refusing ratification. 
Buckingham blamed everything on the Foxites and pressed his brother to 
settle the question of peace and war quickly and finally before death 
robbed the ministry of Fox's sanction. In the end Grenville decided to
^Yarmouth to Fox, 9 July (with enclosure), F.O. 27/73.
2Fox to Yarmouth, 18 July 1806, F.O. 27/73. However, Britain 
accepted the idea of compensation for Sicily, but only with the consent 
of the Sicilian monarch. Minute of Cabinet, 15 July 1806, H.M.C. 
Dropmore, VIII, 235-36.
^Yarmouth to Fox, 20, 21, 24 July, F.O. 27/73. Note Butterfield's 
comments on Yarmouth's labours in Charles James Fox and
Napoleon, pp. 17-19.
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send a second plenipotentiary to push the negotiation back to its ori­
ginal principle. Lauderdale, accompanied by Dugald Stewart, left 
England in late July with instructions to restrain Yarmouth.^
The events of July had convinced British public opinion and a 
majority of the Cabinet that peace was impossible. A Russian visitor 
noted that 'the great majority of people here are convinced that England 
will run less risk in continuing a purely naval war than in making peace 
with the Corsican.' And John Allen, who was well informed about 
Cabinet discussions, recorded in his journal that Bonaparte had been 
'elated to more than his natural insolence by the Russian treaty.'
Even Fox lost hope. 'It is not Sicily,' he told his nephev?, 'but the 
shuffling, insincere way in which they act, that shows me they are 
playing a false game . ..'^ Most members of Government felt defeated 
and alarmed by their plight and Buckingham encouraged Grenville to 
desert the Foxites on their leader's death. Both Fox and llowick were 
very warlike, the latter being obsessed with fears of a French invasion 
of Portugal. In the face of all this Lauderdale and Stewart proceeded 
to Paris full of optimism, only to be embarrassed by the reception of
'lthe French Emperor: 'Comment! on m'envoye un ancien Jacobin.'J
Lauderdale never had a chance. He performed brilliantly in
^Lady Holland Journal, II, 167-68, 'Observations on Lord 
Yarmouth's despatches of 20 and 21 July', by Lord Grenville, H.M.C. 
Dropmore, VIII, 244-46. Grenville to Buckingham, 26 July 1806, 
Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, IV, 54. Buckingham to Grenville, 23 
and 27 July 1806, H.M.C.'Dropmore, VIII, 240-42, 248. Fox to Yarmouth, 
26 and 28 July 1806, F.O. 27/73. Allen Journal, entry of 28 July 1806, 
B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I.
2Butterfield, Charles James Fox and Napoleon, p. 1. Allen 
Journal, entry of 28 Juiy 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I. Holland, 
Memoirs of the Whig Party, I, 257.
^Howick to Grenville, 30 July and 7 Aug. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, 
VIII, 250, 259-60. Allen Journal, entries of 4 and 5 Aug. 18Q1T, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 52204A-I.
recommending the recall of poor Yarmouth, but he soon found that his 
French, which was delivered in a heavy Scots brogue, produced snickers 
and winks at the conference table. Embarrassed by this and overanxious 
to correct his predecessor's errors, he insisted upon negotiation 
through the written word, a demand which brought protests from his 
hosts. At long last, he requested passports, only to be delayed further 
by a refusal and an apology. This made the Scotsman picture himself as 
a political prisoner and he meditated a magnificent protest in the name 
of international law. Talleyraixd delighted in these delays, for it was 
in his interest to suspend negotiation until the final result of the 
Russian treaty were known. Meanwhile, Lauderdale was unpopular on both 
sides of the Channel. In Paris rumours spread that he had deserted Fox 
and adopted the warlike principles of Grenville and in England 
Buckingham hoped that Napoleon had locked him in the Temple. Nobody 
seemed to place any emphasis on his conviction that there was a sincere 
disposition for peace in Paris. Events in the world were making his 
mission ridiculous.^
Throughout August and early September the British Cabinet drifted 
towards unmistakably warlike views. Reports from France and Spain 
confirmed that Joseph Bonaparte was prepared to invade Portugal with the 
object of seizing the fleet, deposing the monarch, and partitioning the 
country. On 25 July, in the wake of the Franco-Russian treaty, the 
Cabinet resolved to defend Portugal. Howick, who was particularly em­
barrassed by events in Paris, showed great pugnacity in the days which 
followed. He told C.W.W. Wynn that he had lost all hope in the
"^Lauderdale to Grenville, 7 and 11 Aug. 1806 (with enclosure), 
H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 273-75, 276-77. C. Goddard to Grenville, 11 Aug. 
1806, ibid., 268. Allen Journal, entries of 14 and 19 Aug. 1806, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 52204A-I. Buckingham to Grenville, 11 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. 
Dropmore, VIII, 316-18. For Burdett's reaction see his letter to Rev. 
R. N. French, 18 Aug. 1806 (Burdett).
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negotiations with France and on 30 July he joined Windham in advocating 
the destruction of Portugal's coastal defences and the confiscation of 
the country's fleet.^ This plan was adopted in early August over the 
strong protests of Sidmouth and Tom Grenville. A military force of 
6,000 men was assembled at Portsmouth with orders to be prepared to 
sail at a moment's notice, while at the same time a powerful naval 
armament was sent with ambassadors to Lisbon for the purpose of coer-
2cing the Portuguese into either resistance or retreat to the Brazils. 
These plans became meaningless when the French invasion failed to mate­
rialize, but unexpected news from the western hemisphere kept the fer­
vour for war at a feverish pitch in the Cabinet.
In early September reports began to filter back to London that 
Buenos Aires had been conquered by a British army. Nobody was more 
surprised by this than the members of government. Admiral Sir Home 
Popham and General Sir David Baird had been despatched by Pitt in 1805 
in command of an expedition against the Dutch colony at the Cape of 
Good Hope. In January 1806 the colony had surrendered and Popham, 
after persuading Baird to place a body of troops at his disposal, had 
proceeded without orders to Rio de la Plata. There he had had little 
trouble in capturing Buenos Aires in June. Adding insult to injury, 
he announced this feat in a manifesto addressed to Britain's trading 
corporations which vividly outlined the commercial advantages offered 
by a conquest of South America. In early September Popham put his
■*-Allen Journal, entry of 25 July 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I.
C.W.W. Wynn Diary, entry of 1 Aug. 1806 (Wynn). Windham to Grenville, 
30 July 1806, H.M.C, Dropmore, VIII, 251.
^Grenville to Auckland, 6 Aug. 1806, B.M., Add, MSS. 34457 
(Auckland). Grenville to Fitzwilliam, 27 Aug. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, 
VIII, 296. Howick to Holland, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 
(Holland).
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case before the government and asked for reinforcements to attack 
1Montevideo.
These developments created mass confusion. Howick was adamant 
in insisting that the country had its hands full in Europe, that prior 
policy had been geared to bolstering British strength in the 
Mediterranean, and that Popham's violation of orders should be punished 
and not condoned. But he stood alone. Petty and Erskine, both of whom 
retained faith in the negotiations for peace, felt that Howick was too 
warlike. Many of the Grenvillitesargued that Spanish American conquest 
would be an effectual means of damaging French resources; Sidmouth and 
Ellenborough paid heed to the popular cry of merchants; and Windham 
abandoned peace and advocated naval isolation from Europe and commer­
cial expansion in South America.^ Unfortunately, Fox was incapable of 
providing leadership.-5 In the midst of this melee one Foxite peer 
noted dejectedly that the country was 'not yet sufficiently pacific to 
approve of such a peace as can be procured & it will require two years' 
more suffering under the scourge of the chan of the exchequer to bring 
all the fools in the country to a right understanding.'4 This was cer­
tainly the case. By early September the Cabinet had gone to pieces and 
Fox's foreign policy was dying with him.
Grenville rose above this confusion. Like his relatives, he 
felt that the capture of Buenos Aires opened new doors to Britain and 
he had little faith in the negotiation with France. However, he was
'*'Popham to Howick, 9 Sept. 1806 (Grey).
^Ilowick to Grenville, 14 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. 
Grenville). T. Grenville to Buckingham, 13 Sept. 1806, Buckingham,
Court and Cabinets, IV, 70-72. Windham to Grenville, 11 Sept. 1806,
H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 321.
^Roger Fulford, Samuel Whitbread (London, 1967), p. 152.
4Ld. King to Holland, Aug. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 (Holland).
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sufficiently perceptive to see that the possibility of peace had to be 
disposed of once and for all before the government could unite behind 
vigorous measures of war. From Lauderdale came reports of a serious 
disposition for peace in Paris, and Petty, Erskine, Sidmouth, and many 
of Fox's friends in the Commons put great stock in them. With the future 
of his government in mind Grenville saw the need for serious negotiation 
before Fox's death, for he was unsure whether the Foreign Secretary had 
'lived long enough to commit himself and his friends to the principles 
of negotiation that have been put forward ...' Consequently, while 
Howick encouraged espionage among the negotiating team in Paris and 
Windham clamoured for the conquest of sugar islands, Grenville stressed 
the need for following the negotiation to its logical conclusion. The 
Cabinet was discussing a plan of strengthening Britain's diplomatic 
posture by encouraging rebellion in Spain when news arrived that Fox had 
died at Devonshire's villa in Chiswick.*
Though the death of the Whig leader had been anticipated for sev­
eral months, it had a considerable impact upon the councils of govern­
ment. Grenville saw immediately that the foreign situation demanded that 
Fox should be succeeded by one of his followers and, satisfied by the 
events of August that Howick's view of the European situation was similar 
to his own, he pushed him forward as Foreign Secretary and leader of the 
House of Commons. He also felt that Holland, as Fox's nephew and politi­
cal disciple, should be admitted to the Cabinet. These plans assured 
continued balance in the government, but they alienated Buckingham, who 
coveted the Foreign Office and the lead in the Commons for his brother 
Tom Grenville. Pressure from Stowe soon forced Grenville to a posture 
which roused considerable animosity: he advocated the accession
*Buckingham to Grenville, 11 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 
316-18. Goddard to Grenville, 19 Sept. 1806, ibid.., 343-44.
of Tom Grenville at the expense of Windham, whom he offered a peerage 
in return for a letter of resignation. Windham refused curtly and 
turned to the Foxites for support. These events convinced many Foxites 
that Grenville was striving for ascendancy in the Cabinet. Howick 
wanted no part of the scheme to depose Windham,and Allen attributed the 
whole thing to the 'marked predilection' Windham had shown to the 
Foxites since coming to office. 'By removing him from the H. of 
Commons,' he noted jealously, 'they probably calculate that T. Grenville 
will take the lead as soon as Ld. Howick is removed to the H. of Lords.' 
Deprived of Fox's leadership, many in the party desired separation from 
the Grenvillites and rumours spread at Holland House that Grenville was 
secretly negotiating with the Pittites.'*'
Howick, who ¡had assumed the lead of Fox's party, soon found great 
disseneLon in his ranks. Many Foxites were unhappy with him and made no 
secret that they preferred Holland. This group was led by Sheridan and 
the Prince, both of whom asserted that Howick was too unpopular to take 
the lead in the Commons and too unprincipled to guide the party in Fox's 
theories. Moreover, there were more ambitious men than places in gov­
ernment. Whitbread, who had been denied office in February, demanded 
attention and Holland insisted that Lauderdale should hold Cabinet rank. 
Howick became so frustrated that he talked of retirement, but a compro­
mise was struck at last. Fitzwilliam magnanimously bowed out to make 
room for Tom Grenville, who became First Lord of the Admiralty.
Sidmouth climbed from the office ofPrivy Seal to that of President of 
the Council so that Holland could assume the former. Howick became
■^Buckingham to Grenville, 11 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 
316-18. Grenville to Windham, 11, 19 Sept. 1806 and Windham to Grenville, 
11, 19 Sept. 1806, ibid., 319, 320, 340-42, 242-43. Grenville to Howick, 
18 Sept. 1806; Howick to Grenville, 19 Sept. 1806, ibid., pp. 337-38, 340. 




Foreign Secretary and Leader of the Commons with the understanding that 
he would offer the Foreign Seals to Holland upon his removal to the 
Lords. Tierney succeeded Tom Grenville at the Board of Control and as 
yet another slap in the face of Sidmouth's enemies, Bragge Bathurst, the 
'doctor's' brother-in-law, became Master of the Mint.^
The balance of the Cabinet was preserved but, like most compro­
mises, the new arrangements pleased nobody. Whitbread and Lauderdale 
were left in the cold; the Prince was infuriated that Holland had not 
been given the Foreign Office; many were upset by the increase of
2Sidmouth's power; and Howick was unpopular with the party he led.
Though the Duke of Bedford summed up the feelings of many when he spoke 
of 'the vast chasm which the Death of Fox has left in our political 
strength and Consequence as a party', most Foxites agreed with 
Fitzpatrick that the new arrangements gave 'the appearance as well as 
the reality of a pacifick system in the Foreign Affairs This
had been Grenville's goal. Only Sidmouth saw Fox's death as an event 
which would change the 'relation in which we stand to all foreign 
countries ...' ^
'  ' ' '«■*»& ‘d  v  i i t  *24
^Allen Journal, entries of 2 Aug. and 19 and 25 Sept. 1806, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 52204A-1.
2Lady Holland Journal, II, 185.
"^Bedford to Howick, 29 Sept. 1806 (Grey). Holland, Memoirs of 
the Whig Party. II, 53-61.
4Sidmouth Life, II, 433.
CHAPTER III
THE SUPREMACY OF GRENVILLE:
COMPROMISE AND COLLAPSE,
SEPTEMBER 1806 - MARCH 1807
Fox'8 strategy upon coming to office had not taken into account 
the possibility of his own death within the year. His name alone had 
inspired confidence in Washington and Paris while Grenville's had been 
Identified with that of Pitt. Then, too, the men Fox left behind him 
in the Cabinet were Incapable of holding the ministry to the guidelines 
and the spirit of his foreign policy. Petty, a boy of twenty-five, 
scarcely said a word in Cabinet meetings. Holland, at thirty-three, 
was emotional, unrealistic, and lacking in resolve. Erskine, at fifty- 
six the only established statesman, was eccentric, erratic, often fool­
ish, and seldom listened to. And Howick, at thirty-eight, was less de­
voted to traditional Foxite dogma than other party leaders and almost 
totally ignorant of the mechanics of foreign relations. These men had 
spent their entire political lives on the opposition benches and were 
aware that they were ill-prepared for the responsibilities of office.
By contrast, Grenville was an established statesman who was better 
qualified in the field of diplomacy than any man in Great Britain. The 
result was catastrophic. Allen sensed the danger and warned that re­
gardless of the friendship and cordiality which existed between Foxite 
leaders and Grenville, it was 'impossible that the body of the party 
can be ever made to look upon Ld. Grenville as their head'.^ But 
Fox's lieutenants were ill-equipped for leadership. Grenville awed the
-*-John Allen Journal, entry of 26 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 
52204A-I.
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Foxltes in the Cabinet, seized the reins of both the Exchequer and the 
Foreign Office, and assumed the position of dominance which Fox had 
held before him. After September the Ministry of All the Talents was 
clearly Grenville's government.
While the ministry was involved with new Cabinet arrangements 
word reached Paris that the Russian Emperor had disavowed d'Oubril and 
demanded not only that Sicily should be left to the Bourbons, but that 
the French should relinquish Dalmatia. Significantly, Alexander au­
thorized Lauderdale to represent Russia as well as Britain in Paris. 
This news put the French in motion immediately. Seeing a new coalition 
in the making, Napoleon resolved to crush Prussia before negotiation 
could sooth Frederick William's differences with Britain. He demanded 
curtly that Prussia must disarm and within three days French troops in 
Germany were preparing for battle. Concurrently, Talleyrand cloaked 
these designs and expressed new interest in peace to the British pleni­
potentiary. Totally unaware of the French scheme, Lauderdale became 
convinced that Russia's new posture had brought the negotiation back to 
the position in which it had stood prior to d'Oubril's arrival in 
Paris. He reported enthusiastically to London that he was on the verge 
of success.1
In London the Cabinet was at first inclined to agree with the 
assessment of its plenipotentiary and on 14 September Grenville ex­
pressed moderation and told Lauderdale that he hoped the capture of 
Buenos Aires would facilitate peace. However, these feelings were 
soon changed drastically as Prussia attempted to bring Russia and Great
1Butterfield, Charles James Fox and Napoleon, p. 25. H.M.C. 
Dropmore, VII, xxxi.
2Grenvllle to Lauderdale, 14 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 
332-33. Cabinet Minute, 7 Sept. 1806, ibid., 312.
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Britain to her side. On 19 September the Cabinet received a Prussian 
plea for assistance which confirmed that the Czar had placed all the re­
sources of the Russian Empire at the disposal of his ally. The storm 
broke immediately. Howick urged war; Windham was equally warlike but 
opposed continental involvement in favour of South American schemes; 
Holland, Erskine, and Petty wanted to pursue peace negotiations with 
France; and Temple warned that Napoleon was 'so much in want of Peace 
that even under these circumstances he will offer terms which we shall 
not dare refuse'.^
Faced with the possibility of an open break in the Cabinet, 
Grenville again stood by the negotiations for peace. Allen noted that 
the Prime Minister was very pacific and that he viewed Buenos Aires 
'in a proper light as an exchange for Hanover & is not dazzled as the 
public at large & some of his colleagues about the prospect of S. 
American conquests'.^ But this moderation did not withstand family 
pressure. Harassed by Buckingham on both foreign affairs and Cabinet 
realignment, Grenville spoke of resignation on the 21st and then leaned 
towards cooperation with Prussia. On the 22nd he cast odium on the 
ministry by instructing Lauderdale to include Buenos Aires 'in our uti 
posseditis, or to ask its full value for it.'3 Holland protested ve­
hemently against cooperation with a power with whom Britain was offi­
cially at war, pointed out that the Prussian offer had included no 
guarantee of Hanover, and even opposed Grenville's plan of sending a
1Allen Journal, entry of 19 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS.
52204A-I. Lady Holland Journal, II, 183, 187. Temple to Wynn, n.d. 
[Sept. 1806], (Wynn), 20.
^Allen Journal, entry of 19 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I.
^Grenville to Howick, 21 Sept. 1806 (Grey). Grenville to 
Lauderdale, 22 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 352.
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plenipotentiary to Berlin.* This calmed Howick somewhat and on 22 
September, when Windham disclosed that it would cost .4 2,400,000 to 
send 10,000 cavalry to Germany, Grenville decided that South American 
conquest was not such a bad idea after all. Such hedging placed 
Grenville in a double pinch. Lauderdale, who was sure that peace was 
at hand, objected to Grenville's instructions to include Buenos Aices 
in the British uti possedltis and the Foxite wing of the Cabinet (with 
the exception of Howick) was bitter on the point. Meanwhile, 
Fitzwilliam broke a long silence and told Grenville that Britain's 
interests lay with Prussia and Russia and that the peace negotiations 
should be abandoned. And Fitzwilliam was not one to be ignored.
In Cabinet discussions of late September Howick and Grenville 
again moved towards compromise. Over the protest of Holland it was 
agreed that Morpeth, Carlisle's son, should be sent on a mission to the 
Prussian Court, and on 1 October Grenville instructed Lauderdale to 
present the Russian demands conjointly with those of Great Britain and 
to stress that if France obliged Britain to follow up her blow in South 
America, 'the Spanish empire there will be placed beyond the reach of 
being restored by any treaty that we could make, were we ever so much 
disposed to it.' The Prime Minister was sure that the increasing dif­
ficulties of France would bring a favourable answer from Talleyrand. He 
speculated on an even exchange of Buenos Aires for Naples, but above 
all else he wanted to force Napoleon's hand. Lauderdale was told that 
if the French refused his ultimatum he was to demand passports and *2
*Lady Holland Journal. IIA 187.
2Windham to Grenville, 22 Sept., and Grenville to Windham, 23 
Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 353.
■^Lauderdale to Grenville, 26 Sept., and Fitzwilliam to Grenville, 
24 Sept. 1806, ibid., 358-59, 355-56.
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return home immediately.^ A similar stance was taken towards Prussia.
'If Prussia has compromised her differences with France she will cer­
tainly never restore Hanover till forced to it by that Power', wrote 
Grenville. 'If she goes to war with France her only hope of success 
must be in our assistance & she will then be too happy to accept it 
upon our terms.'2 2 One way or the other British interests would be 
served. This language pleased everybody in the Cabinet but Holland, 
for it committed Britain to nothing. Smugly Grenville and Howick 
awaited word from Morpeth and Lauderdale.^
Early in October a Prussian minister arrived in London with a 
letter from Frederick William to George III. He assured Howick that 
his government would restore Hanover at the conclusion of a general 
peace and he proposed to renew negotiation for an alliance against 
France. At this stage the British Cabinet was aching for war. Howick 
was impressed by Prussian spunk and the old Pittite wing of the govern­
ment was delighted by what they saw as French difficulty.^ At Stowe 
Buckingham and a Bourbon prince plotted an invasion of Brittany.-* Also 
there had been a shift in Foxite opinion. In late September General 
Walpole, a staunch Foxite and an under-secretary at the Foreign Office, 
dined at Holland House and entertained the table with an exposition of 
foreign affairs. 'I listened to his observations with attention and
^Grenville to Lauderdale, 1 Oct. 1806, ibid., VIII, 368-69.
2Howick to Grenville and Grenville to Howick, 29 Sept. 1806, 
ibid., 365-66, 366-68.
^Holland to Howick, 28 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). 
Howick to Holland, 28 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland).
^Howick to Lauderdale, 1 Oct. 1806 (Grey).
^Buckingham to Grenville, 28 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII,
362.
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surprise, and could not help smiling to perceive how much six months of 
office enlightens the mind and clears the sight', wrote one guest.
'Buonaparte is no longer his Hero; he can believe that there may
be something wrong in the Government of France, and that all its faults 
and errors do not arise from the misconduct of the English Ministers, 
and that one may, without hypocrisy or shabbiness, believe in a report 
of good news, and wish success to our Allies.'1 Even Holland gave way 
to this spirit and wanted to coerce Spain to war against France by
Othreatening to conquer her colonies.
Nevertheless not one influential figure besides Fitzwilliam de­
sired a Prussian alliance. Howick was not content with assurances 
'when there can be [no] inconvenience of giving proofs' of a disposi­
tion to restore Hanover,and though Buckingham was up to his neck in 
schemes for the invasion of France he had no desire for cooperation 
with Prussia. 'The demand of immediate pecuniary succours, without 
even the formality of a treaty of subsidy, & with no further explana­
tion about Hanover except that Prussia will do in that respect whatever 
she shall hereafter promise to do, is certainly not very modest', wrote 
Grenville, '& I imagine you will agree that in answering this letter I 
ought, in a civil way, to make it felt that such is our impression.'-* 
With Russian troops still hundreds of miles away, Prussia stood alone.
During October the Cabinet completely disassociated itself from 
the European struggle. From Vienna Adair stressed that the Austrian 
Government was immobilized by British inactivity. From Weimar Morpeth,
1Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 29 Sept. 1806,
Granville Correspondence, II, 216-17.
^Holland to Howick, Oct. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
^Howick to Grenville, 3 Oct. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 371-72. 
Grenville to Howick, 3 Oct. 1806 (Grey).
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who had left London without the slightest idea of his government's 
intentions, begged for powers to negotiate an alliance.^ But Grenville 
and Howick would not be moved, even after the final rupture of peace 
negotiations with France early in the month. On the 13th Grenville 
advocated a dissolution of Parliament so as to commit the country to 
the principle of war, but he failed to mention with whom he wished 
to fight.^ Howick refused Morpeth's plea 'to speak more specifically' 
and stressed that 'we cannot have confidence enough to act in antici­
pation of her [Prussia's] decision.'-* On 10 October Napoleon engaged 
the Prussians and by the 15th the Prussian army was in ruins on the 
field of Jena.
Accounts of these events began to reach London in late October. 
Lord Darnley, a rather weak Foxite who seldom ventured an opinion on 
anything, decided that Britain now could have 'the glory of beginning 
the deliverance of Europe' and became persuaded 'that steady & uniform 
resistance can alone save u&'^ Astonishingly this feeling was general. 
Certain that Morpeth's accounts of the battle were exaggerated, the 
Cabinet concluded that, after all, Prussia and Great Britain were com­
mon enemies of France and that aid would be forthcoming in spite of 
Anglo-Prussian differences.-* This magnanimous gesture never reached
___________ I________
^Howick to Morpeth, 3 and 7 Oct., and Howick to Adair, 7 Oct. 
1806 (Grey). Adair to Howick, 28 Sept. 1806, F.O. 7/80.
2The Cabinet considered landing Swedish troops in Brittany. 
Howick to Grenville, A Oct. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 373.
Grenville to Buckingham, 13 Oct. 1806, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, 
IV, 85.
3Howick to Morpeth, 15 Oct. 1806 (Grey). Also see Grenville to 
Howick, 11 Oct. 1806 (Grey).
^Darnley to Holland, 26 Oct. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 
(Holland).
•*T. Grenville to Morpeth, 28 Oct. 1806 (Carlisle).
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Morpeth. Outraged by his government's procrastination and terrified by 
the stampede of French infantry, the Minister Extraordinary was on his 
way home before Napoleon could regroup for the push to Berlin. By early 
November Prussia was under the thumb of the French Emperor.
Upon reaching Berlin Napoleon turned his eyes towards Russia, 
Frederick William's tardy ally, whose armies in Poland were being 
strengthened daily by retreating Prussian troops. The French Emperor 
resolved at once to deal the Prussian monarchy the coup de grace and he 
put the Grand Army in eastward motion. Simultaneously French pressure 
at Constantinople forced the Porte to abandon its treaty commitments to 
the Czar and a Turko-Russian war ensued. Russia foolishly invaded 
Turkey while her troops in Poland and the remnants of the Prussian army 
braced for the French onslaught. Frantically Alexander and Frederick 
William turned to Great Britain for help.
These pleas reached a divided Cabinet whose foreign policy was 
none too clear. The death of Fox and the rupture of negotiations with 
France had given the war faction in the Cabinet the upper hand but, as 
Temple noted, the 'continental game' was 'up & hopeless'.^- In the wake 
of Jena only Howick, Sidmouth, and to a lesser extent Spencer favoured 
continental involvement. The result was further inactivity. Howick en­
couraged Russia and Prussia to resist French expansion and his ministers 
at St. Petersburg and Berlin promised general support while Adair 
courted the war faction at Vienna. These assurances, however, soon 
proved to be groundless. Upon learning of the dismal state of the 
Prussian armies the Cabinet stopped payment of a small subsidy to 
Frederick William. Russia had less luck. Alexander, who was straining 
all his resources in efforts to hold Prussian Poland against the Grand
1Temple to Auckland, 23 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
Army, applied urgently to Great Britain, not for a subsidy, but for 
the aid of British credit in raising a Russian loan while at the same 
time tactfully encouraging his ally to stop seizing Russian merchant 
ships in the Baltic and to help the 'common cause' by hostile expedi­
tions to Constantinople, Holland, or even France. Charles Stuart, the 
British minister at St. Petersburg, was close to gaining a Russian 
guarantee of Hanover as well as the renewal of an advantageous commer­
cial treaty which was about to expire and he pressed his government to 
cooperate with the Czar.^
Stuart's recommendations were supported only by Ilowick. The 
Foxites disapproved of the principle behind continental schemes;
Windham and the Grenvilles distrusted Russia and Prussia because of bad 
experiences in the past; and it was felt generally that Great Britain 
had her own interests to consider. In this, fundamental disagreement 
on the goals of the war was paramount. When Howick tried to rally 
Cabinet support for an expedition to the coast of France Spencer re­
fused to leave Althorp:
But if this were attempted, it appears to me that we must take up 
the whole question at once & make the attack avowedly for the ob­
ject of restoring the legitimate Race of Princes to the Throne of 
France; and there are so many difficulties in the way of this, that 
I confess, I cannot bring myself positively to recommend such a 
Measure.1 2
Spencer's comment struck home. The Cabinet was seriously divided in 
opinion on the purpose of the war and it could not broach the fundamen­
tal question of Napoleon's sovereignty in France. The disagreements of 
October and November had shown clearly that the issue of war and peace 
continued to separate the former followers of Fox from those of Pitt
1Stuart to Howick, 19, 28 Nov. and 18 Dec. 1806, F.O. 65/65,
2Spencer to Howick, 30 Nov. 1806 (Grey).
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and there was reason to believe that the government had been immobilized 
by these differences during the Prussian fiasco. Fox's death had 
stripped the ministry of an identifiable foreign policy and subsequent 
compromises had proved ludicrous. Had Spencer followed his reasoning to 
a logical conclusion he would have been forced to advocate the resigna­
tion of the government.
As in the days after Austerlitz, however, French supremacy on the 
Continent pushed fundamental differences of opinion into the background 
and talk of a new system of retrenchment and defensive warfare united 
men who otherwise had little in common. Howick's view of the war, which 
was hardly consistent with that of the majority of Foxites, and 
Grenville's renewed despondency for continental schemes combined to ob­
scure the polarisation of parties, and the ministry once again set out 
to bolster the defences of Great Britain. Grenville renewed work on a 
long-range wartime financial scheme and the Admiralty planned the con­
struction of a breakwater across Plymouth Sound which would give smooth- 
water moorings to thirty-six sail-of-the-line.^ As for foreign involve­
ment, only one avenue remained open. 'The disasters in Germany, I find, 
exceed even the French reports;' wrote Fitzwilliam, 'these are only pre­
paratory to the destruction even of the Russian empire; there is an end 
of the old world, we must look to the new.'1 2
From this frame of mind sprang renewed interest in accommodation 
with the United States. Fox's retirement from the duties of the Foreign 
Office in late June had paralyzed the developing Anglo-American entente. 
Both Pinckney and Monroe had been disappointed greatly by the loss of
1Abbot Diary, II, 285.
2Fitzwilliam to Grenville, 3 Nov. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII,
421
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momentum and throughout July and August they had sat motionless as the 
British Cabinet pursued more important matters. However, in mid-August 
Fox's protests from St. Anne's Hill had sent Holland scurrying about 
Westminster with word that the American question should be given more 
attention. Looking over his shoulder, Grenville had asked Holland to 
join Auckland in discussions with Pinckney and Monroe. Though Holland 
entered these discussions with the same enthusiasm which his uncle had 
displayed two months previously, initial negotiation amounted to little 
more than British tokenism. Auckland and Grenville were engrossed with 
precarious business in Europe and they had no desire to provoke the pre­
judices of their countrymen or to foment further dissension in the 
Cabinet. London merchants and the East India Company looked on America 
jealously and Howick and Spencer were averse to any compromise on naval 
matters. Realistically the Cabinet concluded that American remon­
strances on impressment and neutral commercial rights could not be given 
satisfaction without a general European peace. For these reasons 
Holland's boyish liberalism was discouraged and the negotiations of 
August and early September were far more social than political in na­
ture.^
During September and October, however, Cabinet interest in 
American goodwill increased proportionately with the worsening of the 
European situation. The closure of Prussian ports alarmed the Board of 
Trade and by the early part of September the American embargo on British 
imports had proved to be an effective negotiating tactic. On the 6th 
Grenville had told Auckland:
^Holland to Grenville, Aug., 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 297-98. 
Auckland to Grenville, 10, 20, 21, 27 Aug. 1806, ibid., 265-66, 288, 
289-90, 296. Auckland to Holland, n.d. and 10 Aug. 1806, B.M., Add.
MSS. 51532 (Holland), ff. 1 and 28. Holland House Dinner Book entries 
of 20 July and 20, 30 Aug. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
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The American question is of great uneasiness to me - they have 
taken a more effectual ground of annoying us than if they had like 
Prussia gone to war with us at once - But if the state of Prussia 
is to exclude us from every port South of the Baltic, & even to 
make it doubtful what is to be the situation of Denmark & Sweden, 
in that respect, how can we in the same moment for any interest, 
be it ever so great, risk even a temporary stoppage of our ex­
ports to America? This is a question which with all my aversion 
to humiliating concessions I feel it very difficult to solve. The 
stoppage would I am satisfied be only temporary because Am- wants 
to buy our goods at; least as much as we want to sell them; but how 
can we meet the interval?
This letter had sent Auckland to Dropmore immediately and on 7 September 
he had instructed Holland to encourage Pinckney and Monroe to suspend 
the embargo by assuring them that the British Cabinet was 'honorably 
disposed to remove all real causes of complaint, & to promote every 
practical measure of National Friendship & Conciliation.' The Americans 
had reported a major break-through to their government immediately and 
Jefferson had scrapped his unpopular embargo without delay. However, 
Howick, who was planning the increase of British naval power off 
Portugal and Sicily, had become alarmed by this stance and had made it 
clear that he would oppose major concessions.  ^ This opposition, con­
tinental turmoil, the confusion which followed Fox's death, and the 
length of time required for trans-Atlantic correspondence had prevented 
the Cabinet from coming to grips with the American question until late 
October. At that time the rupture of peace negotiations with France and 
the defeat of Prussia rendered further delay impossible.
After discussing minor points with the Americans for a fortnight, 
Holland and to a lesser extent Auckland became convinced that the 
British practice of impressment on the high seas either should be
^Grenville to Auckland, 6 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
^Auckland to Holland, 7 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51532 
(Holland). Auckland to Grenville, 10 Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 
314-15.
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abandoned or defended convincingly. Aware of Grenville's fears on the 
subject, on 1 November Holland prepared a memorandum for both Auckland 
and the Prime Minister in which he defended American pretensions vigor­
ously. Ever true to his uncle's views, he suggested that if Britain 
were faced with a similar problem 'we should no doubt feel prepared to 
encounter the united navy of Europe than admit [such] a claim ...' 
Holland pressed his conviction that any arrangement with America had to 
be reciprocal; that possibly the problem stemmed from squalid conditions 
in the British Navy; and, above all, that before blocking a beneficial 
treaty the Admiralty should be asked to outline the 'practical impor­
tance' of the point in dispute. On the same day Auckland joined him in 
officially submitting to the King's Advocate a memorandum on the 'sound­
ness of this pretension' in international law.*
The two negotiators stressed to the Cabinet that the Americans 
were prepared to give assurances; they developed projects to facilitate 
cooperation on the point; and they argued that the international situa­
tion rendered an 'experiment' necessary.^ To Howick, whose views he 
feared, Holland stated that the point to be determined was 'whether our 
navy would be endangered by such an agreement & whether its security 
materially depends on a practice which no Neutral Nation will ever sub­
mit to but through fear, which if practised against us would be
11 Draft of a memorial on the Impressment of seamen prepared by 
Holland for Grenville & Auckland', [1 Nov. 1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland). 'Question submitted to Sir John Nicholl His Majesty's 
Advocate General by Lord Holland, Lord Auckland, Nov. 1, 1806', ibid.
^Holland to Grenville, n.d. [early Nov. 1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51530 (Holland). 'Notes on the Result of a Conference of Ld Hd & Auck 
wt Mr Monroe and Pinckney 30 Oct', ibid. 'Memorandum on Impressment', 
n.d. [early Nov. 1806], B.M., Add. MSS.' 51919 (Holland). 'Projet of an 
Article With Respect to Seamen', 4 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland).
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destructive to our carrying trade & which in every war tend [sic] to 
alienate the minds of a people whose geographical position renders 
them indépendant [sic] of France & whom- language habits & mutual inte­
rests should unite closely with Great Britain'.^
These views were strikingly similar to those which Fox had put 
forward between 1783 and his death and Holland's pleading touched a 
nerve in many Foxites. Auckland — j
supported Holland unreservedly and he pressed Grenville 
on the subject. Petty spoke the language of his more famous father; 
Sheridan called for 'common sense & fair dealing'; and Erskine argued 
that the sacrifice was 'a cheap price for the cultivation of so many 
millions of people who walk about in our boots and shoes - Take off our 
Hats to one another; keep out every drop of rain with Cloth from 
Yorkshire, & who when they come hereafter to cut one another's throats . 
will come to Birmingham and Sheffield for their weapons,'* 2
The Cabinet almost gave up impressment. It was with great re­
luctance that Howick, Tom Grenville, and Spencer opposed the concession 
and it was only the almost total dependence of Great Britain on her 
maritime supremacy in the wake of the battle of Jena that made Sidmouth 
and the Prime Minister side with them against Petty, Erskine,and Holland 
With apologies and assurances of his government's desire for Improved 
Anglo-American relations, on A November Grenville closed the door and 
the Admiralty began preparations for the 'possible case of war with
■'"Holland to Howick, 1 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 515AA (Holland).
2Sheridan to Holland, 7 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 516A1 
(Holland). Erskine to Holland, n.d. [3 Nov. 1806?], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51533 (Holland).
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America ,1• » •
The firmness of the Cabinet, however, was soon qualified by 
threatening news from the Continent. Intoxicated by his unprecedented 
successes of the past 13 months, Napoleon sought to bring Great Britain 
to her knees by a plan which, as he phrased it, would 'conquer the sea 
by the land'. Accepting the theory that Britain's sophisticated system 
of division of labour and unique position in world commerce were the 
foundation of her economic life, he anticipated David Ricardo's thesis 
of a later day that the British Empire was especially susceptible to 
'every sudden change in the channels of trade'. In mid-November he con­
fiscated and burned British property at Hamburg, declared the port block­
aded, and on the 21st issued the famous Berlin Decree. The proclamation 
placed the British Isles in a state of blockade and prohibited all trade 
and communication with them; it declared all British subjects in French 
controlled territory prisoners of war and their property fair prize; it 
declared war on British goods; and it stated that every vessel coming 
directly from British or British colonial ports or calling on either 
would be refused access to the Continent.2
Even before learning of the new policies of France Auckland had 
concluded that the entire downfall of the continental powers made it 
'more than ever necessary to advert to Interests which are merely 
British'. And he was quick to assert that the extension of British 
commerce was 'the most efficient measure of war'.-* The Cabinet had *2
^Grenville to Holland and Auckland, n.d. [5 Nov. 1806?], B.M.,
Add. MSS. 51530 (Holland). Howick to Holland, 2 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51550 (Holland). Holland to Howick, 8 Nov. 1806 (Grey). Nicholl 
Memorandum, 3 Nov. 1806, F.O. 5/104. T. Grenville to Buckingham, 5 
Nov. 1806, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, IV, 91-2. Perkins, Prologue 
to War, pp. 126-28.
2Hecksher, pp. 71-90.
^Auckland to Grenville, 25 Nov. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII,
141-42.
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agreed with this logic and Holland and Auckland had spent much time in 
negotiation with Pinckney and Monroe. Surprisingly the American nego­
tiators had agreed to proceed with discussions in spite of the British de­
cision on impressment and by 28 November the Cabinet was confident that 
soon a treaty of some sort would be signed. Only the question of neu­
tral trading rights remained unanswered and most members of the govern­
ment agreed with Auckland that the Essex decision should be abandoned 
in favour of a system of 'clogging the trade with landing, warehousing, 
reshipping, and proof (when required) of bona fide property'
News of the French confiscations therefore produced considerable 
disarray in the Cabinet. Howick acted before he thought and sent a 
letter to the Lord Mayor of London which promised strong economic re­
taliation. But cooler heads prevailed. Sir Francis Baring, to whom 
the government looked for advice in commercial matters, claimed not un­
reasonably that Napoleon's Government was 'ignorant of practical com­
merce' , and that French commercial regulations were often founded on 
'what they can collect from the English news papers, as most likely to 
prove Injurious to this country'. 'The French are very alert to pro­
nounce a guerre a mort against our Commerce which they very soon for­
get, unless their memory is refreshed', he wrote authoritatively.2 
Buckingham, whose influence over Grenville had grown enormously since 
Fox's death, assured his brother that British merchandise would 'find 
its way' and after meeting with the principal Hamburg merchants on 1 
December Auckland agreed.3 By the 2nd Grenville had decided to remain
Auckland to Grenville, 28 Nov, 1806, ibid., VIII, 444-45.
2Baring to Howick, 30 Nov., and Howick to Baring, 2 Dec. 1806
(Grey).
Buckingham to Grenville, 30 Nov., and Auckland to Grenville, 1 
Dec. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 449-50, 454.
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quiet on French policy and to pursue the American negotiation with more 
vigour in spite of public clamour against both courses.1 After counting 
his supporters in the Commons, on 6 December he instructed Auckland and 
Holland to renounce the Essex decision as well as the 'broken voyage' 
doctrine and to offer the Americans unrestricted re-exportation rights 
on the payment of a simple duty. This was an enormous concession and 
Pinckney and Monroe agreed enthusiastically. The subjugation of the 
continent of Europe had led Grenville to turn to the west for economic 
salvation.
Within three days this policy was seriously undermined by news 
of the Berlin Decree. The cry of the public and the parliamentary op­
position was almost overpowering, Pubs and inns buzzed, public prints 
speculated on the possible consequences, and intellectual conversation 
centred on the bizarre statement of French policy. To a people who took 
great pride in their rule of the seas and whose security was founded on 
that rule, the Berlin Decree was as audacious as it was ominous. Con­
sensus opinion was that Napoleon had dared the ultimate insult and that 
Britain's interests and honour demanded immediate retaliation. It was 
here that Grenville saw the brilliance of French policy: to reach 
France British retaliation would have to strike through the trade of 
neutrals.
The Cabinet divided on the issue. Sidmouth, Ellenborough, and
■'‘For opposition opinion see both the Courier and the Morning 
Post of the first week of December. Also see Earl of Sheffield, 
Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably Maintaining the Navigation 
and Colonial System of Great Britain (London, 1806), and Jerome Alley,
A Vindication of the Principles and Statements Advanced in the 
Strictures of the Right Hon. Lord Sheffield (London, 1806). Even 
Baring and Grenville were disgusted by word of the Burr conspiracy 
and labelled the United States a 'mob government'. Baring to Howick,
30 Nov. 1806 (Grey). Lady Holland Journal, II, 191.
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Howick opposed commercial concessions to the United States and 
Spencer, Moira, Windham, and Tom Grenville maintained a threatening 
silence.-^ Only Holland, Erskine.and Petty stood by the Americans. On 
11 December Grenville considered scrapping the agreement of the 6th and 
asked Auckland to try to find an alternative source of corn that would 
accommodate a possible breach with the United States.^ But again 
Buckingham exerted a strong influence on his brother. He was sure that 
French policy would force Russia and the Baltic powers into alliance 
with Great Britain and he advocated a ’wait and see' policy enforced by 
global conquest and a large fleet in the Baltic to encourage resist­
ance. ^  The assurances of Monroe and Pinckney were equally important. 
When Holland and Auckland suggested that the signing of the treaty 
should be delayed until the reaction of Jefferson's government were 
clear, the Americans quickly promised resistance to France and ex­
pressed a wish to proceed as if nothing had happened.^ By mid-December 
Grenville and Howick had concluded that the American market had to be 
opened at all costs.
Meanwhile, at the Board of Trade, Auckland waded through piles 
of correspondence from principal merchants and commercial towns in at­
tempting to find a solution. On 18 December he and Nicholl suggested 
four possible courses of action to the Cabinet. Firstly, Britain could 
impose a blockade on enemy coastal trade as she had done earlier in the *5
^Sidmouth Life, II, 443. Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower,
5 Dec. 1806, Granville Correspondence, II, 330-32.
^Grenville to Auckland, 11 Dec. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
^Buckingham to Grenville, 11 Dec. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 41851 
(T. Grenville).
^Perkins, Prologue to War, pp. 132-33.
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year. It was thought that such a measure would place severe pressure 
on France while promoting British trade with Europe. Secondly, she 
could do nothing at all. Auckland noted that British trade with north 
German ports had actually increased during the past week and he was in­
clined to feel that the strength of entrenched capital could weather 
the storm. Thirdly, she could restrict all blockades to southern 
Europe and thus damage France without angering anyone of importance.
And fourthly, she could force all neutral trade through British ports. 
This policy would increase duties and exports and make Great Britain 
the warehouse of world trade, but it would almost certainly force 
Denmark into the arms of France and bring an American declaration of 
war.-*-
In discussing these alternatives with the Cabinet Grenville's 
first priority was the American treaty. Owing to Auckland's calcula­
tions, the firm support of the Foxites, and the unabashed ignorance of 
commercial matters among those who had doubts, the Prime Minister had 
little trouble in establishing this view as the guiding principle of 
discussion. Logically a desire for American goodwill should have ended 
all consideration of retaliation to the French decree. Most members of 
the Cabinet, however, feared that a policy of inactivity would raise a 
clamour in Parliament and in the mercantile community,and on 21 December 
Auckland warned the overzealous Holland against progressing too quickly,2
The following day brought compromise. The American treaty would 
be signed, but only after appending to it a 'forcing note' reserving the 
British right of retaliation in the event that the American Government
1Auckland to Grenville, 18 Dec. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII.
473-74.
Auckland to John Allen, 21 Dec. [1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 
(Allen).
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did not take effective action to resist the French decree. Immediately 
after the signature of the treaty an Order in Council would assert the 
right of retaliation in forceful language, impose a blockade on enemy 
coasting trade which could 'easily be modified ... as not to touch 
America', and promise stronger measures if subsequent developments made 
them necessary.^- At a stroke the government would disarm its critics, 
sooth public fears, and offer major commercial concessions to America 
while at the same time giving Jefferson every opportunity to declare his 
good intentions at the point of a British bayonet.
This policy, which was reminiscent of that which had led to Fox's 
blockade of 16 May, was resisted by the Foxite wing of the government. 
Lauderdale and Tierney, whose grasp of economics was appreciated by 
Foxites in the Cabinet, warned that an assertion of the right of re­
taliation would be inconsistent with international law and that the very 
principle of blockading European coastal trade would infuriate the 
American Government. As a result Itowick and Holland suggested that re­
taliation should not be made official, and that the plan of blockade
should be concealed. But Grenville emphasized public discontent and
2the Foxites gave way.
On 25 December Holland was instructed to broach the question with 
Pinckney and Monroe and to press on them that 'after the pains which we 
have taken to obtain the adoption of their suggestions to the utmost ex­
tent that our Circumstances would allow, we should be very sorry to be 
sent back to ... new discussions and difficulties'. In short, take it 
or leave it. The Americans took it. Fearing the worst Pinckney and
^Nicholl to Auckland, n.d. [Dec. 1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland), f. 198.
^Grenville to T. Grenville, Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. 
Grenville). Auckland to llowick, 22 Dec. 1806 (Grey).
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Monroe not only appreciated the Cabinet’s difficulties but cheerfully 
offered to help Holland improve the wording of the ’forcing note'. On 
the last day of the year, after the Americans had edited the final 
draft to make it as inoffensive as possible, the treaty was signed.^
On 7 January the British Government swung the second phase of
its plan into action with the announcement of its Order in Council.
The public was assured by blustering talk of retaliation and rigid
2blockades that the outrages of Napoleon had not gone unnoticed. Si­
multaneously Howick instructed his minister in Washington to explain 
his government's action with apologies and assurances of goodwill while 
at the same time warning that American acquiescence to the Berlin
3Decree would make stronger measures of retaliation necessary.
Indecision reached ridiculous extremes among the Foxites. After 
studying the 'forcing note' more closely Howick decided that its word­
ing might allow Jeffersonian Francophiles to represent it 'as a threat 
of hostilities to inflame the people against the treaty'. Under pres­
sure from Lauderdale (who was furious about the whole affair) he wrote 
to Monroe and asked that the note be returned for revision, only to 
learn that it had been communicated officially and that Holland was 
chasing the Americans all over London. '... I shall cut a very foolish 
figure', understated Howick. All this alarmed poor Holland. After
■^Auckland to Holland, 25 Dec. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51532 
(Holland). The government placed great emphasis on the wording of the 
'forcing note'. Auckland to Grenville, 27 Dec. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, 
VIII, 484-85. Auckland to Holland, 28 Dec. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51532 
(Holland). Holland to Howick, 31 Dec. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 
(Holland).
2Printed in Pari. Deb., X, 126-29.
•^Howick to D. Krskine, 8 Jan. 1807, F.O. 5/52, printed in Pari. 
Deb., X, 558. Compare this despatch to the hostile explanation given 
to the Danish Minister. Howick to Rist, 17 Mar. 1807, Pari. Deb., X, 
402-07.
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searching for Monroe and Pinckney for two days, he learned that the 
American despatches had been sent sooner than had been expected. Al­
most frantically he wrote to Tom Grenville at the Admiralty and asked 
if the American ship could be overtaken. The reply was an overly em­
phatic negative.'*'
Meanwhile steps were being taken to mould public opinion. Upon 
signing the treaty Holland told Howick that, with regard to publicity, 
'you must consider that the signature will be known & that the sooner 
the reservation is known also the better'. Auckland, who was very 
proud of his labours, was sure that the declaration would 'make a good 
impression, both at home & abroad, if it should find its way into the 
newspapers'.^ Talk of newspapers horrified Howick and when word broke 
that an editor somehow had obtained a copy of the treaty, he decided 
that the whole policy was wrong.^ But there was no retreat. Opposition 
orators protested that government had done too little in the way of re­
taliation; Denmark, whose prosperous neutrality had been badly bruised 
by the prohibition of coasting trade, was no less declamatory in accus­
ing Britain of doing too much; public opinion was hostile to the treaty; 
Lauderdale and Tierney screamed that the whole transaction lacked both 
principle and legality; and many in the government felt that the issue 
had been overcompromised. To be sure, though the treaty and its accom­
panying blockade were symbolic of the ministry's drift away from Europe,
1Howick to Holland, 2 Jan. 1807 and n.d. [3 Jan. 1807?], B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). T. Grenville to Holland, 7 Jan. 1807, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51534 (Holland).
^Holland to Howick, 1 Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
"^Auckland to Holland, 9 Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 
(Holland).
^Howick to Holland, n.d. [8 Jan. 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 
(Holland).
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they were far removed from what Fox had envisaged upon coming to of­
fice.
Napoleon's dominance on the Continent also brought emphasis on 
South American conquest during the last three months of 1806. The 
government's Initial plan of commercial expansion and defensive warfare 
had turned heads towards Spain's rich colonial possessions from the 
first. Francisco de Miranda, the Venezuelan revolutionary who had been 
trying to gain the support of British sea power for over a decade, had 
been waiting at the door of the Admiralty when Howick made his entrance 
in February. After sporadic and veiled discussions the new government 
had given a cautious nod to Miranda's plan of landing an army of rene­
gades on the shores of his native Venezuela. Howick outlined the 
Cabinet's feelings on 3 June in his instructions to the British naval 
commander who had been sent to observe Miranda's movements:
So long as the persons engaged in this undertaking shall conduct 
themselves in a manner not prejudiced to the interests of the 
British Government, You are to take care that they suffer no inter­
ruption from any part of the force under your command, and if, in 
the course of these transactions, any British ship should proceed 
for the purpose of Commerce, to the Ports occupied by the Insurgents, 
they will, of course, receive that protection which they are en­
titled to expect in every port of the World; but you are carefully 
to abstain from any measures which may tend to commit His Majesty's 
Government to the future support of an undertaking, in which it has 
hitherto taken no part.
Though prepared to ride Miranda's expedition to commercial profit the 
government was deeply suspicious of the political implications. There ap­
pears to have been fear that an independent South America would gravi­
tate towards the United States, and the Cabinet had been very reluctant 
to encourage a spirit of revolution which they had seen reduce Europe 
to ashes. These feelings were strong and in July the Admiralty had
^Howick to Ld. Cochrane, 3 June 1806 (Grey). 1 have been unable to 
find this despatch among the Admiralty papers at the P.R.O.
^Col. Fullerton to Fox, 6 July 1806 (Grey), 52/21.
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expressed great concern when reports indicated that the British squadron 
was cooperating too closely with Miranda.'*' However, commercial interest 
in the Spanish Colonies had never waned and the Board of Trade had been 
most liberal in secretly issuing licences to British merchants who were 
willing to accept the risk of trading in the area.
Popham's surprising capture of Buenos Aires had made the question 
of South American conquest an issue of political importance in September. 
It had led both Holland and Grenville to believe that the threat of 
British dominance in the old Spanish Empire would facilitate peace with 
France and, eventually, the British stance at Paris had been hardened 
considerably by the addition of such a valuable bargaining point. Then, 
too, the commercial community had reacted enthusiastically to Popham's 
glowing reports and, blinded by visions of untapped riches, merchants 
and businessmen had cheered wildly at the stock exchange when it was 
learned that negotiations for peace had ended. But most importantly, 
Windham, the Secretary of State for War, grew disgusted with Europe and 
came to see the riches of New Spain as the hope of his country - a 
British El Dorado.
Others shared this opinion. From Paris Lauderdale suggested a 
naval armistice with France and the exchange of several British-held 
Dutch possessions for Cuba, a strategically located island around which 
British commercial and naval power could develop. Though this proposal 
was rejected, British statesmen cast covetous eyes towards the Caribbean 
island. 'In our hands it would not only afford great Supplies for 
building Ships, & a valuable Naval Arsenal,' wrote one Cabinet member, 
'but it wd. be a great Protection for Jamaica, wd. furnish that Island
•^ •Howick to Grenville, 7 July 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 225.
^Auckland to Grenville, 14 Sept. 1806, ibid., 331-32.
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with lumber & provisions, & Mexico, in any future War wd. be at our
mercy.1 Holland, Sidmouth, and Ellenborough agreed with these feelings
for various reasons and joined with Windham to form a strong but minority
grouping in the Cabinet which favoured reinforcing Popham and proceeding
2to bigger and better things.
The failure of the peace negotiations, the annihilation of 
Prussia, and the accession of Tom Grenville to the Admiralty shifted 
this balance in the Cabinet. According to Courtenay, Fox remarked sW tu\ 
MotehwidovHn a that 'if peace could not be had on tolerable terms, the
•iwar must be carried on vigorously, but chiefly in South America .
Grenville, encouraged by both of his brothers and anxious to commit his 
government to the vigorous prosecution of the war, concluded that there 
was no other place to fight.^ Temple summed up the feelings of the 
majority of the Cabinet when he wrote that projects in South America 
'afforded the chance of something like a counterpoise to the vast weight 
with which Bonaparte has loaded the scale in this hemisphere'.■* Thus, 
with the same spirit in which it turned to the United States, the gov­
ernment began developing plans of South American conquest at a rate 
which became more furious and in a manner which became more absurd with 
every report of Prussian disaster.
On 14 October Buckingham submitted a plan of attacking the West
■'•Howiclc to Lauderdale, 1 Oct. 1806 (Grey).
^Holland to llowick, 28 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland),
qLady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 6 Dec. 1806, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 232*
aGrenville to Lauderdale, 22 Sept., and Grenville to Windham, 23 
Sept. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 352, 353.
^Temple to Auckland, 2 Oct* 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
109
Indies which called for a casual invasion of Senegal on the way and a 
day later he outlined an elaborate scheme of invading Panama. Always 
economy-minded, the Grenvilles seem to have desired conquest without 
committing British troops. Buckingham's plans for Senegal advocated 
the recruitment of blacks and in late October Grenville struck on the 
idea of invading Mexico from the western side so that a young officer 
by the name of Arthur Wellesley could recruit 5,000 Sepoys en route.^
By early November Grenville wanted to strengthen Popham at Buenos Aires 
for an invasion of Montivideo. Flushed with victory, the army would 
cross the Pacific Ocean, join Wellesley's army of Sepoys for the con­
quest of Manila, and then re-cross the Pacific for an attack on the 
western shores of Panama! Such a preposterous expedition, which ignored 
distance and trade winds altogether, was opposed even by Windham. After 
much ado it was agreed that Wellesley would fall on Mexico from the 
western side while the reinforced army at Buenos Aires struck from the 
east. But this plan did not please Wellesley because it called for a 
division of the British force.1 2 Sidmouth and Holland, both of whom fa­
voured the principle of South American conquest, joined the cry against 
the projects of Windham and Grenville. The 'Doctor' was alarmed about 
the plight of Prussia and wanted to send all available troops to the 
north of Europe. Holland opposed any invasion which did not have South 
American independence as its goal. However, in spite of this resistance 
and warnings from the Admiralty that the navy was unfit for such under­
takings, Grenville persevered.-^
1Buckingham to Grenville, 14, 15 Oct., and Grenville to 
Buckingham, 31 Oct. 1806, H.M.C. Dropmore, VIII, 384-86, 386-87, 415-16.
2Windham to Grenville, 2 Nov. 1806, ibid., VIII, 418-20. For 
Wellesley's correspondence with Grenville see ibid., IX, 484-93.
-^Holland to Grenville, 5, 7 Dec. 1806, ibid., VIII,
458-59, 460-61. T. Grenville to Buckingham, 14'Nov. 1806, Buckingham, 
Court and Cabinets, IV, 93.
When the Spanish King mobilized his army and made an overture 
through the Russian Emperor of immediate peace and eventual alliance 
with Great Britain the Prime Minister refused to abandon his Mexican 
schemes,and Howick, whose role by this time resembled that of an er­
rand boy, replied curtly through his minister at St. Petersburg that he 
wanted no part of Spanish scheming.^ By December Grenville, Windham, 
and Wellesley had agreed on a plan of attack and Grenville had high 
hopes for an expedition which entailed the march of Sepoys, blacks, 
soldiers of fortune, and British regulars across hundreds of miles of 
mountainous and steaming jungles. Luckily it never got off the ground. 
On 2 January 1807 word arrived that the British army had evacuated 
Buenos Aires in the face of annihilation.^
By the beginning of the new year the foreign policy of the 
Ministry of All the Talents was under serious attack both at home and 
abroad. The obvious drift away from Europe had welded together an 
otherwise hopelessly divided opposition party in Parliament. Pitt’s 
old supporters protested strongly against the administration's policy to­
wards Prussia, and a strong body of commercial members, Pittites, and 
high tories were incensed by the coddling of the United States. South 
American projects, which had been popular several months earlier, now 
were seen as symbols of an abandonment of European commitments and 
responsibilities. Moreover, the recapture of Buenos Aires excited talk 
of ministerial incompetence. European courts were aware of a marked 
shift in British policy. Stuart, who advocated continental exertions
^•Howick to Stuart, 14 Nov. 1806, F.O. 65/64.
^Temple to Fremantle, n.d. [Dec. 1806], (Fremantle).
^Howick to Grenville, 2 Jan. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 2-3. 
Holland to Howick, 2 Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
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too strongly, had been replaced at St. Petersburg by the Marquis of 
Douglas, a devoted Foxite who was determined to set matters straight. 
Shortly after his arrival in the Russian capital rumour held that the 
British minister had announced that his country's policy 'would be re­
gulated, rather upon the principle of Separation from foreign powers, 
than of Connection with them These reports spread rapidly to
Vienna and raised such fears that Adair protested vehemently to the 
Foreign Office at a later date.l
The ministry had little to say in answer to all this. Jeffrey, 
the editor of the Edinburgh Review, was encouraged to write a 'non- 
political' article on neutral rights stressing that Britain 'ought not 
to aid and abet Napoleon in his plans for extinguishing commerce and 
opulent industry' and similar language was used in the Morning Chronicle 
without noticeable effect.* 2 As for America, the government found op­
position so stiff that they tried to dodge the issue whenever possible. 
Morpeth, who was attacked for his role in the Prussian disaster, was 
discouraged from defending himself with the argument that 'by making a 
newspaper controversy of it you would be giving an importance to the 
accusation which it does not deserve but which might make Cobbett & 
other party writers take it up'.2 Little was done to gain the support 
of the press. Upon coming to office Fox had refused to follow Pitt's 
precedent of employing journalists and nobody but Holland in the 
Cabinet saw the importance of journalistic propaganda.^ But in spite
■^Grenville to Howick, 26 Dec. 1806, and Adair to Ilowick, A April 
1807 (Grey).
2Horner to Jeffrey, 1A Jan. 1807 (Horner), Morning Chronicle,
16 Jan. 1807.
^Holland to Morpeth, 25 Nov. and 26 Dec. 1806 (Carlisle). Also 
see Howick to Morpeth, n.d., ibid., 3/2.
^Richard Edgecumbe, ed., The Diaries of Francis Lady Shelley, 
1787-1817 (London, 1912), p. 72.
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of all this the ministry remained secure so long as its large majority 
in the Commons held together. It was therefore attacks from this quar­
ter which caused the greatest alarm.
Fox's friends were by no means easy to manage. Sheridan and 
Erskine were unblushing prima donnas, the Prince demanded constant re­
assurance, Whitbread and many others guarded their principles closely, 
and many of the older Foxites felt loyalty to nothing and nobody but 
Fox. The old leader of the pack had held his friends together by a 
remarkably forceful personality and by an intellect which inspired con­
fidence. In the months which immediately followed his death nostalgia 
and the absence of a leader had Inflamed passions and stimulated un­
compromising reverence to what each Individual saw as Fox's creed. 
Understandably the policies (or lack of policy) which characterized 
the government after Fox's death caused serious dissension. During the 
last three months of 1806 several Foxites concluded that the coalition 
ministry was not responsive to their needs'*' and on a few occasions 
Sheridan and Whitbread displayed alarming independence.^ in addition 
Horner, Thanet, and probably many others were dissatisfied with Windham's 
plan for the reorganisation of army recruitment,"* and the decision to 
continue Pitt's property tax, according to Creevey, had 'all the Air of 
the oppressive unfeeling policy of the Grenvilles'.^ In foreign affairs 
most of the more Important Foxites agreed with a policy of isolation 
from Europe but few were pleased by what was seen as 'milk & water'
Holland to Howlck, 3 Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II, 61-7.
OHorner to Ld. Webb Seymour, 29 Dec. 1806 (Horner). Thanet to 
Holland, n.d. [Dec. 1806], B.M., Add. MSS. 51571 (Holland), f. 21.
^Creevey to Petty, n.d. [mld-1806], (Creevey), 1806 role.
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compromises by Iiowick and Grenville. But above all else the Foxites as 
a group were experiencing difficulty in explaining why the government 
had not acted on the principles of the 1790's. The Catholic question 
and parliamentary reform had been avoided and the ministry's failure to 
secure peace had caused much embarrassment. All this joined with 
Cabinet bickering to create considerable unhappiness and by the begin­
ning of 1807 the Cabinet was sitting on a political powder keg. To the 
surprise of nobody Grenville and Howick found a match.
The vacillating policies of the Cabinet between July and October 
had raised much doubt as to whether the peace negotiations with France 
had been managed properly. The French Government promptly seized upon 
this fact and its well-oiled machinery of propaganda asserted that after 
Fox's death the British Cabinet had adopted a warlike stance in the ne­
gotiations. Similar feelings prevailed among many Foxites who had been 
suspicious of Grenville and Windham from the start. Yarmouth had re­
turned from Paris in a rage and his claim that peace was prevented only 
by the inadmissible pretensions of the British Government was believed 
by several important men.* Of course the government was quick to argue 
that it had followed guidelines laid down by Fox, and the Foreign 
Secretary was quoted up to the hour of his death. The Gazette of 21 
October published -Hit o H icial. €xp>]nrvn'Vton. * and Howick took care
to protect himself by sending copies of it to key members of the party.* 2 
This tactic calmed but it did not satisfy. Fox had been portrayed by 
caricaturists as John Bull in the weeks before his death and people of 
all political loyalties had concluded, as did the Marquis of Buckingham
*Capel Lofft to Roscoe, 9 Jan. 1807 (Roscoe), 2441. Holland to 
Adair, n.d. [Jan. 1807?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51609 (Holland), ff. 26-8.
2Rachel Leighton, ed., Correspondence of Charlotte Grenville,
Lady Williams Wynn (London, 1920), p. 10m.
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later in the century, that 'the enthusiastic admirer of the Emperor 
Napoleon, and the ministerial coadjutor of Lord Grenville, proved two 
distinct persons'.'*' Unfortunately this conclusion did not go down 
easily with devoted Foxites.and a large and important group led1 by 
Whitbread reserved judgement and called for the publication of diplo­
matic correspondence. After all, Foxite dogma held that the House of 
Commons should not only determine foreign policy but also sit in judge­
ment of the Foreign Secretary.
After studying the despatches of Yarmouth and Lauderdale and 
comparing them to his own and those of Grenville, llowick saw a need to 
make them something less than an open book. Though Lauderdale's be­
haviour had been childishly bullish throughout the negotiation both of 
the British plenipotentiaries had been impressed by a desire for peace 
in Paris and had done everything in their power to reach accord. On 
the other hand the despatches from London were full of demands and ins- 
dicative of an aversion to negotiation. Yarmouth's letter of 30 July 1806 lad 
stated boldly that it was impossible to entertain any doubt of the in­
tention of the French Government to adhere to their offers and after 
reading the despatches Francis concluded that the French stance, 'as 
far as it can be maintained by Inference and Implication ... appear[s] 
to me to be fair'. There was also a striking contrast in the tone 
which Fox had employed prior to 1 July and that of Grenville thereafter. 
Understandably on 4 December Grenville discouraged publication of the 
correspondence. The Prime Minister saw that the peculiar manner in 
which Fox had opened the negotiation (without a written basis) and the 
outrageous behaviour of Yarmouth gave the papers a character which was
^Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, IV, 33.
^Francis to Howick, 18 Dec. 1806 (Grey).
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misleading and politically dangerous."^ Francis, who advised llowick on 
the matter, was in full agreement. 'At first sight, it looks like an 
Acknowledgement of their [French] sincerity, which they are not entitled 
to', he warned.^ But Howick could not afford to suppress the corre­
spondence altogether, and carefully selected documents were laid before 
Parliament.-^
The explosion came quickly and violently. Yarmouth accused the 
government of discolouring the nature of his negotiations by the sup­
pression of documents and many Foxites in Parliament expressed great dis­
satisfaction. '1 could wish you had told me that Lauderdale's share of 
the Correspondence had been forged', wrote Whitbread to Howick. 'I con­
fess I have read it with astonishment and disapprobation ...' Whitbread 
refused to listen to Howick's defence that Fox's guidelines had been fol­
lowed. lie argued that illness had caused an 'unhappy supineness' in Fox 
which made him worthless and that Howick, as his successor, should have 
held the government to the spirit in which the negotiation had been 
launched.^ Almost immediately opposition newspapers reported that 
Whitbread would arraign ministers, and the Courier went so far as to say 
that he would join Castlereagh.^ The Independent Whig, a newly- 
incorporated weekly whose name depicted its political outlook, cried for 
peace and spoke of ministerial treachery.*’ *235
^Grenville to Howick, 4 Dec. 1806 (Grey).
2Francis to Howick, 18 Dec. 1806 (Grey).
3Holland was also displeased. See Holland, Memoirs of the Whig 
Party, II, 77.
^Fulford, Whitbread, p. 174.
5Courier, 3 Jan. 1807.
^Independent Whig, 4 Jan. 1807. The editor of this print, Henry 
White, had supported Fox since the early debates on the French Revolution. 
In most cases his political views coincided with those of Cartwright and 
Wyvill, but his financial backers are unknown.
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In spite of the Morning Chronicle's firm denial of dissension in 
the administration,*" on 5 January Whitbread and Yarmouth attacked the 
government from the left while the Pittites struck from the right. 
Whitbread openly accused the ministry of abandoning its initial eager­
ness, frankness, and simplicity in favour of 'unimportant forms' and he 
moved resolutions for peace in the same words that Howick had used at 
the time of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens. Yarmouth, who was in­
furiated by Grenville's blatant attempt to pin the blame on him three 
days earlier in the Lords, defended Talleyrand and accused the Cabinet 
of refusing an advantageous peace. Concurrently opposition orators 
claimed that France had 'procured the benefit of a truce, and used it to 
blind the Government', and Perceval showed no mercy in attacking Fox.
In laying out his case Howick made a bad situation worse. He boldly 
stated his opinion that 'until the Government of France changed its 
principles and character, there was no hope of peace for this country.'^ 
This testimony struck at the root of Foxite ideology and many important 
Foxites were appalled. Holland could not speak for fear of bursting in­
to tears and Horner felt that Howick's language contained 'all the exag- 
gerated declamation of the Pittite school'.
Fox had come to office on terms which were unacceptable to most 
of his old supporters and he had held his adherents in line by skilful *26
•^Morning Chronicle, 3 Jan. 1807. Perry's double-talk raised a 
cry of apostasy against him. Asquith, 'James Perry', p. 192.
2S. Whitbread, Substance of a Speech delivered in the House of 
Commons, on Monday, January 5, 1807 (London, 1807). Morning Chronicle,
6 Jan. 1807. The Speaker was so struck by Howick's speech that he re­
corded the key sentence in his diary. Abbot Diary, II, 88-89.
^Lady Holland Journal, II, 194-97. Horner to Allen,
6 Jan. 1807 (Horner).
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political manoeuvre and a promise of things to come, all of which de­
pended on his ability either to obtain peace or to place France in the 
wrong by the attempt. The handling of the negotiations after he became 
ill had accomplished neither and Howlck's language of 5 January let many 
people know why. The result was an enormous schism in the Foxite party 
in Parliament and particularly among those in the country at large who 
had admired Fox. Important men like Roscoe, Lofft, Coke, Whitbread, 
Burdett, Erskine, and even Holland developed deep suspicions of the men 
who were leading them and, as Bedford noted, Whitbread’s behaviour was 
vexatious 'because it will hurt Grey, & our enemies will not fall to 
take advantage of it'.*
Foxites in Westminster saw the government's behaviour in the 
peace negotiations as being symbolic of a general abandonment of popu­
lar measures. Suddenly cries for reform which Fox had stifled nearly a 
year before grew louder. The death of the Foxite party of the 1790's 
was lamented in'Peter Pindar's'poem, 'The Tears of Westminster', which 
claimed that only 'A Butt of Whitbread's props her drooping form'.
Henry White, the editor of the Independent Whig, declared open war.
'But is it in the hands of apostate Whigs that the people of England 
can confide the wreck of their liberties', he cried. Soon there was a 
cry against all parties and all public men. White commented that the 
adulation offered to Pitt, Burke, and Fox 'by their apostate adherents 
... exhibits one of the most scandalous and dangerous features of the 
times we live in ...' At a meeting of the Middlesex freeholders 
Burdett toasted 'Our Sovereign the People' and 'The Downfall of all 
Parties and Factions' to the tune of thunderous applause.^ In the
Bedford to Holland, 18 Jan. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland).
^Independent Whig, 11, 18, 25 Jan,, 8 Feb. 1807. Political 
Register. X (1806), 389-92 and XI (1807), 442-47.
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Commons many Foxltes took a course of their own. Sheridan criticized 
the government; Whitbread and Creevey drifted towards popular politics; 
and a committee dominated by Foxites struck at places and pensions with 
a zeal that alarmed Ellenborough, Fitzwilliam, and Grenville.^
Both in the country and in Parliament many of those who had pre­
viously supported Fox used the same language they had employed during 
the 1790's to attack the government. It was only with difficulty that 
Fox had been able to hold his supporters together with pleas for pa­
tience, moderation, and a balance between aristocracy and democracy dur­
ing 1806; differences concerning the conduct of the peace negotiations 
and Howick's language of 5 January signalled the beginning of the detach­
ment of the Foxite Left. Howick, stiff and aristocratic by nature, was 
altogether incapable of stemming the torrent and Grenville was thrown 
into despair. His strength in the Commons was now precarious and new 
developments on the Continent threatened further disagreement in the 
Cabinet.
Battle reports from- Poland had monopolized the attention of the 
country by the dawn of 1807, and protests over British inactivity had 
joined those of Whitbread's supporters. The Cabinet met for dinner at 
Camelford House on the 7th and Windham noted that 'The whole time till 
twelve o'clock [was] occupied with discussion, about loan or subsidy to 
Russia, and with that the general question of old or new world'. 
Whitbread's language in Parliament on the peace negotiations and its 
alarming effect on some of Fox's friends hung ominously over the din­
ner, and probably every member of the Cabinet felt pressure to avoid 
rash continental commitment. Windham and Grenville continued to
- V i -if,. _ • ; JjtR < l *2
^Allen Journal, entry of 28 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-1.
2Mrs. Henry Baring, ed., The Diary of the Right Hon. William 
Windham, 1784 to 1810 (London, 1866), p. 446.
advocate expeditions to South America in spite of the recapture of 
Buenos Aires, and the European views of Howick and Sidmouth were over­
ridden by a majority composed of Grenvilles, Foxites, and Windham. 
Ellenborough and Moira apparently had little to say and Spencer, 
alarmed by the issue, had stayed in Northamptonshire. Probably at 
Howick's insistence, it was agreed to pay the remainder of Pitt's old 
Russian subsidy, but the Cabinet would not go one step further.
As the magnitude of the Franco-Russia war became known public 
opinion became alarmed and the opposition began to make a noise. At 
the same time many Foxites were angered by the decision to complete 
payment of Pitt's Russian subsidy. The government could only defend 
itself with double-talk. On 15 January the Morning Chronicle and the 
Statesman, both of which generally spoke the language of government, 
revealed the inconsistencies of British foreign policy. The Statesman 
ridiculed the idea that Russia would risk a general battle-*- while the 
Foxite editor of the Morning Chronicle displayed a fantastic shift of 
opinion by defending subsidies. 'They have not the means of keeping 
on foot great armies, except at home', wrote Perry, 'and a small 
Subsidy for the supply of stores, must be our contingent towards the 
great object of the league.'2 This dallying got the reaction it de­
served. 'I like not the dreadfully extravagant & unnecessary ... ex­
pense of our Government', wrote a former supporter of Fox. 'I like 
not our continental alliances, subsidies. Nor do I see any sound pol­
icy in attempting the conquest of South America ...'3 Perched halfway 
between the new world and the old, the government pleased nobody. By
-^Statesman. 15 Jan. 1807.
^Morning Chronicle. 15 Jan. 1807.
^W. Rathbone to Roscoe, 31 Jan. 1807 (Roscoe), 3057.
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the end of the first week of February reports of fierce fighting in 
Poland had so alarmed public opinion and ministerialists in Parliament 
that Grenville was forced temporarily to shelve his advanced plans on 
South America and look towards Europe.
In a meeting of 11 February the Cabinet at last came to grips 
with the priorities of British foreign policy. Grenville and Windham 
came to the meeting with well-developed plans for an invasion of 
Mexico. The Secretary of War spoke of 'easy conquest' in the Spanish 
colonies and Grenville seconded this view, stressing that the new world 
would give Britain both strength in war and facilities for an advanta­
geous peace, 'either in the shape of barter or compensation to the 
numerous kings whom our cause on the Continent was likely to ruin'.
Great emphasis was also placed on the necessity of redeeming British 
honour which had been stained by the recapture of Buenos Aires. Holland 
supported these arguments but opposed any attack on South America except 
for the purpose of political emancipation. Finally Tom Grenville's 
arguments reduced the question to its ultimate form. He maintained that 
since Popham's unauthorized expedition had failed the question was no 
longer whether the Cabinet should be led by events beyond its control, 
but whether Britain's military strength should be directed towards the 
old world or the new. He shifted feet by calling for a total commitment 
to Europe and an enormous buildup of strength in the Mediterranean. He 
was supported enthusiastically by Howick who thought that further com­
mitment to Buenos Aires 'would act as a drain on our military force & 
disable us from operations more important, more politic & nearer home'.1-
Grenvllle was ready for these arguments. He recalled the
^Allen Journal, entry of 12 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I. 
Cabinet note by Holland, 11 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51917 (Holland).
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Cabinet to the guidelines which had been agreed upon when the ministry 
was formed and asserted that there was no reason to believe that the 
present coalition was any more formidable than those of the past. He 
stated the continuing need for retrenchment and home defence and 
Auckland uroeii on h<ra'H\euiei»>. that ’our season is past for continental 
campaigns . ..'^ Grenville adamantly opposed the despatch of British 
troops to Poland. The Order in Council of 7 January had alienated 
Denmark, he argued, and it was impossible to send an army to Poland 
with ’the key to the Baltic in hands so very equivocal . ..'^ He saw 
the commerce of South America and the United States as Britain's only 
salvation and he warned that Britain 'must be prepared by the Autumn to 
meet here or in Ireland, or both, the influx of this overwhelming 
t i d e . T h e  Continent was in ruins, British trade was threatened, 
finance was strained, Ireland was again on the verge of revolt, and a 
British army stood disgraced at Buenos Aires. As in January 1806 there 
was cause for alarm and a need to adopt policies uniquely British in 
preparation for the day when Europe would rise with a hope of success. 
The present conflict in Poland was not such a time.
The force of Grenville's arguments proved overpowering. It was 
agreed over the strong protest of Howick^ that an army would reinforce 
Popham, recapture Buenos Aires, and proceed to the conquest of 
Montivideo. To calm public clamour and dissenters in the Cabinet a
^Auckland to Grenville, 15 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, .2.70.
^Grenville to Howick, 27 Dec. 1807 (Grey).
^Grenville to Buckingham, 24 Feb. 1807, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 126-27.
^Memorandum on Buenos Aires by Howick, n.d. [12 Feb. 1807], 
(Grey), 52/21.
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shipload of rifles was sent to Poland, a British fleet was despatched 
to Constantinople with orders to frighten the Porte into honouring its 
treaty commitments to the Czar,-'- and, apparently without Cabinet ap­
proval, Tom Grenville and Windham transferred 5,000 troops from Sicily 
to Egypt.^ These, however, were token measures with little chance of 
success; Grenville had carried the day.
Though disagreement on both wartime tactics and Strategy con­
tinued, the meeting of 11 February at least returned the government to 
the priorities it had established upon coming to office and committed 
Great Britain to an identifiable foreign policy. This policy was deter­
mined by Grenville's innate despondency and his lack of faith in 
European cooperation; by Foxite aversion to continental involvement; 
and, more importantly, by the fundamental disagreement on foreign poli­
tics which had crippled the government since its inception. Fox had 
been the catalyst of an artificial bond between men who disagreed on 
the issue of the war and his foreign policy had been geared solely to 
negotiations for peace. Even had he lived the rupture of negotiation 
and the renewal of the continental war would have produced insurmount­
able disagreement in the ranks of government for his policy was purely 
defensive. Old views had not been renounced, only tempered by Fox's 
personal attributes and by the reduction of wartime activity which fol­
lowed the battle of Austerlitz. Foxites, Grenvillites, and Burkians
^Grenville to Howick, 23 Feb., and Howick to Whitbread, 27 Oct., 
and Howick to Adair, 2 May 1807 (Grey). The expedition to Constantinople 
was undertaken reluctantly. As Charles Arbuthnot noted, 'Russia expects 
more from the Porte than I fancy our Government would acquiesce in'.
Adair to Howick, 4 April and 29 May 1807 (Grey).
2Lady Holland Journal, 1,1, 209.
3Allen Journal, entry of 12 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add MSS. 5220AA-I. 
Cabinet note by Holland, 11 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51917 (Holland).
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were incapable of formulating a realistic scheme of offensive operations 
in Europe for they disagreed on the goals of the war. South American 
schemes dodged this issue altogether. After the meeting of 11 February 
the foreign policy of the Ministry of All the Talents was prudently 
geared to an increase of 'purely British' interests in the new world.
This belated clarification of foreign policy was never put to the 
test. Frightened by the threat of rebellion of both Irish Catholics and 
Foxites and desirous of enlisting Catholics for duty in South America, 
Grenville boldly brought forward legislation to alter the Mutiny Act. In 
mid-March when Howick brought the Catholic Bill before the Commons George 
III dismissed the ministry with charges of duplicity.
CHAPTER IV
REORGANIZATION AND DISUNION,
MARCH - DECEMBER, 1807
The dismissal of the government came at an awkward moment. Half­
hearted pursuit of the peace negotiations with France after Fox became 
ill had assured the ministry of attacks from both right and left, and 
Cabinet disagreement during January and February 1807 had led to pro­
crastination and eventually to the adoption of half-measures which dis­
played clearly that the government was singularly incapable of coping 
with the demands of the war. When the ministry fell a tardy and totally 
inadequate naval expedition was headed for failure and disgrace at 
Constantinople; a British army was approaching defeat at Alexandria; and 
the expedition to Buenos Aires, which represented the first priority of 
government, had departed so under-manned and ineptly commanded that soon 
it would be repulsed by an inferior force.
The Talents had also mismanaged Anglo-American relations. The 
American treaty, on which the Cabinet had been comparatively united, was 
seen by the Courier as ’a Treaty almost entirely in favour of America, 
with scarcely one stipulation favourable to the commerce of this country - 
nay, so far from it, that it contains stipulations hostile to it.'* Sad­
ly, while the vast majority of Britons shared the feelings of the Pittite 
press, those who supported a policy of American conciliation found the 
principle of retaliation which had been asserted in the ’forcing note’ and 
in the Order in Council of 7 January equally objectionable. In its effort 
to appease both American and British public opinion, the government had 
alienated both, while at the same time causing great disharmony in its own
•^Courier, 11 Nov. 1807. Also see the Morning Post, 20 April 1807.
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ranks. 'The American commission was an epitome of the Cabinet; in nei­
ther was there a combination, but a collusion of talents', judged a pamph­
leteer. 'Every measure was a compromise ... The result was a total want 
of principle.' Britons of all political persuasions agreed with Thomas 
Courtenay that the Talents' American policy was 'vexatious enough to con­
tinue the complaints of America, but too weak to secure the interests of 
Britain'.'*' Notwithstanding the ministry's good intentions, British trade 
was beginning to feel the pinch of the French decrees by March and the 
American government later would refuse to ratify the treaty.
The decision to pursue 'purely British' interests had not been a bad 
one but, like every other decision of the ministry, it had been compromised 
to such an extent that nobody was pleased. Clearly Britain was unsuccess­
ful everywhere. One Foxite explained away all this folly by maintaining 
that 'had they remained in power much would have been accomplished ... but 
this it would have done slowly because it would have taken time to obtain 
the consent of some of the parties to all this good'.^ This was nonsense. 
Foreign policy, necessarily the first priority of every government during 
the French wars, had been a knife in the side of the Fox-Grenville coali­
tion from the start and the Cabinet had been unable to cope. Englishmen 
were aware of this in March and April. Crabb Robinson, reporting on for­
eign affairs for The Times, found the Talents reproached everywhere."*
The fall of the government also came at a moment when the Foxite
■^ Thomas P. Courtenay, Observations on the American Treaty 
(London, 1808), p. 92, and Additional Observations on the American 
Treaty ... (London, 1808), pp. 69-73.
2G. Coldham to Holland, 29 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 (Holland).
3T. Sadler, ed., The Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of 
Henry Crabb Robinson (London, 1869), I, 124. Also see the anonymous 
pamphlets, Plain Facts; or a Review of the Conduct of the late Ministers 
(London, 1807), and The State of the Case. Addressed to Lord Grenville 
and Lord Howick (London, 1807).
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Left was approaching open rebellion. The dispute on the peace negotia­
tions had opened gaping holes in the party, and government propaganda, 
which stressed that everything had had Fox's approval, backfired. Many 
Foxites had concluded that Fox had deserted his principles upon coming to 
power and Fox's name, which had worked wonders on those who had followed 
him, lost some of its magic. 'I was one of the number that shouted in 
the train of Mr. Fox, that embraced every feeling of my soul in opposi­
tion to the principles of which Mr. Pitt carried on the war against 
France', wrote a Bedfordshire Foxite. 'I was one of those who was stopped 
in their full career at the very moment they thought themselves sharers in 
the glory of having conquered in the cause of justice and peace, by the 
very leader, who had inspired us with the desire to conquer and who had 
led us on.'^ It appears that these feelings were almost universal among 
the popular wing of the party. Henry White claimed that Fox's behaviour 
in 1806 'blasted at a blow the sanguine expectations of my ardent youth'* 2 
and even the loyal Whitbread admitted that the last years of his hero's 
life had 'overset the Publick opinion with regard to Statesmen' and that 
the rump of his ministry had 'completed the job'.-*
Fox's death had given rise to a stir for reform which had become 
serious by the time of the government's fall. In late 1806 two pamphlets 
had attacked Tierney for apostasy on the issue and Cobbett had lent his 
powerful pen to this cry.^ Serious dissension had arisen among Foxites
*-P. Payne to Whitbread, 6 Sept. 1812 (Whitbread), 2557.
2Independent Whig, 22 Nov. 1807.
^Whitbread to Creevey, 20 Dec. 1808, Creevey Papers, I, 90-92.
^J. G. Jones, Five Letters to the Right Honourable George Tierney 
including reflections on his political character and conduct (London, 
1806), and S. F. Waddington, Three Letters to that greatest of political 
Apostates, the Right Honourable George Tierney (London, 1806).
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at the metropolitan election of 1806 and according to Holland, Burdett 
had succeeded in doing 'irreparable mischief by shaking the confidence 
which seemed to be so firmly established between the Whigs and Reformers—  
and endeavoring as far as lay in him to diminish the popular influence and 
consequently the power of the former to carry their principles and plans 
into execution'This was undeniable. Perry's Morning Chronicle was not 
only under serious attack but on the verge of collapse due to its support 
of the Talents and White's Independent Whig was daily gaining ground in 
Westminster and in the City of London. The dilemma faced by the party 
hierarchy had been defined succinctly by Gillray in January 1807 when he 
published a caricature which portrayed two parties trying to pull the 
Talents down: the Pittites and the patriots. These 'patriots' had been 
held in line almost solely by faith in Fox; his death had set them adrift.^
The rantlngs of reformers, however, were as nothing when compared 
to the excitement which had been raised by the Talents' Catholic Bill.
The gesture itself had spread alarm everywhere, and the Cabinet had dis­
turbed Englishmen further by being less than honest with the king in 
bringing it forward. Finally, when George III got wind of the scheme, 
his ministers had taken fright and backed away enough to assure the hos­
tility of Irish Catholics.^ With cries of 'No Popery' and 'Church and 
King' growing daily, the new government of the Duke of Portland dis­
solved Parliament and the deposed ministers were forced to endure an 
election at a time when their policies had engendered a storm of
^-Holland to Roscoe, 11 Nov. 1806 (Roscoe), 2090. Also see Roscoe 
to Holland, 13 Nov. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51650 (Holland). Also see the 
anonymous pamphlet, History of the Westminster and Middlesex Elections in 
the month of November l£06 (London, 1807TT ~
2Asquith, 'James Perry', pp. 192-93.
1 l k  . ■ , i ' r j  f f  %
3Dinwiddy, 'Parliamentary Reform', pp. 124-25.
^Michael Roberts, The Whig Party, 1807-1812 (London, 2nd ed.,
1965), pp. 13-26.
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religious bigotry in England.'*
In the end the members of the coalition could only count their 
blessings and breathe a sigh of relief that their government had not 
brought forward parliamentary reform. Backed by the power of 
Fitzwilliam's sterling, Lord Milton was elected along with Wilberforce 
in Yorkshire after a bitter contest with his Pittite opponent.^ This 
triumph was accompanied by that of the old Foxite George Byng in 
Middlesex and the party hierarchy was delighted to capture seats in 
large, open constituencies. But all this could not disguise the fact 
that the election showed considerable public discontent with the deposed 
ministry. Fitzpatrick had won his seat by only fifteen votes in 'safe' 
Bedfordshire and he reported that old women 'had a spite at him, call­
ing him paleface and buttermilk, and telling him one comfort was that 
... he would not live to keep it long'. Lord William Russell had been 
beaten convincingly in Surrey; Tierney had not been returned; and George 
Ponsonby, the Irish Chancellor, had been defeated in his native Ireland. 
Roscoe, a promising young Foxite, had been beaten at Liverpool and of 
great consequence was the defeat of Howick in Northumberland. Humil­
iated, the Foxite leader was forced to turn to one of Bedford's family 
boroughs.^ The most symbolic defeat, however, came in Westminster,
Fox's old constituency, where Sheridan, running on memories of days
^See the anonymous pamphlet, All the Talents in Ireland 1 A 
satirical poem with notes (London, 1807).
2E. A. Smith, 'The Yorkshire Elections of 1806 and 1807; a study 
in electoral management', Northern History, II (1967).
•*Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 28 May 1807, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 250.
^Lady Morpeth to Morpeth, 14 May [1807], (Carlisle). Tierney to 
Howick, 18 May 1807 (Grey).
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gone by, was trounced.^ Flaunting both his political independence and 
support for reform, Burdett was returned. Howick and Holland must have 
shuddered when the new 'Man of the People' was drawn through the streets 
in an enormous triumphal car, seated on a chair of state, and dressed in 
a blue coat and buff breeches.* 2 Holland was forced to admit that 'if 
the Court had not gained, the Whigs had lost the people'.'* Sadly, this 
feeling was mutual. The Foxite hierarchy was incensed by the ’perverse 
and illiberal manners' of the public.^ 'So much for the substantial 
value of fame, which is purchased at so great an expense of comfort & 
of health', wrote Howick.
The fall of the government had seriously damaged the coalition's 
parliamentary strength. Thanks to Buckingham's borough patronage 
Grenville's followers in the Commons remained firm but the Grenvillites 
had lost their fringe supporters in the Lords. Infuriated by the poli­
cies of the Talents, Egremont had refused further support without ex­
planation and he had been followed by Kenyon, Oxford, Selkirk,
Eglinton, and Northumberland. When the smoke cleared, Grenville found 
himself reduced to only his closest friends and the members of his 
family, all of whom were now unpopular in the country.^ Sidmouth also
^"Unsupported by Grenville and Howick, Sheridan turned unsuccess­
fully to Georgians,Lady Morpeth for emotional support. Her mother had 
played a prominent role in the reelection of Fox in Westminster in 
1784. Lady Morpeth to Morpeth, 12 May 1807 (Carlisle).
2Albemarle, Fifty Years of My Life, I, 247-48.
"^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II, 227-32.
^Bedford to Howick, 23 May 1807 (Grey).
%owick to Lady Howick, 13 May 1807 (Grey).
^Cassilis to Spencer, 30 April and 10 May 1807 (Spencer). Selkirk 
to Lauderdale and Lauderdale to Selkirk, n.d. [April 1807], B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51691 (Holland), ff. 98-103. Howick to Holland, 30 May 1807, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). Egremont to T. Grenville, 8 Nov. 1809, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 41857 (T. Grenville). T. Grenville to Spencer, 10 Nov. 1809 
(Spencer).
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posed a problem. Ever true to his principles, the 'Doctor' had not dis­
guised his opposition to the Talents' Catholic Bill and his discussions 
with the king had cast on him the ugly imputation of apostasy among both 
Foxties and Grenvillites. Windham was also politically isolated. The 
Grenvillites loathed him because of his social connexions with the 
Foxites and the Foxites distrusted his political views.*
Possibly the most important consideration, however, was continu­
ing animosity between Grenvillites and Foxites. Political coalition had 
not brought social union.
Grenvillite ladies, especially Lady Grenville and Lady Spencer, 
were great prudes who wanted nothing to do with the scandals of 
Devonshire House, the bawdiness of Woburn Abbey, the affairs of Lady 
Jersey and Lady Melbourne, the rudeness of Lady Holland, or the pious 
self-righteousness of Mrs. Fox, a former lady about town. Grenville 
himself looked with disdain upon the social character of Fox's old par­
ty. Fitzpatrick, Francis, Lauderdale, Lord Robert Spencer, and Lord 
John Townshend were hard drinkers, gamers, and skirt-chasers who appre­
ciated a cock fight and who had been known to brawl on occasion. Of 
course the humble origins of Whitbread and Sheridan were equally ob­
jectionable and Grenville was deeply suspicious of the manner in which 
young Foxites had been raised. He once complained of Petty's'preju­
dices & leanings (derived from his education & from the habits of so­
ciety into which he happens to have been thrown) ... which ... by no 
means correspond with those which I have long since adopted & acted 
upon'. *2
*Note Holland's views on party bickering in his Memoirs of the 
Whig Party, II, 204-15.
2Grenvllle to T. Grenville, 22 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville).
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The loss of office accentuated political as well as social dif­
ferences between Grenvillites and Foxites, There is good reason to be­
lieve that Grenville saw himself as the true successor of Pitt, for 
later he spoke jealously of Perceval and Castlereagh as the leaders of 
'the party of the Tories, & the old Court & high Church'.* Grenville 
was bound to Pitt primarily by his rather poorly developed concept of 
Pittite foreign policy which, after all, had been his own. This was 
unfortunate for coalition harmony because, as J. W. Ward (later Earl of 
Dudley) noted, Pitt's real legacy was eternal war with revolutionary 
France, a principle which struck at the root of Foxite ideology. In 
opposition Grenville insisted on the same reverence for Pitt's memory 
that he had demanded in office. This sensitivity brought problems.
'... I hope I need not assure you that my opinion as to Pitt is much 
too deeply rooted, and formed upon too long an examination of the Arch- 
juggler's proceedings, to be at any time even in the least degree modi­
fied by any reason of party expediency or party concert', wrote 
Brougham. 'I need scarcely add that no other motive ... could ever 
reach me. Indeed, any notion of such sentiments giving offence in any 
quarter of our friends, could only have the effect of making one speak 
more loudly if possible.'"*
These differences were serious in themselves, but where Grenville 
was willing to compromise, his family and friends were not. Buckingham, 
Temple, Glastonbury, Carysfort, Stafford, and Fremantle among the 
Grenvillites and Fitzwilliam, Windham, and Elliot among the Burkians 1
1Grenville to T. Grenville, 17 May 1812, ibid.
^Ward to Whitbread, 4 Feb. 1808 (Whitbread), 2440.
^Brougham to Creevey, 1810, Greevey Papers. I, 
llJ)-20. For Romilly's views on this subject see his Memoirs, II,
255-56.
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were devoted to the restoration of the Bourbon Family to the throne of 
France, and Stowe was soon to become a second home for the princes of 
the blood. Foxites and Grenvillites disagreed fundamentally on European 
politics and though their ministry had done a remarkable job of avoiding 
this question, underlying discord had been ever-present. Much the same 
could be said of domestic politics. The Foxite hierarchy could not es­
cape from the fact that much of their political reputation depended on 
continued support of Foxite principles of the 1790's. These principles 
called clearly for parliamentary and financial reform - projects which 
Grenvillites abhorred.
However, Grenville, Sidmouth, and the Burkians were but append­
ages of the larger Foxite party. Grenville's strength in the Commons 
was insignificant - probably no more than twelve - and his power in the 
Lords was now eclipsed by that of the Foxites. Fitzwilliam had little 
more than his family name. He seldom attended Parliament and his friend 
Windham could count on personal support from nobody but Elliot and 
Lawrence. Sidmouth (ever a potential ally because of his feud with 
Canning) had been weakened considerably in the election of 1806 and he 
probably could depend on the support of no more than twenty men in the 
Commons.1 In marked contrast the Foxites numbered well over eighty in 
the lower house and a year in office had swelled their ranks in the 
Lords. Moreover, as Allen noted, this group (which was regarded gene­
rally as the 'whig' part of the coalition as opposed to the Grenvillite) 
could be expected to become larger with time for it was being 1
1Sidmouth's 'party' is a mystery. Grenville estimated it to 
number 'between 40 and 50' on 20 May 1807 but this is undoubtedly an 
inflated figure. I suspect that Sidmouth could depend on no more than 
fifteen or twenty but that several country gentlemen supported him on 
rare visits to London. His power was great on the Catholic question. 
Grenville to Holland, 20 May 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 (Holland).
133
strengthened gradually by the accession of young men from aristocratic 
families.^ The Foxites, however, were a divided party.
The splintering of Fox's old party was occurring not only in the 
popular wing but also among the Foxite hierarchy as well. The support of 
the Prince of Wales had been fundamental in Fox's concept of party poli­
tics. During the last two decades of the eighteenth century he had 
taken great care to flatter, pacify, and indoctrinate Prinny. After a 
break of several years these efforts had been resumed in 1804 and 1805 
when Fox had become impressed by 'the slowly increasing but still in-
•ycreasing weight of Carlton House ...' By the time the Talents came to 
power Fox had so boosted the Prince's sense of importance that the royal 
heir considered himself the leader of the Whig party, and Malmesbury 
noted disdainfully that he had assumed 'the size of a common party 
leader'.^ In the vacuum which followed Fox's death Holland had re­
emphasized Prinny's importance in stressing that 'unless the Foxite side 
of the Ministry have ... the sanction, support and favour of the Prince, 
they will have no weight at all, and will be merely employed under an­
other party'.^ This plea had fallen on deaf ears. Grenville detested 
Prinny and resented his influence in the government; Howick, an old 
rival of the Prince for the favours of the Duchess of Devonshire, had 
a poor relationship with Carlton House. According to Holland, after 
Fox's death the government had treated the Prince 'with as continued and 
mortifying a slight as could have been exhibited towards the most *3
^Allen Journal, entry of 26 Feb. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 52204A-I.
^Fox to Lauderdale, 12 July 1805, B.M., Add. MSS. 47564 (Fox).
3Third Earl of Malmesbury, ed., Diaries and Correspondence of 
John Harris First Earl of Malmesbury (London, 1844), IV, 349-50.
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, I, 244-45.
insignificant runner of a party'.*
Of course Prinny had been horrified and he had had little trouble 
identifying with Sheridan, who was disliked by Howick and Grenville and 
who had been politically isolated by Fox's death. By December 1806 
Sheridan and the Prince had found much in common. At Carlton House they 
\Ah\etvVeA Fox over gallons of port and were delighted when Howick and 
Grenville suffered a setback. When the ministry fell they pinned the 
blame squarely on Grenville, and Carlton House complained loudly that the 
government had deserted Fox's principles. This led to an open break be­
tween Carlton House and Dropmore. After talking to the Duke of Clarence 
Tierney concluded that 'someone had been at work to prejudice the Prince 
against Lord G[renville] and had succeeded'. This was Sheridan. By 
summer Carlton House opposed Grenville and ignored Howickthere was 
fear in the party that Sheridan and the Prince would raise a standard of 
their own.^
Then there was Whitbread. No man had shown more devotion to Fox 
and his principles than the brewer. Devoid of all rank and social stand­
ing, Whitbread had cast his lot with the public and had become one of the 
few genuine 'liberals' among leading Foxites. He not only spoke about, 
but believed in the necessity of helping the poor, of improving 1*34
1Ibid.. II, 60-61.
^Tierney to Howick, 29 Sept. 1807 (Grey).
Note Lady Bessborough's comments on the poor relationship which 
existed between Howick and the Prince in her letter to Ld. G. L. Gower,
3 June 1807, Granville Correspondence, II, 250-51.
4Ld. John Townshend to Howick, 5 April 1807 (Grey). Prince of 
Wales to Spencer, 30 Mar. 1807 (Spencer). Prince of Wales to Tierney,
30 Mar. 1807 (Tierney). Bedford to W. Adam, 2 April 1807 (Adam).
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prisons, of equalizing representation in Parliament, of reforming the 
abuses of government, and, above all, of bringing peace to Great 
Britain on almost any terms so as to insure liberty at home. His con­
tempt for continental monarchs and British involvement in their war 
was so extreme that many people thought him inept in foreign affairs 
and unpatriotic in his views. The reverse was the case. Whitbread 
was a Foxite in the sense of 1793 and, unlike many of his friends, he 
refused to accept the context of a war which he felt threatened both 
British and French liberties.
Whitbread lived by the code he laid down in Parliament. He was 
active in Westminster and Bedfordshire politics and he dispersed the 
profits of his brewery so freely in his county that some people called 
it 'Whitbreadshire'. Unfortunately he identified so closely with 
Napoleon’s struggle against the courts of Europe that a bust of the 
Emperor stood in his parlour, imperial eagles held up the curtains in 
his drawing room, and, like Holland House, Southin'8 decor was con­
spicuously French. Under Fox's bust in the library were the lines:
He pleads humanity's neglected cause 
And wins from after ages sure applause.
Bred and raised in the Commons under the watchful eye of Fox, Whitbread
accepted the hostility of established power with a smile, confident
that his principles would sweep him to political prominence when peace
restored the balance of the Constitution. Understandably his following
in the country was large and his reputation for consistency rendered
him the party's best link with the people.^-
He was, however, a difficult man to manage. 'Where a total sur­
render of Opinion on grounds of the first importance is demanded of me
1Fulford, pp. 73, 115.
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as the price of cooperation, I cannot pay that price', he wrote. 'Fox 
never expected it of any man; nor did he conceive that he had a right 
to exact it of any man.'* 3- Whitbread realized where his power was an­
chored and he once told Howick that 'having no Family to boast of, I 
ought to be and am more diffident as to my situation with the Public 
than if I were nobly born'.^ Whitbread was acutely conscious of his 
social handicaps and when Fox and Howick did not find a place in govern­
ment for him, he wrote that he had lost 'all the reputation my 
Consistency and Effort of fifteen years ... have procured for me'.3 
This slap in the face had been followed by ministerial behaviour which 
troubled him greatly and by Howick's failure to find him a place in the 
ministry after Fox's death. In September 1806 he had demanded office 
and though Howick had promised him the War Office (of all places) on 
Fitzpatrick's retirement, Whitbread in effect had broken with the gov­
ernment by attacking the management of the peace negotiations. From 
January 1807 the Grenvilles desired Whitbread's separation from the 
party.^ And with good reason! Fox's old friend had nothing in common 
with the Grenvilles, either socially or politically. Piqued and hor­
rified by what he saw as an abandonment of principle, Whitbread began 
to surround himself with fawning admirers who loathed Grenville and 
distrusted Howick. When the Talents fell Gillray drew the king as a 
farmer driving his pigs down a cliff to the sea. Whitbread was no more 
than a half-submerged barrel of beer in this print. The brewer,
^Whitbread to Grey, 9 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
^Whitbread to Howick, Mar. 1806, ibid.
3Fulford, p. 144.
^Grenville to T, Grenville, 23 Feb. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 
(T. Grenville). T. Grenville to Grenville, 23 Nov. 1807, H.M.C. 
Dropmore, IX, 148-50.
however, was ripe for rebellion and no man in Britain threatened the 
party hierarchy more than he.
Most of the party's problems can be traced to the absence of a
leader. Fox was irreplaceable. His intellectual hold on the party had
been so great that many Foxites had distrusted their judgement whenever
1they disagreed with him. Unfortunately it appears that few Foxites 
had learned to think for themselves and that those who had done so, 
like Tierney and Sheridan, were shunned.  ^ Howick's wife once admitted 
that her husband often formed political opinions solely on the basis of 
Fox's reasoning at a given time1 *3 *and Adair worried constantly lest his 
behaviour would not show 'unshaken steadiness in the cause of Mr.
Fox . ..'^ This vague but highly emotional reverence to the past 
seriously prejudiced the decisions of the present; according to 
Brougham, popularity in the party depended on a refusal to see 'Pitt &
Fox & Burke in their graves'.5
On these terms Holland was the most popular man in the party, 
but Fox's nephew was young, idealistic, inexperienced, and disinterested 
in everyday politics.6 De jure leadership fell on Howlck. Ambitious, 
vain, and talented in debate, the young Charles Grey had closely re­
sembled Canning in the 1780's and there is ample reason to believe that 
circumstances had far outweighed conviction in his gravitation towards
1S. Parr to Holland, 16 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51651 (Holland).
^G. Olphin, George Tierney (London, 1934), pp.42-3, 74.
3Lady Grey to Adair, n.d, [early 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 51611 
(Holland), ff. 1-2.
^Holland to Adair, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 51609 (Holland), ff. 34-5.
^Brougham to Alien, 26 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
6Lloyd Sanders, The Holland House Circle (London, 1908), p. 26.
137
138
Fox. Lady Holland felt that the charms of the Duchess of Devonshire 
had been the fount of his Whiggism and that he had been 'more seduced 
by his heart than convinced by his reason'.1 But whatever the motive, 
once committed Grey had been zealous, indeed overzealous. His total 
disregard of convention and political prudence during the early stages 
of the French Revolution had been instrumental in Fox's separation from 
Burke, and he and his rude friend Lauderdale had been so vehement in 
their advocacy of parliamentary reform as to cause dissension among 
Fox's few remaining supporters. But for some inexplicable reason Fox 
had loved him above all others and had defended his indiscretions. In 
explaining Grey's attachment to Fox at a later date Holland admitted 
that the young man knew that 'much of the obloquy cast on the party was 
founded on measures of which he had been the author' and that Fox had 
'supported him against the aspersions, even of some of his oldest 
friends'.2
Though Grey remained loyal to Fox throughout the 1790's his poli­
tical principles, like those of Lauderdale, had not held firm under 
pressure. By 1797 he had lost faith in the people. 'It is but too 
plain that the public take no deep interest in our reforms or in any 
other public measure which does not affect their pockets', he had
written. 'How often have we been told ... that if we would only speak 
out, if we would throw off the disguise, if we would only give a pledge 
which people could understand & depend upon, we should experience a 
degree of assistance & support which would be effectual ... This long
desired pledge ... has been given, & where is the support?' Convinced
1Lady Holland Journal, I, 171.
2Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, I, 31.
■*Grey to Whitbread, 16 Oct. [1797], (Whitbread), 866.
of public profligacy, Grey had been a great force in the Foxite seces­
sion from Parliament in 1797 and afterwards at his home in 
Northumberland he had turned to social respecta.bility and family life 
with a determination that would produce fifteen children. Between 1802 
and 1805 Fox had experienced great difficulty not only in luring Grey 
to London but in reaching agreement with him on matters of foreign 
policy.1
Grey's behaviour in office had raised serious doubts about his poli­
tical consistency among Foxites. He was easily the most warlike member 
of the Cabinet after Fox's death and his defence of the rupture of the 
peace negotiations had contradicted his sentiments of two years before. 
Brougham contended that Howick was decidedly 'Grenvillian';2 *Major
Cartwright noted that Howick's friends had 'more reason than his enemies'
3to find fault with him; and Sheridan described him as one of those who 
had been 'thrown by accident in the outset of his life into situations 
for which they are not fitted, become Friends of the People for a time, 
and afterwards, finding their mistake, desert the popular cause'.4 This 
was a fair assessment. After Fox's death Howick's willingness to accept 
Pittite wartime policy had led to the obscurity of the Foxites in 
policy-making and Grenville had treated the Foreign Office as his own.5 
Though Holland, Bedford, and many other key members of the Foxite hier­
archy looked to Howick for leadership, Howick himself looked to Grenville.
1See above, pp. 30-31.
2Brougham to Rosslyn, n.d. [6 Jan. 1807], copy (Brougham), 
aF. D. Cartwright, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Major 
Cartwright (London, 1826), p. 352.
4Fulford, p. 275.




The net result of these difficulties was dissension and apathy 
among key party members in the wake of the government's fall. Brougham, 
who managed the party's press campaign,^ got little support. Horner, 
Francis, Petty, and James Abercrombie refused to write articles for the 
press; the Foxite editor of the Globe would not cooperate; and Brougham 
reported that Perry had 'too much of an opinion of his own'. During 
the election, party machinery in Surrey broke down because of internal 
squabbles, Yorkshire Foxites missed the poll by going to a horse race, 
and many candidates who had supported the Talents either deserted out­
right or prudently refused to identify with Howick and Grenville.5 The 
short summer session of Parliament disclosed that initial estimates of 
party strength had been too optimistic. On 26 June the opposition mus­
tered only 155 votes to the government's 350 and on a state of the na­
tion vote of 6 July that number fell to 136.4 The prorogation of 
Parliament found Howick and Grenville in despair; the party's strength 
was falling slowly but surely, dissension was rampant, and it was 
obvious that most independent members were hostile. Infuriated by 
Howick's inability to control his party, Grenville left for Cornwall 
immediately. Foxite leaders remained in London, aware of their dif­
ficulties but unsure of solutions.
'My first object is to contribute as much as I personally can to­
wards keeping my Uncle' 3 political friends together upon the same prin­
ciples as they & he uniformly acted', wrote a disturbed Holland.5 This *24
^A. Aspinall, Politics and the Press, 1780-1850 (London, 1949), 
pp. 284-91.
2Brougham to Allen, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 May 1807, B.M., Add.
MSS. 52177 (Allen).
^Tierney to Howick, 20 May 1807 (Grey).
4Abbot Diary, IT, 123-25.
^Holland to Howick, 19 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
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feeling was general among Foxites. The timing of Fox's death, however, 
had left much doubt as to what his principles were and upon whom he 
looked as political friends. Howick, Holland, and Bedford faced the 
same basic dilemma which Fox had faced between 1801 and 1806, a dilemma 
which sprang from a conflict of 'principles'. On the one hand were the 
clearly established general principles of group loyalty and systematic 
opposition; on the other was the leading tactic of Fox's last years in 
politics: coalition with traditional enemies. Between these already 
contradictory maxims were the specific principles of peace and reform, 
principles which set Foxites apart from other politicians. Fox's pre­
cedent was clear. He had chosen coalition with 'odious' politicians 
and justified this decision by maintaining that a powerful party in the 
House of Commons backed by firm aristocratic connexions and acting upon 
systematic opposition to the Crown was the only manner in which peace 
and reform could be realised. This approach had implied only a tacti­
cal union with Grenville, a union to 'checkmate' the king, gain office, 
secure peace, and thereby restore the 'natural balance' of the 
Constitution.
The problem came from the fact that death had stopped Fox in mid­
stream. This had led to serious disagreement among his successors. 
Generally Foxites in the government agreed with Grenville that peace had 
been prevented only by French duplicity. On the other hand there were 
grounds for a sound argument that the diplomacy of Grenville and Howick 
had prevented Anglo-French accord. In this argument Fox's views were 
battered to and fro like a shuttlecock with one prominent result:
Howick and the party hierarchy were pushed towards the Grenville camp. 
This was the determining factor. Already a strong case could be made 
for the maintenance of the coalition. A return to the opposition
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benches necessarily began a new campaign against the Crown, a campaign 
in which allies would be necessary, and Grenville had proved himself to 
be a reliable ally in such a contest. Holland noted that Grenville's 
decision to maintain the coalition after Fox's death 'secured him the 
affections of many, and should have dispelled the suspicions of all, who 
had been uniformly attached to Mr. Fox'.'*" Enraged by their dismissal 
and united with the Grenvilles by the attacks of Pittites, radical 
Foxites, and middle class opinion,the Foxite hierarchy maintained a con­
nexion in opposition that had proved difficult in office.
Such a decision had enormous consequences. In all probability a 
majority of Fox's old admirers agreed with the moderate Horner that 
Fox's party and the old Whig faction had died with him and that circum­
stances demanded a popular party 'constituted by the opinions, inte­
rests, and habits of those numerous families who are characterized by 
moderate but increasing incomes ...' Continued coalition with 
Grenville rendered the formation of such a party impossible. Because of 
this and the open hostility of the Prince, Sheridan, Whitbread, and many 
of the party's young men it is not surprising that Tierney found 'some 
amongst us who I think would not be sorry to get rid of him [Grenville] 
and who will be ready enough to put the worst interpretation upon what­
ever he does and to quote for the purpose of mischief any stray impres­
sion ... which in a sulky moment he may drop'.-* This prediction was 
sound. Grenville's presence in the ranks of the opposition would prove 
disastrous.
The immediate consequence of cooperation with Grenville in
^•Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party. II, 50.
2Horner to Jeffrey, 15 Sept. 1806, Horner Memoirs, I,
373-76.
^Tierney to Howick, 29 Sept. 1807 (Grey).
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opposition was continuing emphasis on the foreign policy of the 
Ministry of All the Talents. In July news arrived that the Franco- 
Russian war had ended in stalemate and that Alexander and Napoleon had 
signed not only a truce, but a treaty of alliance at Tilsit. This de­
velopment had a great impact on British public opinion and it led to 
increased recrimination in Parliament. Whereas the supporters of the 
Portland ministry emphasized the importance of Europe, the need for 
continued British involvement, and the ruinous foreign policy of the 
former government, the opposition presented a united front in calling 
for home defence, retrenchment, and defensive warfare as they had done 
in office. As always, Lady Holland went overboard and 'gave up the 
whole country to destruction as unworthy to be nam'd among the nations 
of Europe', but her sentiments were not far removed from those of the 
party hierarchy.'*’ Threatened by internal disagreement and infuriated 
by the grounds on which their government had fallen, Howick and 
Grenville represented Irish relief as the covenant of their wartime 
politics and Catholic emancipation as a sine qua non for their return 
to power. Grenville outlined this rationale:
Whoever has been obliged as I was for so many years to watch the 
course of events of a naval War must know that no maritime supe­
riority can enable us to prevent an Enemy who has the command of 
the whole coasts & navies from Stockholm to Alexandria from landing 
troops in Ireland. No naval superiority could prevent this, nor 
can any reasonable man ensure that in the present state of Europe 
we can retain any naval superiority at all, for any considerable 
space of time.
If French troops are landed in Ireland ... a hostile neutrality 
is the utmost we can how hope, & more than we can reasonably expect 
from them.
Can we then defend Ireland by British troops alone, against the 
armies of France, & the wishes, if not the exertions, of the mass
^Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 23 July 1807, 
Granville Correspondence, II, 268-69.
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of its own population? I am confident we cannot - The example of 
America is in point. & the case of Ireland is far more difficult 
than that ever was.
These views were but a forceful restatement of Fox-Grenvllle logic in 
1804 and 1805. Grenville was always a great friend of Irish claims in 
opposition and in times of national peril, and Tilsit rendered him so 
violent that the shade of principle which separated him from the 
Foxites on the subject disappeared altogether. 'But the real effect to 
be produced is by creating a belief among that very large body of men 
that the union with England has assured to them the affections & kind­
ness of the British Government, Parliament, & people', he wrote. 'Un­
less this is done they will still believe that in resisting French in­
vasion they are fighting your battle & not their own.'1 2
This approach was reasonable, but it was non-political. The fall 
of the Talents had made it clear that the king would not tolerate minis­
ters who he felt espoused principles that were inconsistent with his 
coronation oath, and the election had shown that public opinion could not 
equate national security with Catholic relief. Then, too, Sidmouth, who 
was eager to oppose the new ministry, would never agree to such heresy. 
Also of great importance was the fact that the French Revolution had 
made Englishmen overly protective of the Church of England and dis­
trustful of the Foxites on religious grounds.-^ The painter Farington 
expressed concern over the 'free-thinkers' at Holland House; George Rose 
recorded in his diary that Fox had been an enemy of the Church of 
England; and when Fox came to power in 1806 Wilberforce had noted that 
his 'chief fear of the party now in power, has long been grounded
1Grenville to Auckland, 26 July 1807, B.M., Add. MSS, 34457 
(Auckland),
2Ibid. Also see Ld. Ponsonby to Whitbread, (Whitbread), 4270.
^Holland to Wyvill, 11 Feb. 1808 (Whitbread), 4272.
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rather on the loose, immoral principles of many of them.'*
But though dangerous, the Catholic question was indispensable to 
the coalition. As one Foxite noted, the circumstances by which the 
Talents fell 'fixed that question upon them, and the universal impres­
sion of the public (whether favourable or not) has so identified their 
return to power with the success of that question, that they must carry 
it or lose the last remnant of character with the people . ..'^ Nobody 
felt this so much as Howick. 'This requires no consideration or con­
sultation with my friends', he told Tierney at a later date, 'for if 
they were all to be unanimously of opinion that we ought to undertake 
the government subject to some condition, I would not agree to it.'
Then there was the question of party unity. The various wings of the 
Foxite party looked favourably on Catholic relief and, as Holland wrote, 
Ireland was 'the badge & standard of the party' primarily because it was 
the 'only means of keeping us permanently united - for on what other 
point do our frinds all agree? ' ^
The importance which the opposition attached to Ireland in their 
general scheme of wartime policy was depicted clearly by the publication 
of The Letters of Peter Plymley, a series of stinging satires written by 
Sydney Smith under the auspices of Holland House and with the warm
-^-Farington Diary, VII, 94. Rev. Leveson Harcourt, ed. ,
The Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George Rose (London, 
1860), II, 277. Wilberforce Life, III, 269.
^Horner to Allen, 30 Sept. 1809, Horner Memoirs, I, 467-70.
■*Crey to Tierney, 3 Oct. 1809 (Tierney).
^Holland to Grey, 3 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). 
Adair claimed that Catholic relief was, 'after the abolition of the 
Slave Trade, the object nearest Mr. Fox's heart, and that as such he had 
left it as a legacy td his friends.' Adair to Holland, n.d,, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51609 (Holland), ff. 79-80.
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approval of Grenville.*- Portrayed as a series of letters from ficti­
tious Peter Plymley, an enlightened Whig, to his bigoted and obviously 
Tory brother Abraham, Smith's argument rested upon Fox's assertion of 
the 1790's that 'if you are engaged in a war that is to last for years, 
and to require important sacrifices, take care to make the justice of 
your case so clear and so obvious, that it cannot be mistaken by the 
most illiterate country gentleman who rides the earth'. And in line 
with Grenville's ideas of national expediency Smith warned 'that if 
Bonaparte lives, and a great deal is not immediately done for the con­
ciliation of the Catholics, it does seem to me absolutely impossible but 
that we must perish ...' Again and again he stressed that Ireland was 
nearly lost to England during the American War. He emphasized the grow­
ing strength of the French navy; he compared Napoleon's religious tole­
ration to the bigotry of the British Government; and he maintained that 
'No power in Europe, but yourselves, has ever thought for three hundred 
years past, of asking whether a bayonet is Catholic, Presbyterian, or 
Lutheran; but whether it is sharp and well-tempered'. This publication 
won the opposition few friends in England and none in Ireland, but the 
logic behind it united them in defence of their 'much wronged' ministry 
and gave them identity as a coalesced party. The Catholic question be­
came the rock upon which Howick and Grenville launched their wartimegrufinoyMvc*
opposition and a critical J. W. Ward came to see as the 'beau ideal'
3of Whiggism. But here ideological agreement ended. The question remained 
whether the happy irresponsibility of opposition could overcome the
*"Lady Holland, ed., A Memoir of the Reverend Sydney Smith (London, 
1855), I, 104.
2Sydney Smith, The Letters of Peter Plymley (London, 3rd ed.,
1929), pp. 3, 17, 20, 50, 57.
-*Ward to Helen Stewart, [Aug. 18131. Letters to 'Ivy', 
pp. 212-17.
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problems which had plagued the party in office.
Though they found it expedient to skirt the Irish question, the 
Portland Government reacted to the Treaty of Tilsit in much the same 
manner as their political antagonists. Upon receiving intelligence 
that Joseph Bonaparte was prepared to launch his long-delayed invasion 
of Portugal and that a secret clause of the Franco-Russian treaty had 
assured Franco-Danish naval cooperation, the Cabinet concluded that an 
invasion of the British Isles was imminent. Canning, the new Foreign 
Secretary, immediately displayed the decisiveness for which history 
would remember him best and the government acted with vigour. A large 
naval expedition set sail for Copenhagen with orders to confiscate or 
destroy the Danish fleet. At the same time a smaller force was des­
patched to Lisbon for the purpose of escorting the Portuguese Royal 
Family and their fleet to the Brazils.
The departure of the Copenhagen expedition set London ablaze with 
excitement and nobody was more favourably impressed than Tom Grenville 
and the knot of Grenvillite peers who advocated war to the knife: 
Spencer, Carysfort, Stafford, Cassilis,and Glastonbury. However, they 
stood alone among their political colleagues. Foxite leaders dis­
approved of the principle behind the attack on neutral Denmark and ar­
gued that mere suspicion did not warrant such extremism. Grenville, 
obsessed by fears of invasion and theories of home defence, was equally 
hostile. The risk, he maintained, outweighed the potential advantage, 
and the overall project 'resembled the dreams of a madman'. But ig­
norance of precisely what was transpiring kept these opinions private 
throughout August. The opposition press had little to say and Auckland 
and Grenville agreed that the political impact of the expedition would
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be formed 'not on merits, but on the result, of the enterprise'.-^
However, the party stance hardened in late August when Benjamin 
Garlike (the British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
to Denmark) sent Tom Grenville alarming news. According to Garlike 
Canning had instructed him to report officially that the Danes were 
preparing for war against Britain and when he refused to fabricate such 
a charge the Foreign Secretary had removed him to Memel without further 
ado. Garlike, who owed allegiance to the Talents, presented his case 
as a martyr and he was accepted as one. Though Tom Grenville continued 
to support the expedition, he softened his tone considerably and told 
Buckingham that ministers had tried to 'revenge themselves upon poor 
Garlike, for speaking the truth, instead of saying what was agreeable 
to their wishes.'2 Of course this intelligence was what the Foxites had 
been waiting for. Holland House expressed self-righteous indignation; 
Brougham was certain that the expedition would throw Danish seamen into 
the arras of France; and Howick was loud in abusing ministers. Windham 
joined this cry enthusiastically and Grenville sat in Cornwall brooding
3over the risk. Significantly Sidmouth was infuriated by the attack on 
Copenhagen. Ignoring differences on the Irish question, two of his 
lieutenants began correspondence with Auckland on the subject.^ But 
still the opposition was not prepared to make the Danish expedition a
^■Grenville to Auckland, 6 Aug. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
2T. Grenville to Buckingham, 25 Aug. 1807, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 200-01.
3Brougham to Holland, 2 Sept. [1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 51561 
(Holland). Windham to Cpt. Lukin, 5 Sept. 1807, Windham 
Papers, II, 333-35. Grenville to Auckland, 27 Aug. 1807, B.M., Add.
MSS. 34457 (Auckland).
^Buckinghamshire to Auckland, 22 Aug. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
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party question. 'Nobody seems to talk of the Expedition without a sort 
of complaint', wrote George Eden on 12 September. 'I believe people 
are ashamed of wishing it success, & yet cannot help it.'3
In mid-September word arrived that Admiral Gambler had silenced 
the Danish shore batteries, bombarded Copenhagen, forced the Danes to 
sign a convention, and made off with their entire fleet in tow. The 
Tower guns boomed and none could deny the unqualified success of 
Canning's project. The question for the opposition was whether British 
success was politic. Initially the Foxite leadership was impressed. In 
a complete about face Howick maintained that he had looked favourably on 
such an expedition for years.2 Though Petty continued to chatter about 
principle, he confessed to Lady Holland that the project 'appears to 
have been judiciously as well as boldly conducted'.-* Holland compro­
mised. He was reluctant either to approve of the expedition or to ex­
press admiration for Canning's stroke and he somehow concluded that the 
affair had been effected so as to open peace negotiations with France.
But political recrimination soon prevailed. 'I do not believe 
that any such object [peace] was ever in view', wrote Lord King. 'It 
was rather Intended to exhibit a strong contrast with your inactivity 
... '4 The contrast was striking indeed. Right or wrong, Canning had 
acted in a manner which re-emphasized the waffling of his predecessor 
and the Portland ministry took care to promote this truth. Soon Bedford *234
^G. Eden to Auckland, 12 Sept. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
2Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 25 Sept. 1807,
Granville Correspondence. II, 286-87.
3Petty to Lady Holland, 22 Sept. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
4Ld. King to Holland, 8 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 (Holland).
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held that Foxite honour and principle demanded open and bold opposition 
to the expedition and upon reflection Petty decided that the British 
occupation of Zealand, which had followed the bombardment, compounded 
injury with impolicy.*- To these opinions was added the surprising out­
rage of Fitzwilliam and Windham and the remonstrances of Sidmouth's 
followers.2 'it was a coward's blow; ijt^ was aimed at Russia and 
Prussia, but it struck at Copenhagen!', cried the Independent Whig, and 
other opposition newspapers began to lament the expedition.-*
All this completely ignored the fact that British pride was 
thrilled. The ministerial press sang Canning's praises and polite so­
ciety followed suit. Many opposition ladies thought that Canning was 
marvellovs and feminine chatter about the 'naughty Danes' frustrated 
more than one member of opposition. Lady Caroline Lamb was so vocal in 
her praise of Canning that William found it necessary to restrain her 
and similar scenes occurred at Castle Howard and Chatsworth.^ By early 
October Tierney and Bedford were expressing serious reservations about 
raising the issue in Parliament and Whitbread, while demanding parlia­
mentary exertion, warned Itowick that ministers would defend themselves 
by pointing to the Talents' Portuguese policy.* 25 Meanwhile, Windham and
*■ Bedford to Holland, 1 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 
(Holland). Petty to Howick, 9 Oct. 1807 (Grey).
2Lauderdale to Howick, 17 Oct. 1807 (Grey). Sidmoutli 
Life, II, 479-81.
^Independent Whig. 18 Oct. 1807. Morning Chronicle, 19 Oct.
1807. Statesman. 19, 20 Oct. 1807.
^William Lamb to Lady Caroline Lamb, 25 Sept. 1807, A. Aspinall 
and the Earl of Bessborough, eds., Lady Bessborough and Her Family 
Circle (London, 1940), pp. 163-64. Lady Spencer to Lady Morpeth, n.d. 
[Oct. 1807?], (Carlisle), 2/6 (incorrectly filed).
5Tierney to Howick, 7 Oct., and Bedford to Howick, 19 Oct., and 
Whitbread to Howick, 4 Oct. 1807 (Grey).
Erskine were trying to stir up the public in Norfolk and the Foxite 
Left was hot on the subject. Seeing this disarray, Howick maintained 
silence in Northumberland and confided to Lauderdale that the issue 
would be forgotten before the meeting of Parliament.^
Animosities within the party kept the issue alive.
Auckland, who appears to have been motivated by a sincere desire to 
hold the coalition to the vague principles of the late government, 
maintained that the expedition had stained British character, closed 
the Baltic to British commerce,>and strengthened Napoleon's hold on the 
Continent.^ However, few Grenvillites agreed with him after the suc­
cess of the expedition became known. Provoked by the views of the 
Foxite press and hostile to cooperation with Windham and Sidmouth, Tom 
Grenville set out to unite his brother's party in support of the ex­
pedition. 'The language of the Horning Chronicle & what I hear quoted 
of that wing of the opposing army ... is so little agreeable to my 
honest opinion, that I do not avoid any opportunity of making known my 
sentiments upon that subject lest they should seem to be Included in 
the language of the majority of the opposition', he told Spencer. He 
maintained that opposition to the Copenhagen Expedition was hypocriti­
cal because of the Talents' Portuguese policy and he was determined to 
keep his family's name clear of Foxite views.3
His efforts had Impact. Morpeth, who had criticized 'the folly, 
the Injustice, the rashness, the impolicy ... of the measure' in early
■^Lauderdale to Howick, 2 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
o‘'Auckland to Grenville, 23 Sept. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
137-38.
qT. Grenville to Spencer, 15 Nov. 1807 (Spencer). T. Grenville 
to Grenville, 15 Nov. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore. IX, 144-46. For the of­
fending editorials see the Morning Chronicle, 13, 22, and 26 Nov. 1807.
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September, wrote that 'One must not enquire too strictly into the jus­
tice of a measure that has had such brilliant success ...' ^ Temple 
and Spencer agreed and Buckingham, always sensitive to the necessity of 
family integrity and political independence, joined brother Tom enthu­
siastically. ^
Lord Grenville's views, however, were the key to family and 
party unity and it was with him that Tom Grenville had most difficulty. 
On 2 October the former Prime Minister denied that there was similarity 
between Copenhagen and any aspect of his ministry's wartime policy and 
though he admitted that the Danes had been 'more than willing to be 
ravished' he criticized the Portland government for announcing its in­
tention to 'meet Bonaparte with his own weapons'. Intelligence of the 
secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit did not effect his opinion to 
any great extent, for as late as 10 November he wrote that the issue 
'depended wholly on the case ministers could make out ...' But 
Grenville's neutrality deteriorated under fire from his family. On 18 
November he told Tom Grenville that it was 'high time for us to fight 
Bonaparte with his own weapons. I certainly believe in the hostile 
mind of Demnark, &, assuming that, I have no doubt that it was right 
for us to act while it was yet time for us to do so.' Significantly, 
he agreed that efforts should be made to 'mark that our sentiments on 
such questions are not to be pledged by the language of others held
^Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 25 Sept. 1807,
Granville Correspondence, XT, 286-87.
2Spencer to T. Grenville, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 
(T. Grenville). Temple to Auckland, 2 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS.
34457 (Auckland). Buckingham to T. Grenville, 27 Sept. 1807, B.M.,
Add. MSS. 41851 (T. Grenville). Buckingham to Fremantle, 11 Oct. 
[1807], (Fremantle).
without any communication with us.’’*' By late November the Grenvillites 
were largely united in support of the government and many of them were 
openly hostile towards their political allies.
The emergence of this factionalism influenced Foxite opinion 
greatly. Those who opposed the continuance of the union with Grenville 
became more adamant in their hostility to the expedition and in spite 
of Fremantle's assurances that Lord Grenville did not share the views 
of his brother, Holland and Howick became furious. Holland attributed 
everything to Tom Grenville's hatred of Sidmouth and Windham, and Tierney 
showed disgust in telling Howick that Tom Grenville's foolish endorse­
ment of the expedition in August had bound him to a stance which he re-
Ogretted. Howick, who had been instrumental in formulating the Talents' 
scheme for the invasion of Portugal, regarded Tom Grenville's analogy as 
a personal slur. He expressed deep suspicion of Grenvilllte motives and 
wrote that he had 'always had a misgiving that it would be so'. Whereas 
he had shown great timidity on the subject only days before, he suddenly 
told Tierney that the bombardment of Copenhagen would render Denmark 'a 
French Dock-yard' and that Danish cooperation would allow Napoleon to 
'secure himself against the only danger which threatens his alliance 
with Alexander, viz: the discontent which may be occasioned by the loss 
of the British Market'.* 3 These views came largely from anger, but they
^•Grenville to Auckland, 2 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland). Grenville to T. Grenville, 10, 18 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add.
MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
^Holland to Howick, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). 
Tierney to Grey, 26 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
3Holland to Howick, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). 
Howick to Holland, 13 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland).
Howick to Tierney, 8 Nov. 1807 (Tierney). For an example of Howick's 
rage see Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 30 Oct. 1807,
Granville Correspondence, II, 302'.
153
154
pointed the way for Foxite unity. The party rank and file endorsed 
Howick quickly, Fitzwilliam and Windham moved into the Foxite camp, and 
differences about the Copenhagen expedition became so intense among the 
opposition that public opinion was forgotten altogether.*-
Disagreement on Copenhagen was accompanied by increased party 
divergence concerning the issue of war and peace. By 1807 the Foxites, 
on the whole, had come to see Napoleon in a more reasonable light. 
However, almost to a man they continued to identify Whig principles 
with those of the French Revolution and though they echoed national 
antipathy for the French Emperor intellectual contradiction left their 
ideology quite unclear. The 'legitimacy' of Napoleon's government was 
not questioned and it was no secret that many Foxites admired him as a 
military genius and as a political leader in comparison with his ene­
mies. Horner wrote as late as 1809:
When one considers the French conquests ... it is impossible to 
deny that the civilized world is reaping immense benefits from it; 
and that while its own mischiefs and miseries are probably of short 
duration and may pass quickly off, it has swept away, and perhaps 
was alone of force enough to sweep away, evils of inveterate ob­
stinacy, which depressed and degraded mankind, and by the extinc­
tion of all free spirit left the nations an easy prey to this free­
booter, who deserves however to be classed with those heroes of 
mythology who run over the face of the earth to rid it of mon­
sters. 2
Feeling this way, many of Fox's friends had equated the cause of France 
with their own in England during the 1790's and Napoleon had been iden­
tified closely with Fox - as a champion of Whig principles. Much of 
this remained in 1807. Either portraits or busts of Fox and Napoleon 
stood side by side at Chatsworth, Hothfield, Woburn, Bowood, Southill, 
and Holland House, and John, the eccentric Marquis of Lansdowne, owned *2
^■Windham to Fitzwilliam, 14 Nov. 1807 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
2Horner to J. Lock, 5 Aug. 1809 (Horner).
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a tower at Southampton which was filled with portraits of his 
'worthies': Robespierre, Marat, Massena,and Bonaparte. Among aristo­
cratic Foxites, Thanet, his wife, and Lady Holland were vocal in their 
praise of the Emperor and many others expressed similar views more pri­
vately. The Whig Club continued to ring with Francophilia and the 
Independent Whig, which must be regarded as the voice of many demo­
cratic Foxites, openly championed the cause of France.^ And there was 
a school of opinion in the country which continued to maintain that the 
war had been forced on a peace-loving French Emperor.2 2
It was felt generally among those who tried to define the Whig- 
gism which Fox had willed to his party that national enmity was war­
ranted only by a war which promoted international justice and liberty 
and that Napoleon was no more than an instrument of nature in the con­
tinuing improvement of man. His character as a ruler was in many ways 
to be lamented but that character had been formed by the folly of Pitt 
and the European despots in resisting the irresistible power of nation­
alism. Napoleon's power was as firm as the justice of his cause and 
British interests could not be promoted by war so long as the European 
struggle retained its original political context. Peace, therefore, 
was the only answer.
Whitbread's attack on the Talents' management of the peace nego­
tiations had aroused the deepest passions of many Foxitea and the wave 
of popular expression which followed had begun serious intellectual 
conflict among Fox's old friends. On the one hand were the members and 
beneficiaries of government who maintained that their efforts had
Hihite claimed that the circulation of his weekly was never 
under 2,000. White to Grey, 31 Aug. 1814 (Grey).
2Robert8, p. 32.
proved the impracticability of peace with Napoleon and on the other 
were those who argued that Fox's colleagues had either deserted their 
principles or fallen prey to Grenville. This latter group had grown 
stronger in the months which followed Whitbread's motion. 'We chose to 
rest a dispute, which was to involve everything near and dear to us, on 
a diplomatic ambiguity; on a technical question as to the manner how 
and to whom we were to give up a barren rock which was of no use to us, 
and to which we had resigned all pretensions', wrote William Hazlitt.
'It was not the danger of invasion which produced the taking up of arms, 
but the determination to take up arms which produced the fear of inva­
sion.'^ This interpretation agreed with that of Whitbread and it was 
echoed in an article in the Political Register by the old Foxite Capel 
Lofft.^ The Independent Whig took care to stress maliciously 'that the 
hints we have given for some time past, that the most perfect unanimity 
of sentiments did not exist between the Grenvilles and the Foxltes, are 
more than confirmed ...' Though Howick and the Foxite hierarchy did 
everything possible to refute these accusations, it was impossible to 
deny that the issue of peace was one of fundamental disagreement in the 
ranks of government. Holland and Erskine remained quiet at the time of 
Whitbread's motion, but both of them had serious reservations about the 
conduct of Howick and Grenville,and many Foxites in the Commons were 
unhappy.^
^P. 0. Howe, ed., The Works of William Hazlitt (London, 1930-40),
I, 96.
^Political Register, XI, 442-47.
-^Independent Whig. 11 Jan. 1807.
^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party. II, 75. Erskine to Roscoe,
4 Sept. 1810 (Roscoe), 1457. Coke to Brougham, n.d. [Feb. 1807], 
(Brougham). Whitbread was right when he claimed that he had 'the Hearts 
of many with me, altho' I should have had the voices but of very few'. 
Whitbread to Grey, 9 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
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The fall of the Talents signalled the beginning of more serious 
agitation for peace among Foxites. In April an article in the 
Edinburgh Review on 'The Dangers of the Country' argued for peace by 
maintaining that the Continent was lost and that Britain had 'more 
foreign settlements already than we have any good use for ...' Simul­
taneously the Morning Chronicle, which had spoken the language of 
llowick and Grenville so long as the Talents were in, advocated peace 
and the Independent Whig redoubled its exertions against the war in 
peculiarly Foxite language: we cannot and we ought not to expect
success; and ... as it [the war] was begun for the avowed purpose of 
crushing the infant liberties of another nation, there is too much rea­
son to apprehend that it will terminate in the destruction of our own!'^ 
All this joined with the first pains of French commercial restriction to 
produce a considerable movement for peace among other old allies of Fox, 
the industrialists and merchants of the North. Petitions to Parliament 
were prepared in Manchester, Bolton, and Oldham; a similar agitation de­
veloped in the West Riding of Yorkshire.
By October this movement had aroused great excitement among 
Foxites. Holland House and Southill were alive with enthusiasm; the 
party rank and file were cooperating with the petitioners; and to the 
delight of almost everyone Perry disclosed that Great Britain was on the 
verge of peace negotiations with France and Russia.* 2 Though Hawick 
maintained that the rumours of a French overture would be 'like Pitt's 
negotiations, merely to silence the clamours against the war', he felt 
that the maze of British and French commercial restrictions would 'force
^Edinburgh Review. X, 19-20. Morning Chronicle, 16 Mar. and 
15 Aug. 1807. Independent Whig, 25 Oct, 1807.
2Tierney to Howick, 5 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
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both Governments, however reluctant, to a Peace'.^ Lauderdale agreed 
and with unbounded optimism he represented the peace agitation in the 
North as the beginning of a movement which would restore the coalition 
to power.
Invariably despair had a softening effect on Grenville. As had 
been the case in early 1806, the old warrior's fear of invasion and pre­
occupation with schemes of retrenchment and home defence led him towards 
agreement with the Foxites. 'I hear there is much speculation in favour 
of peace,' he wrote, 'and placing so little hope as I do in the war 
prospects which seem to be afloat, I should look upon that event as a 
blessing, if it could be procured on any terms short of national dis­
grace and ruin . ..'* 2 However, this superficial agreement did not carry 
the impact of days when the succours of office had been the re­
ward of compromise. Both Tom Grenville and Buckingham resisted their 
brother's views vigorously; Stafford, Carysfort, and Carrington screamed 
for war to the end; and Windham, whose personal relationship with 
Grenville had been strained since Fox's death, was concerned that the 
peace movement would make the new ministry strive for popularity by 
doing 'what Pitt was too apt to do: - defeat the injury which the cry 
was meant to effect against themselves by complying with it . ..'^ With 
Grenville isolated in Cornwall, his old war party drew together to com­
bat Foxite pacifism without him.
'There is a large portion of those, with -whom we are connected,
^Howick to Tierney, 8 Nov. 1807 (Tierney).
2Lauderdale to llowick, 2 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
-^Grenville to Buckingham, 25 Aug. 1807, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 200.
^T. Grenville to Buckingham, 9 Oct. 1807, ibid., 205-07. Windham 
to Fitzwilliam, 1A Nov. 1807 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
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who under the influence of impressions having nothing to do originally 
with the love of peace or war ... . have formed themselves into a 
sort of distinct sect as the supposed lovers of peace', wrote an alarmed 
Windham. 'Others again will think a cry for peace a fine way of annoy­
ing & overturning the Ministers. I see that it will be impossible to go 
on long without a necessity of combatting some opinions originating from 
one or other of these sources.Fitzwilliam agreed and he encouraged 
his son to resist the petitioning movement among his new constituents in 
Yorkshire. Without party coordination, Milton headed north immediately. 
Milton, like his father, epitomized the politics which had divided the 
Whig party during the 1790's. He worshipped Fox's memory, enjoyed a 
firm social bond with many Foxites, and, in domestic matters, he spoke 
the language of Whitbread.^ But when any issue touched on the French 
Revolution or Napoleon he hardened in the style of Burke and gravitated 
towards Windham and the Grenvilles. In November 1807 he tried to strike 
a balance.
Representing himself as a spokesman for the Ministry of All the 
Talents, Milton stressed to the people of Yorkshire that peace was de­
sirable indeed, but that petitions and public clamour would render it 
impossible. Napoleon, he argued, would never negotiate seriously so 
long as Britons expressed weariness; the British Government could not 
negotiate from a position of weakness.* 3 This logic received the warm 
endorsement of opposition leaders. Windham, Fitzwilliam, and most 
Grenvillites felt they were making a major concession by approving of 
negotiation with Napoleon. Grenville, who had become more warlike owing
•^Windham to Fitzwilliam, 24 Nov. 1807 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
^'Particulars Illustrative of the Family Character of 
Fitzwilliam', undated draft, (Fitzwilliam/Northants), 127/84/2.
3Morning Chronicle, 5 and 17 Nov. 1807.
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to the success of the Copenhagen expedition, and Howick, who was frantic 
with fear of a party collapse, welcomed Milton's efforts as the embodi­
ment of their policies in office and as a step towards party harmony.
'In the last War the opposition believed, or chose to believe, that we 
had at different times bound ourselves not to treat with the Fr. 
Republic, & their motions were directed to obtain satisfaction on that 
point', recalled Grenville. 'Now there is no such thing - the French 
Republic is as much destroyed as its bitterest Enemy could have wished,
& the only question is about terms of Peace - which there is no reason 
to believe the Ministers would carry higher than the safety of the 
Country requires.'1 When Milton succeeded in stifling the Yorkshire 
movement the opposition leadership congratulated themselves on the death 
of the issue.
However, many Foxites saw Milton's language as only another ex­
ample of the former government's unprincipled compromises. The 
Independent Whig outlined the essence of these feelings on 22 November. 
Milton's arguments, it maintained, denied the people of Yorkshire their 
only mode of expression and thus their only means of participating in 
the decisions of government. The duty of an M.P. was not to influence 
his constituents, but to represent their grievances and interests in 
Parliament. As for party politics, if ministers were to be considered 
as the best judges on questions of great national importance, then 'why 
is your Lordship so hostile to them?' And White, like many people in 
the country, recoiled in defence of Foxite principle. 'Their [the 
Foxites'] great outcry has continually been against this war, which you 
so much applaud, and their deceased leader ... declared that, in point
^Grenville to Grey, 27 Dec. 1807 (Grey). Grenville to T. 
Grenville, 10 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
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of absurdity, folly, and want of any reasonable cause ... it exceeded 
the former.'^ Obviously these views were intellectually fundamental 
to most Foxites. One old Yorkshire Foxite pleaded with Milton to rise 
above 'the illiberal policy of the Grenville faction' and to return to 
Whig principles:
When the late Ministry most unfortunately determined to sacrifice 
the interests of England for those of Russia and to carry on a War 
for Sicily and Dalmatia a general feeling of disgust and disappoint­
ment was excited ... At the time of the election the friends of 
Lord Milton here were also the friends of peace and hailed the 
choice of your Lordship as an event which gave them another Mr.
Fox to plead the rights of Mankind and ease the wounds of suffer­
ing humanity. They feel little interest in the success or failure 
of the late administration ...^
It appears that many Foxites shared these views and were aware of a 
pressing need for party leadership. Whitbread, in distant Bedfordshire, 
was sent the Yorkshire petitions,and the Independent Whig appealed to 
Holland to throw off party factionalism in favour his uncle's prin-
Ociples. The Morning Chronicle, Holland House, and Southill maintained 
ominous silence.
At this juncture the government announced its decision to allow 
the Count de Lille and his Bourbon kinsmen to enter Great Britain. Pru­
dently Canning made it clear that the ministry would offer the Frenchmen 
no personal assistance. This only emphasized differences between 
Bourbon sympathizers and Foxites. Practically every Grenvillite was up­
set by what he saw as Canning's ungracious treatment of royalty. With 
visions of uniting Grenville and Bourbon blood through the marriage of 
his ugly daughter to a prince, Buckingham promptly offered his mansion 12
1Independent Whig, 22 Nov. 1807.
2R. Bakewell to Milton, 13 Jan. 1808 (Fitzwilliam/Northants).
■*R. Bakewell to Whitbread, 25 Nov. 1807 (Whitbread), 4179.
'Drafts of petitions for peace', ibid.. 4180. Independent Whig, 22 Nov. 
!807. ----------------
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at Gosford and invited the entire coterie to Stowe.^
Foxite reaction was decidedly hostile. Lauderdale was furious 
and he, like many of Fox's friends, felt that the government could have 
opened the door to fruitful peace negotiations with Napoleon by refusing 
to admit the Bourbons. When the Count de Lille applied to Devonshire 
for the use of his Chiswick villa (where Fox had died), the duke gave a 
hasty refusal.^ The Independent Whig began a series of attacks on 
Pittite foreign policy while stressing that ministers should commit 
themselves, either by making common cause with the 'Pretender' or by 
recognizing Napoleon as the lawful ruler of France. The former course 
was represented as a 'visionary and obsolete idea' but emphasis was 
placed on the necessity of defining the goals of the war so as to make 
an end to it possible.^ This argument had been fundamental in Fox's 
attack on Pittite wartime policy. By late November only Howick stood 
by Fitzwilliam and the Grenvillites on the issue of war and peace. 
Lauderdale and Tom Grenville argued the point; Holland House was so ex­
cited over the petitions and the rumours of negotiations that Fitzwilliam 
lectured Holland; and Whitbread told Howick bluntly that he was deter­
mined on 'some measure in Parliament for peace'.■*
The coalition's disarray on the issues of war and peace and the
^Grenville to Buckingham, 23 Nov. 1807, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 208-11. Henry W. W. Wynn to Lady W. Wynn, [Jan.] 1808,
Lady Williams Wynn_____Correspondence, pp. 122-23. Holland,
Memoiirsof ~ ~th e~ Whig Party, II, 234.
^Lauderdale to Howick, 5 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
OStuart, Dearest Bess, p. 158.
^Independent Whig, 22, 29 Nov. and 13 Dec. 1807.
^Lauderdale to Grey, [29 Nov.], 4 Dec. 1807 (Grey). Fitzwilliam 
to Holland, 13 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51593 (Holland). T. Grenville 
to Buckingham, 9 Dec. 1807, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, IV, 15-17.
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Copenhagen expedition between June and November was accompanied by dis­
agreement on a subject which had produced comparative harmony in office: 
Anglo-American relations. The American treaty was the only mark of po­
tential permanence the Ministry of All the Talents had made on British 
foreign relations and Foxites, Grenvillites, and Fitzwilllams proudly 
saw their policies towards the United States as a clear departure from 
those of their predecessors. Undoubtedly the treaty was in many ways 
symbolic of the 'much wronged' ministry's entire scheme of foreign pol­
icy and in opposition, as in office, the question of America gave iden­
tity and purpose to a coalition whose members had little else in common.
In mid-March, when the Talents Government was considering the 
alternatives of resignation or compromise with the king on the Catholic 
Bill, Erskine had been quick to argue for the latter. 'With regard to 
America which touches us more nearly than our connection with all the 
nations upon earth put together, you are well acquainted with all the 
difficulties attending it from the manners & views & interests of that 
people', he wrote to Howick. 'You know that with all out moderation & 
management & prudence We are only just at peace with her and we know 
that from what our opponents avow publicly the system they would in­
stantly pursue would lead to an instant exclusion of all our Manufactures 
& most probably a war under the wing of France ...* Others had agreed 
with the Lord Chancellor. Both Holland and Auckland had encouraged 
Howick and Grenville unsuccessfully to ratify the treaty before the 
Portland government could take office and on 1 April Temple had ex­
pressed regret that so much had been left to Canning, whose American 
system he dreaded greatly,2
^•Erskine to Howick, 15 Mar. 1807 (Grey).
^Howick to Auckland, 22 Mar. 1807, B.M., Add, MSS. 34457 
(Auckland). Temple to Auckland, 1 April 1807, ibid.
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The former ministers could do little from the opposition benches. 
Auckland pleaded with his neighbour Lord Hawkesbury to follow up the 
Talents' American policies and he told Holland that they must try to 
cooperate with Canning. If the Foreign Secretary refused to be reason­
able, he added, the opposition must convince the public that the new 
government was incapable of meeting the demands of Anglo-American rela­
tions.1 But everything hinged on American ratification of the treaty 
and here the opposition was confident. Fitzwilliam, who apparently had 
good Federalist contacts, assured his friends of a favourable reaction 
to the treaty in the United States,and Holland House spoke the same
language. Apparently few people even considered the possibility that
2Jefferson could let the late government down.
Meanwhile, the 'friends of America' did their best to promote a 
lasting bond with Pinckney and Monroe. In this they were successful. 
Erskine entertained the Americans regularly; Auckland invited them to 
Eden Farm at least once; and Holland paid Monroe the ultimate compli­
ment by giving him a bust of Fox.-* This attention was reciprocal. In 
late April William Eden visited the Americans and found them hostile to 
the new government and in despair for the fate of the treaty. Monroe 
told him in confidence that he and Pinckney had been instructed to re­
sume negotiations on the basis of the treaty but that Canning did not 
appear interested. 'Monroe wished much that you & Lord Holland could 
retain the [treaty] Commission & said that the Change of Ministry here 
had a very unfavourable effect in America', Eden reported to his
Auckland to Holland, n.d. [Mar. 1807], and 3 April 1807, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51532 (Holland), ff. 22-23, 80-81.
^Fitzwilliam to Holland, 19 April 1807 (with enclosure), B.M.,
Add. MSS. 51593 (Holland).
^Monroe to Holland, 26 Mar. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 
(Holland).
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father.^ Such talk filled Auckland with missionary zeal. After visit­
ing the Americans he told Holland that Monroe felt that their resigna­
tion as commissioners would cause ill will between the two countries. 
Completely ignorant of the fact that Jefferson's government was unwill­
ing to sign any treaty which did not end impressment, Holland and
Auckland indignantly refused to resign and Howick encouraged William
2Eden to raise the issue in Parliament.
In mid-July Pinckney and Monroe received word from Washington 
that if Britain wanted a treaty she must accept at least six changes in 
the unratified document, including abandonment of impressment and modi­
fication of the Talents' 'forcing note'. This was hardly a ringing en­
dorsement of the late government's policy and Auckland was infuriated 
by the 'unworthy proceedings of Messieurs Jefferson & Madison ...'
Canning immediately applied to the commissioners for clarification of 
Monroe's contention that there had been an 'implied understanding of for­
bearance on impressment' and Auckland was so embarrassed that he dreaded 
3going to town. It was rapidly becoming clear that the American Govern­
ment was as unappreciative of the Talents' labours as everybody else.
But extraordinary events soon convinced the opposition that Jefferson's 
obstinacy was no fault of their own.
The despatch which related the American refusal to ratify the treaty 
was accompanied by news of the famous Chesapeake-Leopard Affair. On 22 June
XW. Eden to Auckland, n.d. [22 April 1807?], B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland), f. 286.
2Auckland to Holland, 7 April and 12 May 1807, B.M., Add. MSS.
51532 (Holland). W. Eden to Auckland, n.d. [May-June 1807], B.M., Add.
MSS. 34457 (Auckland), ff. 305-06.
3
Monroe and Pinckney to Canning, 24 July 1807, F.O. 5/54. Auckland 
to Holland, 28 July, 23 Aug. 1807, B.M.* Add. MSS. 51532 (Holland).
Holland and Auckland to Canning, 28 July 1807, cited in Perkins, Prologue 
to War, p. 189.
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H.M.S. Leopard, the flagship of the commander-in-chief of the American 
Station, had found the Captain of the U.S.S. Chesapeake unwilling to 
submit to search. One event had led to another and the Leopard had 
fired into the smaller American warship, boarded her, and carried away 
four seamen. Of course there was every reason to believe that the naval 
engagement had influenced the American stance on the treaty, a theory 
which Pinckney and Monroe used to sooth the injured feelings of Holland 
and Auckland. At any rate Holland House was buzzing about infringe­
ments of the right of search on the afternoon of 24 July and that even­
ing, only minutes after Canning himself had learned of the one-sided 
battle, Holland embarrassed ministeralists in the Lords by asking for 
information on 'the report of hostilities having actually commenced'.^
Understandably the opposition initially showed indignation if for 
no other reason than that the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair excused them 
from blame for the American refusal to ratify their treaty. On 25 July 
Monroe and Pinckney discussed the matter over dinner at Holland House 
with Lauderdale, Windham, Petty, Romilly, Elliot, Fitzpatrick, and 
Holland.^ Here discussion ended. Vice-Admiral Sir George Berkeley, the 
commander of the American Station whose orders had provoked the attack 
on the Chesapeake, not only owed his appointment to the Talents, but was 
a kinsman of the Grenvilles, a close friend of Buckingham, and an M.P. 
who voted with the Grenvillites between tours of sea duty."* All this 
immobilized the opposition leaders and only Lord Stanhope, who owed 
allegiance to no party, bothered to broach the question during the re­
mainder of the session.
•^Parl. Deb., IX, 926-27.
^Holland House Dinner Book entry of 25 July 1807, B.M., Add.
MSS, 51951.
•^Buckingham to Fremantle, 25 Oct. 1807 (Fremantle).
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In the months after the prorogation of Parliament the leaders 
of the opposition seldom mentioned the American question. Neither 
British nor American policy was clear and political prudence dictated 
that the Chesapeake-Leopard affair should be ignored. However, there 
were undercurrents. Brougham continued to show interest in the ques­
tion. After detailed research into the legality of searching ships of 
war he told Holland that the issue was clear enough to merit a crusade 
in Parliament. Lauderdale agreed with Brougham and their combined 
talents produced a strong article which was published in the Edinburgh 
Review.^  From America the Foxite David Erskine, whom Canning had re­
tained as his minister in Washington, sympathized openly with the 
United States and defended American claims in an official despatch.^
Of course Lord Erskine shared his son's views and both he and Lauderdale 
urged Howick to show more interest in the issue.-* Among Grenvillites 
the Eden brothers, their father, and Temple continued to distrust 
Canning's motives, while Grenville himself, though handicapped by 
family considerations, deprecated government behaviour.1 2*6 Always of 
importance was the hatred of Canning among Sidmouth's followers. Both 
Buckinghamshire and Vansittart informed Auckland that they were prepared
1Brougham to Holland, 2 Sept. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51561 
(Holland).
2Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 25 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51691 
(Holland).
•^Edinburgh Review, XXI, 1-31.
^D. Erskine to Canning, 5 Oct. 1807, F.O. 5/52.
^Lauderdale to Howick, 25 Oct. 1807 (Grey).
6W. Eden to Auckland, n.d. [Sept. 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland), ff. 358-59. Temple to Auckland, 2 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add.
MSS. 34457 (Auckland). Temple to Grenville, 3 Oct. 1807, 1I.M.C. 
Dropmore, IX, 138-39. Grenville to Auckland, 6 Aug. 1807, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 34457 (Auckland).
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to oppose a British assertion of the right of searching neutral ships 
of war.*"
The haze which surrounded Anglo-American relations cleared in 
October. In his annual message to Congress Jefferson attacked Great 
Britain bitterly and the Talents' Order in Council of 7 January figured 
prominently in the charges he levelled. Representing it, the Chesapeake- 
Leopard Affair, and the British refusal to abandon impressment as justi­
fication, the American President asked the legislature for power to ex­
pel British warships from American ports and to enact the long- 
threatened Non-Importation Act. Congress endorsed his requests im­
mediately and debated military preparations at length.^
These warlike measures forced the British Foreign Office to act. 
Canning, who had remained non-committal while American public opinion 
festered over the Chesapeake-Leopard affair, promptly refused to nego­
tiate with Pinckney and Monroe on the basis of the rejected treaty.-* 
Simultaneously he appointed George Rose, Jr., as special emissary to 
the United States and sent the young Pittite to Washington to discuss 
reparations for the Chesapeake-Leopard affair. The Foreign Secretary 
then issued a proclamation recalling British seamen to the Royal Navy 
which strongly reaffirmed the right of impressment while at the same 
time stating that Britain did not claim a right to search neutral war­
ships. Canning would not be restricted by the former government's
^Buckinghamshire to Auckland, n.d. [Sept. 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 
34457 (Auckland), ff. 352-54.
^James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1897), I, 425-30. Courier, 7 
Dec. 1807. For official American remonstrances to the Talents' Order 
in Council see Madison to Erskine, 20 Mar. 1807, enclosed in Erskine to 
llowick, 30 Mar. 1807, and Madison to Erskine, 29 Mar. 1807, enclosed in 
Erskine to Howick, 31 Mar. 1807, F.0. 5/52.
^Canning to Monroe and Pinckney, 22 Oct. 1807, F.0. 5/54.
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concessions; he was eager to avoid a break with America on the basis of 
the Chesapeake-Leopard affair; and he had no intention of backing down 
on impressment. With the exception of the treaty, which even Auckland 
admitted had only 'postponed the principal difficulties to quieter 
times',*- Canning's policy was fundamentally consistent with the American 
policy of the Ministry of All the Talents. But it lacked the hint of 
desperation and the phil-Americanism of the former ministry's exertions. 
Canning consequently succeeded where his predecessors had failed.
Though it could be argued that his policy lacked the 'spirit' which had 
characterized that of the Talents, few could convict him of anti- 
Americanism and nobody could assert that he had conceded British mari- 
time rights.
The policies of Jefferson and Canning produced confusion in the 
ranks of the opposition. The Times later criticized 'the sententious 
manner in which Mr. CANNING dismisses the ... mutilated deed,' but not 
even Holland was prepared to argue that the treaty should be resur­
rected.^ And though the Independent Whig attacked Canning's stance on 
impressment,-* the experiences of office had convinced men like Erskine, 
Auckland, and Holland that not only public opinion but their colleagues 
were averse to agitation on that point. Little could be said on the 
Rose mission. Auckland protested against the decision to send 'a young
man without rank or commanding Talents, and the son of a person who has.. j - .. . : . — ' : ' ' . ,■ ' A l l f ;A  ' .often affected to hold a Language hostile to the neutral trade of the
United States' but even Foxites admitted that the purpose of the mission
^Auckland to Abbot, 1 Jan. 1807, Abbot Diary, II, 87.
2The Times, 24 Feb. 1808.
-^Independent Whig, 18 Oct. 1807.
was good.l Generally the opposition's frustrations were directed to­
wards Canning's proclamation. Lauderdale described it as hypocritical, 
tactless, vague, and illegal; Grenville, though less adamant, found the 
public declaration 'as undignified as it is foolish'. Opposition 
leaders, however, backed away from a parliamentary attack on the gov­
ernment's policy.^ If Canning's manoeuvres of October accomplished 
nothing else, they immobilized his parliamentary adversaries in Britain. 
The coalition's innate weaknesses soon made matters worse.
The hostile language of the United States had stirred the fight­
ing blood of many important men. Windham, Spencer, Sidmouth, and 
Darnley, all of whom had supported a policy of American conciliation, 
spoke of Canning's 'concession' on the right of searching neutral war­
ships and their views towards the United States hardened.  ^ Windham told 
Fitzwilliam that he was 'by no means certain that the conciliatory sys­
tem may not easily be pushed too far'."* Howick abandoned America alto­
gether:
I disapprove very much of the conduct of our Government; & I think 
it was our policy to conciliate America as much as possible ... 
without absolute detriment to ourselves ... But from the spirit 
which appears in Jefferson's speech I doubt very much whether this
170
^Auckland to Grenville, 16 Oct. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 
140-41. W. Eden to Allen, 24 Oct. [1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 
(Allen), f. 78.
2Lauderdale to Howick, 8 Nov. 1807 (Grey). Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 14 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51695 (Holland). Grenville to 
Auckland, 24 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 (Auckland).
^Ld. King acknowledged that Canning had stolen the opposition's 
thunder. Ld. King to Holland, 20 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 
(Holland). Also see Holland to Auckland, n.d. [Oct. 1807], B.M., Add. 
MSS. 34457 (Auckland), f. 204.
^Sidmouth to Abbot, 18 and 23 Oct. 1807, Abbot 
Diary, II, 132-33. Spencer to T. Grenville, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 41854 (T. Grenville). Darnley to Holland, n.d. [Oct.-Nov. 1807], 
B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 (Holland), ff. 156-57.
^Windham to Fitzwilliam, 14 Nov. 1807 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
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policy would have been successful; & we must be careful not to in­
cur the charge of giving up the cause of the country. It would be 
very prejudicial to us now, & might prove extremely embarassing to 
us hereafter. I must tremble at the result of a situation in 
which all neutrality will be banished from the world; but if placed 
in that situation we must make up our minds to meet all the diffi­
culties it brings with it, which timidity will only increase.^
Betrayed by Jefferson, outmanoeuvered by Canning, and frustrated by the
demands of political coalition, the opposition deserted a major aspect
of Foxite foreign policy and one of the few points which had held them
together in office.
By mid-November 1807 only the unpopular question of Ireland gave 
the coalesced opposition identity on public grounds, but such important 
men as Howick, Lauderdale, and Tom Grenville were against bringing even 
that issue forward in Parliament. Lord Grenville had not corresponded 
with Foxite leaders since August and the old Pittite was outraged by 
what he saw as the ruinous measures of government and infuriated by the 
rashness of his political allies.* 3 William Eden told Tierney that 
Grenville was so disgusted with politics 'as hardly even to take up a 
newspaper, and consequently to be pretty much in the dark as to all that 
is passing'.^ The word at Holland House was that he would break with 
the Foxites3 and rumour held that plans for a Grenvillite-Canningite
"Hiowick to Tierney, 26 Oct. 1807 (Tierney).
^Lauderdale to Holland, n.d. [Dec. 1807?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51691 
(Holland), ff. 104-05. Lauderdale to T. Grenville, 6 Nov. 1807, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 41857 (T. Grenville). Grenville to T. Grenville, 18 and 26 
Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
3Grenville to Auckland, 28 July 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
^Tierney to Howick, 29 Sept, and 31 Oct. 1807 (Grey).
3Petty to Lady Holland, 25 Oct. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
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alliance were at an advanced stage.^ But Grenville's impact on the 
Foxite leadership since the fall of the Talents nevertheless had been 
enormous and there were fears that many M.P.'s would not follow llowick. 
With both Sheridan and Whitbread threatening rebellion Howick's only re­
maining card was his influence as the leader in the Commons. But in 
mid-November, at the height of party disharmony, Earl Grey died.
Control of the House of Commons had been fundamental in Fox's 
reasoning on the utility of coalition in early 1806. His power there 
had been firm and growing and he had looked to Petty as the man who 
would lead after his own retirement and Ilowick's elevation to the Lords. 
But Fox's premature death and the events which followed it had made most 
people agree with Carlisle that there was nothing to stop the Commons 
from becoming 'as wild & as impracticable as a kennel of hounds without 
a huntsman, & more mischief arising from want of discipline in our 
friends, than [from] the exertions of our enemies'.* 2 There was certain­
ly reason for these fears in late 1807. 'The Hour that made you an Earl 
made the Power of the Crown, during the remainder of the present reign 
at least, complete', wrote Tierney to the new Lord Grey. 'if the Blow 
had come upon us in Office, office might have enabled us to recover from 
the shock. As it is I quite despair, and look upon the Party of the 
late Administration as split or soon about to be split into a thousand 
pieces.'^ Windham and most Grenvillites saw the departure of Howick from 
the Commons with alarm, and within five days of Earl Grey's death Tom 
Grenville was plotting to separate Whitbread from the Foxite hierarchy
^Tierney to Howick, 24 Oct. 1807 (Grey). Grenville to T. 
Grenville, 18 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
Independent Whig, 25 Oct. 1807.
2Carlisle to T. Grenville, 3 Aug. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 
(T. Grenville).
^Tierney to Grey, 26 Nov. 1807 (Grey).
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and undermine Foxite ascendancy in the Commons by the selection of 
George Ponsonby, the uncle of Grey's wife.^
Foxite leaders were equally concerned. Among Foxites in the 
lower house Petty and William Lamb were too young, Tierney was unpopu­
lar, Lord George Cavendish was a poor speaker, Sheridan was distrusted, 
Coke was unwilling, and Whitbread, whom both Grey and Bedford admitted 
to be the logical successor, was disqualified by his opposition to the 
Talents and by the prejudices of the Grenvillites. Lauderdale suggest­
ed bringing Brougham into Parliament, but the young man's connexions 
with the Edinburgh Review had alienated the aristocratic wing of the 
party. Astonishingly it appears that Holland, Grey, Bedford, and 
Lauderdale would have agreed to the appointment of Tom Grenville had 
not his hypochondria made him unwilling. Finally Grey and Holland 
struck on the idea of an 'Opposition Cabinet' to include Petty, Whitbread, 
Sheridan, Tierney, Elliot, Windham, and Tom Grenville. But this compro­
mise found no support and by early December, when the Grenvillites en­
tered the fray, the coalition's leaders were divided in opinion. Grey, 
Bedford, Tom Grenville, Fitzwilliam, and Windham insisted that the 
Commons could be controlled only by the selection of a leader. Holland, 
Grenville, Lauderdale, and Petty argued that an effectual leader could 
not be selected arbitrarily. The former group soon came to agree with 
Tom Grenville and Grey that Ponsonby would be a good compromise candi­
date; the latter (with the exception of Lord Grenville) gave way to the 
contention that a leader was necessary, but they supported Petty. At *2
^T, Grenville to Grenville, 19, 22 Nov. 1807, Ii.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
147- 48, 148-50. The Grenvilles had speculated on Lord Grey's death since 
June. Buckingham and Tom Grenville opposed both Whitbread and Petty. 
Buckingham to Fremantle, 21 June 1807 (Fremantle).
2Howick to Holland, 14 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). 
Holland to Grey, [Nov. 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland), ff.
148- 57.
174
this juncture Holland showed uncharacteristic firmness in opposing 
Ponsonby and in demanding that a Foxite, preferably Petty or Whitbread, 
must lead his uncle's party and on 5 January Tom Grenville, fearing the 
selection of Whitbread, acquiesced in the selection of Petty.1
However, on the 6th fresh rumours of a French overture for peace 
negotiations circulated through London. Holland House came to life 
with excitement, Petty agreed with Holland on the necessity of laying 
the petitions for peace before Parliament, and Whitbread disclosed that 
though he would not incite petitions in Bedfordshire, he must attend 
any meeting called on the subject and 'think it his duty to ... hold 
then a very different language from that of Lord Hilton ...'2 Imme­
diately Tom Grenville informed his brother that though Grey 'seems to 
agree with us on this point, Lord Holland is very strongly inclined to 
some measure in Parliament for peace, and however conciliatory he will 
be found in practice, his opinions in this respect come nearer to 
Whitbread than to Lord Howick.'^ Tempers flared to such an extent that 
Tierney threatened retirement and Petty's appointment became impossible. 
Magnanimously Tom Grenville told Holland and Tierney that Ponsonby 
'would be an atonement to you for the opposition which we felt it would 
be necessary to make ...' Fearing an open breach, the Foxites again 
compromised and Ponsonby, who did not know twenty members of the House 
of Commons, was agreed upon.^ As Bedford observed, he was 'the person
■■•Grey to Holland, 6 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). 
Petty to Holland, 10 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A (Holland). 
Grenville to Buckingham, 23 Nov. 1807, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets. 
IV, 208-11. T. Grenville to Grenville, 5 Dec. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore,
IX, 155-56.
2T. Grenville to Buckingham, 9, 11 Dec. 1807, Buckingham, Court 
and Cabinets, IV, 215-17, 217-19.
■*T. Grenville to Grenville, 8 Dec. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
156-58.
^Tierney to Grey, 7 Dec. 1807 (Grey).
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to whom the fewest objections can attach among the various interests of 
which the great body of the opposition is composed . ..'^ The same logic 
had made Catholic emancipation the beau ideal of the coalition. Fonsonby 
was the compromise candidate of a compromising group of politicians. He 
was to become a lasting tribute to the weaknesses of the coalition.
'Never I fancy had a party so much to attack as our friends will 
have next session', wrote Brougham. Indeed the Portland Government had 
first ridiculed and then overturned almost every policy of the Ministry 
of All the Talents. Windham's system of army recruitment had been aban­
doned. South American operations had almost ceased. New emphasis had 
been placed on Europe. The bombardment of Copenhagen had violated what 
many saw as the Talents' policy of letting Europe shift for itself. A 
policy of firmness had been adopted in Ireland. The American treaty had 
been deserted. And in late November the government had issued proclama­
tions which jeopardized the trade of the United States and threatened 
war. 'I never was so hurt', wrote Auckland. 'Many obvious projects of 
Infinite Importance are gohe for ever.' However, in a testimony to 
their unfitness as ministers, the opposition could not agree to dis­
agree. The coalition was hopelessly divided on the Issues of Copenhagen, 
peace, and America and the dangers which threatened the country from the 
Treaty of Tilsit had convinced many members of the party that this was 
not the time to divide the country with agitation on their raison 
d'etre, the Catholic question.
Actually there was no ground for opposing the government, for the 
real battle raged in the ranks of opposition. Grenville admitted meekly *2
^•Bedford to Grey, 19 Dec. 1807 (Grey).
2Brougham to Allen, 17 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen). 
Auckland to Grenville, 23 Sept. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 137-38.
that his views were not 'equally adapted to influence the conduct of 
younger men, such as some of our friends are, or of those whose public 
life has not been thrown into the same channels as mine has been'.^ 
Tierney noted tactfully that the Grenvillites lacked 'that systematic 
eagerness without which no opposition can be effective' and confessed 
that he 'could see without very much concern our Ranks thinned by some 
40 or 50, if the operation would bring the remainder into an united & 
manageable Phalanx.'2 Holland sax* no way to avoid a schism in the party 
on the first day. The Foxite hierarchy was on precarious ground. 
Whitbread was known to be seriously piqued at the selection of Ponsonby 
as leader and he almost certainly would bring on a motion for peace.^ 
Equally piqued, Sheridan threatened to move the Catholic question if 
Grey and Holland did not do so.^ Burdett was determined to move parlia­
mentary reform, upon which Grey admitted that 'we stand pretty much in 
the same situation, as in the Catholic Question.'6 Peace, reform, and 
Catholic relief represented the meat of Foxite dogma but the demands of 
the coalition had tied the party's hands on each of these questions.
Ever perceptive to the context of the disagreement among Foxites, the 
Independent Whig railed against aristocratic politicians.^ Grenville 
prudently advocated a partial political secession; Tierney warned against 1*56
1Grenville to Grey, 27 Dec. 1807 (Grey).
^Tierney to Howick, 24 Oct. 1807 (Grey).
^Holland to Grey, n.d. [Dec. 1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 
(Holland), ff. 148-57.
^Whitbread to Tierney, 21 Dec. 1807 (Tierney).
5Tierney to T. Grenville, 28 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
6Tlerney to Grey, 26 Dec. 1807 (Grey).
^Independent Whig, 27 Dec. 1807.
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any meeting of the party before the opening of Parliament; Crey and 
Lauderdale delayed their departure for London.1 Fox’s strategy had 
backfired. '... I am inclined to think that those who were acting to­
gether in 1806 will be differing a good deal in 1808', wrote Spencer in 
the understatement of his day.
■^Grenville to Grey, 27 Dec., and Lauderdale to Grey, 31 Dec. 1807
(Grey).
2Spencer to T. Grenville, 8 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. 
Grenville).
CHAPTER V
THE ROUT OF THE COALITION:
JANUARY - JULY, 1808
Grey and Grenville had assured themselves of almost every politi­
cal handicap by the closing months of 1807. They had set out with an 
army composed of traditional enemies; they had disagreed on what they 
would fight; they had tried to unite their forces by raising a standard 
which frightened potential allies; and Ponsonby, the new leader of their 
attacking force, was a bumbling private whose chief attribute was his 
obscurity. The leader of the largest battalion was dead, and his troops 
were restless and unwilling to base future campaigns on the strategy of 
a lost battle. Captains threatened rebellion, privates demanded the 
marching orders of days gone by, and old soldiers stayed at home. The 
allied army was deficient in artillery and the lower ranks suspected 
espionage at headquarters. Many spectators doubted whether the army 
would reach the field of battle.
However, the Duke of Portland's own forces were far from strong 
and men who had no confidence in government flocked to London in December 
and January. Optimistically the friends of the coalition began repairs. 
Holland, Bedford, Tierney, Elliot, and Tom Grenville led the way in the 
promotion of Ponsonby. 'Upon the subject of Ireland', wrote 
Morpeth,'he will necessarily speak with great authority, & that after all 
is the most serious subject of discussion.'^  This unhappy delusion ap­
pears to have formed the strongest point in the promotion but it left
^Morpeth to Holland, 14 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51557 
(Holland).
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both friends and independent M.P.'s unimpressed. Country gentlemen did 
not like Irishmen and they harboured deep suspicions of any plan to de­
crease the comparative strength of the Protestant establishment.* In 
addition Ponsonby had done a miserable job as Irish Chancellor under the 
Talents and radicals and many moderates in Ireland trusted him no more 
than did the Archbishop of Canterbury. The few members of the House of 
Commons who knew Ponsonby agreed with William Lamb that he was the most 
unfit man imaginable.2 Seeing in his clumsiness and slovenly appearance 
the likeness of a boorish farmer, Creevey nicknamed him 'Snouch'. 
William Anstruther writhed with laughter when he learned that Ponsonby 
would fill the shoes of Fox. But the nail was driven and the party 
hierarchy was determined to make it hold. Poor Ponsonby was represented 
as a tried and true statesman in letters to key party members, elaborate 
dinners were planned, and Lord George Cavendish came to town and tried 
to stir up support for the Irishman among incredulous country gentlemen.
Meanwhile innate political differences continued to delay a de­
cision on policy. The issue of peace hung ominously over Grey's head 
and on 28 December he finally mustered enough courage to broach the 
question with Whitbread. To his surprise the brewer was not as hostile 
as Lady Holland had reported. Not only did Whitbread express a desire 
to cooperate, but he promised not to move for peace in Parliament. This 
delighted Grey and he encouraged Tierney to open correspondence with 
Southill.^ Hoping to appease the popular wing of his party Grey
■1-Note Tierney's comments in his letters to Grey of 14 and 26 
Dec. 1807 (Grey).
2Lamb to Holland, 18 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51558 (Holland).
^Lady Holland to Morpeth, 22 Dec. 1807 (Carlisle).
^Grey to Whitbread, 28 Dec. 1807, and Whitbread to Grey, 3 Jan. 
1808 (Grey). Tierney to Whitbread, 22, 24, and 28 Dec., and Whitbread 
to Tierney, 21 and 25 Dec. 1807 (Tierney). Tierney to Grey, 26 Dec.
1807 (Grey).
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stiffened in his opposition to the Copenhagen expedition and told 
Grenville on 3 January that he could not compromise.^- This was probably 
a good decision because Russian hostility towards Britain had given the 
bombardment of Copenhagen a new political context. As Auckland noted, 
'the only point of anxiety on the Russian declaration is the party ques­
tion: whether, on the other hand, it bears with crimination on the late 
Government for not having given ... a continental diversion after the 
battle of Jena, or whether, on the one hand, it bears heavily on the 
Danish expedition ...' ^  But on the 4th Tierney found the Grenvilles 
almost unanimous in support of the expedition.^
The Catholic question was another source of discord. Most sup­
porters and potential supporters of the coalition felt that a motion on 
Ireland would do more harm than good but many Foxites, who saw the ques­
tion as one of abstract right, and Grenville and Buckingham, who feared 
a French Invasion, were eager to bring it forward in Parliament. Trou­
bled by such disagreement Grenville backed away from exertions in 
Parliament altogether. So long as Irish relief were denied, he argued, 
'all other measures must be ineffectual, and all other discussions su­
perfluous.' A partial secession, therefore, was the remedy. By de­
claring such an intention in Parliament he could avoid differing 'from 
those with whom it is my most anxious & sincere desire to remain firmly 
united.' Without opposition the government would fall from within.^ 
There was something ludicrous in this logic but It was supported by *
*Grey to Holland, 6 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). 
Also see T. Grenville to Grenville, 9 Jan. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 
170-71.
^Auckland to Grenville, 5 Dec. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 155.
^Tierney to Grey, 4 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
^Grenville to Grey, 27 Dec. 1807 (Grey). Buckingham agreed. 
Buckingham to Fremantle, endorsed 3 Jan. 1808 (Fremantle).
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such important men as Norfolk and Carlislejand Grey would have agreed if 
his friends had let him.^ But Grey's friends were daily becoming more 
disillusioned with the demanding coalition and both they and the 
Fitzwilliams were eager for action in Parliament. Lauderdale was out­
raged by Grenville's views and Bedford was anxious to support Whitbread 
and Sheridan.^ The result was frustration and further inactivity.
o'Fox's friends are indifferent since his death', noted Lady Holland.
There was, however, one potential source of agreement. The po­
licies of the Ministry of All the Talents had been designed to facili­
tate commerce with the western hemisphere as compensation for the loss 
of that of Europe and a firm bond with the United States had been funda­
mental in this scheme. Jefferson's failure to appreciate the efforts of 
the Talents had angered the coalition's leaders but though men like 
Grey, Grenville, Windham, and Spencer lent silent support to Canning's 
policies of October 1807 they continued to feel that the American market 
was indispensable to British survival. This conclusion, which had noth­
ing to do with any affection for the United States, complemented the 
more phil-American views of men like Holland, Erskine, Sheridan, 
Whitbread, and Petty. However, the American question lay dormant until 
mid-November when the government announced a revolutionary commercial 
system.
In a series of Orders in Council the Portland Ministry put for­
ward the commercial code which its members had promised while in *4
Norfolk to Holland, 28 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 
(Holland). Carlisle to T. Grenville, 17 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS.
41854 (T. Grenville).
^Lauderdale to Holland, 28 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51691 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Grey, 29 Dec. 1807 (Grey). Bedford to Holland,
4 [Jan.] 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland), ff. 103-4.
^Lady Holland Journal, II, 235.
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opposition. Fundamentally the new policy prohibited all trade with 
French-controlled Europe that did not go first through a British port 
for inspection and taxation. To avoid this procedure merchants of all 
nationalities were invited to purchase a licence from the Board of Trade. 
Though founded on a principle of commercial control, as opposed to the 
French principle of commercial prohibition, the Orders in Council were 
justified in international law by the right of Britain to retaliate 
against the Berlin Decree. Through licences and the taxation of neutral 
trade the new system fed the exchequer, gave preferential treatment to 
British shipping, and brought Britain a monopoly of world trade with 
Europe.'*' Economically this approach was logical; politically and morally 
it was open to question. Standing behind British maritime supremacy the 
government in effect had denied the existence of neutral trading rights.
It assured American ill will.
The principle of retaliation which disguised the effects of the 
Orders had a double purpose. Firstly, it justified a controversial 
system of commercial control. Secondly, it immobilized Grey and Grenville 
because the Talents' Order in Council of 7 January 1807 had put forward 
the same principle. Then, too, the ridiculously incongruous manner in 
which the new policies were announced dumbfounded all who read them and 
it appears that even economists such as Lauderdale, Auckland, and Tierney 
were unsure of their meaning until early December.^ Nevertheless it 
soon became obvious that the new commercial regulations represented a 
striking departure from the policies of the Talents, for as Auckland
^Printed in Pari. Deb., X, 130-48.
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 25 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51695 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Allen, 26 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 52180 
(Allen). Tierney to Howick, 7 Nov. 1807 (Grey),
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noted, they removed 'one principal motive which the Americans might have 
had for remaining at peace with us.' Pinckney and Monroe were active in 
protesting to the opposition and the former told William Eden that the 
Orders in Council were tantamount to a declaration of war.^
All this gave new life to the American question and alarm was 
almost universal among the opposition's leading men. The Talents had 
considered a similar commercial plan in December 1806 but the Cabinet 
had backed away from it because of a desire to conciliate the United 
States and because it was felt that such a scheme would only enforce 
French policy. It was not surprising therefore to find genuine concern 
among those members of the opposition who accepted the Portland govern­
ment's announced motive of commercial retaliation. Grenville felt that 
Great Britain was now 'cooperating with Bonaparte, & lending our navy 
in aid of his decrees, & are shutting from without those doors against 
ourselves which all the Laws in the world could not close against us 
from within.'^ Tom Grenville, Auckland, and Lauderdale agreed with this 
assessment, and Horner, who understood the controlling effects of the 
Orders immediately, saw them as a reimposition of the policies of taxa­
tion against which Americans had struck for independence in 1776.^
The primary political importance of the Orders in Council to the 
coalesced opposition came with the fact that Grenville, Fitzwilliam, and 
the war faction saw them as measures which would foment discontent among *5
*Auckland to Grenville, 7, 25 Nov. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
143, 151-2. Grenville to T. Grenville, 30 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 
41852 (T. Grenville).
^Grenville to Auckland, 18 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
■^Auckland to Grenville, 28 Nov., and T. Grenville to Grenville,
5 Dec. 1807, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 152-53, 155-56. Lauderdale to Grey, 
n.d. [29 Nov. 1807], (Grey). Horner to Holland, 14 Nov. 1807 (Horner).
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manufacturers and merchants and therefore stimulate the already alarming 
cry for peace in the industrial north.^ This led to a relaxation of 
tensions in the party. Almost everyone agreed that the Orders in Council 
only gave effect to Napoleon's Continental System and assured industrial 
unrest in Britain; the loss of the American market was feared; and 
Grenville, who was greatly alarmed, told Holland on 5 December that he 
would support negotiations for peace. By mid-December the issue repre­
sented a potential bridge to opposition unity. Brougham and Eden defended 
the late government's American treaty and blamed Jefferson's Anglophobia 
on the Rose mission and the new commercial code. Holland, Auckland, 
Erskine, Whitbread, Sheridan, Petty, and the Barings felt that Britain 
had no right to retaliate through neutral commerce.3 Windham, Fitzwilliam, 
and the Grenvilles were concerned about the loss of both the European and 
American markets and frantic with fear of increased agitation for peace. 
Devonshire House, which had shown little interest in politics since the 
death of the Duchess in 1806, came to life with talk of motions in 
Parliament.^ And the coalition;'s economists agreed that the Orders were 
not only illegal but also economically ruinous. All these views were
codified somewhat by a feeling of defensiveness among the old supporters
*of the Ministry of All the Talents for a philosophy which they re­
garded as their owm; the Orders in Council struck at the root of it.
Behind Lauderdale the Foxites took the lead in developing a
■^Windham to Fitzwilliam, 24 Nov. 1807 (Fitzwllliam/Sheffield).
2Grenville to Holland, 5 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland).
3Eden to Allen, 16 Nov. [1807], B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 (Allen), 
ff. 79-80. Eden to Holland, 3 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 
(Holland), ff. 121-2. Milton to Holland, 16 Dec. 1807, ibid., ff. 
123-4. Brougham to Allen, 22 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
^Lady Elizabeth Foster to Lady Morpeth, 12 Nov. 1807 (Carlisle).
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case. From the first their greatest problem was the Talents' blockad­
ing decree of 7 January 1807 which as a concession to public opinion 
had put forward the principle of commercial retaliation. Lauderdale, 
who had opposed the assertion of this right at the time, noted on 2 
December that it had been a 'horrid slip' but he nevertheless began 
efforts to rally the party against the new policy. He met with stiff 
opposition from Grey, who wanted nothing to do with the ungrateful 
Americans, but the Scotsman persevered. Lauderdale ignored personal 
differences and opened correspondence with Whitbread; he encouraged 
Allen to study the Orders and to research their effect on American 
trade; he emphasized the importance of the issue to Tom Grenville; and 
after studying the implications of the new code with Brougham for seve­
ral days, he envisaged a parliamentary crusade against the Orders as a 
means of reconciling political differences in the party.1
The Copenhagen expedition and the new commercial code had similar 
effects, argued Lauderdale. Both drove neutrals into the arms of France 
and therefore damaged the British economy. Both were contrary to the 
policies of the late government because they increased the strength of 
France without bolstering British resources. And both were symbolic of 
the fraine of mind which led Portland's government to deny England 
the active support of Irishmen. Lauderdale also saw parliamentary op­
position to the Orders as a means of coming to grips with the dangerous 
issue of peace because it would 'turn the clamour of the manufacturers 
which I foresee must exist against the proclamations rather than against 
the war ...' Directed against the war, he wrote, this clamour would
^"Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 24 and 25 Nov. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51695 (Holland). Lauderdale to Allen, 26 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1807, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 52180 (Allen). Lauderdale to T. Grenville, 6 Dec. 1807, B.M. , 
Add. MSS. 41857 (T. Grenville). Lauderdale to Whitbread, n.d. [Dec. 
1807?], (Whitbread), 3760/1.
186
divide the opposition while at the same time making it impossible for 
Britain to obtain advantageous terms of peace; directed against the 
Orders in Council, public protest would strengthen the opposition and 
’equally dispose to Peace but it will not hamper in the course of 
Negotiation . ..'^
These arguments were by no means unreasonable and they offered 
the opposition both a rallying point and firm ground from which a com­
prehensive, responsible, and united attack on government could be 
launched. Consequently Lauderdale found supporters. Whithread and 
Erskine began research on the issue. The Holland House circle did the 
same and Pinckney ate Christmas dinner at Lady Holland's table.2 
Auckland, the Eden brothers, and Temple placed pressure on the 
Grenvillite leadership. The strength of Lauderdale's case was so 
strong that Tom Grenville expressed a desire to compromise somewhat on 
Copenhagen; Lord Grenville became quite eager for the plan; and as a 
bonus, Sidmouth agreed with Lauderdale completely.^
Though no comprehensive scheme was developed, by the beginning 
of 1808 the system pursued by Portland's government was a leading topic 
of conversation at Holland House, Brooks's, and Dropmore and the 
Morning Chronicle, which hitherto had tacitly defended the new commer­
cial code, printed a strong editorial against it on 6 January. But at 
a time when the opposition was beginning to show the first signs of 
unity unexpected news produced chaos.
■^Lauderdale to Grey, 2 Nov. and n.d. [29 Nov.] 1807, (Grey).
2Petty to Holland, 10 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A 
(Holland). Also see the entry of 25 Dec. 1807 in the Holland House 
Dinner Books, B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
^Lauderdale to Grey, n.d, [29 Nov.], and Grenville to Grey, 27 
Dec. 1807 (Grey). Sidmouth to B, Bathurst, 1 Dec. 1807,
Sidmouth Life, II, 487.
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On 6 January word broke that Napoleon had agreed to Austro- 
Russian mediation in negotiations for peace with Great Britain. Almost 
immediately rumours spread among the opposition's war party that the 
British government had accepted a humiliating basis of negotiation. Tom 
Grenville reported that not only Sicily but Gibraltar would be the price 
of peace. Alarmed by this reactionary nonsense, men like Carysfort, 
Stafford, Temple, Windham, and Buckingham drew together in defence of 
British honour.'*' Many Foxites also found the news of the French offer 
most interesting. Sheridan departed for Southill immediately, Creevey 
worked to unite Whitbread and Burdett, the Independent Whig cried for 
peace, and it appears that by 8 January many old Foxites in the Commons 
felt that peace should form the basis of their parliamentary campaign.^
The French overture reopened deep wounds in the ranks of the 
coalesced opposition and Grey and Grenville moved to avert an open 
schism.On 7 January Grenville told his excited brother that peace, even 
at the cost of Gibraltar, was necessary for British security and on the 
8th Grey reemphasized the need for moderation to Whitbread. Simulta­
neously the Morning Chronicle tried to appease both extremes by repre­
senting the French overture as merely a ministerial ploy designed to
3stifle talk of peace among manufacturers.
All this had little effect. On the 11th party animosities were 
increased by the arrival of the Bourbons at Stowe. With the exception 
of Tom Grenville, who prudently stayed in London, the Grenville hierarchy
1T. Grenville to Grenville, 6 Jan. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
167-8. Temple to C.W.W. Wynn., 7 Jan. 1808 (Wynn).
2Fulford, p. 191. Creevey to Whitbread, 8 Jan. [1808] (Whitbread), 
373/7. Independent Whig, 10 Jan. 1808.
3Grenville to T. Grenville, 7 Jan. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852 
(T. Grenville). Grey to Whitbread, 8 Jan. 1808 (Grey). Morning 
Chronicle, 8 Jan. 1808.
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company,
every body changes his manner towards you; one sneers, another ex­
presses an incredulous astonishment, a third shrugs his shoulders 
in a corner with a sort of piteous patience at your ignorance, 
while a fourth spills his tea and almost choaks himself with 
swallowing his toast to make you an answer full of bitter violence
This frame of mind was most threatening to the coalition with Crenville
2and on the evening of 11 January a disturbed Grey arrived at Dropmore. 
Frightened by reports that Whitbread would take a line of his own^the 
Foxite leader supported Grenville's plan for a parliamentary secession 
so warmly that his host became alarmed. I find in him much less
expression of a disposition to moderate & to controul that I expected', 
wrote Grenville. 'All this makes it still more necessary that I should 
keep in my own hands the thread of our own conduct.
Grey and Grenville travelled up to London on the 16th. After 
much ado a meeting of party leaders was scheduled for the 18th at 
Camelford House. Grenville did not include Whitbread on the invitation 
list and it was only the insistence of Holland and Grey that led to his 
presence at the dinner.^ Grey's motives at this point were clear.
Above all else he wished to surround his unmanageable friend with men 
who were willing to compromise on the issue of peace in the hope that 
he would adhere to more moderate views. This tactic failed miserably. 
Midway through the dinner Grey condemned the large and unruly demonstra­
tions for peace at Leeds. After several seconds of uncomfortable si­
lence Whitbread exploded with anger and lectured Grey on the duties ■
•^Examiner, 17 Jan. 1808.
2Grey to Lady Grey, 11, 14, and 16 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
^Lady Holland Journal, II, 236-37.
^Grenville to T. Grenville, 12 Jan. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41852
(T. Grenville).
was in full attendance. Lord Grenville, Buckingham, Temple, Carysfort, 
Proby, Fremantle, Ebrington, the Wynns, and the Nevilles toasted, 'The 
True Peace of Europe founded on a strict alliance between the two 
Sovereigns', and the orchestra played 0 Richard 0 Mon Rol.^  Meanwhile 
in London it was learned on the 12th that the British government had 
refused the Austro-Russian offer of mediation.
In a terse letter to Grey Whitbread defended the right of the
2people to petition for peace. Leigh Hunt's Examiner, which only re­
cently had joined the Independent Whig as a whiggish but non-party week­
ly, called for naval based isolation from Europe.-^ As always the 
Independent Whig raised the banner of Fox and begged Holland to assert 
himself, 'We were the instigators of the famous combination of kings;' 
wrote White, 'every monarch on the European Continent flew to arms, and 
divided in imaginary partitions the -territories of France; in the dread 
of democracy we forgot our favorite balance of power, and abandoned our 
support of the long defended continental equipoise to our horrow of a 
republic.Reflecting the fears of the party hierarchy, the Morning 
Chronicle defended the decision of government in a shuffling editorial.-* 
But Perry stood almost alone. The proceedings at Stowe, the peace move­
ment in the north, the refusal to negotiate with France, and the absence 
of leadership made Foxites rally round the principles of days gone by. 
After visiting St. James^Street in the wake of the government's refusal 
to negotiate Leigh Hunt reported that if a man praised Pitt in Foxlte
■^ Henry W. W, Wynn to Lady W. Wynn, 12 Jan. 1808, Lady 
Williams Wynn Correspondence, pp. 119-20.
^Whitbread to Grey, 12 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
^Examiner, 24 Jan. 1808.
^Independent Whig, 24 Jan. 1808.
M^orning Chronicle, 13 Jan. 1808.
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of a Foxite.^ 'Old Grenville seemed dumbfounded & hardly spoke a word', 
reported Grey.* 2 This exchange ended the meeting. Afterwards Whitbread 
approached Holland and Grey and stressed the necessity of 'maintaining 
a clear distinction between the Foxite part of the Party from the 
Grenvilles.’
As would be the case for the next eight years, Whitbread's abil­
ity to discomfort the party hierarchy rested entirely on the soundness 
of his politics in the eyes of leading Foxites. Many thought them sound 
in mid-January. On the 19th Erskine, Tierney, and Whithread visited 
Lord Hutchinson, who had just returned from Tilsit. As soon as the 
three entered his parlour the old diplomat exclaimed. 'There is but one 
sound man among you by God! and that is Whitbread.' A few minutes of 
discussion converted Erskine. 'Damme,' he said emphatically, 'I always 
thought with him and every body knows it.' Tierney left in alarm.^
Grenvillite leaders also disagreed on the subject. Though he 
opposed petitions for peace Grenville was unhappy with the government's 
refusal to negotiate and Spencer horrified Tom Grenville by condemning 
Canning's punctilious and outrageous demands on France.^* Count 
Stahremberg, the Russian minister, strengthened these opinions. Before 
leaving London he gave Grey copies of the official correspondence which 
contained the French offer of negotiation. Grey was stunned by their 
content. 'It is a pity that everything could not appear which passed of 
a Confidential Nature', he lamented. 'In these I think stronger proofs
•^Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II, 240-42. Also see 
Fulford, p. 192.
2Grey to Lady Grey, 19 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
■^Fulford, p. 193.
^Spencer to T. Grenville, 15 Jan. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
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of a desire for Peace on the part of the French Government are con­
tained than anything that has appeared at any former period. On our 
side, on the contrary everything that has passed seems to breathe a 
spirit of interminable war.'^
It appears that a majority of opposition leaders shared these 
views by 20 January when the party hierarchy met at Holland House to 
discuss political strategy. Of the men who attended, Holland, Erskine, 
Bedford, Petty, and Whitbread wanted peace and felt that the party 
should champion it in Parliament. Grey, Grenville, Spencer, Lauderdale, 
Tierney, and Morpeth were equally pacific but opposed petitions and par­
liamentary agitation on the subject. Only Tom Grenville, who spoke the 
language of most Grenvilllte peers, and Elliot, who represented 
Fitzwilliam and Windham, remained intensely warlike. Ponsonby, who had 
just arrived, was willing to follow the majority. But with the opening 
of Parliament less than 24 hours away the subject was dodged altogether. 
Grey was far more concerned with avoiding further disagreement. 
Grenville, obviously uncomfortable in the presence of Lady Holland, re­
fused to open his mouth. The dinner ended with no more than polite 
conversation and a few whispers in the drawing room about Whitbread's 
jealousy.^ Nothing solid was decided on the Catholic question, America, 
the Orders in Council, or peace.
That evening Ponsonby called a meeting at his house to discuss 
the Copenhagen expedition but few M.P.’s attended. Temple's attitude 
was typical. Grenville reported that his nephew had 'so strong an opin­
ion of his own against that measure [opposing the expedition], & so 
fully satisfied me of the impossibility of reconciling our friends to
l-Grey to Lady Grey, 19 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
^Holland House Dinner Book entry of 20 Jan. 1808, B.M., Add.
MSS. 51951. Grey to Lady Grey, 21 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
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it that I was glad to find him inclined not to attend the meeting, but 
rather to make previous communication of his sentiments, to Ponsonby 
... Faced with internal disagreement Grey and Grenville concluded
meekly that there would be no amendment to the Address on opening day; 
party harmony could be preserved best by generalities.^
Surprisingly the meeting of Parliament on 21 January brought a 
convincing display of opposition power. Unhampered by the fear of a 
division Grenville delivered a vague but impressive harangue against 
ministers. Sheridan and Whitbread made every effort to cooperate with 
their leaders and both of them shone in debate. Though Abbot thought 
that Ponsonby’s speech was 'short and cold', the new opposition floor 
leader was well-received by back-benchers. The only hitch came in the 
Lords when Gloucester and Sidmouth grew angry at a favourable reference 
to the Copenhagen expedition in the Kjnqsi - speech. As
Grey and Grenville held their breath Sidmouth declined to approve of it 
before seeing relevant papers and several opposition peers entered a 
Protest upon the journals of the House.^ A division was happily avoided 
but it was now obvious to most people that Grey and Grenville had to 
commit themselves on the issues of the day. An opposition dinner was 
held at Erskine’s on the 23rd but nothing was accomplished. Neither 
Spencer, Tom Grenville, Whitbread, nor any of the Fitzwilliams attended, 
and Erskine, whose phil-Americanism had reached imprudent extremes, in­
vited Pinckney. The presence of the American minister made the dinner
’''Grenville to Grey, [21] Jan. 1808 (Grey).
2See Romilly's comments in his Memoirs. II, 239.
^Abbot Diary, II, 137. Grey to Lady Grey, 22 Jan.
1808 (GreyTT^
^Parl, Deb., X. 14-16, 58-9. J. T. Rogers, ed., Protests of the 
Lords (Oxford, 1875), II, 384.
193
no more than a social occasion. Erskine entertained his guests with 
Home and Cline, two pet leaches which he kept in a glass of water, and 
Romilly left the dinner in disgust.^
At this juncture the Foxite zeal of William Roscoe rocked the 
party. In late 1807 this Liverpool Whig had published a pamphlet, 
Considerations on the Cause, Objects and Consequences of the present 
War, and on the Expediency, or the Danger, of Peace with France. Suc­
cinctly and forcefully it outlined the essence of Fox's old arguments 
for peace and concluded with an attack on the peace efforts of the 
Ministry of All the Talents. Copies of this pamphlet were sent to old 
members of the Foxite party in late January and the clash between poli­
tical consistency and loyalty to the Talents government came to the sur­
face once again.. Francis and Derby agreed with Roscoe^and Creevey 
chastized the author for 'your too great forbearance on my late Masters 
... Brougham and Thanet were reluctant to condemn the former govern­
ment but both of them advocated a motion for peace in Parliament and the 
former encouraged Jeffrey to 'preach a lecture on peace' in his next 
review.^ Poor Holland was caught In the middle. He told Roscoe:
'Every thing that you write must give me pleasure in point of style & 
principle but I will confess to you that it gave me much concern to 
find you differed so entirely with our friends & with my Uncle upon the 
late negotiation.'^ Holland, like many others, refused to admit that 
Fox or the rump of his government had compromised the principles of *3
^Romi1ly Memoirs, II, 239-41.
^Francis to Roscoe, 7 Feb., Derby to Roscoe, 9 Feb., and Creevey 
to Roscoe, 5 Feb. 1808 (Roscoe), 1584, 1192, and 1054.
3Brougham to Roscoe, n.d. [27 Jan.), and 28 Jan., and Roscoe to 
Brougham, 9 Feb. 1808 (Roscoe), 455, 458, and 459.
^Holland to Roscoe, 30 Jan. 1808 (Roscoe), 2093.
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the 1790's.
Roscoe's stature as a Foxlte, however, was as firm as the princi­
ples he championed, and the timing of his pamphlet undermined the tem­
porising of the party hierarchy. On 26 January Whitbread gave notice in 
Parliament of a motion on the Austro-Russian offer of mediation. Roscoe 
immediately offered his services to the brewer; young Whigs like Lord 
John Russell, Althorp, Creevey, and Ward hailed Whitbread as Fox's suc­
cessor in foreign politics; and old Foxites cast reflective eyes towards 
Southill.'*' As Belsham noted, Whitbread's motion would 'bring the 
Politics of the Grenville Party to the Test, & I fear that they will not 
endure the experlmentum cricms.1^  Host Foxites were ready for the air 
to be cleared; Robert Southey predicted the dissolution of the Whig 
party.^
Roscoe's attack on the Talents and Whitbread's notice of what was 
surely going to be a motion for peace placed the coalition's leaders in 
a difficult position. Though Grey, Grenville, and most of the party 
hierarchy were in fundamental agreement with Whitbread on the Austro- 
Russian offer of mediation, the renewed attack on the Talents' peace 
negotiations gave them much in common with Canning. The Fitzwilliams 
and most Grenvillite peers continued to support the government stance , 
and the publication in early February of a pamphlet which openly accused 
the opposition of treason did nothing to stimulate interest in motions 
for peaced But action of some sort was necessary and Grenville placed 
new emphasis on Lauderdale's scheme for a comprehensive assault on the 4
^Ward to Whitbread, 4 Feb., and Roscoe to Whitbread, 10 Feb.
1808, (Whitbread), 2440 and 4179.
^Belsham.to Whitbread, 21 Feb. 1808 (Whitbread), 4183.
■^Southey Diary, MSS. 4812 (Southey), f. 199.
4Anonomous, Letters to a French Spy; or. Five Original Letters 
found in the Bureau of a Foreigner (London, 1808)7
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new system of government. This entailed a three-pronged attack on the 
Copenhagen expedition, the Orders in Council, and the refusal of govern­
ment to meet the demands of Irish Catholics. Individually, each of 
these heads was a source of party disharmony; collectively, they were 
symbolic of a ’new morality' which undermined the resources of the 
British Empire, increased French power, and most importantly, over­
turned the policies of the Ministry of All the Talents. By late January 
most party leaders apparently agreed with Lauderdale that such a compre­
hensive attack on government could bring a semblance of unity and re­
lieve party tensions on the issue of peace. The question was whether 
Temple, Tom Grenville, and the Grenvillite war faction would compromise 
their views on Copenhagen enough to facilitate the broader scheme.
The authoritative opinions of Hutchinson and the persistence of 
the wronged Garlike joined with Canning's unnecessarily harsh condemna­
tion of the late government and his failure to justify the attack on 
Copenhagen to alter Tom Grenville's views considerably. Under pressure 
from both his brother and Foxite leaders,he wrote C. W. W. Wynn on 30 
January:
I had been inclined to believe that ministers would make out a case 
to justify their expedition, instead of which they have manifested 
such a total disregard of all grounds necessary to their justifi­
cation as leaves them in my mind without any excuse or apology for 
a measure of so unusual a description. I am told that L“
Hutchinson (who was at Tilsit with Alexander) disclaims all belief 
of any hostile intention on the part of Denmark, & entre nous 
Garlike has told me he knows it to have been the determination of 
the Prince Regent [of Denmark] to burn the Danish fleet rather 
than let it fall under the controul of France!!!! These two evi­
dences are the best upon the subject, & appear to me to be un­
answerable.
But Tom Grenville had committed himself to support the expedition at an
^T. Grenville to Wynn, 30 Jan. 1808 (Wynn). Canning's attitude 
disturbed even his supporters. Lady Jackson, ed., The Diaries and 
Letters of Sir George Jackson (London, 1872), II, 236.
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earlier date. Moreover, he continued to admire the successful expedition 
and he appreciated Canning's reluctance to disclose his sources of in­
formation. This defence of the doctrine of confidence was enough in 
itself to infuriate most Foxites and the compromise which was adopted 
on 2 February was precarious indeed. Censure would centre on the gov­
ernment's refusal to justify measures of such an unusual nature.
Plagued by doubt the opposition would refrain from passing judgement on 
the utility of the expedition and merely press the need for the publica­
tion of papers by educating the House on the potential ill effects of 
Danish hostility.
With only superficial unity in the party, on 3 February Ponsonby 
divided 108 against the government's 253.* This defeat hardly soothed 
differences in the party. On the 5th Canning's attack on the foreign 
policy of the Talents so frustrated Tierney that he took an unbending 
stance on the censure of Copenhagen and the compromise came unravelled. 
Whitbread accused Tierney of wanting to be 'Viceroy' over Ponsonby and 
Tierney retorted that Whitbread was eager to ruin Ponsonby so he could 
take the lead. As the ministerial benches rolled with laughter Ponsonby
somehow managed to calm tempers enough to arrange a meeting at his
2house. At this point Grey intervened.
On the evening of the 5th the Foxite leader met with Garlike and 
Tom Grenville and convinced the latter that Canning was guilty of 'de­
liberate falsehood in a way & to a degree that must expose him
*This debate is published in the Pari. Deb., X, 182. According 
to Abbot forty M.P.'s paired off. Windham refused to temper his criti­
cism of the expedition and his speech was so hostile that even Henry 
White was impressed. Abbott Diary, II, 137. Independent 
Whig, 7 Feb. 1808.
^Grey to Lady Grey, 5 Feb. 1808 (Grey). Also see Creevey to 
Roscoe, 5 Feb. 1808 (Roscoe), 1054.
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completely, If we can only get the necessary papers before the House'.' 
This led to a second assault against the expedition by Whitbread on 8 
February which attracted only 75 votes. The reason for this poor show­
ing was continued party disagreement for on the 9th opposition leaders
3were still arguing about the manner in which they would oppose ministers. 
But winning divisions was of secondary importance. The motion of the 8th 
found Whitbread, Tierney, Petty, Windham, and Tom Grenville on cordial 
terms and in the days which followed, Canning's invective increased unity 
on the opposition front bench. By the 18th, when Petty delivered what 
was probably the finest oration of his career, Copenhagen was actually a 
source of party harmony and Grey was full of optimism.lk
The Copenhagen expedition was only part of a much broader scheme 
of opposition which centred on the Orders in Council and their effect on 
Anglo-American relations. The new commercial code was most symbolic of 
what opposition leaders represented as the 'new morality' and by mid- 
January even Grey had become alarmed about the possibility of a ruinous 
American war.'* Stressing the precedents of the Talents, Auckland backed 
Lauderdale's ideas emphatically and on 18 January the former President 
of the Board of Trade told Grenville that the principle of the Orders in 
Council branched 'into all the more important interests external and 
internal; and we have many advantages in it.' By the 24th he had grown
•^ Grey to Lady Grey, 6 Feb. 1808 (Grey). Also see Grey to T. 
Grenville, 5 Feb. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 (T. Grenville).
2Parl. Deb.. X, 310. For further comment on this debate see Sir 
Henry L. Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston 
(London, 2nd ed., 1870), I, 79-83.
3Auckland to Grenville, 9 Feb. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 176.
^Grey to Lady Grey, 12, 19 Feb. 1808 (Grey).
^Grey to Lady Grey, 16 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
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disgusted with the inactivity of his superiors and wrote that the 
Orders were 'so inseparably connected with the great objects of our 
American negotiation which I am desirous to explain, and also with the 
order of the 7th January, 1807, in the issuing of which I had some share 
of responsibility, that I feel myself personally called upon.'^
There were, however, solid reasons why Grey and Grenville held 
back. Firstly, the ministerial press had succeeded in raising a popu­
lar cry against the 'giveaway' American policies of the Talents. 2 
Secondly, though Pinckney had shown a willingness to cooperate with the 
party, his government had failed to acknowledge a distinction between 
the policies of the Talents and those of its successor. Thirdly, the 
principle of retaliation which had prefaced the Talents' response to 
the Berlin Decree had proved embarrassing. Fourthly, word of Napoleon's 
Milan Decree, which announced the commencement of French seizures on the 
high seas, reached London in January and increased support for the poli­
cies of the British government. Lastly, Grey doubted whether any meas­
ure could conciliate the Americans.-* But Whitbread's threatened motion 
on the Austo-Russian offer overcame all else and while Grey and Tom 
Grenville grappled with the question of Copenhagen Holland House and 
Dropmore turned to the Orders in Council.
Shortly after Whitbread's speech of 26 January Holland wrote to 
Frederick Lawrence (who had been an under-secretary at the Foreign
Auckland to Grenville, 18, 24 Jan. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 
173, 173-4. Auckland forced the issue in the Lords on 27 January. 
Grenville and Holland supported him with reference to the policies of 
the Talents, but the debate was short, and there was no division.
Pari. Deb., X, 149-54.
2Party leaders were concerned over this. Romilly Memoirs, II,
140.
3Grey to Grenville, 3 Jan. 1808, C. Grey, ed., Life and Opinions 
of Charles, 2nd Earl Grey (London, 1861), p. 190.
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Office under the Talents) and requested an analysis of the late govern­
ment's official correspondence on the subject of blockade. Three days 
later Lawrence reported that these despatches were 'at best evidence of 
the negative kind' but that there was ground for a strong argument that 
the Orders in Council of November 1807 had forced the French to extend 
their blockade to the high seas. Affidavits from prominent merchants 
were at the Foreign Office and they contended that the Berlin Decree 
had not begun maritime captures. In addition American newspapers proved 
that up to 18 September there was doubt as to whether the French block­
ade would do any more than prohibit the importation of British goods.
One might argue convincingly that a clearly illegal British blockade had 
led Napoleon to desert a clearly legal program of commercial prohibition 
which was recognized in international law even during peacetime.
Lawrence concluded:
Have Ministers then any intelligence to produce showing a single 
instance of the practical application of the rules of blockade to 
any neutral vessel bound to or from this country between the 18th 
of September & the 11th of November, the date of their orders? If 
not, the whole ground of their retaliation, which consists in a 
blockade without a blockading force, is cut from under them. Your 
Lordship will remember that the preamble of your order of the 7th 
of January 1807 Is in direct contrast with theirs of the 11th 
November. You menace the retaliation of an actual blockade by our 
superior force.^
This fragile interpretation was accepted by Holland, and he and Allen 
worked feverishly to depict the differences between the commercial
t
policies of the Talents and those of the Portland government.^
Meanwhile many members of the opposition concentrated their ef­
forts on the importance of Anglo-American friendship. Probably at the 
instigation of Southill (and clearly with the money of someone else) *2
^Lawrence to Holland, 29 Jan. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 
(Holland).
2See Holland's pencilled comments on an American publication of 
pertinent diplomatic correspondence in ibid., ff. 151-54.
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Creevey commissioned a merchant to report on the potential effects of 
an American war on trade and industry in the Wakefield area.^ Auckland 
grew emotional and told Grenville that he wanted to close his career in
Odefence of the same principles with which it had begun. Horner and 
Lauderdale developed arguments which magnified the importance of the 
American market and pointed out the inconsistencies of the Orders in 
Council. * 5 Roscoe and Alexander Baring attempted to mobilize the mer­
cantile communities of Liverpool and London. And Grey, Whitbread, 
Tierney, and Brougham worked closely with the small deputations of mer­
chants and manufacturers which had gathered in London to lay their 
grievances before Parliament.^
All this was accompanied by a remarkably well-oiled press cam­
paign. The Times. which was usually neutral or ministerial in politi­
cal comment, attacked Canning's American policy and stressed that the 
French decrees did not affect the interests of Great Britain. The 
Morning Chronicle, the Statesman, and the Independent Whig warned of 
the effects of an American war. And when word arrived that the United 
States had reacted to the French and British blockades with an embargo 
on all European trade the Examiner, the Morning Chronicle, and the 
Independent Whig defended America and emphasized that the embargo should 
not be interpreted as an act of war . 5
Alexander Baring's pamphlet, An Inquiry into the Causes and
*M. J. Naylor to Creevey, 6 Jan. 1808 (Creevey).
Auckland to Grenville, 15 Feb. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 176.
5Horner to Allen, A Jan. 1808 (Horner).
‘W .  and Mrs. W. Rathbone to Roscoe, 29 Feb. and 5 Mar. 1808 
(Roscoe), 3061.
5Examiner, 2A, 31 Jan. 1808. The Times, A Jan., 2A Feb. 1808. 
Morning Chronicle, 9, 13 Jan. 1808. Independent Whig, 10, 31 Jan. 1808. 
Statesman, 9, 1A Jan. 1808.
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Consequences of the Orders in Council; and an Examination of the Conduct 
of Great Britain towards the Neutral Commerce of America, argued that 
jealousy of America had led the British government to adopt ruinous com­
mercial measures. Brougham's pamphlet, Orders in Council; Or, An 
Examination of theJustice, Legality, and Policy of the New System of 
Commercial Regulations, put forward a convincing case. And a second 
pamphlet by Brougham, An Enquiry into the Causes and Consequences of 
Continental Alienation, attempted to give the case against the Orders 
in Council a proper political context. In a forceful attack on Pittite 
foreign policy the author asserted that the alienation of Europe and 
America, indeed the source of all Britain's woes was the
rigorous maintenance of what we assume to be our maritime rights, 
and to a system of policy the evident end and object of which were 
the attainment of our own immediate interest; an extravagant pre­
ference of ourselves and every thing connected with us, and to a 
consequent relative and active contempt of the rights and Interests 
of others. 1
The opinions of journalists and pamphleteers who had no faith in gov­
ernment by no means sprang from a rigorous campaign by the leaders of 
opposition; far from it, in most cases these were individual efforts 
which merely complemented and possibly influenced the formulation of 
opposition policy. Brougham's arguments were important primarily be­
cause they attempted to channel these opinions into a united course of 
general remonstrance to the 'new morality' which was undermining British 
security. These were the grounds on which Grey and Grenville had chosen 
to base their politics in opposition.
By 30 January Grenville had developed a plan of parliamentary 
opposition to the Orders in Council. He would move for a Committee of 
the House to investigate the different leanings of the commercial code
^A. Aspinall, Lord Brougham and the Whig Party (Manchester, 
1927), p. 16. Also see Brougham to Allen, [22] Jan. 1808, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 52178 (Allen).
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on the Constitution, international law, the state of trade, and the 
pending negotiations with the United States. If refused the opposition 
would bring on each of these heads in separate resolutions.^ The main 
attack would come in the Lords where the party leadership could exer­
cise better control. In the Commons, where the government was to bring 
forward legislation on the commercial code first, opposition would be 
purely defensive and thus less divisive and dangerous. This strategy 
was a direct reflection of the opposition's problems: Grey and 
Grenville would neutralize a disunited party in the Commons by attempt­
ing to lead from the Lords. Of course the overwhelming strength of the 
government in the upper house rendered an opposition victory impossible 
but Grey and Grenville had other priorities.
On 5 February Grenville opened the attack with a long discourse 
in defence of neutral maritime rights which stressed the importance of 
American goodwill. At the same time Petty, Lawrence, Windham, Piggott, 
and Eden voiced identical sentiments in the Commons. After being denied 
papers on the 11th Grenville sent an eager Auckland forward on the 15th. 
Auckland argued that the Orders in Council were illegal, unnecessary, 
and ruinous and moved for a Committee of the House. He was defeated 48 
to 106. After Grenville caught the government unprepared with a motion 
for papers on the 18th St. John moved resolutions on the 26th which de­
fended American rights and asserted that the French blockade had not 
been maritime prior to 11 November 1807. This was beaten 47 to 137. 
Meanwhile in the Commons Petty's motion of 15 February for the produc­
tion of the American despatches of the Ministry of All the Talents back­
fired when the government successfully used them to support its policy. 
On 18 February the Orders in Council Bill passed its second reading by
^Grenville to Grey, 30 Jan. 1808 (Grey).
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214 to 94 and on the 26th Whitbread's amendment was beaten 78 to 165. ^
The crux of the government's defence was most disheartening.
'It was extraordinary', argued Perceval, 'after the example set by the 
late administration, that the noble lord [Petty] condemned in opposition 
what he had as a minister sanctioned and approved.'“ As Lauderdale had 
warned in December 1806, the principle of commercial retaliation laid 
down by the Talents came back to haunt the coalition. By 26 February 
it was obvious that independent voters saw no great distinction between 
the policies of the two governments, that most M.P.'s felt the attack 
on the 'new morality' was no more than poorly disguised political re­
crimination, and that further exertions against the Orders in Council 
would be a waste of time.
Nevertheless it was impossible to deny that Grey and Grenville 
had succeeded in uniting their divided party to a great extent. The 
attacks on the Copenhagen expedition and the Orders in Council had 
brought harmony in the Lords where convinced Foxites like Holland, 
Erskine, St. John, and King had stood side by side with Carlisle, 
Carysfort, and Fitzwilliam. Whitbread's wounded pride had been greatly 
repaired by close cooperation with Ponsonby, Tierney, Temple, Windham, 
and Tom Grenville in the Commons. A spirit of cooperation was in the 
air and on 20 February Whitbread sent Ponsonby, Grey, and Grenville 
copies of his resolutions on the Austro-Russian offer of mediation and 
expressed willingness to compromise for the welfare of the party .
At first glance Grey was afraid to discuss the issue but Tom 
Grenville, who had been impressed by Whitbread's recent efforts in the 
Commons, encouraged the party's leaders to cooperate. Lord Grenville
1 Parl. Deb.. X, 312, 314-39, 431-33, 465-86, 641-42, 665-84, 
726-32, 780-86.
2Parl. Deb.. X, 321, 5 Feb. 1808.
responded enthusiastically to this proposal. Seeing that the coali­
tion's harmony depended on compromise, the old Pittite accepted the 
basis of Whitbread's resolutions and merely added a paragraph which ex­
pressed disapprobation of the entire basis of Canning's foreign policy.
He objected to the bombardment of Copenhagen and to 'the whole spirit 
& tendency of the late Orders in Council' in which could be seen 'strong 
indications of a disposition on the part of His Majesty's Ministers ra­
ther to extend & even to render universal the War in which we are en­
gaged, than to adopt any proper & dignified measures for ascertaining 
whether it is Possible to bring it to a just & honourable conclusion.'^  
This language was not only a concession to Whitbread; it represented a 
comprehensive plan of opposition and the only possible chance of unit­
ing the coalition. On 26 February Lauderdale carried the revised draft 
to Whitbread. 'He ought & I hope he will adopt it', wrote Grey. 'If 
he does not I shall be obliged to believe that he aims at distinguish­
ing himself from us, as entertaining more pacific dispositions & thus 
recommending himself to the People whom he believes increasing distress 
will make more clamourous for peace.
Grey's suspicions were ill-founded. Whitbread and his circle 
were delighted with Grenville's views for,as Thomas Belsham noted, 'It has 
brought Ld. Grlle sincerely to the test & the result is highly honor- 
able to him.' Whitbread opened a warm correspondence with Grenville, 
accepted the revised resolutions, and even suggested further alterations 
which tended to soften the emphasis on peace. Grey was astonished and *2
^This draft has survived. See Whitbread MSS., 4184. Also see 
Grenville to Grey, 23 Feb. 1808 (Grey).
2Grey to Lady Grey, 22 Feb. 1808 (Grey).
^Helsham to Whitbread, 4 Mar. 1808 (Whitbread), 4185.
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admitted to his wife that Whithread's desire to cooperate had gone far
beyond his wildest dreams. By 28 February agreement was so complete 
that a meeting was held at Ponsonby's house. When the proposed resolu­
tions were read, however, Windham, Elliot, and several others objected 
strongly. At this point Ponsonby lost control. Whitbread promptly 
read his original resolutions and a majority of those present, led by 
the much respected Lord George Cavendish, supported him completely. 
Windham and Elliot stormed away in a huff and practically every Foxite 
left Ponsonby's prepared to second Whitbread on the morrow.-* Grey and 
Grenville soon made matters worse. Fearing the formal separation of 
the Fitzwilliams,they instructed Ponsonby to resist Whitbread. 2
On 29 February there was mass confusion on the opposition benches 
as Whitbread rose to speak. In proposing three resolutions he repeated
Foxite dogma of the 1790's; he protested against the personal hatred
with which the British government pursued Napoleon; and he concluded on
a note which moved the deepest of Foxite emotions:
Having mentioned the name of Mr. Fox, I willingly acknowledge my­
self his true and genuine disciple. I am only feebly urging the 
sentiments which he would have forcibly uttered, if he had not been 
unhappily taken from us. I trust that I am treading in his foot­
steps; would to God that his countenance were now upon me! would to 
God, this humble effort over, I could feel myself as I have often 
done, secure under the impenetrable aegis of his eloquence!-*
With these words Sam Whitbread summarized the feelings of Fox's direc­
tionless friends and captured the imaginations of many. H. A. Herbert, 
a firm Foxite, seconded Whitbread,and Ward, Lord Mahon, Sheridan,
^Grey to Lady Grey, 29 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1808 (Grey). Also see 
Grey, Life and Opinions, p. 180.
2Grey summed up the source of his difficulties when he wrote 
that Grenville disagreed with most of his traditional supporters on the 
issue of war and peace. Grey to Holland, n.d. [28 Feb. 1808], B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland), ff. 57-9.
3Parl. Deb., X, 801-56.
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William Adam, and John and William Smith, all of whom had followed Fox, 
spoke in favour of all three resolutions.
Supported by Ponsonby,the first two resolutions, which repro­
bated the government's refusal to accept Austro-Russian mediation, drew 
70 and 67 votes respectively. But the crisis came on the third resolu­
tion which asserted 'That there is nothing in the present state of the 
war, which ought to preclude his majesty from embracing any fair oppor­
tunity of acceeding to, or commencing a negotiation with the enemy on 
a footing of equality for the termination of hostilities on terms of 
equity and honour. ' This language captured the essence of Foxi.re ideology 
because it advocated the acceptance of Napoleon's government 'on a 
footing of equality ...' Grey and Grenville found it far too realis­
tic for the maintenance of their precarious union. Milton joined 
Ponsonby in opposing it and Tierney and Petty maintained silence. But 
Whitbread had struck a chord and 58 men practically walked over Ponsonby 
in accompanying the brewer to the lobby.*
On 29 February twenty-one of the men who had supported Fox's anti­
war address of December 1792 remained in the Commons.~ Ten of these 
voted for Whitbread's third resolution.J Of the remaining eleven pro­
bably only six were In town (but possibly not in the House) and two of 
these, Fitzpatrick and Dudley North, were firmly attached to Holland 
House and friendly with Grey. Other old supporters of Fox who voted 1*3
1 Parl. Deb.. X, 856-69. Grey, Life and Opinions, pp. 181-2. 
Roberts, pp. 111-12.
oW. Adam, W. Anthonie, Sir John Aubrey, G, Byng, G. Bouverie, J. 
Curwen, R. Fitzpatrick, W. Howard, W, Hussey, T. Jekyll, Sir William 
Milner, D. North, Lord William Russell, R. Sheridan, W, Smith, B.
Tarleton, M. A. Taylor, T. Thompson, Lord John Townshend, C. C. Western,
S. Whitbread.
3Adam, Anthonie, Aubrey, Bouverie, Byng, Jekyll, Lord W. Russell, 
Sheridan, Smith, Whitbread. L, G. Mitchell, p. 265.
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with Whitbread were H. C. Combe, W. Madocks, and the former Jacobin 
Sir Oswald Mosley. Of prominent second generation Foxites, Abercromby, 
Biddulph, Brand, Burdett, Colborne, Creevey, Horner, y. Lamb, R. J. 
Lambton, Lyttelton, H. Martin, Piggott, and Ward followed Whitbread. 
Also of significance was the fact that the Dundas brothers, who sat for 
Fitzwilliam boroughs, and the three Cavendishes, who represented the 
Whig centre, ignored Ponsonby. Petty, Tierney, Fitzpatrick, and North 
were the only genuine Foxites present who abstained and it may be sur­
mised from subsequent developments that they acted against their better 
judgement. In total only about a dozen members of the opposition stood 
by the coalition's leaders. Clearly, Whitbread carried the Foxite cen­
tre with him.^
For all practical purposes the division of 29 February ended the 
coalition's parliamentary campaign for the year. The party continued 
to push against the Copenhagen expedition and the Orders in Council,and
Roberts, p. 112, argues that Whitbread's strength sprang from 
the fact that the party was 'particularly irritated just then by 
Ponsonby's mismanagement' and he concludes that 'it would be incorrect 
to see in the 58 the partisans of a wholehearted peace policy.' Such 
statements constitute the only real weakness of Robert's excellent 
book. He repeatedly ignores the effects of the political polarization 
of the 1790's in treating a period in which political consistency was 
closely watched. In this case he is unsupported by fact. Well over 
three-fourths of those who voted for the third resolution had supported 
Fox's definition of the European struggle all their political lives; 
the party had been firmly united prior to the meeting of 28 February; 
and personally Whitbread was none too popular among those who supported 
him. Only Sheridan showed pique but if he had not supported the reso­
lution it would have revealed glaring inconsistency with the politics 
of his lifetime. Roberts also notes that Horner, Abercromby, Piggott, 
and Sheridan, 'who were by no means of Whitbread's group', supported 
the third resolution. Whitbread had no 'group' of parliamentary sup­
porters at this time. His strength was in the country and that which 
he enjoyed in Parliament sprang from the views he put forward on a 
particular occasion. '1 would go even further', wrote Bedford, 'I 
would have a frank & manly offer of negotiation made & renewed by this 
country year after year, till peace is procured ...' Bedford to 
Whitbread, 5 April1808 (Whitbread), 4191. For similar views see 
Roscoe to Whitbread, 23 Mar. 1808, ibid., 4189.
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in May Grattan drew 128 votes in the Commons while Grenville secured 74 
in the Lords by moving the Catholic question."^ But though Foxites jour­
neyed up to town to support a cause with which they identified they 
showed little interest in the other concoctions of their leaders.
Richard Sharp's motion of 21 March against the Copenhagen expedition 
rallied only 64 votes (six more than had supported Whitbread's third re­
solution) and when the party opposed the vote of thanks to the command­
ers of the expedition their division sank to 19.* 2 The campaign against 
the Orders in Council also floundered. Grenville rose in defence of the 
Talents' treaty with the United States and claimed that Canning seized 
everything 'that could stir up a spirit of animosity against America, 
and prepare the public mind for hostilities with that country . ..' 3 
The Barings, whose commercial house was losing a fortune by the inter­
ruption of Anglo-American trade, tried to stimulate interest among the 
party rank and file. But as Tierney noted, the American question was 
one 'which does not now excite the least Interest ...'^
On 8 March Erskine's ridiculously long and boring discourse on 
the illegality of the Orders was crushed 61 to 127; on the 16th Grenville's 
motion to reject the Orders in Council Bill secured only 52 votes; divi­
sions of the 22nd and of the 25th drew 21 and 19 respectively; and 
Holland's resolutions of 29 March, which denied that the Anerican govern­
ment had been angered by the policies of the Talents, were supported by
Pari. Deb.. XI, 643-94. The division of 25 May drew no less 
than 40 Irish members, and Grattan was pleased. Henry Grattan, ed.,
Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Rt, Hon. Henry Grattan (London,
1849), V, 381. Morning Chronicle, 28 May 1808. Roberts, pp. 42-3.
2Parl. Deb.. X, 396-97, 1235, 19 Mar. 1808.
3Ibid., X,, 927, 8 Mar. 1808.
^Tierney to Grey, 16 May 1808 (Grey).
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good ... that yet remains', he judged, 'consists in my opinion in the 
preservation of the union between Fox's friends & Ld. Grenville's, & 
the discretion of the latter as Leader of the Party.Immobilized by 
this opinion, Grey stayed in London only long enough to determine that 
he had no control over the House of Commons. Begging the ill health of 
his wife he set out for Northumberland in late March. From his northern 
stronghold he flooded London with pessimistic correspondence and fell 
prey to paranoia. He planned legal action against the libels of
newspapers; he wrote nasty letters to Whitbread; and when Holland became 
excited about the Catholic question Grey dampened enthusiasm by assert­
ing that 'the overwhelming torrent of Bonaparte's power will come upon 
us before we have raised the dams and mounds that are necessary to risk
Oit.' Grey lacked the temperament necessary for his demanding role and 
in his absence what was left of Fox's party went to pieces.
The most distinguishable breakdown came between Foxites in the 
Lords and those in the Commons. Grey's emphasis on the necessity of 
maintaining the coalition was supported by Holland, Lauderdale, 
Bessborough, Albemarle, Derby, Jersey, St. John, and Darnley, a group 
which represented the most politically active Foxite peers. Other ac­
tive Foxites like Bedford, Erskine, King, Crewe, and Thanet had mixed 
emotions on this point but their doubts were in most cases overcome by 
social factors and by their very presence in the upper house. There­
fore the House of Lords represented the fount of the coalition's 
strength. The views of the Foxite hierarchy were voiced in the Commons 
by Ponsonby, Tierney, Petty, Abercromby, and Anstruther, a group which
^Grey to Lady Grey, 2 Mar. 1808 (Grey).
^Piggott to Grey, 9, 10 Sept. 1808 (Grey). Grey to Whitbread,
22 May, and Whitbread to Grey, 6 and 16 June 1808 (Grey). Grey to Lady 
Holland, 3 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland).
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25 peers.^ Canning, l’erceval, and Castlereagh made fools of the opposi­
tion in the Commons. Sir William Scott was brought forward to refute 
Tierney's interpretation of international law and ministers continued to 
justify themselves by referring to the principle of commercial retalia­
tion established by the Talents. On 3, 10, and 11 March the opposition
Odrew 80, 59, and 68 votes respectively and then decided to avoid fur-
ther divisions. Few M.P.'s understood what they were opposing;
Baring’s arguments only excited a cry of self interest;*1 23’ Ponsonby,
Petty, and Tierney foolishly refused to oppose the Orders except with 
reference to the policies of the Talents; and Whitbread had no patience 
with the commercial schemes of either ministry. Based on the policies 
of the Talents^ the basis of the opposition's arguments against the 
Danish expedition and the new commercial code was faulty. Their minis­
try was unpopular with both sides of the House and, of equal importance, 
many of Fox's friends saw little reason to debate these Issues so long 
as Grey and Grenville refused to define the objectives of the European 
war. ^
Disagreement on the issue of peace left the large Foxite wing of 
the party without even token leadership. Grey was disheartened by the 
peace motion and on 2 March he told his wife that his greatest wish was 
'to have nothing more to do with Politicks & Parties.' Regrettably the 
Foxite leader had learned nothing from experience. 'But any chance of
1 Parl. Deb. X. 929-76, 1148-54, 1236-42, 1254-55, 1270-83.
2This division was to determine whether the Liverpool petition 
against the Orders would be accepted. It had the support of commercial 
members.
3Parl. Deb., X, 889-95, 1056-66, 1072-6.
^Political Register, XIII, 273-4.
3See White's plea to Holland in the Independent Whig, 14 Feb.
1808.
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made every effort to cooperate with the Grenvillites and Fitzwilliams.
Beyond this stratification, however, party allegiance was un­
clear. Albemarle noted in May that many Foxites continued to distrust 
Grenville 'without a shadow of reason' and Whitbread told Creevey that 
he refused to be 'a slave to a Party in the Lords.''*' Grenville's be­
haviour in the days before the motion for peace had only compounded 
problems. Most Foxites were pleased with Grenville because of his de­
sire to compromise but at the same time they were aware of the imposi­
tion of political restraint from above. Belsham blamed Grey, Tierney 
blamed Whitbread, others blamed Ponsonby, and everyone was aware that 
something was amiss. However, the problem was so perplexing that there 
were no distinguishable splinter groups of Foxites in Parliament during 
1808.
Burdett refused to cooperate with Ponsonby but he had little 
personal influence in the House. Among Fox's old supporters in the 
Common Council of London,Combe, Sir William Curtis, and Robert Waithman, 
whom White described as a 'time-serving Foxite' . 2 made efforts to identi­
fy their politics with those of the 1790's but they generally showed a 
studied contempt for parties and public men. 3 Whitbread's spirit of 
independence and stature in the Commons had been boosted by his peace 
motion and he was anxious to increase his influence. After a trip to 
Southill in July Lady Holland noted that the brewer had surrounded *23
•’■Albemarle to Holland, 18 May 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51593 
(Holland), Fulford, p. 199.
2Independent Whig, 10 April 1808.
3See Leigh Hunt's comments in the Examiner, 3 April 1808. For an 
account of Foxite activity in the Common Council see J. R. Dinwiddy, 
'"The Patriotic Linen-Draper"; Robert Waithman and the Revival of 
Radicalism in the City of London, 1795-1818' , Bulletin of the Institute 
of Historical Research, XLVI, no. 113 (May 1973), pp. 72-94.
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himself with a 'remplissage of the very worst sort, fulsome flatterers, 
and disgusting dependants.' Prominent among these was Belsham, who ex­
tolled Whitbread and criticized Grey.^ Several M.P.'s - Creevey, Brand, 
Bennet, and Lord Folkestone - were beginning to move in Whitbread's 
circle. But Whitbread had little personal influence among members of 
Parliament for, as Brougham once noted, he was 'good for execution, but 
nothing for council . ..'^ Besides, Whitbread had been impressed by 
Grenville's views an peace and in Grey's absence he opened a cordial 
correspondence with Dropmore and expressed a desire to cooperate.
The restlessness of the cunning Brougham was almost as poten­
tially dangerous as the vanity of Whitbread. Disappointed by the atti­
tude of Grey, he considered the formation of a third party in support of 
peace, reform, and traditional Foxite dogma during the summer. But 
when Jeffrey, whose pen was important in his scheme, turned a deaf ear^ 
Brougham dropped the idea and codperrf\eii u0'&Vunv m  ; a blister­
ing attack on aristocratic government in the Edinburgh Review. 5 The 
Prince of Wales headed the only force which could be considered even 
remotely as an identifiable Foxite splinter group in Parliament. In 
his fit of despondency Grey concluded that he could never please *2
^Lady Holland Journal, II, 244-45. Also see Belsham to 
Whitbread, 4 Mar. 1808 (Whitbread), 4185.
2Brougham to Creevey, 6 April 1813, Creevey Papers, I, 181.
^Tierney to Grey, 26 May and 12 July 1808 (Grey).
^Jeffrey to Brougham, 25 July 1808 (Brougham).
oO»
^Edinburgh Review,/XIII, 219-31.^ Brougham's 'Don Cevallos' 
article disturbed both ministerial and opposition leaders. Aspinall, 
Brougham and the Whig Party, pp. 19-20. H. J. C. Grierson, ed.,
The Letters of Sir Walter Scott (London, 1932), II, 106. Lauderdale 
to Lady Holland, 19 Nov. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 (Holland).
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Prinny^ and by May the independent power of Carlton House was growing. 
Sheridan, Moira, and Yarmouth were firmly attached to the Prince^and 
such old Foxites as Adam, Taylor, and the Duke of Norfolk were spending 
much time in Pall Mall. But the Carlton House party had not formed.
These groups had only their Foxite heritage in common. Denied 
Fox's leadership, they by no means agreed on politics. It appears 
that the issue of peace with France was the only potential catalyst. 
Roscoe continued to advocate peace motions;2 the threat of such a mo­
tion hung over Grenville's head until the end of the Session;^ and 
Waithman kept the issue alive in the Common Council. * 4 This issue, how­
ever, was jaded by its general unpopularity with the public and by the 
compromises of the Foxite hierarchy.
The Whig Club, Fox's great forum, represented the greatest or­
ganized threat to those Foxites who clung to the coalition. It was 
there alone that young men like Ward, Althorp, Creevey, and Folkstone 
rubbed elbows with old Foxites like Coke, Francis, Lord John Townshend, 
Sheridan, William Smith, and the likes of Burdett, Waithnam, Cartwright, 
and the radical Lord Cochrane. It was also there that Fox's memory 
brought a semblance of political unity. Whitbread exerted such a power­
ful influence at these meetings during the months which immediately fol­
lowed his peace motion that Tierney labelled the Whig Club a 'pedestal' 
for the brewer^, and Bedford, whose political principles were badly
•1-Grey to Lady Holland, 18 Apriland 4 May 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51550 (Holland).
^Roscoe to Whitbread, 23 Mar. 1808 enclosing a draft of a resolu­
tion for peace (Whitbread), A188 and A189.
^Tierney to Grey, 12 July 1808 (Grey). Grenville to T. Grenville, 
12 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. A1852 (T. Grenville).
4The Globe, 26 Mar. 1808.
-’Lady Holland to Grey, 30 April 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland).
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confused, advocated its dissolution.-^ But the effects of these meet­
ings were not far-reaching. The Westminster radicals frightened old 
Foxites, parliamentary reform was a subject of great disagreement, and 
personal rivalries prevented a complete union of sentiment. Political 
loyalties were so confused that the violent toasts of the Whig Club had 
no immediate political consequence; in most cases they were no more 
than a means for Foxites to vent their frustrations.
Though these undercurrents produced no third party in Parliament 
they completely undermined the efforts of the mainline opposition. 
Whitbread, Sheridan, Burdett, and Windham butted heads frequently, many 
M.P.'s left London and, caught in the middle, poor Ponsonby was help­
less. By late summer Grey could count on few Foxites to follow his 
dictates. As Tierney wrote on 16 Hay:
As a Party (in the House of Commons at least) we are completely 
disbanded and that word conveys all I mean to say for I know of no 
disposition ... in any quarter to desert ... We have numbers suf­
ficient to make two or even three very respectable Oppositions but 
it is impossible ... to mould us into one. We have neither Leader 
nor concert, nor, on the whole, the means of obtaining either. 2
Of course Ponsonby, who tripped over his own feet in trying to maintain
harmony, became the scapegoat. Grey, Lauderdale, and Tierney wanted
him to resign but none of them was prepared to broach the subject.3
Towards the end of the Session when Petty tried to assert himself a
ministerial pamphlet ridiculed the lack of leadership on the opposition
front bench.^ The unity of the Foxite wing of the coalition was the
key to a strong parliamentary opposition. By the summer it was obvious
■'"Bedford to Grey, 14 April 1809 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 16 May 1808 (Grey).
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 11 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS.
51696 (Holland). Tierney to Grey, 12 July 1808 (Grey).
^Rev. Charles Edward Stewart, Charles's Small Clothes: A 
National Ode (London, 1808).
that Grey had failed as its leader and that the demands of coalition 




THE OPPOSITION AND THE SPANISH REVOLUTION,
MAY 1808 - JANUARY 1809
By the summer of 1808 England had been at war with revolutionary 
France for fifteen years. Trade and industry were geared to a wartime 
economy, law had been adjusted to meet the demands of wartime unity, and 
national prejudices had developed accordingly. The war had long since 
become the common denominator of British politics. Portland's govern­
ment had come to grips with this fact. Its members bickered over who 
would hold Pitt's standard but they were always behind it in dogged pur­
suit of Napoleon. The views of their parliamentary adversaries were 
less identifiable. Grey and Grenville had laid their 'husbanding, de­
fensive system' before the nation during the early months of 1808.
Their ideas were not unreasonable and their 'system' represented a clear 
alternative to what appeared to be rather directionless activity on the 
part of the government. But opposition arguments lacked credibility.
The Ministry of All the Talents had proved that even the originators of 
the defensive system could not apply it successfully and the parliamen­
tary session of 1808 had confirmed that the various wings of the coa­
lesced opposition disagreed fundamentally on the goals of the war. The 
result had been a thumping defeat for the ideas of Grey and Grenville 
and an unenthusiastic endorsement of what Canning represented as Pittite 
wartime tactics. Such was the political situation in Britain when 
Spaniards rose in bloody rebellion against the rule of Joseph Bonaparte 
in late May. Two questions arose immediately. Would the government 
commit British troops to a revolutionary struggle with republican
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overtones in the Iberian Peninsula? Would the opposition unite behind 
a constructive wartime scheme?
There was never much doubt about the reaction of the government. 
Ministers were anxious to carry the war to the Continent and Pitt him­
self had pointed to the Peninsula as an ideal spot for British interven­
tion. Portland's government quickly despatched a fleet and a small 
army to aid the Spaniards>and the king closed Parliament with promises 
of further support for Spain's 'legitimate' sovereign. The opposition's 
old war party promptly divided on the issue. Upon hearing of Spanish 
successes Fitzwilliam noted:
These Spaniards are a fine people - by their own energy they will 
emancipate themselves. But the business does not rest here: Can 
B. [onaparte] return to Paris, defeated & disgraced .... Must he 
not go forward - then comes the question - will the French go for­
ward with him - will another 100,000 Frenchmen go forth, not that 
France may direct the Councils of Spain, but that one of B's family 
may wear a crown - not the Nation's cause, but an upstart family's - 
Will they cling to him in defeat & disgrace as they have done in 
victory and glory - impossible - this then may be, & probably it 
will turn out the beginning of his downfall.*
So wrote a man who had agreed with Pittite wartime objectives for six­
teen years and his colleague Windham echoed his sentiments and called 
for total military commitment. 3
Grenville disagreed. 'It would appear incredible to one who was 
not an eyewitness to it', he scoffed, 'that after sixteen years of un­
interrupted disappointments the People of this Country should be just 
as ready to believe in the Spanish insurgents as they ever were in Lord 
llawkesbury's march to Paris. ' 3 Grenville had never recovered from 
Austerlitz and Jena and looking to European history he saw no reason to
^Fitzwilliam to Grey, 22 July 1808 (Grey).
2Parl. Deb.. XI, 893-95, 15 June 1808.
3Grenville to Auckland, 15 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
think that inspired peasants posed a threat to French power. He was 
pleased that turmoil in Spain would open South American trade but the 
thought of a British commitment to Ferdinand's cause disturbed him 
greatly. The reports of his colleague Auckland stiffened his views.
No member of the opposition had better sources of information in govern­
ment than old Auckland and his friends at the War Office sent him copies 
of official correspondence and assurances that the Spanish cause was 
bleak.^ These were passed on to Grenville without delay and by mid- 
July he and his brother Tom were certain that the French would defeat 
the Spaniards and the tiny British army within days. Grenville clung 
to his 'husbanding, defensive system', pushed his views on Grey, and 
upon hearing rumours that Austria would declare war on France he pre­
dicted the total destruction of the Austrian monarchy. Europe was not 
ready to rise against Napoleon, he stressed. Austria, like Britain, 
should conserve her strength and await the first signs of dissension in 
the French high command. * 2 But Grenville did not speak for his party. 
Carysfort, Stafford, and Spencer agreed with Fitzwilliam, Temple was 
riding on the southern beaches in a light infantry jacket talking of 
cutting off the retreat of the French; Ebrington wanted to accompany 
his regiment to Spain; and the ever-scheming Buckingham was preoccupied 
with yet another plan for the invasion of Italy.^
^Auckland to Grenville, 12 July and 4 Aug. 1808. H.H.C. Dropmore, 
IX, 208-09, 210-11, “ ~~
2T. Grenville to Spencer, 23 July 1808 (Spencer). Grenville to 
Auckland, 20 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 (Auckland). R.H.M.B. 
Atkinson and G. A. Jackson, eds., Brougham and His Early Friends;
Letters to James Lock, 1798-1809 (London, 1908), II, 3l4.
^Tierney to Lady Holland, 22 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland). Grenville to Auckland, 10 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 




News of the Spanish revolt found the large and divided Foxite 
wing of the coalition groping for leadership and intellectual identity. 
Holland had recently published his uncle's History of the Early Part of 
the Reign of James II, a vindication of Foxite Whiggism and for all 
practical purposes a delayed, indirect reply to Burke's Appeal From the 
New to the Old Whigs. 1 Jeffrey, reviewing it in the Edinburgh Review, 
stated bluntly that Fox's book was worthless as history but that it 
contained principles which his successors could not ignore.^ The over­
all effect of the book on Foxite leaders was considerable for it served 
to remind many important men of their political heritage. In response 
to Pittite criticism several friends of Fox put their pens in motion in
defence of their hero's theories and by early summer these theories
3were being debated in Whig circles.
In June the delegates of the Asturias arrived in London to ask 
for help. Within two weeks Sheridan forced the issue in Parliament. 
Convinced that the time had finally arrived when the unpopular politi­
cal principles of his lifetime could be applied to the vigo rous pur­
suit of the war, Fox's old lieutenant drank his fill at Brooks's, stum­
bled down Whitehall to the House of Commons, and raised the Foxite ban­
ner in support of the salvation of Europe:
... since the first burst of the French Revolution, nothing of so 
favourable a nature has occurred as the present enthusiasm ... in 
the province of Austurias, and if that enthusiasm should become 
general throughout Spain, such an opportunity of striking a deci­
sive blow had never happened ... Bonaparte had hitherto fought 
with Princes who had been misled and infatuated, and Ministers, 
who had been most mistaken, if not corrupt, but all of whom seemed 
destitute both of foresight and fortitude. He had never yet fought
^J. R. Dinwiddy, 'Charles James Fox as Historian', The Historical 
Journal, XII, I (1969), pp. 23-4.
^Edinburgh Review, XII, 271.
^Dinwiddy, 'Charles James Fox as Historian', pp. 31-3.
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with a people, much less with a people who felt themselves roused 
by a noble indignation . ..*
These arguments rested firmly upon Foxite theory. Fox had used them 
during the American and French revolutions and his recently published 
observations on the reign of James II had identified nationalism and 
popular revolution with the long and continuing march of Whiggism. But 
Sheridan's speech left Fox's friends unmoved for several important rea­
sons. Firstly, Sheridan's independence and connexions with Carlton 
House rendered him odious. Secondly, political recrimination led 
Wliithread and others to the conclusion that Sheridan's warlike language 
was the product of cooperation with Canning. Thirdly, the patriotic, 
non-partisan character of the speech struck at the policies of the 
Talents as well as those of Pitt's governments. And fourthly, Sheridan 
was drunk. Grey and others used this fact to discredit a man whom they 
loathed. Whitbread and Ponsonby scolded Sheridan before the House, 
Windham scared away others with a cry for Napoleon's throne, and 
Castlereagh clouded the issue with a blistering attack on the Talents' 
foreign policy.^ However, Holland agreed with Sheridan's interpreta­
tion of events in Spain and soon began efforts to unite Fox's friends.
Holland was an important man. Not only was he the nephew of 
Fox and the owner of Henry Fox's magnificent house in Kensington; he al­
so resembled his uncle in appearance and demeanour. His interests were 
broad, he was well-travelled, and his conversation was coveted by all 
who knew him. His devotion to what he saw as Fox's principles was com­
plete and his house, in which his uncle's spirit was kept alive, was
^Examiner, 19 June 1808.
^Idem. Grey, Life and Opinions, p. 219. Holland to Grey, 22 
June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). Whitbread to Grey, 16 
June, and Grey to Whitbread, 19 June 1808 (Grey). Also see R. Coupland, 
Wilberforce (London, 1945), p. 292.
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the party's focal point. Many wanted him to take the lead of the party 
'as a mark to all the world of the Esteem & honour in which poor Fox's 
memory was held by his Colleagues'.^ John Whishaw was right when he 
observed that no man was 'so well qualified, both from his principles & 
situation, to be a mediator between the aristocratic & democratic Whigs 
as Lord Holland'.^ After the election of 1807 old Foxites had refused 
to attend Parliament without a prior invitation to Holland's dinner 
table and Grenville felt that Grey's hold on the party was only as firm 
as Holland's support."*
But Holland was young, idealistic, something short of an intel­
lectual leader, and plagued by political disqualifications. He saw him­
self as a child of the Enlightenment and like Whitbread he identified 
too closely with the cause of France. Like Fox he felt contempt for 
established ecclesiastical and political power and disdain for middle 
class morality. Though he genuinely felt the sufferings of humanity it 
is not unfair to suspect that his bond with the people was only as 
strong as public willingness to see things.like he saw them. These poli­
tical weaknesses were reflected in the characters of those who sur­
rounded him. The Fox family appreciated good repartee and wit at the 
expense of others and here Holland followed his uncle's precedent 
closely. Whishaw (impiously nicknamed the 'Pope' of Holland House) and 
Sydney Smith were easily a match for Fox's old circle,and Fitzpatrick, 
Tierney, Bouverie, and occasionally Sheridan, all of whom were hold­
overs from 'better days', continued to mock and gibe at the folly of 1
1Derby to Holland, 20 Sept. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS. 51566 (Holland).
^Whishaw to Lady Holland, 22 Dec. [1809], B.M., Add. MSS. 51658 
(Holland).
■H'ierney to Holland, 6 June 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51584 (Holland). 
Grenville to Sidmouth, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 51823 (Holland), f. 130.
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the world around them. These men were joined by the talented but 
slightly radical young Whigs of the 'Edinburgh set' - Horner, Brougham, 
and Allen - who gave Holland House a controversial connexion with 
Jeffrey and the Edinburgh Review.^ - 'Monk' Lewis, a 'little toad1 who 
hopped around the drawing room, had a heart that was 'not ^uite wide 
enough for Patriotism' and Allen, Holland's librarian, physician, mar­
riage counsellor, and confidant, mocked Christianity so enthusiasti­
cally that one visitor, hearing not a word of wit at the expense of
2religion, concluded that he was depressed. Then there was Lady Holland, 
whose idiosyncrasies gave Holland House politics a cutting edge.
Lady Holland's petty tyrannies represent one of the more amusing 
facets of an amusing age but they had dire political consequences. 
Divorced, vulgar, and thus shunned by polite society, her sense of so­
cial Inadequacy was so intense that she delighted in mocking everything 
English. Her journal abounds with disdain for English gardens, archi­
tecture, values, and manners and she once mortified Lady Stafford by 
proclaiming respect for high rank and then coupling her with Nelson's 
Lady Hamilton to whom she thought great deference due from her exalted 
station in life.-* As a defence mechanism Lady Holland represented her­
self as a superior continental. In Glenarvon Lady Caroline Lamb por­
trayed her as the odious Princess of Madagascar: 'She spoke of her own 
country with contempt; and even in her dress, which was magnificent,
■^Lauderdale to Holland, 23 and 29 Dec. 1807, B.M. , Add. MSS.
51691 (Holland). Of interest on this subject is the pamphlet by 
'MENTOR', The Dangers of the "Edinburgh Review"; or a brief Exposure 
of its Principles in Religion, Morals, and Politics (London, 1808).‘ irC JT G  • i i  • f-- *IC  -• '.i i ' : * •  '" X  I I I  fV i.l*  I V  t .Z  • t r  - t o  K lS  >. v •
2M. Lewis to Lady Holland, n.d., 1806» B.M., Add. MSS. 51641
(Holland), ff. 131-32. Broughton Recollections, 1, 85.. , ....
3Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, n.d., Granville 
Correspondence, II, 311.
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attempted to prove the superiority of every other over it. 1 By 1808f 
Lady Holland had decided that she had much in common with Napoleon and 
her praise of the Emperor led to some embarrassing scenes at Holland 
House.^ This behaviour did Holland's political reputation no good be­
cause many Englishmen saw his wife's lack of patriotism, piety, and man­
ners as further proof of Foxite radicalism.^  The painter Farington wrote 
contemptuously of Allen being 'Lady Holland's atheistand  it was not 
coincidental that no Grenvillite lady set foot in Holland House and that 
Grenville himself appeared only twice during his long connexion with the 
Foxites.
Lady Holland was a political force in the party. In 1806 she 
browbeat Holland into disclosing Cabinet secrets.^ Determined to profit 
from her husband's station, she pumped him mercilessly, scolded Lauderdale 
for speaking of 'nothing but gowns', undertook a great part of Holland's 
political correspondence, and told a friend pompously that 'all women of 
a certain age and in a situation to achieve it should take to Politics - 
to leading and influencing'. This was what many Foxites feared most.
Her hold on Holland was so strong that many people thought she influ­
enced his political views. Cruikshank once sketched Holland entering 
10 Downing Street in a dress; his wife followed in breeches with 
Napoleon under her cloak. As Lady Bessborough noted, this imputation
■1-Lady Caroline Lamb, Glenarvon (London, 1816), p. 243.
2For some interesting but highly controversial comment on Lady 
Holland's Bonapartist leanings see Lean, pp. 12, 127-30, 135-36, 229-30, 
and 240-41.
Note Ward's comments on this subject in his letter to Helen 
Stewart of 21 October 1808, Letters to 'Ivy', pp. 57-60.
^Farlngton Diary, VII, 94.
^Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 28 Sept. 1806, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 216^ 1'i.
gave 'ridicule to Lord Holland and I know does him harin'.^ Little won­
der that Holland had remained in the political background during the two 
years which immediately followed Fox's death! But in June 1808 the 
editing of Fox's book had roused his interest in politics and he saw the 
beauties of Foxite theory unfolding in the march of the Spaniards. With 
Grey in Northumberland Holland stepped over his wife into the political 
spotlight.
Holland had long admired the Latin character. His extended Grand 
Tour had been sidetracked in Italy and Spain where he had cultivated 
valuable political contacts and he and Allen were active members of 
London's Spanish Club. In October 1806 he had pointed out the advanta­
ges of weakening Napoleon through a British-instigated Spanish revolt 
and in late 1807 he had assured Spanish leaders of British support in 
the event of a 'popular revolution'.^ Beginning in late 1807 Holland 
and his circle had interpreted political confusion in Spain as the early 
stages of a liberal awakening and correspondence with leading Spaniards 
had increased. The Due d'Infantado, an important grandee, had visited 
Holland in April and the Spaniard had been hailed as a talented, bene­
volent aristocrat, a Whig and a Washington rolled into one, and there­
fore the future champion of Spanish liberties.-^ Holland House was 
primed and cocked in early June when Count Florida Blanca and Don 
Gaspani Melchoir de Jovellanos reported the revolution to Holland and
Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 24 Dec. 1807, B.M., Add. MSS. 51695 
(Holland). Lady Bessborough to Ld. C. L. Gower, 29 Sept. 1806,
Granville Correspondence. II, 115, . ~ .
^Holland to Howick, 19 Sept, and Oct. 1806, B.M., Add. MSS.
51544 (Holland). Holland to Grey, 3 Dec. 1807, Ibid.
Lllen to Horner, 26 April 1808, Horner Memoirs,
422-23, Horner to Allen, April 1808 (Horner).
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asked him to convey the news to the British government.1
Holland, Horner, and Allen had worked together in editing Fox's 
History of the early p a r t the Reign of James II and they and other 
Foxite leaders regarded it as a codification of Whiggism.2 Their re­
action to events in Spain followed accordingly. Host of Holland's cir­
cle-* saw the Spanish revolution as an event with significance only to 
Spain and one that was removed from the context of the broader European 
war. They were not interested in the fact that a rebellious Spain of­
fered Britain an ally and a foothold in Europe and they did not see 
events in Spain as the beginning of a crusade for the restoration of 
'legitimate' monarchs.
The events in Spain [wrote Horner], great as their consequences 
must be in improving the political prospects of the West of Europe, 
carry me no further, for they cannot tend to make coalitions of 
Austria & Prussia a whit more practicable. It will be time enough 
when we see a free insurrection of the people of Italy or the North 
of Germany for England to «w give them the succour they may de­
serve: if they should ever attempt what the Spaniards have done we 
shall of course feel for them in the same way.
■'■Lord Stavordale, ed., Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1807- 
21, by Henry Richard Vassall Third Lord Holland (London, 1905), pp.
13- 14.
2^Horner to J. Lock, 13 June 1808, Horner Memoirs, I,
423-25. Erskine to Holland, 3 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51533 
(Holland).
JHolland's closest friends were Allen, Horner, Whishaw, Marsh,
Lewis, Petty, King, Fitzpatrick, and Sydney Smith. He had no borough 
patronage but at this time his home was frequented by the most politi­
cally promising young Whigs, all of whom professed loyalty to Foxite 
principles in varying degrees. These included Brougham, William and 
Frederick Lamb, Abercromby, Morpeth, Piggott, Tavistock, William and 
Frederick Eden, and Lord Archibald Hamilton. Older Foxite regulars at 
Holland House were Erskine, Sheridan, Francis, Lord Robert Spencer, Cowper, 
North, Bedford, Lord William Russell, Lauderdale, Upper Ossory,
Tierney, Jersey, Derby, Bessborough, and to a lesser extent Romilly. 
Windham, Elliot, and Tom Grenville were also frequent guests, and 
several of Canning's friends, notably John Hookham Frere and Lord 
Granville Leveson Gower, were regulars. The dinner book is an impor­
tant reference. B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
^Horner to Whitbread, 21 Oct. 1808 (Whitbread), 4203.
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As Cartwright noted, it was immaterial whether a Bonaparte or a Bourbon 
sat on the Spanish throne 'but whether the Spanish liberties shall or 
shall not be recovered, is not immaterial'.^ This goal, which resisted 
the original and continuing objectives of Pittite wartime policy, was 
the only concern of many old Foxites. In endorsing British involvement 
in the Peninsular Whr Whitbread displayed marked defensiveness with re­
gard to a broader assault on Napoleon's throne.^ As early as April Lady 
Holland assured Grey that her husband favoured British aid but only for 
securing Spanish liberties and certainly not for the restoration of 
Ferdinand, and Holland made it clear that much of his admiration for 
Infantado sprang from the Spaniard's unpopularity at the Bourbon court.* 
Above all else British aid could have no strings attached.^ Horner even 
opposed British military involvement as a threat to Spanish liberties, 
and Lady Holland, who advocated the despatch of a British army, doubted 
whether the Spaniards would want one.-’ While Fitzwllllam, Windham, and 
the government visualized a blow which would undermine Napoleon's power 
Holland House toyed with constitutional theory, discussed the pros and 
cons of republicanism and mixed monarchy, lauded the 'spirit and magni­
ficence' of Spanish ballads and literature, and denied that the Spanish 
cause had relevance to the so-called deliverance of Europe.6
•^Cartwright *Life -, p. 359.
^Whitbread to Grey, 17 Sept. 1808 (Grey).
■^ Lady Holland to Grey, 29 April and 28 June 1808, B.M. , Add. MSS.
51549 (Holland). Holland to Grey, 11 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 
(Holland).
^Lady Holland to Grey, 28 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland). The Morning Chronicle, 16 June 1808, adopted this view.
^Horner to J. Lock, 13 June 1808, Horner Memoirs, I,
423-25. Lady Holland to Grey, 2 July 1808, B.M., Add. MsTT. 51549 (Holland). 
Also note the editorial comment in the Examiner, 17 July 1808.
^Horner to J. Lock, July 1808 (Horner). Lady Holland to Grey, 9 
July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
mIn a narrow sense Holland and his circle saw the Spanish 
Revolution as a test for Foxite principles, 'it is quite a new experi­
ment, in which the powers are for the first time to be tried of a vast 
regular army, and of an enthusiastic people', wrote Horner. 'The one 
result would revive our original persuasion, in its first ardour, that 
the people are not to be subdued by foreign troops ... The latter 
would sink me in final despair . ..'1 Spain appealed to what was seen 
as the international applicability of Foxite principles. Popular re­
volution against arbitrary power was to be applauded and aided in the 
spirit of Chatham and Fox. Consequently Foxite leaders compared 
events in Spain to those of the American and French revolutions. Both 
Fitzpatrick and Grey placed emphasis on the American example in formu­
lating schemes of government for revolutionary Spainjand Horner argued 
for an extension of hostilities 'upon the very same principle which con­
demned the original hostilities ... when this long war [with France] 
commenced'.-* Popular revolution was the key. Events in Spain repre­
sented only another step in the march of human progress which had begun 
in 1688 and had been carried on by the revolutions of 1776 and 1789. 
After reading a proclamation of the new Spanish government Holland noted 
proudly that the 'tone & temper of the publication ... is more liberal 
& more truly in the spirit of thorough Whiggish doctrines than I ex­
pected ...' Fitzpatrick felt that Spain would be an ideal training 
ground for young Whigs; Holland, Petty, Bedford, Adair, and young Lord
-^Horner to J. Lock, 8 July 1808, Horner Memoirs, I,
427-28.
2Note White's comments on this head in the Independent Whig,
15 May 1808.
-*Grey to Lady Holland, 16 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 
(Holland). Fitzpatrick to Holland, 11 Oct. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51799 
(Holland). Horner to Jeffrey, 18 Jan. 1811, Horner Memoirs,
II, 68-75.
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John Russell planned journeys to the 'land of liberty' a la mode de 
Lafayette; and Horner noted that the events of the summer had made him 
'more Whiggish than ever . ..'1
Continuing their emphasis on Fox's theories Holland and his 
friends felt that the triumph of liberty abroad would assure the tri-
I
umph of liberty in Britain. Horner told a ministerialist that the
Spanish struggle would popularize constitutional principles even among
Pittites and tories.^ Brougham, who saw little hope of Spanish success,
nevertheless agreed with Holland House that events in the Peninsula
would revolutionize British politics:
One thing to me is clear - that the success of the Spands is the 
downfall of our own govt constituted as it now is - There is an end 
to the high aristocratic tone of the upper orders - & the whole 
discredit brought on democracy by the Reign of Terror is wiped 
away - Even already enough has been done to secure somewhat of this 
great benefit - but whoever hates the ruling system & especially 
the secret cabinet influence, should pray cordially for the Spands.^
Building castles in the air,Holland and his friends took the lead of
what rapidly became an explosion of Foxite passions.
'Spain! Spain! I am in a fever till I hear more about Dupont 
and the passes of Sierra Moren^.' , cried one of Lady Holland's regulars.^ 
But Holland did not wait to hear more: as early as 11 June he described 
the Spaniards as good Whigs.’ The drawing room at Holland House soon
^Holland to Fitzpatrick, 7 Nov. [1808], and Fitzpatrick to 
Holland, 16 Nov. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland). Bedford to 
Holland, 3 Oct. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland). M. G. Lewis to 
Lady Holland, 30 Oct. 1808, B.M,, Add. MSS. 51641 (Holland). Horner to 
Murray, 27 Oct. 1808, Horner Memoirs, I, 434-37.
^Horner to Gray, 21 Sept. 1808 (Horner).
-^Brougham to Allen, n.d. [July 1808?], B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 
(Allen), ff. 79-82.
^Horner to J. Lock, 8 July 1808, Horner Memoirs, I,
-’Holland to Grey, 11 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
resembled a military headquarters. Maps stretched across mahogany 
tables, Spaniards and Foxites stood wide-eyed around them, young Whigs 
dashed in and out with battle reports from Spain, and Allen sat at his 
desk and scribbled instructions for the patriots at a furious rate. 
Holland became so involved with his epistles to Spanish leaders that 
his wife undertook his British correspondence and Lady Holland once be­
came so excited by the arrival of news that she ended a letter in mid- 
sentence. By July Holland House was distinctly Latin. Spanish generals 
and politicians, whose absence from their country was not questioned, 
filled the dinner table. The Morning Chronicle was flooded by Holland 
House propaganda, Holland had practically composed a Spanish constitu­
tion by the end of the month, and Lady Holland told Grey: 'We sat out 
half the night basking in the Moonbeams listening to Spanish Sequidellas 
on the guitar & Drinking cooling liquors.'*- Pessimism was not tolerated. 
When Tierney dared to suggest that impassioned peasants were no match 
for French infantry he was reminded of Lord North's later career and 
Lady Holland recorded that he had 'gone beyond his usual narrow views in 
respect to foreign politics.'^ Even an attack of gout failed to dampen 
Holland's enthusiasm: Spain was to him what America had been to his 
uncle.
Though the dreams of the Holland House circle were far more vi­
sionary than those of the party as a whole,Holland's enthusiasm gave 
Foxites a semblance of intellectual leadership and during June and early 
July Fox's old party displayed remarkable unity. Grey, who had
*-Lady Holland to Grey, 2, 3, 5, 17, and 28 July 1808, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51549 (Holland). Also note the entries in the Holland House dinner 
books for the months of June and July. B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.




threatened retirement only two months earlier, spouted Foxite doctrine 
and predicted that French atrocities would 'kindle a flame more formid­
able to Bonaparte than any opposition that combined Courts or kings 
could make In June he stressed the necessity of sending British
troops to the Peninsula and told Whitbread that Spain afforded 'perhaps 
greater means for successful resistance than any country in Europe ex­
cept this'. By July he was too excited to sleep. Uncharacteristically 
he wished for the reins of government.^ Whitbread, though reluctant to
ybelieve in Spanish success, was equally pleased with the revolution.
Godwin, whom historians continue to label a Bonapartist, stated candidly 
that 'the goodness of the cause changed sides'.'* The Independent Whig 
maintained that the Spaniards were fighting for the same principles 
which had seated the House of Brunswick on the English throne and the 
Morning Chronicle spoke the same language.^
Holland, Brougham, and Wilberforce cooperated to send abolition-
CList propaganda to the revolted provinces. Cartwright and Holland dis­
cussed the wisdom of initiating agitation for parliamentary reform in
^Grey to Holland, 6 Dec. 1807 and 19 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS.
51550 (Holland). Grey to Whitbread, 3 June 1808 (Grey). Grey to Lady 
Holland, 2 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). Henry Lord 
Brougham, The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham (Edinburgh, 1871), I, 413.
^Whitbread to Grey, 6 and 10 June 1808 (Grey).
Lean, p. 65.
^Independent Whig, 15 May 1808. Perry's editorial comment in 
the Morning Chronicle on the subject of the Spanish Revolution during 
June and July was more genuinely Foxite than at any other period be­
tween 1806 and 1815. We know that Holland House 'inmates' sent him 
more propaganda than he could print. Lady Holland to Grey, 2 and 3 
July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
5Wilberforce. Life, pp. 371-72. Lady Holland to
Grey, 18 July 1808, B'.M'.', Acfd. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
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Britain as a means of influencing the patriots of Spain.1 Infantado, 
whose character and views were closely akin to those of an old Rockingham 
Whig, must have been horrified by the language of Holland and his friends. 
Like everyone else Horner was 'dreaming wild' and republican dogma was on 
every lip.^ One cannot escape the Impression that many important men re­
garded the British government's decision to aid Spain as a victory for 
Foxite wartime principles. 'How strangely do nations as well as indivi­
duals sometimes change their Sentiments and desert their energies to dif­
ferent objects', wrote the radical editor James McCreery; ' - who could 
have supposed ten years ago that France should this day be employed in 
fighting the battles of a Tyrant, & Spain, with her whole Sects of 
Saints contending with her for the freedom of the world - Or what is 
still more wonderful, that the same British Ministers who leagued against 
the Liberties of France, should be the encouragers of the Patriots of 
Spain.'^
Within four months of Whitbread's catastrophic motion for peace 
Foxite leaders were largely united in support of war in the Peninsula. 
Holland, Grey, Erskine, Bedford, Petty, Whitbread, and Sheridan called 
for military involvement. In Westminster and Middlesex, where Fox's 
name had once performed magic, large meetings adopted warlike resolu­
tions. ^ The Morning Chronicle printed satirical poems about 'Boney' and *24
-*-Holland refused to commit himself to Cartwright's schemes but he 
probably agreed with the old reformer's logic. Perry represented Holland 
at a reform meeting in Hackney which was attended by many lesser lights 
from the Whig Club. Cartwright to Holland, 12, 20, and 27 July 1808, and 
Holland to Cartwright, n.d, [July 1808], B.M., Add. MSS. 51824 (Holland). 
Perry to Holland, 30 Aug. 1808, ibid,
2Allen encouraged the friends of Holland House to read a recently 
published book on the republics of Italy. Lady Holland to Grey, 9 Julv 
1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
■*J. McCreery to Roscoe, 8 Aug. 1808 (Roscoe), 2504.
4B.M., Add. MSS. 27838, ff. 325-26.
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'Nap'.'*' Carlton House followed suit. Moira^ joined Sheridan in cham­
pioning war. At his birthday dinner Prinny 'sported nothing but the 
most Whig opinions and Toasts' and was prevented from toasting Fox only 
by the presence of a Spanish admiral.-* Lady Holland went so far as to open 
correspondence with Lady Elizabeth Whitbread^ and St. Anne's Hill once 
again became an important meeting place for old Foxites.3
These views, of course, brought unity of action without unity of 
purpose. The Spanish deputies were feasted at Spencer's Wimbledon 
estate in late June and Windham and William Smith called for the des­
patch of a British army of liberation while apparently holding conflict­
ing opinions on why troops should be sent.** Fitzwilliam and Holland 
eagerly lent their support to the government; the former aimed at 
France, the latter at Spain. Holland seems to have ignored traditional 
differences of opinion on the goals of the war against Napoleon in cham­
pioning the Spanish cause. Possibly he agreed with Brougham that the 
party could 'gain a great deal of popularity at present & be really
^Morning Chronicle, 25 July 1808.
2Sir John Sinclair, The Correspondence of the Right Honourable 
Sir John Sinclair (London, 1831), II, app. ii, p. 8.
3Lock to Allen, 18 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 (Allen).
^Lady Holland to Grey, 28 June 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland).
-*For those who could stomach Mrs. Fox's piety St. Anne's Hill 
apparently represented a political symbol. During the ten years which 
immediately followed Fox's death the number of those who visited the 
shrine rose and fell proportionately with events which reminded Foxites 
of their political heritage. In June and July 1808 Lord Robert Spencer, 
Adair, Holland, Lauderdale, King, Bouverie, Fitzpatrick, Whitbread, St. 
John, Albemarle, and Sir Francis Vincent called at least once.
Ebrington and Fortesque, Grenvillites who agreed with Holland on the 
issue of Spain, also called. Diaries and Journal of Elizabeth Bridget 
Fox, entries of June and July, B.M., Add. MSS. 51478.
ftFarington Diary, V, 85.
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doing a right & just thing, by appearing fairly & heartily to favour 
the Spaniards - without an attack on Ministers^ But whatever the 
case Foxites could never support the objectives of the war which minis­
ters were planning for Spain. In early July the first of several key 
events started a movement of the party towards the views of Grenville.
The king's address to Parliament in early July promised military 
aid in restoring 'legitimate' monarchs to their thrones and it was fol­
lowed by a wave of popular clamour against Napoleon. As Brougham re­
ported:
People are busy fortifying the Pyrenees agt new invasions of the 
enemy - contriving terms of peace which he [Napoleon] may not be 
able to accept, & which will lead to a campaign in France - raising 
a fifth coalition in Germany - & bringing back the Bourbons. The 
first act of the piece, the defeat [of France] in Spain, is of 
course never doubted - I really believe at this moment there are 
scarcely 10 men in London who would give Bpte j 100 a year of half 
pay to retire to Ajacio & live as an invalid officer the rest of 
his life.2
The announced objectives of the British government and the cry of the 
public caused many Foxites to reevaluate their view of the Spanish war. 
The Examiner cooled immediately^ and later Hunt made his opinion clear: 
'In short ... if the deliverance of Europe means the destruction of all 
tyranny, that is, not only Bonaparte's tyranny, but the whole pande­
monium of corrupt courts, interests, and factions, I coincide with all 
my soul in the honest ardour of those who cry so loudly for it: but if 
it merely means the restoration of the noble race of Potentates ... I 
really think that Europe is already delivered as much as she can be 
... The Independent Whig was less moderate: ’But what, in the name *4
•^Brougham to Allen, n.d. [July 1808], B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 
(Allen), ff. 75-6.
^Broughamto Grey, 2 July 1808 (Brougham).
•^Examiner, 10 July and 14 Aug. 1808.
4Ibid., 11 Sept. 1808.
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of reason and common sense, can be traced in the old government of Spain
or Portugal, that renders the restoration of either of them equivalent
to the valuable blood of the best officers and soldiers that can be
culled out of the British army.''*" As had been the case of Fox and his
friends in 1792 and 1793, Hunt and White were willing to tolerate the
excesses of revolutionary France rather than support a war with an ob-
✓jective of restoring the ancien regime♦
Of course old Foxites could not ignore this point. On 17 July 
Bedford expressed uneasiness about the whole affair and in early August, 
at the height of Spanish successes, Petty suddenly questioned the abili­
ties of the patriots.* 2 Lady Holland was sadly disappointed that 'they 
talk of loyalty to the Bourbons more than that of the Justice of the 
Cause in Spain'. On 9 July she recorded that some of her friends were
disposed to let Spain sink and soon rumours were spreading that Lady
4Holland herself had deserted the cause. The reasons for this shift in 
opinion were twofold. Firstly, the opposition found it difficult to 
promote Canning's foreign policy. Secondly, as Lauderdale pointed out, 
victory in Spain would only stimulate nonsensical cant against Napoleon 
and the 'legitimacy' of his regime.
-^Independent Whig, II Sept. 1808. Also see the issues of 10 
and 24 July and 4 Sept. 1808.
2Bedford to Holland, 17 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland). 
Petty to Lady Holland, Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 (Holland).
2Lady Holland to Grey, 2 July 1808, B.M., MSS. 51540 
(Holland). Also see the Morning Chronicle, 3 July 1808.
^Lady Holland to Grey, 9 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland). Lady Caroline Lamb to Lady Bessborough, 21 Aug. 1808,
Lady Bessborough and Her Family Circle, pp. 170-71. Lady Bessborough 
to Ld. G. L. Gower, 26 Aug. 1808, Granville Correspondence, II, 323.
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 26 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 
(Holland).
235
Holland, Horner, and Allen stood by the Spaniards, retreated 
from their earlier emphasis on a republican government, and pointed out 
the advantages of a constitutional monarchy under Ferdinand.^  But this 
ignored a fundamental point - the right of the Spanish people to choose 
their own form of government^ - and consequently the Holland House cir­
cle became daily more isolated from the mainstream of Foxite opinion. 
Syndey Smith found Horner so serious on the issue that he was 'forced 
to compose my face half a street off before I meet him'.-^ Tierney, 
Abercromby, and Piggott agreed with the despondent Grenville while 
Lauderdale, Whitbread, and many others advocated peace.^ Intellectual 
conflict was developing rapidly.
As always Whitbread's views were important. In June he had des­
paired for the Spaniards but wished them success and in early July 
(according to Wilberforce) he maintained that the king's speech 'was 
the place to which men ought to look for the opinions and feelings of 
the country on Spanish affairs'.-’ This was not to say that he agreed 
with the opinions and feelings of the country. Concerned over the war­
like, pro-Bourbon clamour of the public,he immediately stressed to
^Horner to J. Lock, July 1808, and Horner to Allen, n.d. [Aug.] 
1808 (Horner), III, ff. 284-85 and 305-06.
^By making this decision Holland retracted his earlier reasons 
for supporting the war. On 11 June he had assured Grey that 'the feel­
ing in Spain is entirely national & unmixed with any attachment or 
enthusiasm to any family or person' and that the Spaniards did not 
'affect to act from any principle of loyalty to him [Ferdinand] but 
from a determination not to have Frenchmen in Spain'. B.M., Add. MSS. 
51544 (Holland).
^Sydney Smith to Lady Holland, 8 Oct. 1808, Lady Holland, Sydney 
Smith, II, 38.
^Tierney to Lady Holland, 22 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland). Grey to Lady Holland, 22 July 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 
(Holland). Piggott to Grey, 24 Sept. 1808 (Grey). Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 15 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 (Holland).
^Wilberforce Life, p. 370.
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Holland the necessity of qualifying the grounds upon which Foxite sup­
port for Spain was based. After gaining the endorsement of Holland, 
Tierney, Fitzpatrick, and other leading Foxites^ he published a pamphlet 
entitled A Letter to Lord Holland:
If Hr. Fox were alive and had power commensurate with his ability,
I see a bare possibility that his genius might turn this crisis to 
such great account. Nothing should be done but in concert with the 
Spaniards, and the complete evacuation of Spain by the French 
armies, the abstinence from all interference in her internal ar­
rangements, the freedom of the royal family might be conditions of 
the negotiation. There is no humiliation in such a proposal. I 
should be desirous of conveying these terms to the court of 
Bayonne, and of proclaiming them to the world. If they should be 
accepted, is there a statesman who could doubt of their propriety, 
of their justice, of their honour? If rejected, is there a free 
spirit in the universe that would not join in applauding the jus­
tice and moderation of Great Britain - in condemning the violence, 
the injustice and the ambition of the Emperor of the French?“
Whithread's pamphlet was an honest effort to hold the party to its tra­
ditional view of the war but the author's concluding statements des­
troyed its purpose. Whitbread would never let Grey forget his beha­
viour as Foreign Secretary and in stating his case he represented the 
peace negotiations of 1806 as an occasion 'when the Whigs themselves 
manifestly deserted their ancient tenets, and, betrayed by the false 
hopes of Continental victories ... adopted the language and view of 
their ancient adversaries'.-^ Holland had not seen these remarks prior 
to publication and he, Grey, and Tierney were infuriated.^1 Lingering
•^Whitbread to Grey, 14 July 1808 (Grey).
21 have been unable to find Whitbread's pamphlet. I have quoted 
here from another rare pamphlet found in the Wickham Papers at 
Winchester. Brief Memoir of the Life of Mr. Whitbread (London, 1815), 
p. 31.
Quoted by the Edinburgh Review in its review of the pamphlet, 
XII, 435 et seq. According to Lauderdale, however, the pamphlet 
flattered Grey. Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 12 Nov. 1808, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51696 (Holland).
^Whitbread to Grey, 14 July 1808 (Grey). Tierney to Grey, 12 
July 1808 (Grey).
memories of the Ministry of All the Talents would divide the Foxites 
for years to come. In the summer of 1808 these memories diverted the 
party from the only course which could have united them on the question 
of the Spanish war. One must wonder what the reaction of the party as 
a whole would have been had not the prorogation of Parliament scattered 
its members in early July. Other Foxites were not so concerned for the 
reputation of the Talents as Grey. Even Petty chose to overlook the 
slur on the late government and represent the pamphlet as being 'manly, 
gentlemanlike, & what is best of all convincing'.^- But few read it and 
those who did so saw it as only another source of discord. Prudently 
Lauderdale told Lady Holland that wartime objectives were 'not a sub­
ject on which I would speak to the Spaniards at present'.^
Party bickering on wartime objectives ceased in mid-August when 
the astonishing news of Dupont's surrender to Castanos at Baylem reached 
London. The sagging spirits of Brougham and Lauderdale were uplifted; 
Grey expressed fear that Spanish liberties would be won too easily; and 
the Morning Chronicle entertained extravagant hopes that the British 
army could soon be moved to Italy where it would assist Austria and 
simultaneously emancipate the Italians. The victory of a Spanish army 
obscured every other consideration at Holland House. Cartwright scolded 
Whitbread in a letter to the Political Register.^  Even the despondent *3
XPetty to Lady Holland, 2 Nov. [1808], B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 20 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 
(Holland).
3Grey to Lady Holland, 14 and 15 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 15 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51696 (Holland). Lady Holland Journal, II, 245. Morning 
Chronicle, 11 Aug. and 9 Sept. 1808.
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^Political Register, XIII, 110-15.
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Grenvilles revived. Convinced that the Spaniards had set an example 
for all Europe Lord Grenville praised the character of Spanish troops 
and predicted that Junot, Dupont's coadjutor, would suffer a similar 
fate. Auckland agreed enthusiastically; Stafford, Carysfort, Spencer, 
and Fremantle felt that their dreams had materialized; and Tom Grenville 
told Carlisle that Spanish valour and perseverance would 'protract the 
contest till the other powers of Europe shall find means & courage 
enough to take their part in it . ..'^ Castanos gave the British oppo­
sition superficial unity. Grenvillites and Fitzwilliams hailed Baylen 
as a blow which would rouse all Europe against Napoleon; Holland House 
saw it as another Saratoga; radicals felt that it would boost the cause 
of reform in Britain; and the peace party expected the battle to open 
negotiations for a general armistice. But in mid-September the Convention 
of Cintra brought things back to earth.
Sir Hew Dalrymple's convention was not all bad but Sir Hew was 
careless in delaying his despatches to England. The first news came 
from the indignant Portuguese who naturally reported that Junot had been 
saved only by British folly.* 2 Following on the heels of Baylen, news of 
the Convention on Cintra had a considerable impact on the opposition. 
Ebrington, who was in Portugal, sent his family reports which lambasted 
both Portuguese cowardice and the foolishness of British commanders.3 
Lord Grenville, forgetting his earlier excitement, claimed that his 
views had been vindicated. Without hesitation he called for the
^Grenville to Auckland, 18 and 28 Aug. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS.
34457 (Auckland). Grenville to Newport, 29 Aug. 1808 (Newport).
Auckland to Grenville, 13 Aug. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 213. T. 
Grenville to Carlisle, 28 Aug. 1808 (Carlisle).
2Roberts, p. 120.
3Ebrington to T. Grenville, 17 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
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withdrawal of the British army and reemphasized his earlier wish for a 
negotiated peace.^ Those Foxites who had had doubts before Baylen now 
agreed with him. The Edinburgh Review, reviewing Whitbread's pamphlet 
of July, deprecated the renewal of coalitions or the declaration of war 
on France by other European powers.^ The Independent Whig doubted 
whether the Peninsula was worth defending and called for increased ex­
penditures at home.^ The Examiner deserted the Spaniards altogether and 
Perry, who wanted to support the government, could only express astonish­
ment in the Morning Chronicle.^  Many Foxites had had second thoughts on 
the wisdom of British involvement in the Peninsula since early July and 
Cintra strengthened Grenville's stand against continental involvement.5
Even the members of the opposition who advocated war to the death 
with Napoleon began to despond. Holland House tried to hold the middle 
ground with a dinner for the lingering Spanish deputies on 18 September 
but Holland's views had lost much of their charm. If the dinner book 
reflects party interest Holland was almost reduced to his irelm»»res, 
Fitzwilliams, Sheridan, and a sprinkling of Canningites after the middle 
of the month.6 Tierney, Piggott, and Abercromby openly opposed the 
maintenance of an army in the Peninsula, Lauderdale was anxious for 
peace and isolation, and Whitbread, who continued to demand clarification
^•Grenville to Holland, 5 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland). Grenville to Auckland, 19 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland). Grenville to Grey, 5 Nov. 1808 (Grey).
^Edinburgh Review, XII, 435 £t seq.
-^ Independent Whig, 18 Sept. 1808.
^Examiner, 18 Sept. 1808. Morning Chronicle. 19 Sept. 1808.
^Bedford was so upset by the public cry against Napoleon that he 
expressed fear of even capitalizing on the prevailing indignation against 
the Convention. Bedford to Whitbread, Oct. 1808 (Whitbread), 5479.
6B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
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of the party's wartime goals, leaned towards the. views of Grenville.
Grey cautioned Holland against committing himself to views he could not 
retract and Lady Holland criticized the Spaniards behind her husband's 
back.-*-
These developments quickly assumed political importance. De­
lighted by the cry against ministers on the streets of LondonjTemple 
told his father that 'Our crimes are now forgotten, and the indignation 
of the public is now solely directed against government ...'2 The 
Prince of Wales did much to stimulate this opinion. Carlton House 
spread word that the king would summon Grey and Grenville, and the 
Prince expressed a wish to visit Buckingham, 'not as Prince of Wales 
but as his best and most sincere friend'. In October Sussex, Downshire, 
and the Garletons accompanied the royal train to Stowe, and Buckingham 
was assured of the king's newfound esteem for Lord Grenville excepting, 
of course, his views on Roman Catholics.^ During the month which fol­
lowed the news of Cintra the line between opposition to the war and out­
rage against the management of it was thin indeed. Only Holland stood 
between the two but in October he ignored the protests of his friends 
and set off for Spain. As he told his sister later, 'If I cannot be a 
Whig in England I certainly shall be in Spain.'4 Holland would school
^Tierney to Grey, 25 Sept. 1808 (Grey). Tierney to Lady Holland, 
22 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 (Holland). Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 20 and 22 Sept. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 (Holland).
Whitbread to Grey, 17 Sept. 1808 (Grey). Grey to Lady Holland, 16 Sept. 
1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51550 (Holland). Lady Holland to Grey, Sept.
1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
^Temple to Buckingham, 7 Nov. 1808, Buckingham, Gourt and 
Cabinets, IV, 277-78.
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 8 Oct. 1808 (Spencer). T. Grenville 
to Grenville, 7 Oct. 1808, Ii.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 221-23.
^Holland to Caroline Fox, 20 May 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51738 
(Holland).
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the Spaniards in the fundamentals of Whiggism.
There was mass confusion in the party during November and 
December as General Sir John Moore's British expeditionary force marched 
through Portugal to engage the French. Moore was a greatly admired man 
with strong Whig connexions and his presence in the Peninsula held many 
Foxites to Holland's view of the war. Brougham, writing in the Edinburgh 
Review, abandoned insularity and encouraged Englishmen to rally to the
cause.^ Perry's editorials were so pro-Spanish until Christmas that the
2Grenvilles raised objections. And as late as 3 December Horner told
3Murray that such a people as the Spaniards could not be vanquished.
But the cry against the war was loud in those quarters where Holland had 
no influence. On 11 September the Independent Whig had represented for­
eign expeditions as a plot by aristocrats to subdue the lower classes and 
in the months which followed White championed isolation and peace.^ The 
Examiner, while expressing general support for the Spanish cause, at­
tacked Jovellanos for praising the Bourbons and chided the British gov­
ernment for directing its foreign policy towards the restoration of des­
potism.^ Political recrimination led even warriors to attack the gov­
ernment's military strategy. Brougham's article in the Edinburgh Review 
denied that Portugal was relevant to Spain, and Fitzwilliam was angry be­
cause British troops had not been sent to Biscay.6 Grey and Lauderdale 
had long since decided that Holland's views were somewhat visionary and
1Edinburgh Review, XIII, 219-31.
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 30 Dec. 1808 (Spencer).
^Horner to Murray, 3 Dec. 1808 (Horner).
^Independent Whig, 11 and 25 Sept, and 13 Nov. 1808.
^Examiner, 16 Oct. and 4 Dec. 1808.
^Fitzwilliam to Grey, 7 Dec. 1808 (Grey).
both of them maintained calculated silence on the issue of the war. All 
tills added up to mass confusion and in London Tierney dreaded the open­
ing of Parliament. 'He states himself to be overwhelmed with puzzling 
reflections', reported Lauderdale. 'He describes at length the grounds 
on which he plainly sees the present Government cannot exist, and then 
with equal force and ingenuity he states the reasons why there cannot 
possibly be a change, & thus having made out that the Ministry neither 
can exist nor Die, he professes his total incapacity to say what x^ ill
happen.'"*' Meanwhile Grey tinkered with the Catholic question in 
2Northumberland.
By early December reports from the Peninsula had confirmed that 
Moore's advance was precarious. Colonel Willoughby Gordon, who was 
friendly with Foxite leaders, assured both Grey and Whitbread of Spanish 
cowardice and predicted that Moore would be cut to pieces." Tierney's 
nephew was also in Portugal and his accounts verified those of Gordon.^* 
Auckland's friends at the War Office continued to give him alarming re­
ports of the danger that threatened the British army and as early as 7 
November he concluded that all was lost."* From Spain Holland tried to 
keep the home fires burning with a steady stream of optimism but his *2
"^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 19 Nov. 1808, II.M. , Add. MSS. 51696 
(Holland).
^Grey to Ponsonby, 28 Oct., copy, and Lauderdale to 
Lady Holland, 25 Oct. 1808, ibid.
2Gordon's accounts were frequent and always dismal. See the 
Grey Papers, box 19. Also see Gordon to Whitbread, 15 Dec. 1808 
(Whitbread), 5482. For the effects of these reports see Whitbread to 
Grey, 3 Dec. 1808 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 2 Dec. 1808 (Grey).
^Auckland to Grenville, 7 and 8 Nov. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
239.
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opinions were undermined by no small degree of inaccuracy. Then, too,
Allen, who had accompanied Holland, sent back reports of a lack of en-
2thusiasm and Whiggish principles among Spaniards. The Examiner 
slammed the Spanish Junta for its corruption and arbitrary policies.^ 
Tierney and North opposed the war unreservedly as early as 4 December, 
Petty was under pressure to agree, and Brougham gave up the cause in the 
middle of the month.^ Disgusted by the whole affair Sydney Smith urged 
Lady Holland to come home: 'Linendrapers and shoemakers might perhaps 
save Spain, - in the hands of dukes and bishops it is infallibly gone.'-’ 
In mid-December word arrived that Moore was in full retreat with 
Napoleon biting at his heels.  ^ Much of Holland's support in Britain 
collapsed overnight. Fitzpatrick's shift of opinion was disgraceful.
He denied that he had ever been able to 'imbibe an atom of Id. Holland's 
Quixotism'. 'The enthusiasm of the Spanish Patriots', he wrote disdain­
fully, 'I have always believed to consist in the national antipathy of 
the lower orders to the French, excited by the fears of their Bishops, 
Priests, & Monks, alarmed for the enormous wealth of the Church.'2 *25
l-T. Grenville to Buckingham, 31 Dec. 1808, Buckingham, Court 
and Cabinets, IV, 292-94. Grey to Grenville, 26 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. 
Dropmore. IX, 274.
2S. Smith to Jeffrey, Dec. 1808, Lady Holland, Sydney Smith, II,
46-7.
^Examiner, 6 Nov. 1808.
^Sarah Spencer to Robert Spencer, 4 Dec. 1808, Mrs. Hugh Wyndham, 
ed., Correspondence of Sarah Spencer Lady Lyttelton, 1787-1870 (London, 
1912), pp. 50-1. Brougham to Grey, Dec. 1808 (Brougham).
5S. Smith to Lady Holland, Dec. 1808, Lady Holland, Sydney Smith, 
II, 47-8.
^Auckland became so alarmed that he wrote the king and warned him 
that the country was heading for disaster. Auckland to Grenville, 10 
Dec. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 247-48.
^Fitzpatrick to Whitbread, 17 Dec. 1808 (Whitbread), 5483.
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These were strange words from a man who a month earlier had represented 
Spain as an ideal training ground for young Whigs. But Fitzpatrick was 
not alone. Grey, who had maintained silence since Cintra, confessed 
that he had been wrong about Spain.*- The Examiner noted immediately 
that the revolution had failed and Hunt's 'Retrospect of the Year' on 
25 December lamented that Britain had pursued measures which would have 
ruined the best of causes.2 The Independent Whig launched a brutal at­
tack on both the Spanish Junta and British policy-* and the Horning 
Chronicle, the Statesman, and the Edinburgh Review soon followed.^
Grenville was the somewhat reluctant beneficiomj of this Foxite 
stampede. He saw a good case against ministers, and the retreat of 
Moore's army vindicated his earlier gloominess. But Grenville was 
patriotic and felt 'a strong reluctance to these wordy wars, at a mo­
ment when the country itself has not, perhaps two years more of exist­
ence ...'5 There were reasons for Grenville's disinterestedness. It 
appears that he was seriously disturbed by reports that an attack would 
soon be launched on the alleged corrupt practices of the Duke of York. 
In the spring of 1808 an anonymous pamphlet, A Plain Statement, had 
slandered the Duke and asserted that enquiry had already begun. This 12
1Grey to T. Grenville, 16 Dec. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 (T. 
Grenville).
2Examiner, 11 and 25 Dec. 1808.
^Independent Whig, 25 Dec. 1808 and 8 Jan. 1808.
^The Times, 12 Jan. 1809, noted the striking shift of opinion 
in the editorials of opposition prints and deprecated their attack on 
constituted authorities, British commanders, and the Spanish nation.
The Examiner, 15 Jan. 1809, defended the views of the Edinburgh 
Review, the Morning Chronicle, the Statesman, and even the Political 
Register but denied any connexion with them.
^Grenville to Buckingham, 28 Dec. 1808, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 290.
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pamphlet had caused great alarm at both Howick* and Dropmore during 
August, and Grenville and Fremantle had persuaded Perry to refute its 
allegations in the Horning Chronicle.* 2 But on 30 October the attack had 
been reopened when the Independent Whig published a leader entitled 
'Corruption and undue influence on the promotion of military officers 
the source of national disgrace'. By December rumours were flying that 
an attack would soon be launched on corrupt practices in government and 
Grenville was unnerved. His family had much to lose in a successful 
campaign for economical reform, and the Foxites had pestered him on 
this subject repeatedly since 1806.^ The parliamentary session of 1808 
had shown him that he could not control the House of Commons and pros­
pects for 1809 looked even worse. Holland was in Spain and both Grey 
and Lauderdale had announced that they would be unable to attend the 
opening of Parliament.-* Grenville was eager to challenge the policy of 
involvement in the Peninsula but he feared the rashness of the Foxites 
and he was unwilling to lend support to an attack on the government's
•^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 26 and 27 Aug. 1808, B.M. , Add. MSS. 
51696 (Holland).
2Grenville to Fremantle, 27 Aug. 1808 enclosing paragraphs for 
communication to Perry (Fremantle). Morning Chronicle. 2 Sept. 1808.
U&kiCK' "• * • : • "V. V- ‘ : ¿V- t  0 &oThe sinecures of Grenville and his brothers defy computation.
By Buckingham's own account his Joint Tellership of the Exchequer 
brought him 5 209, 671 between 1783 and 1805. His deputy made$ 34,000 
during the same period. 'Mutual Release between the Marquis of 
Buckingham and William Henry Fremantle Esq.', 1 Aug. 1806 (Fremantle), 
47. The Examiner of 10 May 1812 estimated Buckingham's earnings in 
1806 at & 55,000. As Auditor of the Exchequer Grenville drew enough 
to make him refuse to relinquish the office to become First Lord of 
the Treasury in 1806, 1809, 1811, and 1812. For further information 
on this 'Venetian Oligarchy' see Roberts, pp. 175-76.
^For an account of party differences on this score see H.M.C. 
Dropmore, VIII, xii.
^Grenville to Auckland, 28 Dec. 1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 
(Auckland).
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foreign policy which could easily have far-reaching domestic implica­
tions. As he told Auckland later: the truth is that while we are
disputing whether the Ship be well steered or not, others are at work 
to destroy its whole frame: & it is very difficult to resist the blun­
ders of the Pilot, without assisting the mutinous part of the crew.'^
For these reasons he hedged.
On 20 December Grenville told Grey that he wished to state his 
views on opening day and then abandon exertions in Parliament. This 
statement would question the initial decision to send an army to Spain, 
point out the government's mismanagement of Moore's campaign, stress the 
continuing need for a program of national retrenchment and rebuilding 
and an end to continental expeditions, and conclude by announcing a re­
duced level of opposition activity in the House of Lords. Above all he 
wanted to condemn 'the rash and desperate act of pledging the public 
faith to the Spanish cause now for the first time, when it is become 
completely hopeless, and binding ourselves by a public declaration not 
to treat with France, without obtaining as a preliminary to negotiation 
the acknowledgement of Ferdinand the seventh'. Grenville wanted to 
proceed along two fronts. Firstly, he was anxious to unite the coali­
tion behind his 'husbanding, defensive system' for an open assault on 
the fundamentals of British foreign policy. Secondly, he wanted to de­
lay this assault until events had assured him of a united party. Ac­
cording to his brother he feared 'that some of the new discussions will 
not fail to suggest new matter of division among ourselves'. A motion 
of censure on the initial decision to send an army to Spain would reduce 
the Grenvillites to a small minority at the present time and a similar
^-Grenville to Auckland, 1 April 1809, ibid.
^Grenville to Grey, 20 Dec. 1808 (Grey).
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motion on the Convention of Cintra would excite no interest. The 
Fitzwilliams, Holland's friends, and independent voters would support 
the government until Moore's defeat or possibly even the capture of his 
army disarmed ministers. The rumours concerning the Duke of York were 
possibly a larger consideration. There were too many reasons to fear 
that an open confrontation with the government would only give rise to 
an attack on 'all public men'. Delay, therefore, was necessary at least 
until the nature of the charges of corruption was discernable. Moreover^ 
Grey's presence was essential and a delay until his scheduled arrival in 
mid-February would be prudent. Meanwhile Grenville would put his views 
on record in the Lords and reprobate the rumoured decision of government 
to bind the country to the restoration of Ferdinand.*
Reports from the Peninsula became more alarming daily and with 
the opening of Parliament less than a month away the list of those who 
advocated an attack of some sort on the government grew. Grenville, 
the only opposition leader in the vicinity of London, was put under 
great pressure to assert himself but he stubbornly refused to sanction 
a parliamentary crusade. In early January, however, he grew eager on
the subject of Spain and noted vindictively that the 'silly notion that
♦
Don somebody with the Peasants of GalAcia was to overturn Bonaparte & 
beat the whole French army ... is beginning to give way to a juster 
view'.  ^ But still Grenville could not unite the coalition's leaders 
behind his views. Grey and Lauderdale, who agreed with Grenville in 
principle, backed away from an attack on the initial decision to send
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 21 Dec. 1808, enclosing Grenville to 
Grey, 20 Dec. 1808, copy (Spencer). Also see T. Grenville to Grenville, 
14 Dec. 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 249-50.
^Grenville to Auckland, n.d. [2 Jan. 1809], B.M., Add. MSS.
34457 (Auckland).
troops to the Peninsula in deference to Holland. On 2 January 
Lauderdale exhorted Grey 'rather to dwell on the management of our 
Ministers in relation to sending our force to Spain than to dwell on 
the measure of sending a force there; because ... Holland ... publicly 
encouraged them to it towards the close of the Session . ..'^
Fitzwilliam and Windham questioned the wisdom of mixing British troops 
with a foreign army and had doubts about 'sending Moore in at the time 
& in the way they did', but though they favoured parliamentary enquiry 
they were 'fearful of saying boldly & generally, that they [ministers] 
should in no case ... have employed a large army in the interior of 
Spain ...'^ Both Foxite and Burkian leaders, then, were prepared to 
base a motion of censure on the management of the war but opposed, for 
different reasons, to Grenville's emphasis on the necessity of broaching 
the broader question of continental expeditions. This situation wa9 
further confused by Grenville's aversion to active exertions in 
Parliament. The Foxites and particularly the Burkians were anxious to 
move for enquiry on the first day of the session.
On 2 January these conflicting opinions surfaced during a meeting 
of party leaders at Dropmore. Probably alarmed by strong reports that 
the Duke of York case would soon break,Grenville opposed any amendment 
or division on opening day but demanded a systematic attack on the theory 
of continental expeditions. He met with stiff resistance on both counts. 
Petty and Ponsonby thought that it was impossible to avoid a division 
in the Commons and they refused to censure the policy of military *2
^-Lauderdale to Grey, 2 Jan. 1809 (Grey).




involvement in the Iberian Peninsula. Tierney and Bedford'* supported 
Grenville, Fitzwilliam agreed with Ponsonby and Petty, and soon the is­
sue was complicated by disagreement on the Catholic question. This 
bickering led to ludicrous compromises. Petty and Ponsonby agreed to 
condemn the decision to send troops to Spain only If it could be ascer­
tained if Spain had requested military aid and if competent judges had 
ruled that the British army could sustain a campaign. Fitzwilliam re­
fused even to consider these conditions, Tierney called for a dissolu­
tion of the coalition, and to Grenville's delight it was decided that 
the party would not be summoned to Parliament by the customary circular 
letter.2 2
Upon hearing of Grenville's views and the result of the meeting 
Whitbread became disgusted and tried to rally the Foxites behind a mo­
tion for peace.-* He found little support. Creevey, while warning of 
being 'seduced' by Grenville and Tierney, wanted parliamentary enquiry 
and an attack on Arthur Wellesley.^ Roscoe clung to the Spanish caused 
Horner, writing at a later date, summed up the feelings of many of 
those who had supported Whitbread's peace motion of 29 February 1808: 
'Upon the question of peace, I parted company with some of my best 
advisers ... at the moment of the Spanish insurrection; thinking that 
the circumstances of that event recommended an extension of hostilities,
*-As early as October Bedford had wanted peace and a reduction of 
activity in Parliament. Thus he embraced Grenville's views. Bedford 
to Whitbread, Oct. 1808 (Whitbread), 5479. Bedford to Holland, 3 Oct. 
1808, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland).
2Ponsonby to Grey, 2 Jan. 1809 (Grey). Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam,
7 Jan. 1809 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
^Whitbread to Creevey, 11 Jan. 1809, Creevey Papers, 1,
94.
^Creevey to Whitbread, 4 and 13 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread), 373/9, 10.
~*Roscoe to Whitbread, 9 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread), 2448.
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upon the very same principle, which condemned the original hostilities 
... when this long war commenced.'^ The Foxites were hopelessly con­
fused. Tierney, Piggott, Abercromby, North, Fitzpatrick, and Bedford 
wanted a return to isolation; Petty, Erskine, Horner, and probably the 
bulk of the party supported the war but criticized the management of 
it. Whitbread was somewhere between these groups with his desire for 
peace, and Grey and Lauderdale were afraid to commit themselves.^ 111
blood flowed in London. To Tierney's chagrin Whitbread refused to dis­
cuss the issue. Relations between Fitzwilliam and Grenville were 
strained to the breaking point and rumour held that Grenville and 
Melville would unite for an attack on the war.^
Stimulated by word that Moore would be cut off before reaching 
Coruna the Grenvilles and those who agreed with them began a serious 
effort to rally the coalition behind a policy which called for an end 
to continental involvement and a return to the foreign policy of the 
Ministry of All the Talents. Auckland and Tierney encouraged Grey to 
desert the undeserving Spaniards,^ Tom Grenville tried to whip up sup­
port in London, and Lord Grenville pushed his views on Fitzwilliam and 
others.-’ On 5 January Grenville struck at Foxite dogma *2
^Horner to Jeffrey, 18 Jan. 1811, Ilorner Memoirs, II,
68-75. For a conflicting Foxite opinion see Rev. J. C. Banks to 
Whitbread, 22 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread), 4205.
2Grey feared that a debate and a division on Spain would lead many 
members of the coalition into the ministerial lobby. Roberts, p. 124.
^Tierney to Grey, 7 Jan. 1809 (Grey). T. Grenville to Grenville,
7 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 263. Sydney Smith to Lady Holland,
Dec. 1808, Lady Holland, Sydney Smith, pp. 47-8. Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 17 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51696 (Holland).
^Auckland to Grey, 2 Jan. 1809 (Grey). The utmost discretion was 
exercised in this effort for, as Tierney noted, 'the newspapers ... have 
one and all so poisoned the public mind that even to doubt of the great­
est success is considered as proof of Jacobinism.' Tierney to Grey, 6
Jan. 1809 (Grey).
'’Grenville to Fitzwilliam, 9 Jan. 1809 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield). 
Grenville to Newport, 5 Jan. 1809 (Newport).
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in a letter to Grey: 'The opinion that enthusiasm & love of independ­
ence (even if those sentiments had been universally prevalent in Spain) 
can enable an undisciplined People to resist a great & regular Military 
Power, is such as one must wish were true, but it is contradicted by all 
History, without (as I think) one single exception The commitment
of a British army to the cause of Ferdinand, he argued, was a gross vio­
lation of 'that defensive & husbanding system which alone I am convinced
2can, if any thing can, carry us safely to the end of this contest ...' 
These were strong arguments but Grey refused to desert Holland. How­
ever, he made it clear that his resolve tested on the fate of Moore's 
2army.
The Grenvilles were more successful in other quarters. Elliot 
abandoned Fitzwilliam, Anstruther joined the Grenville camp,-5 and on the 
8th Erskine, one of Holland's warmest supporters, gave way. Moore's re­
treat, noted the former Lord Chancellor, had discouraged the Spaniards 
to such an extent as to destroy their initial enthusiasm. The Peninsula 
was lost and the time had come to return to the policies of the Talents. 
Ministers could not stand 'unless we shall be as dilatory in our attacks 
upon them as they have been in theirs upon the Armies of France'.^ The 
alarming news of Spanish cowardice and Moore's plight before Coruna 
undermined the theoretical grounds on which Foxites had supported the 
Spanish cause. By 10 January the only remaining questions were whether 
British interests could be served by continued exertion in the Peninsula
^Grenville to Grey, 5 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Grey to Auckland, 6 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 (Auckland). 
Auckland to Grenville, 15 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX. 269-70.
^T. Grenville to Grenville, 8 Jan. 1809, II.M.C. Dropmore, IX.JlUM.
^Erskine to Spencer, 8 Jan. [1809], (Spencer).
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and whether 'obviously guilty' ministers should be censured for sending 
an army there in the first place. The Fitzwilliams and several Holland 
House regulars stood virtually alone on both points. The Grenvillites 
were largely united behind their system of defensive warfare. The 
Foxite rank and file were leaderless and being drawn towards Grenville 
by traditional support for peace and isolation. It appears that opposi­
tion leaders in the Commons either agreed with Grenville or remained 
prudently silent. Tierney, Piggott, Anstruther, Abercromby, Tom 
Grenville, Elliot, Fitzpatrick, North, and Morpeth were with Grenville. 
Petty and Milton were young, confused, and non-committal. Windham was 
not in London, Whitbread was for peace and isolation and separated from 
Grenville only by his desire to attack the government and divide the 
House on the first day of the session. Ponsonby supported the war in 
the Peninsula but was anxious to compromise for the sake of party unity. 
Only Horner remained true to Holland without reserve but he was on the 
legal circuit. On the 9th a frustrated Petty wrote to Lady Holland:
'I will only say that I hope your absence affords you both a great deal
of pleasure, because it certainly does us at home a great deal of mis­
chief. ' ^
Tom Grenville, Petty, Elliot, and Anstruther met at Tierney's 
house on 10 January and concluded that Lord Grenville's idea of a half­
secession could not be enforced in the Commons because the party was 
eager for a strenuous attack on the government.1 2 News of this decision 
placed Grenville in a difficult position. It was now clear that most of
the nonsense about the 'universal Spanish nation' had been undermined by
1Petty to Lady Holland, 9 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
2T. Grenville to Grenville, 10 Jan. 1809, Il.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
266-67.
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reports from the Peninsula; that Grey, Lauderdale, and those in the 
Commons who clung to past views did so primarily from fear of alienating 
Holland and Fitzwilliam; that the opposition press had almost deserted 
the Spaniards and the British government altogether;^ that Moore was 
headed for a disaster that would greatly influence public opinion and 
waverers in the p a r t y a n d  that therefore the ball was in Grenville's 
court. An almost identical political situation had existed in December 
1805 and January 1806 and Fox had capitalized fully on the battle of 
Austerlitz to form the coalition behind the 'husbanding, defensive 
system'. But the talents and reputation of Fox had excited the inte­
rest and the support of even those who disagreed with him. In January 
1809 the absence of such a leader was felt. Grey, Lauderdale, Holland, 
Fitzwilliam, and Spencer were not in London and their absence rendered 
a definitive party stance impossible. Moreover, Fox had been sure of 
his objectives in the days before and after Austerlitz; in early 1809 
Grenville was not. His worse fears had been realized in early January 
when it became clear that the Duke of York stood accused by his mistress 
of illegally using public money for procuring commissions and hastening 
promotions, and rumours of an open assault on sinecure places and cor­
rupt practices were everywhere. Again Grenville hedged.
Obviously after much deliberation Grenville agreed to support a 
campaign in the lower house If he could be assured on several key points. 
Firstly, could the front bench hold the party rank and file to an attack 
solely on foreign affairs? Secondly, was the party prepared to abstain 
from an amendment and division on the opening day of Parliament?
^Independent Whig, 8, 15, and 22 Jan. 1809. F.xamlner, 8, 15, and 
22 Jan. 1809. Morning Chronicle, 9-14, 16-21, 23-4 Jan. 1809,
^Buckingham to T. Grenville, 15 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41851 
(T. Grenville).
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Thirdly, could Whitbread be persuaded to accept these terns? Grey 
approved this plan and urged Tierney to cooperate fully with Whitbread 
and Ponsonby in the formulation of policy. On the 14th Fitzpatrick re­
ported from Southill that Whitbread was cooperative and disposed to await 
events in the Peninsula. A meeting was scheduled without delay.
On 18 January, only a day before the meeting of Parliament, forty 
three members of the Commons assembled at Ponsonby's house. Whitbread 
came to the meeting with resolutions in his pocket which reemphasized the 
need for Great Britain to establish reasonable wartime objectives so as 
to form a basis for negotiations with France.^ He wanted to amend the 
king's speech on this basis but he was cooperative and promised to ab­
stain from moving his amendment 'unless it was called for by the sense of 
the meeting'. According to Tierney eight or ten of those present were 
prepared to support Whitbread^ but the brewer never opened his mouth. 
Possibly Whitbread saw wisdom in Grenville's tactics; possibly he was 
simply in a good mood; maybe he looked around him and saw that his reso­
lutions had no chance of success. But whatever the case Ponsonby intro­
duced Grenville's plan, Petty and Tom Grenville supported it, and there *3
“I
^Grenville to T. Grenville, 12 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville). Grenville to Grey, 13 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Grey to Tierney, 13 Jan. 1809 (Tierney). Tierney to Grey, 16 
Jan. 1809 (Grey). Creevey to Whitbread, 13 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread),
373/10,
3T, Grenville to Grenville, 14 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX,
269. T. Grenville to Spencer, 14 Jan. 1809 (Spencer).
^1 have been unable to find this draft but it is safe to assume 
that Whitbread's resolutions were no more than a restatement of the 
opinions he had put forward in A Letter to Lord Holland. Creevey 
probably helped Whitbread write this amendment. Whitbread to Creevey,
14 Jan. 1809 (Creevey).
3These men were probably Adam, A. Baring, Combe, Creevey, Hibbert, 




The meeting of 18 January gave Grenville little reason to feel 
comfortable. Attendance was scant; Windham, the Dundas brothers, 
Sheridan, and Horner, all of whom continued to support the war, were 
not present; and Whitbread's silence was probably an anti-climax. 
Therefore further steps were taken to control the party. As had been 
agreed earlier the front bench would attempt to stifle discussion of any 
subject that did not deal with foreign affairs. In that field the party 
would harass ministers but avoid divisions. Realizing that this strat­
egy would not go down easily with backbenchers, Grenville divided respon­
sibilities among frontbenchers to assure maximum control. Ponsonby 
would specialize on Spain, Petty on Portugal, and Tierney - no, on 
second thought Whitbread - on America.2 Grenville would state his views 
candidly in the Lords but avoid divisions and neutralize the party in 
the Commons until the ultimate fate of Moore and every implication of 
the charges against the Duke of York were known. Bedford, Tierney, 
Petty, and Ponsonby, all of whom put great stock in the presence of Grey 
and feared an open break with Holland and Fitzwilliam on the question of 
the war, accepted Grenville's plan as a prudent compromise.
Parliament convened on 19 January. The king's speech generally 
approved of the Convention of Cintra and announced that a treaty of al­
liance had been concluded with Spain, that Sweden had been given a sub­
sidy, that the country's militia would be mobilized and increased, and 
that a Franco-Russian offer of peace negotiations had been refused be­
cause Napoleon would not treat on a basis which guaranteed the
^Tierney to Grey, 19 Jan., enclosing a list of the M.P.'s who at­
tended the meeting, and Piggott to Grey, 18 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 1 Feb, 1809 (Grey),
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restoration of Spain's 'legitimate' sovereign.* Had foreign affairs 
been the only consideration of opposition leaders this summation of 
British policy would have inspired a great deal of party unity for it 
overturned the fundamentals of the wartime system to which the coalition 
had paid lip service since 1806. Moreover, the treaty with Spain ig­
nored the obvious implications of Moore's retreat and opened the possi­
bility of another disaster, and the refusal to negotiate with France was 
justified on grounds which displeased the vast majority of party regu­
lars. Among the more influential members of the coalition only Horner 
supported the decision to stand by the restoration of Ferdinand and even 
he objected to the curt refusal to negotiate for peace.1 2 3 The Independent 
Whig and the Examiner represented this decision as fatal to the Spanish 
caused and Whitbread, Bedford, Fitzpatrick, and Erskine felt that the war 
could be supported only if a negotiated peace assuring Spanish independ­
ence (leaving political arrangements to the Spaniards) and the withdrawal 
of British troops were the announced objectives of Great Britain. On the 
16th Lauderdale had come round to this opinion and a day later he had 
confessed to Lady Holland that he could no longer support the maintenance 
of a British army in the Peninsula.^ Grey, Horner, and Petty therefore 
were clinging to Holland's views by their fingernails.
The bulk of the opposition's war party was also angered by the 
king's speech, 'We never had cause with them [the Spaniards], excepting 
checking B [onaparte]', wrote the warlike Carlisle. 'We were not to
1Parl. Deb.. XII, 1-4, Also see Abbot Diary. II, 163.
2Horner to Murray, n.d. [Jan.] 1809 (Horner), IV, ff. 27-9.
3Independent Whig, 15, 22 Jan. 1809. Examiner, 22 Jan. 1809.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 16 Jan, 1809 (Grey). Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 17 Jan. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS, 51696 (Holland).
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fight for their Church or their Princes . ..'^ Auckland, who had op­
posed British involvement in Spain from the beginning, agreed with the 
Foxites that the vague reference to 'legitimate' sovereigns should be 
challenged in Parliament.  ^ The Swedish subsidy also alarmed the bulk 
of the coalition. Both Foxites and Grenvilles were on record as being 
opposed to the principle of subsidizing continental powers. The opposi­
tion press therefore criticized the announcement and later when Sweden 
moved into the French sphere of influence Grenville expressed satisfac­
tion because 'if it lessens the demands on this country for money, 
troops, and ships it will rather be for our advantage than otherwise 
... But these views were not welded together to form a systematic 
attack on the government's foreign policy. Fear of internal division 
led coalition leaders to spike their guns and a promise of more forceful 
language after the fate of Moore was known apparently pacified an eager 
party.
Ponsonby backed away from an amendment and division in the 
Commons and delivered a long, boring speech which was devoid of con­
structive criticism. In the Lords Grenville showed little restraint in 
condemning the theory of continental expeditions (to the horror of Grey 
and Horner) but made no effort to unite opposition peers behind an intel­
ligible argument or to divide the House.^ Of course the refusal of party 
leaders to take a definitive party stance on the question of the war led *35
^•Carlisle to Morpeth, n.d. [Jan.-Feb. 1809], (Carlisle).
^Auckland to Grenville, n.d. [Feb.-April 1809], H.M.C. Dropmore,
IX, 303.
3Erskine to Spencer, 8 Jan. [1809], (Spencer).
^Grenville to Grey, 27 Mar. 1809 (Grey).
5Parl. I)eb., XII, 11-21, 38-54. Whitbread to Grey, 31 Jan. 1809 
(Grey). Horner to Jeffrey, 21 Jan. 1809 (Horner).
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to ludicrous and irresponsible speeches. As Fox's career exemplifies, 
parliamentary opposition to the wartime policies of government is always 
difficult, even when those in opposition are united behind a forceful 
leader and a clear alternative policy. The coalition had neither of 
these redeeming characteristics in early 1809. Everywhere was disorder 
and cross-purposes as amateur strategists and disgruntled military men 
put forward conflicting observations; nowhere was there responsible 
criticism. Denied of a goal by the fears of the party hierarchy opposi­
tion spokesmen harped on the past inadequacies of ministerial planning 
and disgusted the House with trivia.^ As Ward noted, 'Of a few broad 
features we may perhaps be able to judge, but with regard to details and 
points disputed, even among professional men, we neither have nor deserve 
to have, the smallest authority.This folly would have continued in­
definitely if Grenville had had his way but on 21 January word of Moore's 
death reached London.
This event had an enormous impact on the opposition in itself but 
soon reports of Spanish cowardice were everywhere. Horner, who had pro­
mised to write a favourable account of the Spanish cause for the Edinburgh 
Review, promptly withdrew:
I have been deterred from reducing my notions upon the subject to 
writing, in consequence of the uncertainty which has been thrown 
upon what I built on all along as my fundamental fact, the disposi­
tion & zeal of the people of Spain; an uncertainty which has been 
increasing by every account Latterly received from that country. In 
addition to this, the case has now assumed that shape in which it 
becomes impossible to separate, in the discussion of it, the conduct 
of the English Ministers from the other causes which have cooperated 
in producing the disappointment of our hopes in Spain: and all 
examination of their conduct would be improper in the Review.3
1 Parl. Deb., XII, 4-91.
%ard to Helen Stewart, ll Feb. 18091, Letters to 
'Ivy'» P- 63,
■^ Horner to Jeffrey, 21 Jan. 1809 (Horner).
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The cause of Moore carried everything before it.
Lauderdale mocked Holland openly and told Grey that there was 
'something ridiculous in the abuse of Moore which forms a part of a 
dream about one half of the Spanish nation laying down their lives ra­
ther than submit to a Man you will see them cherish',^  Grey shared this 
opinion and on 26 January he surrendered to Grenville. 'I must confess 
that, as things have been managed, it is much to be regretted that your 
opinions, against sending troops to Spain at all, did not prevail.
The Foxite leader continued to fear an open break with Holland but he 
was ill, confined to his bed, and not disposed to resist the ardour of 
both his lieutenants and allies, 'This is the only period in which we 
ever had a chance, or rather the certainty of driving out Ministers by 
Parliamentary Exertions', Tierney wailed from London.  ^ On the 29th Grey, 
nou> fearful of Fin iownsion of leelnnd, finnlln trBenoille f t-s peo»-«^
Ue coo\«d noi t>e in Lcmdcm in Jnme "H\e mofum. ^  Whitbread 
soon followed. After hearing Grenville condemn the theory of continental 
expeditions and criticize a war in Spain for the restoration of Ferdinand 
he concluded logically that the old Pittite was prepared to support 
peace. On 1 February he told Grey:
Of Lord Grenville I entertain the highest opinion personally and 
politically: the latter perhaps is strengthened a great deal by the 
similarity I think I discover between his Sentiments & my own in 
the principal points .... If there should at any time be a division 
of party, which in the House of Commons is not connected at present 
by any strong ties, I will venture to say that there will be no
■^Lauderdale to Grey, 28 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Grey to Grenville, 26 Jan. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 274.
Quoted in Lauderdale to Grey, 16 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
V>rey to Grenville, 29 Jan., and Grey to Rosslyn, 1 Feb. 1809, 
II.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 275, 276.
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disunion of Sentiment, between Lord Grenville & those ... who are 
still attached to the Memory & Principles of Fox.^
British military disasters on the Continent had produced similar opinions 
among Foxite leaders for over three years. The disillusionment of 
Grenville and his war party in the wake of Austerlitz had made coalition 
with Fox possible. The same disillusionment after Jena had soothed 
serious dissension on the question of continental alliance, and continu­
ing pessimism had facilitated a certain degree of cooperation during 
early 1808. The drift of the coalition towards opposition to the 
Peninsular War had been no different. By late January 1809 Grenville's 
predictions had been verified by the event. The intellectual struggle 
between party leaders had virtually ended with the defeat and death of 
Moore, and Grenville was in a strong position among his peers within the 
coalition. But the Duke of York case had broken. The question was 
whether Grenville would lead.
■*-Whitbread to Grey, 29 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
CHAPTER VII
THE ATTACK ON THE WAR 
1809 - 1812
'I hear nothing talked of but the maddest prospects of sending 
all that remains to us of army, to do for the Spaniards which all men 
now see they cannot do for themselves, & to outnumber Bonaparte's troops 
on the Continent of Europe', wrote Grenville on 1 February 1809. 'That 
such an experiment if tried, will ultimately produce the loss of Ireland,
& the destruction of this country is my sincere & deliberate opinion.1'* 
This opinion was not overly pessimistic at the time it was stated. The 
British army had been cut to pieces; the country's most reputable generalI ; . , ; -■ v  l "i j ?. • Z (:■: *.* X >. i  I "l V- Vp>  V  s: ' ■ - A G J . & - * VlV * • ' t. :
had been slain; report held that the Spaniards and Portuguese had proved 
themselves almost worthless as allies; British finance was strained; 
Ireland was boiling with discontent; the American and north European mar­
kets were officially closed to British shipping; and the Portland govern­
ment was weak, divided, and incapable of inspiring the nation. Well might 
Grenville point to his predictions; well might he argue that the salva­
tion of Europe depended on either dissension in the French command or 
the revival of spirit in the northern powers. Britain should await these 
events, conserve her strength, and refrain from squandering her resources. 
In strikingly similar circumstances Grenville and Fox had embraced these 
views in early 1806. In January 1809 they represented a reasonable 
alternative to the policies of the British government. 2
^■Grenville to Grey, 1 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
2Godfrey Davies, 'The Whigs and the Peninsular War, 1808-1814', 
Royal Historical Society Transactions, 4th series, II (1919), pp. 113-31.
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While the once controversial Convention of Cintra had been half- 
forgotten by the public* the Coruna tragedy demanded parliamentary en­
quiry. Moore had been unhappy with his mission from the start and the 
British government had insulted and slighted the general at every turn. 
It had been an effort to advance Arthur Wellesley and jockey Moore that 
had sent four successive commanders to Portugal in 1808 and at last when 
Moore had assumed the supreme command he had found nothing but confu­
sion."^  His ill-fated advance to Sahagan had been undertaken'in spite 
of practically every military disadvantage^ and there was reason to be­
lieve that Canning’s friend John Ilookham Frere and his ill-chosen agent 
Charmilly had handicapped Moore seriously.^ The sight of the survivors 
of Coruna returning to English soil undoubtedly made a great impression 
on the public, and the dismal tales of these veterans undermined what 
remained of dreams concerning a 'universal Spanish nation'. It can be
r  ; * f i • V -  ■ * * ’•*■- - ' • • : ?  i - ' ■ ■ ‘ Is
argued validly that Moore's advance was a successful diversion^ but the 
questions before British statesmen in early 1809 were more fundamental. 
Could the country afford such diversions and, if so, could further *2
^Lady Jackson, ed., The Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson 
(London, 1872), II, 345.
2Grenville had procured official correspondence which formed his 
views on this subject, Grenville to Fremantle, 25 Nov. 1808 (Fremantle). 
Also see J. C. Moore, The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore 
(London, 1834), II, 104-06.
^Supported by information from his friends at the War Office 
Auckland had outlined these disadvantages in a letter to Grenville of 
28 Oct, 1808, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 231. Also see Grenville to T, 
Grenville, 27 Nov. 1808, B.M,, Add. MSS. 41852 (T. Grenville).
^Horner to Mrs. D, Stewart, 25 Jan. 1809, llorner 
Memoirs, I, 442-44. Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 17 April 1809, B.M.,
Add, MSS, 51696 (Holland), T, Grenville to Spencer, 12 April 1809 
(Spencer). For Frere's defence see John Hookham Frere, The Works of 
John Ilookham Frere (London, 1874), I, 99.
^Roberts, p. 131,
263
exertions in the Peninsula serve British interests? These points alone 
were where the strength of Grenville's case rested.
The coalition's leaders had long since committed themselves to 
defensive warfare and opposition to the policy of continental expedi­
tions. This had been the announced (though ill-administered) policy of 
the Ministry of All the Talents, and during the session of 18D8 Grey 
and Grenville had defended their administration and opposed ministers 
with a cry for a 'husbanding, defensive system', Coruna provided them 
with an excellent opportunity to display political consistency at a 
crucial moment. Moore had agreed with Grenville that the Peninsula was 
no place to base a British campaign and his official despatches and 
private correspondence strengthened the case against the war. Shortly 
before his death Moore had written officially from Coruna:
I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the 
Spaniards would have never been believed; that had the British been 
withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their 
retreat, and it was necessary to risk the army to convince the 
people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards 
had neither the power nor the inclination to make any effort for 
themselves. It was for this reason that I had to march to Sahagen. 1
This explanation did little for Moore's military reputation but it gave 
Grenville the evidence he needed to call for the withdrawal of British 
troops from the Iberian Peninsula. Even after Moore's defeat, however, 
there were reasons to hesitate. Fitzwilliam and Windham were very quiet 
on the subject but both of them were disinclined to retract former opin­
ions. Holland was having second thoughts on the utility of a British 
army in Spain but he remained committed to the Spanish cause and his 
wife flooded England with letters that defended the Spaniards at the
Hloore to Castlereagh, 13 Jan. 1809, J. Moore, A Narrative of 
the Campaign of the British Army in Spain (London, 1809), app. E.E.
This despatch was also published in the Independent Whig, 16 April 1809.
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expense of Moore.^ Of most significance, however, was the fact that
Grenville's views were threatened by the impetus of those who were most
eager to attack the government. While nodding approval to Grenville's
emphasis on the withdrawal of British troops from the Peninsula the
rank and file M.P. was far more concerned with the vindication of Moore's
memory. As Holland remembered at a later date:
Sir John Moore was in habits and opinions more connected with the 
Whigs than with their opponents. He was sincerely lamented by 
that party; and in vindicating his memory, sometimes from reason­
able criticism, at others from malevolent aspersions, many members 
of it were hurried into desparaging a cause in which they thought 
he had been sacrificed by Ministers.2
This was certainly the case with Foxite leaders. In response to criti­
cism of Moore Lauderdale reminded Lady Holland curtly that the general 
had been a Whig. Grey built his entire case against ministers on a 
defence of Moore which he thought 'invincible in argument',^ and Horner 
probably summed up the feelings of most of his colleagues in the Commons 
by professing heartache 'when I think of the flippant sneers we shall 
have from Canning, and the cold malignity of Castlereagh, both of whom 
hated Moore, and intrigued against him in the basest manner. ' * 3
These opinions threatened difficulty. The opposition's strength 
rested on its traditional aversion to continental expeditions; a game 
of party generals would do it no good. A defence of Moore would steal
^Earl of Elchester, ed., The Spanish Journals of Elizabeth Lady 
Holland (London, 1910), pp, 233, 280. Lauderdale to Grey, 18 Jan. 1809 
(Grey). Petty to Lady Holland, 28 Feb. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland), Horner to Murray, 31 Jan, 1809 (Horner).
?Holland, Further Memoirs, p.25.
3Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 17 Jan. 1809, B,M,, Add. MSS. 51696 
(Holland),
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 12 April 1809 (Spencer).
^Horner to Mrs. D. Stewart, 25 Jan. 1809, Horner 
Memoirs, I, 442-44,
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thunder from the broader and more valid scope of Grenville's arguments 
and by implication it would endorse the theory of continental expedi­
tions. It would entail a discussion of the mechanics of Moore's cam­
paign, a subject on which the party had no source of reliable informa­
tion, and it would seriously alienate Holland by unnecessarily attacking 
the Spaniards, whom Moore had criticized severely, Holland would not 
make common cause with Moore. He had always separated the cause of the 
Spaniards from that of the British government and its armies; he, like 
Horner, felt that it was 'quite a separate question whether the troops 
have been sent in sufficient numbers, or to the proper places, or with 
due combinations and method.'* Undoubtedly the views of Holland and 
Grenville were reconcilable. British military involvement in Spain was 
the key issue and Moore's behaviour had made Holland grow cold on the 
idea. On the other hand Grenville felt that the only hope of success 
lay in Spanish guerilla warfare with British logistical support.^' There 
was a pressing need for leadership but Grenville hesitated.
The facts were not yet before him and he was still the only member of 
the coalition's hierarchy in London. Moreover, the Duke of York case 
was gradually rising to national importance. Grenville therefore in­
structed his front bench to hold the party at bay and it was probably no 
coincidence that on 28 January the Morning Chronicle found the charges 
against the Duke incredible.
It quickly became clear that front benchers in the Commons could 
not hold the party in check. Most M.P.'s thought that Moore's defeat 
and death had formed an impregnable case against ministers and they were
^Horner to Jeffrey, 21 Jan, 1809 (Horner),
^Grenville to Newport, 5 Jan. 1809 (Newport),
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disgusted by the restraint imposed by their leaders.'* Wien Perceval 
proposed a vote of thanks to Wellesley for his victory at Vimiero the 
opposition went to pieces. Frustration led Whitbread to demand the in­
clusion of Sir Harry Burrard, an officer who had not come ashore until
the battle was over, and this absurdity exposed the opposition to
2Canning's 'best jokes and manner'. On another occasion back benchers
rose up in arms when Petty and Tierney tried to thwart a division on a
bill which called for increasing the army:
... before we and some others could make our Escape into Bellamy's 
[wrote Tierney], the door was locked and we could get no further 
than the Passage. There our Fellows came to look for us, and, 
having been present when the question was put, we were obliged to 
vote in the House, that is against giving leave to bring in the 
Bill. The consequence was that because the House was resumed Petty 
felt himself obliged to declare that he had been made to vote 
against his inclinations, & I, Calcraft, & others, did the same!^
Grenville was exposed to enormous pressure during early February. 
Buckingham observed that the cry against the Duke of York in the Commons 
resembled scenes in f*ncc at the beginning of the revo­
lution and told his brother that it was 'now of little consequence to 
us whether in this matter [the war] we were right or wrong, for the 
next French battle will be fought in Ireland, or perhaps in Kent.'^ On 
the other hand Fremantle was anxious to capitalize on the growing cry 
against corruption to attack the government's foreign policy, and Temple 
stressed that the reports of returning officers had brought the public
•^Note the retrospective opinion of Western in his letter to 
Creevey, n.d, [Oct. 1809], (Creevey). Also see Lauderdale to Grey, 16 
Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Temple to Buckingham, 3 Feb. 1809, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 313-14, Pari. Deb., XII , 145-67.
^Tierney to Grey, 1 Feb, 1809 (Grey),
^Buckingham to Grenville, fZ Feb. andj2.5-3l 3nnr] 1809, H.M.C. 
Dropmore, IX, 273-74, 277-78.
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round to Grenville's views.^ Grey was exposed to similar pressure.
f)Rosslyn sent him dismal accounts of Spanish Incompetence*- and in London 
Tierney found his position untenable. 'Nothing you have ever experi­
enced enables you to form an idea of the irksomeness of holding a place 
in the Front row of such an Opposition as now exists', he protested.3
Whitbread soon tried to rally the party to a specific, identifi­
able attack on the government's Spanish policy. He had opposed 
Grenville's idea of restraint in Parliament from the start and the king's 
speech had led him to obvious conclusions. He was disturbed by the 
Cabinet's refusal to negotiate for peace on any basis that did not re­
store Ferdinand to the Spanish throne and he felt that a majority of the 
party agreed with him.^ Upon hearing Grenville say distinctly on 26 
January -* that he opposed continental expeditions and favoured a nego­
tiated peace assuring the withdrawal of both British and French troops 
Whitbread concluded that the party was ready to define its stance on the 
war
Around 25 January Whitbread and Creevey circulated a proposed mo­
tion among leading Foxites. Once again they found that lingering intel­
lectual conflict on the issue of Spain Immobilized the party. Greevey
■^Temple to Buckingham, 3 Feb., and Fremantle to Buckingham, 16 
Feb. 1809, Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, IV, 313-14, 318-21.
^Rosslyn to Grey, 30 Jan. 1809 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 1 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
^In late January Whitbread received a letter from Grey which ex­
pressed a wish that all British troops would be recalled. Grey to 
Whitbread, 16 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread), 905.
■’Papers relative to the negotiation at Erfurt were laid before 
Parliament on 20 January and six days later Grenville expressed unhappi­
ness over the stance of the British Government while Whitbread sat in 
the gallery, Pari. Deb., XII, 169-70,
^Whitbread to Grey, 1 Feb, 1809 (Grey).
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reported that Sheridan was 'foolishly warlike' and that the men who had 
supported Whitbread a year earlier were only 'luke warm about any stir 
for peace.'“'- Roscoe, like many others, completely ignored Whitbread's 
emphasis on 'legitimate' sovereigns and supported the government's re­
fusal to abandon Ferdinand in the negotiations with France.^ Burdett, 
who was anxious for peace, had infuriated Whitbread by attacking the 
Whig aristocracy a week earlier and apparently there was no communica­
tion between the two.-* Undeterred by these setbacks Whitbread laid his 
case before the coalition's leaders in the Commons. Here he found men 
who appreciated his motives. Tierney, who was unsure of Grenville's 
views, agreed with the proposed motion but advised Whitbread to await 
Grey's arrival. Fitzpatrick endorsed the motion enthusiastically. 
Ponsonby, who was harassed on all fronts, read it without comment and 
asked for a copy.^
On 31 January Canning proposed a vote of thanks to the king which 
approved of the government's behaviour in the short negotiation with 
France. Whitbread promptly moved an amendment which called for the pub­
lication of Moore's despatches and challenged the grounds on which 
Canning had broken off negotiations. He received no support from the 
opposition front bench. Grenville and Grey continued to fear a defini­
tive stance on the war in general and on Spain specifically. Conse­
quently Ponsonby, Petty, and Lord Porchester opposed the amendment while 
Tierney and Fitzpatrick remained silent. Supported by only Burdett, 
Whitbread grew angry, pointed out the moderation of the French government,
^Creevey to Whitbread, 30 Jan. 1809 (Whitbread), 373/12.
^Roscoe to Whitbread, 5 Feb, 1809 (Whitbread), 3777.
^Whitbread to Creevey, 22 Jan. 1809 (Creevey).
^Whitbread to Grey, 9 Feb, 1809 (Grey).
269
and concluded with yet another attack on the Talents' peace negotia­
tions,^- Unpopular even with Foxites, he left the House in a huff.
Opposition front benchers regarded Whitbread's failure as a vic­
tory for the coalition. 'I am not without hope', wrote Petty, 'that 
the effect produced may have been good, as the number of persons deter­
mined to vote for peace in any shape, appeared to be so small, as to 
prevent a division which had certainly been intended so that no encour- 
ment is given to a repetition of the experiment,'- Tierney, who was 
guided by more personal considerations, was equally pleased. Only 
Bedford stood by Whitbread. 'I am but a fire side Politician, and know 
little of passing events but what I learn from the Newspapers', he 
wrote on 3 February, 'yet I confess I am unable to comprehend why we 
who contended for Peace and Reform during the whole of the last unfor­
tunate war, should not equally contend for them now .... I am old 
fashioned in my politicks, and am for old Principles Others
should have asked this question in early 1809 but the Foxites as a party 
were drifting, blinded by other considerations.
The events of 31 January had sad implications, 'My Ears failed 
me if Lord Grenville did not say in the Ho: of Lords that Negotiation 
ought to have been accepted & the Independence of Spain made an object 
of that Negotiation', explained Whitbread to a ruffled Grey. 1 *5 His ears 
had not failed him. Both Grey and Crenville had expressed opinions
1Parl. Deb.. XII, 221-40.
^Petty to Grey, 3 Feb. 1809 (Grey),
^Tierney to Grey, 1 Feb, 1809 (Grey).
^Bedford to Whitbread, 3 Feb. 1809 (Whitbread), 2455. Cartwright 
also endorsed Whitbread's views in a letter to the Independent Whig, 5 
Feb. 1809.
5Whitbread to Grey, 9 Feb, 1809 (Grey),
which could only lead to such conclusions and there was reason for 
Whitbread to be concerned over their refusal to act. The coalition's 
leaders had refused once again to come to grips with the elementary 
question of war and peace. Whitbread had tried to resolve a pressing 
issue and his failure had left the coalition without direction as it 
drifted towards factious opposition to the Peninsular War. Grenville's 
desire to advocate the withdrawal of British troops was also ignored. 
The bulk of the party wanted to defend 'poor Moore' and concentrate 
solely on the management of the war. Undoubtedly Grenville saw the 
weakness of this approach. He, however, was backpeddling and little 
disposed to exert himself, Not only the Duke of York enquiry but the 
views of Fitzwilliam, Windham, and Holland frightened him. The game of 
party generals would be yet another prudent compromise.
By mid-February the coalition's opportunity to challenge the 
government's foreign policy with any semblance of unity had passed. 
Wellesley had been given orders for another expedition, legislation for 
the maintenance of a war in the Peninsula had passed Parliament without 
a serious challenge, and the Duke of York scandal had virtually monopo­
lized the attention of the nation. Nevertheless the opposition front 
bench was experiencing increasing difficulty in holding backbenchers at 
bay. Young men were disgusted with the temporizing views of Ponsonby 
and Tierney, 1 Folkestone, Creevey, Madocks, the much respected Romilly, 
and many others were daily showing more interest in Wardle's charges of 
corruption. This situation was explosive in itself but the weakness of 
the government and the restraint of opposition leaders only increased
■^ Note Spencer's explanation of Althorp's feelings in Spencer to 
T. Grenville, 4 April 1809, B.M,, Add. MSS. 41854 (T. Grenville). Also 
see Denis Le Marchant, Memoir of John Charles Viscount Althorp Third 
Earl Spencer (London, 1876), pp. 111-17.
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pressure.-1 The need for political activity of some sort was intense in 
the Commons and, according to Rosslyn, opposition peers were so eager 
to attack the government's Spanish policies that a motion for the pro­
duction of official correspondence could be delayed no longer.^ More­
over, Grey had again alienated Whitbread by censuring his peace motion 
of 31 January and the brewer's violent reaction had given party leaders 
ample reason to fear that he would soon take an independent line in 
Parliament.^ Grenville could hold the line no longer. His own family 
disagreed with his policy of political inactivity and Auckland was 
pressing him to bring the American question forward.^ He therefore 
changed his tactics.
Grenville allowed Petty to go forward with a motion censuring the 
Convention of Cintra on 21 February and three days later Ponsonby opened 
the question of Moore's campaign.-5 Simultaneously Grenville expressed 
fear that the Duke of York case would obscure the question of Spain, 
urged Grey to come to London immediately, and agreed to delay a motion 
in the Lords only with great reluctance. 6 The reasons for this new ap­
proach were two-fold. Firstly, party leaders had remained inactive for
^-Horner to Murray, 25 Mar. 1809, Horner Memoirs, I,
453-55.
^Rosslyn to Grey, 24 Feb, 1809 (Grey).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 13 Feb. 1809 (Grey). Grey to Tierney, 17 
Feb. 1809 (Tierney).
^Buckingham to T, Grenville, 7 Mar, 1809, B.M., Add, MSS. 41851 
(T, Grenville). Buckingham to Grenville, 14 Mar., and Auckland to 
Grenville, 15 Feb. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 280-82, 278-79.
^This was obviously a sudden decision. Ponsonby gave notice of 
the motion on Cintra and one on the American question for the same day 
and later had to rearrange dates. Auckland to Grenville, 15 Feb. 1809, 
H.M.C, Dropmore, IX, 278-79.
6Grenville to Grey, 25 Feb. 1809 (Grey).
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as long as possible and they were now aware that their case against 
ministers was evaporating.^ Secondly, the Grenvilles probably felt that 
an attack on foreign affairs would release pressure and divert attention 
from Wardle, Mrs. Clarke, and the Duke of York. Grey's views undoubted­
ly represented those of Grenville. 'But even suppose them [ministers] 
beaten, what is to become of it? There is such a maze of difficulties 
that I cannot at all see my way thro' them, even if events were placed 
at my own c o m m a n d . T h i s  opinion was Important. The coalition's 
leaders were not ready to attack the government broadly and openly.
They actually feared success in Parliament because the party was divided 
to such an extent that it had no alternative policy. It is almost cer­
tain that opposition leaders in the Commons were instructed to concen­
trate on ministerial incompetence in the management of the war and to 
dodge the controversial questions of continental expeditions and wartime 
objectives. This assured chaos.
The ever-increasing cry against corruption enabled Petty to se­
cure an extraordinarily gooddivision of 153 to the government's 203 in 
spite of the fact that he did not prove his case. He displayed pro­
found ignorance of military operations and Sir Arthur Wellesley himself 
completely refuted his arguments.-* Ponsonby's motion was supported by 
equally shallow observations. Obviously relying almost exclusively on 
the opinions of returning veterans and the biased case which had been
xPetty to Lady Holland, 22 Feb. [1809], B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
^Grey to Tierney, 17 Feb. 1809 (Tierney).
^Parl. Deb., XII, 897-917, 928-36. Also see Roberts, pp. 126- 
27, for a good explanation of the weaknesses in Petty's military views.
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put together by Moore's indignant family, opposition orators represented 
the advance to Sahagan as a sacrifice of military orthodoxy to political 
necessity and slammed ministers for forcing Moore to make such a deci­
sion. Ponsonby's arguments reflected the tactics of his leaders. He 
contradicted himself at least three times; he completely ignored Moore's 
tactical errors; he failed to point out that Moore's advance had been a 
successful diversion; and he professed himself willing to fight to keep 
the French out of Spain but unwilling to fight to expel them.* 2 Denied 
a goal by the fears of the party heriarchy, opposition spokesmen harped 
on the inadequacies of ministerial planning and on the shabby treatment 
of Moore. This dismal performance set the tone for the remainder of 
the session but it probably made little difference. In March the dikes 
broke and the bulk of the party in the Commons followed Whitbread's lead 
against corruption in government. Confusion in the Commons would ob­
scure the issue of Spain between mid-March and early summer while 
Wellesley took his first steps towards fame in the Peninsula. The opposi­
tion had not challenged the government's foreign policy, only its alleged 
failure in administering it. The crucial parliamentary session of 1809 
had been lost.
The summer of 1809 brought important developments on the 
Continent. Austria declared war on France in the spring and the question 
of wartime strategy was reopened in Great Britain. Those who were not 
opposed to the principle of continental expeditions but disinclined to
■^Moore's Narrative, which appeared shortly after his death, 
probably became the bible of outraged Whigs. Creevey read it. John 
Gore, Creevey's Life and Times (London, 1934), p. 43.
2Parl. Deb., XII, 1057-1119, for this debate.
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risk another army in the Peninsula saw the Austrian declaration as an 
excellent opportunity to venture a diversion in the north of Germany. 
Others felt that increased activity in the Peninsula would best serve 
Austria, Of course the leaders of the coalition were not unanimous in 
their opinions for the summer's campaigning. Moira was loud in calling 
for a north German expedition1 while Holland, encouraged by the Austrian 
declaration, shifted his emphasis and pointed out that a campaign in 
Spain would divert French resources.^ Grenville remained rigid in his 
support for purely defensive war. His fears for the security of the 
country had been doubled by the Duke of York enquiry and he saw politi­
cal confusion in England as yet another reason why continental expedi-
3tlons should he abandoned. The opinions of the Foxite centre were 
cloudy. Undoubtedly many agreed with Caroline Fox that the war in Spain 
and Portugal had done 'a great deal more towards rooting out the hatred 
between the French & English nations than perhaps in the present circum­
stances could be wished.'^ Whithread certainly held this view and 
Lauderdale adopted it in May.*> But still the Grenvilles were unwilling 
to include support for peace negotiations in their theories of isola­
tion from the Continent.
The government was more decisive. Reluctant to give up the game
1Roberts, p. 133.
OThis was the first time that Holland rose above his preoccupa­
tion with Spanish liberties and looked to the advantages of the 
Peninsular Wir in the broader European struggle. Holland to Morpeth, 6 
May 1809 (Carlisle). Holland to Grey, 27 April 1809, enclosed in Grey 
to Grenville, 25 May 1809, H.M.C, Dropmore. IX, 308-11.
^Grenville to Grey, 27 Mar. 1809 (Grey). Grenville to Fitzwilliam, 
30 Mar. 1809 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
^Caroline Fox to Holland, 20 April 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51738 
(Holland).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 3 May 1809 (Grey).
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in the Peninsula and doubtful about the prospects in Germany, Portland's 
ministry despatched Wellesley to Portugal at the head of a small army 
and sent an enormous expedition to the Scheldt with orders to capture 
Flushing, Antwerp, and the French fleet which was shut up in the estuary. 
Neither of these expeditions helped Austria. The battle of Wagram had 
practically ended the Franco-Austrian war by the time the large, force 
under the joint command of Sir Richard Strachan and Lord Chatham left 
England. Once at Flushing a series of blunders led to the abandonment 
of the Invasion of Antwerp and the army fell prey to disease on the is­
land of Walcheren before returning to Great Britain in disgrace.
Though Wellesley's campaign in the Peninsula contrasted strikingly with 
that of Moore it also ended on a sour note.After capturing Oporto and 
chasing Soult out of Portugal Wellesley advanced into Spain too hastily. 
Threatened with destruction at Talavera the British army fought val­
iantly but was forced to retreat so abruptly that British wounded were 
left on the field. In the final analysis British military activity 
during the summer of 1809 left little reason for rejoicing at home.
Bickering among opposition leaders increased as these events un­
folded. Wellesley's presence at the head of the British army compli­
cated matters seriously. The game of party generals which had been be­
gun by the defeat and death of Moore had become fundamental in the views 
of many Foxites, regardless of their opinion of the Peninsular War. The 
Morning Chronicle stopped at nothing in promoting the opinion that Sir 
Arthur was the cypher of a corrupt, inefficient government1 and when 
Lord Wellesley succeeded Frere in Spain he had to contend with a great 
deal of misrepresentation in the Foxite press.2 Unfortunately for the
^Morning Chronicle, 26 Mar. 1809.
2Lady Knighton, Memoirs of Sir William Knighton (London.
1838), I, 126-Z7. ~
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cause of party harmony the Grenvilles were very friendly with the
Wellesleys and Sir Arthur was always a favourite with Windham.^ The
Austrian war and the operations of Wellesley revived support for the
cause of the Spaniards among Holland's friends. Grey's speech of 212April in defence of Moore offended Holland so deeply that during May 
and June serious tension developed between the two Foxite leaders. 5 
Meanwhile Whitbread reprobated the Austrian declaration of war as per­
fidious to France, Ponsonby challenged him, and a nasty scene occurred 
in the House.^ Holland encouraged his friends in Britain to resist the 
opinions of their leaders;-* Lauderdale came out in support of Holland's 
view of the war in June;^ and Grey became so frustrated that he chased 
away potential allies. Sidmouth, who was prepared to reprobate the 
management of the war, met Grey in St. James's Street in late April. '1 
am convinced', announced the Foxite leader, 'that in six weeks' time 
there will not remain a single British soldier in the Peninsula except 
as a prisoner.' 'Though that should be the case,' replied Sidmouth, 'I 
still should prefer it to our retiring from Portugal without making any 
further efforts.' 'Then', said Grey haughtily, 'we cannot talk on the 
subject.' And he stormed away.'7 *2
^Roberts, p. 134.
2Parl. Deb., XIV, 121-73.
■^Holland to Grey, 20 May 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland). 
Grey to Holland, 13 June 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). Holland 
to Caroline Fox, 20 May 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51738 (Holland). Grey to 
Tierney, 21 June 1809 (Tierney).
^C.W.W. Wynn to H. Wynn, 14 May 1809, Lady Williams 
Wynn Correspondence, pp. 146-48.
^Holland to Horner, n.d. [June 1809], and Horner to Holland, 16 
July 1809 (Horner), IV, ff. 89-91, 96-7.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 18 June 1809 (Grey).
2Sidmouth Life, II, 504-05.
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As always British operations on the Continent led to fierce dis­
agreement within the ranks of the coalition; as always the failure of 
such operations produced a certain degree of unity. News of Talavera 
reached London in August. The Grenvilles, of course, were ready to be­
lieve the worst, notwithstanding their connexions with the Wellesleys. 
Tom Grenville immediately represented the battle as the 'second act of 
the tragedy of Coruna' and Lord Grenville told Adam that 'Few defeats 
have ever been so disastrous in themselves or in their consequences 
as Talavera - From any more such victories heaven preserve us.'^ The 
propaganda of the government added outrage to this pessimism. There 
was deep resentment among the Grenvilles when the Tower guns sounded in 
celebration of Talavera and Auckland expressed contempt when it was an­
nounced that Wellesley and several of his officers would be awarded 
peerages for their efforts. When it became obvious that Wellesley's 
position was not critical several Grenvillites had second thoughts. 
Temple and Buckingham actually joined other Britons in hailing the brav­
ery of the army at Talavera3 and Tom Grenville took care to guard him­
self by maintaining absurdly that even if Wellesley defied logic and re­
gained the offensive it would be owing solely to Napoleon's preoccupa­
tion with Austria.^ But Lord Grenville's views were a gauge for those 
of the rest of his clan and in mid-August he summed up the stance which 
the Grenvillites eventually assumed:
^T. Grenville to Grenville, 15 Aug. 1809, H.M.C. Oropmore, IX, 
313. Grenville to Adam, 4 Sept. 1809 (Adam).
2Auckland to Grenville, 30 Aug. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 314. 
Also see T. Grenville to Fremantle, 15 Aug., and Grenville to Fremantle, 
19 Sept. 1809 (Fremantle).
3Temple to Fremantle, 15 Aug. 1809 (Fremantle).
*T. Grenville to Holland, 31 Aug. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51534 
(Holland).
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I am not at all surprized at the result of this farfanned expedi­
tion - To suppose that we can meet Bonaparte with an army on the 
Continent is an imagination so extravagant that the only wonder is 
how any men should be found mad enough to entertain it.
The only good news 1 have seen from our armies for a long while 
is that paragraph of Wellesley's letter in which he says that he 
has suspended his forward move[ment]. I hope it will soon be fol­
lowed by another to say that he is retreating to his transports as 
fast as he can - You see Moore expressly says that Portugal cannot 
be defended agst a superior force, & so I always thought.-*-
The reference to Moore was important. The views of the dead general had 
not formed Grenville's opinion but they had strengthened his already well-
developed concept of the war. Unfortunately both Grenville and Moore
were wrong. As Arthur Wellesley wrote:
The great disadvantage under which 1 labour is that Sir John Moore, 
who was here before me, gave an opinion that this country could not 
be defended by the army under his command ... I have as much re­
spect as any man can have for the opinion and judgement of Sir John 
Moore; and I should mistrust my own, if opposed to his ... But he 
positively knew nothing of Portugal.2
Neither Wellesley's brilliance nor the terrain of Portugal, how­
ever, could be seen from the opposition benches. There Moore's opinions 
had taken hold and the publication of the dead general's correspondence 
only days before news of Talavera reached London led to extraordinarily 
intense hatred of Spaniards. 'They [the despatches] present a lament­
able picture of the affairs of Spain, the evils of which are apparently 
without remedy: for they seem to consist in nothing less than a total 
want of energy & talents civil & military', wrote one of Holland's most 
devoted supporters.* 3 This opinion was strengthened by personal cor­
respondence from the Peninsula. Young John Bouverie sent dismal ac­
counts of Spanish cowardice and his mother, a notorious gossip;
-^Grenville to Fremantle, 16 Aug. 1809 (Fremantle). 
Quoted in Heberts, p. 141.
3Whishaw to Brougham, Aug. 1809 (Brougham).
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spread the word indignantly.1 Lord John Russell, Holland's most devoted 
'Spaniard', confessed sheepishly that several Spanish regiments at 
Talavera had been so frightened by their own gunfire as to throw down 
their weapons and run. Ward was also in Spain. 'Now after all that 
has been said', he wrote, 'this cannot be a very violent feeling in a 
nation which allowed itself to be bequeathed with almost as little cere­
mony as an old woman would bequeath a china jar, to the great grandson 
of the King of France only [a] century ago, and has continued ever since 
in most loyal obedience to him & his descendants.'1 Hut possibly the 
most important correspondent was Sir Charles Stewart, a disaffected offi­
cers and an acquaintance of Brougham who had few connexions with the 
opposition. Stewart was outraged by the management of the war and dis­
gusted that the British ministers were delaying the formation of a 
Spanish government. He put these views before Brougham in a letter of 
early August and it was in Grey's hands in a matter of days.^
As early as 16 July Horner had noted that though Holland's clos­
est friends remained prudently silent on the question of Spain Holland 
was alone among Foxites in his support for continental expeditions.^
This silence was broken when word of the smashing French victory at 
Wagram followed on the heels of Talavera. Fitzpatrick, whose wisdom on 
military matters always showed in retrospect, agreed with the Grenvilles
1Henrietta Bouverie to Brougham, n.d. [Aug. 1809], and Brougham 
to Grey, 11 Aug. 1809 (Brougham).
^Ld. John Russell to Lady Holland, 2 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51678 (Holland).
^Ward to Brougham, 14 Sept. 1809 (Brougham).
^Brougham to Grey, 11 Aug. 1809 (Brougham).
^Horner to Holland, 16 July, and Horner to J. Lock, 5 Aug. 1809 
(Horner).
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that Talavera was a disaster. Bedford, whose views also fluctuated 
with events, noted that 'the imbecility of our own Gov't may keep pace 
with Spanish Treachery and Cowardice.' '... we ought to think of noth" 
ing but bringing our army home in safety and be content to pocket the 
disgrace', he wrote.* 3 *5 Lord King shared this opinion-* and Erskine la­
mented 'the frantic joy of the people of this besotted country when they 
read of the destruction of nearly 6000 of their fellow men & subjects, 
fighting for Spain whilst Spaniards can only look on & without any pos­
sible chance of an ultimate result from whence our country can reap any 
advantage.Undoubtedly the defeat of Austria joined with Grenville's 
pessimism to form an unrealistically bad opinion of Wellesley's ope­
rations in the Peninsula. This was a second blow to those who leaned 
towards Holland's view of the war.
Indignation was almost universal in Foxite circles, especially 
among men who had formerly supported the Spaniards. The Spanish general 
Cuesta became a leading target for abuse. One Whig lady attributed the 
Talavera 'disaster' to the alarming rumour that the general kept a mis­
tress at his headquarters^ and the Independent Whig censured his refusal 
to fight on Sundays.6 When Allen attempted to exonerate the Spaniards 
by blaming their folly on the prejudices of English soldiers Lady
-^Whishaw to Brougham, 27 Aug. [1809], (Brougham).
Bedford to Holland, 3 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51661 (Holland).
3Klng to Holland, n.d. [Aug. 1809], B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 
(Holland), ff. 24-5.
^Erskine to Grey, 27 Aug. 1809 (Grey).
5Lady Sarah Napier to Lady Susan O'Brien, 25 Oct. 1809, Countess 
of Ilchester and Lord Stavordale, eds., The Life and Letters of Lady 
Sarah Lennox (London, 1901), II, 225-30.
6Independent Whig, 13 Aug. 1809.
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Caroline Lamb turned on him with biting satire:
It is true there is such a strong prejudice against running away in 
our Armies that though perhaps it may be more useful than many other 
military movements, I doubt they will never get over their contempt 
for it and whether it is jealousy or any other motives which actuate 
the Spanish troops the effect is weakness, fright and want of 
energy. I cannot but feel the deepest regret that all our Men 
should be sacrificed for them.l
Of course contempt for Wellesley (nowVtscwnl Wellington) increased. 
Whitbread had decided by November that Moore's successor was 'thoroughly 
obnoxious to the Countryand rumours spread that General Hill, who had 
not been mentioned in Wellington's field report, alone had saved the 
British army from disaster. Whishaw reported that Holland's friends 
were furious because Hill had not been given 'any share of the honours 
which have been so lavishly bestowed upon the Commander in C h i e f . A s  
was to be expected Hill had strong Whig connexions. Horner preferred to 
cling to Moore. 'Though I think highly of Wellington.' he noted with 
objectivity, 'when 1 compare his campaign to that of Sir John Moore, 
Moore's conduct is elevated.
Even Holland, who had stood by the Spaniards in the wake of 
Moore's death, began to have doubts after the rout of Austria was con­
firmed. Upon his return to England in August he and Allen conceded that 
Napoleon would overrun and hold Spain if events in Germany released the 
Grand Army for operations in the south.5 Though Holland continued to 
champion the Spaniards' quest for liberty he and his closest friends *3
■*"Lady Caroline Lamb to Allen, n.d. [Sept. 1809], B.M., Add. MSS. 
52193 (Allen), ff. 171-72.
^Whitbread to Lady Holland, 20 Nov. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 
(Holland).
3Whishaw to Brougham, 19 Sept. 1809 (Brougham).
^Horner to Murray, 11 Sept. 1809 (Horner).
F^. Horner to J. Horner, 30 Aug. 1809 (Horner).
were now opposed to the presence of a British army in the Peninsula. 
According to HornerjHolland maintained that Moore had 'treated the 
Spaniards with excessive reserve and haughtiness, and thereby not only 
deprived himself of information and facilities which were within his 
reach, but continued to the last to misunderstand the real nature of 
the Spanish character and their peculiar spirit and mode of resistance 
in this struggle.' Obviously Holland saw no reason to think that 
Wellington would do better. Like Fitzpatrick he felt that 'the Military 
Men of France & England always agree in a cordial contempt of all other 
nations', and one may surmise that it had finally occurred to Holland 
that his emphasis on the reestablishment of Spanish liberties was not 
consonant with the views of the British government. With these conside­
rations in mind it is not surprising that Holland, Allen, and Horner de­
cided that a British army would only retard the progress of the 
Spaniards.^ But Holland and his circle could not hide their disappoint­
ment at the performance of the patrofcts at Talavera. Both Brougham and 
Horner began to look towards the revolted American colonies of Spain as 
a brighter horizon^ and Holland confessed to Mackintosh in early November 
that the slowness of the Spaniards in civil and military matters had 
'ruined a good cause'. 'But the cause of Spain is hopeless', wrote 
Whitbread on 20 November. 'Even at Holland House I hear it is given up 
& there was its last Refuge.
Like Talavera, the Walcheren expedition was seen as yet another
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•'■Horner to Murray, 11 Sept. 1809 (Horner). W. Eden to Auckland, 
25 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 (Auckland).
^Horner to Jeffrey, n.d. [7 Dec. 1809], (Horner), Iv >. ff* 182-87. 
Brougham to Grey, 17 Sept. 1809 (Brougham).
^Holland to Mackintosh, 4 Nov. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51653 
(Holland).
^Whitbread to Lady Holland, 20 Nov. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 
(Holland).
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reason why British activity on the Continent should be abandoned. In 
July there was a disposition in some members of the opposition to look 
on the expedition as a cheap and easy road to success^- but a majority of 
opposition leaders were hostile from the first. Of primary importance 
was the fact that the Ministry of All the Talents had investigated the 
utility of an invasion of the Scheldt only to decide that the risk was 
too great.^ Then, too, the government's choice of commanders hardly 
pleased the leaders of the coalition. Strachan had no political iden­
tity but both Popham and Chatham were stained by association with Pitt's 
name. Moreover, Popham, who commanded Chatham's flagship, was unpopular 
with the opposition because of his behaviour at Buenos Aires in 1806. 
Rosslyn, who had sound contacts at the War Office, maintained that 
Popham had 'put forward his plan [for the expedition], & then prepared 
& collected Intelligence to support it; and I suspect that in like Manner 
Ministers believed anything that favoured their v i e w s . H o r n e r  echoed 
this opinion^* and Lauderdale told Grey that 'the whole scheme is a pro­
ject of that rash adventurer Sir H: Popham, in whose ship Lord Chatham 
has sailed for the purpose of receiving the advice of this fellow, who 
may be thus said tho' a Captain in the expedition to have the command of 
the Fleet & of the Army.'^ Such criticism sprang primarily from politi­
cal recrimination but the opposition's observations on the appointment 
of Chatham were more responsible. As early as 28 June Grenville told 
his brother that the news of the expedition was 'frightful to those who
•^-Morning Chronicle, 19 July 1809. Brougham, Life and Times, I,
444.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 22 Oct. 1809 (Grey).
-Hlosslyn to Grey, 28 Aug. 1809 (Grey).
. Horner to J. Horner, 18 Sept. 1809 (Horner).
-’Lauderdale to Grey, 3 Aug. 1809 (Grey).
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know Lord Chatham such as I do.'* Undoubtedly Chatham was a poor choice 
and opposition leaders (many of whom were eager to discredit Pitt's 
brother) seized on this fact immediately. Tom Grenville was spreading 
rumours concerning Chatham's incarapei'ei\ce even before the expedition set 
sail'* and Grey probably summed up the feelings of most of his colleagues
on 24 July when he laid his views before Tierney:
It is now all over with Austria, with the Continent & I fear with 
us. Whether the expedition will proceed or not I know not. The 
object was never worth so great a risque. Whilst there were hopes 
on the Continent it was most impolitic as tending to make it as 
odious to the inhabitants of the Country where we were to act. Now 
that objection is in a great degree removed, but I am sorry to see 
so large a portion of our remaining resources risqued for such a 
purpose & under such Commanders. If such a force could be spared 
there was not common sense in sending it to any quarter but Spain, 
where 60 to 70,000 British ... might have expelled the French from 
the Peninsula.3
There was much good sense in this assessment and from the first the 
Walcheren expedition stimulated unity among the leaders of the coali­
tion. Holland was seeking both common ground with Grey and Grenville 
and an opportunity to explain away failure in the Peninsula; his indig­
nation grew with every report from the Scheldt.^
These reports were plentiful. Rosslyn, who commanded a regiment 
under Chatham, had formed a poor opinion of the expedition before it de­
parted from England and throughout the affair he was far more interested 
in waxing prophetic in his gloomy correspondence to Foxites in Britain *2
^Grenville to T. Grenville, 28 June 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville).
2T. Grenville to Grenville, 28 July 1809, H.M.C. Droptnore, IX,
312-13.
^Grey to Tierney, 24 July 1809 (Tierney). Also see T. Grenville 
to Spencer, 27 July 1809 (Spencer), and Buckingham to Fremantle, 30 Aug. 
1809 (Fremantle).
^Holland to Morpeth, 13 Sept. 1809 (Carlisle).
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than in making the most of a bad situation.-*- Lauderdale's son also 
accompanied the expedition and his reports added credibility to those 
of Rosslyn.^ Holland and his friends placed unrealistic emphasis on 
the jaded intelligence of Yarmouth and Lowther, both of whom returned 
from Flushing in late August.^ It appears that there was little doubt 
in opposition circles concerning the ultimate failure of the expedi­
tion. Poor Chatham was easily the primary target of their abuse. Lady 
Holland found great pleasure in circulating rumours of the commander's 
incompetence^1 and Horner reported that Chatham kept 'such hours in 
Walcheren as suit Boodle's & White's; never being visible to any body on 
business, till eleven or twelve o'clock. He is said to be the scorn of 
the whole army ...'-> Soon poetry was circulating in Whig society:
Great Chatham's son, with his sword drawn,
Was waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
And Strachan, as eager to get at 'em.
Was waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
Another poem was printed in the Independent Whig:
Chatham and Nap, OhJ how they sound;
A Penny, and a Thousand Pound!
A Cock-Boat, and a Man of War;
A Glow-Worm, and a Blazing-Star!'7
Horner tried to believe that Chatham had set sail opposed to his mission
^-Rosslyn to Grey, 26 July and 28 Aug. 1809 (Crey). Brougham to 
Grey, 10 Aug. 1809 (Brougham).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 7 Sept. 1809 (Grey).
^Horner to Murray, 23 Aug. 1809 (Horner).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 21 Aug. 1809 (Grey).
^Horner to Murray, 23 Aug. 1809 (Horner).
^'Lines dropped on board the Venerable previously to the sailing 
of the expedition against Flushing, 1809', Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 364.
^Independent Whig, 20 Aug. 1809.
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and that the government had kept the news of the Austrian armistice from 
him.^ Lauderdale, who followed the movements of the expedition on an 
outdated map, was convinced by 17 August that the expedition had been 
'dreadfully mismanaged'.^
Reports of the failure of the expedition began to filter back to 
London shortly after word of Talavera and Wagram had arrived. Not since 
Austerlitz had the cause of continental exertions looked darker. 
Brougham, who had opposed further involvement in Spain for nine months, 
told Grey that if Chatham's army had been at Talavera 'one might have 
had considerable hopes for Spain being saved - Now this seems out of the 
question.' Apparently this retrospective opinion was shared by every 
opposition leader, regardless of former views on the wisdom of war in 
the Peninsula. The Grenvilles were sure that 'it would be impossible 
for any Government to make any effort now for the assistance of any 
power in Europe.14 The Morning Chronicle-* and the Independent Whig actu­
ally hailed the dual defeats as a triumph for the policy of isolation. 
'Every man of reflection', wrote White, 'must admit that we can much 
more easily cope with a French army on our own shores than in distant 
kingdoms; - and does not the same apply equally to Buonaparte?'^
This gloating took a new direction in mid-September when it was 
learned that Chatham's army had been retained on the island of Walcheren 
and that serious feuding had erupted in the Cabinet. Rosslyn returned 
to England early in the month, went to Northumberland to confer with
^F. Horner to J. Homer, 18 Sept. 1809 (Horner).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 1 and 17 Aug. 1809 (Grey).
^Brougham to Grey, 11 Aug. 1809 (Brougham).
^T. Grenville to Carlisle, 30 Sept. 1809 (Carlisle).
M^orning Chronicle, 2 Sept, and 28 Oct. 1809.
^Independent Whig, 20 Aug. 1809.
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Grey,*- and thereafter spread alarming reports of disease riddling both 
Chatham's and Wellesley's armies. Soon rumours were spreading that 
British troops were being held on Walcheren solely 'to prepare the pub­
lic for total failure'.-* The cry against government was especially loud 
among the former supporters of Fox, all of whom found great delight in 
the discomfiture of Castlereagh and Canning. Grey and Holland accepted 
Canning's contention that Castlereagh's incompetence had foiled the 
scheme but both Foxite leaders affected outrage over Canning's failure 
to air his feelings before the expedition set sail.^ The views of the 
extreme left wing.of Fox's old party were probably summed up by an edi­
torial in the Independent Whig:
Viewing the crusades in which the policy of our government are 
now engaged, but as the frantic and visionary pursuits of treachery 
and folly, every success which may accompany the valour of our 
armies we can consider but as HUMAN BUTCHERY, perpetrated for the 
PERSONAL SPLEEN AND VINDICTIVE RAPACITY of the British Ministry!* 345
As always White's opinions were extreme and politically imprudent but 
it appears that few opposition leaders disagreed with his general out­
look. Grey, Holland, Fitzwilliam, and the Grenvilles were mortified by 
the events of the summer and all of them were aware that the government 
stood vulnerable to an attack on the management of its wartime policy, 
if not on the fundamental concept behind it. Brougham called for 'open 
war' and Erskine was sure that the government would fall if the opposi­
tion could be rallied behind an amendment and a division on the opening
■^Brougham to Grey, 17 Sept. 1809 (Brougham).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 12 Nov. 1809 (Grey).
3Fitzwilliam to T. Grenville, 17 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add, MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
4Grey to Holland, 3 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
Holland to Grey, 25 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51544 (Holland).
^Independent Whig, 20 Aug. 1809.
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day of Parliament. In this, however, the leaders of the coalition 
faced seemingly insurmountable problems.
Events at Talavera and the Scheldt had been accompanied in 
England by the enquiry into the alleged corrupt practices of the Duke 
of York. This enquiry had given rise to a cry for reform which had 
caused important realignment within the ranks of the opposition. Above 
all else the events of the spring and early summer had pitted the fears 
of the aristocratic wing of the coalition led by Grenville against the 
reforming zeal of the popular wing which included most Foxite M.P.'s 
and many of the younger and more idealistic Grenvillites and Burkians. 
Grey and Lauderdale had divided with the former. Their outrage had 
been unqualified; their efforts to soothe differences in the party had 
been as desultory as in the early 1790's when their own intemperence on 
the issue of reform had helped lead Fox to disaster.^ The net result 
of this behaviour had been the weakening of their already precarious 
hold on the House of Commons.
The reactionary behavlour.of ‘the coalition's leaders had undermined 
Ponsonby and Tierney. Petty had felt such contradiction that he had re­
fused to assert himself^ and Horner obviously spoke for many others when 
he told Ward that he could not 'find men and measures together.'^ This 
dilemma had been the inevitable result of the contradictions inherent to 
Foxite 'principles' and Whitbread alone had dared to step between the *4
■^Brougham to Holland, n.d. [Oct. 1809?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51561 
(Holland), ff. 63-4. Erskine to Lady Holland, 22 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51533 (Holland).
^Note the comments of Tom Grenville and Spencer. T. Grenville to 
Spencer, 28, 30 Mar. 1809 (Spencer), and Spencer to T. Grenville, 28 Mar.,
4 Aprill809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. Grenville).
^Caroline Fox to Holland, 4 June 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51738 
(Holland).
^Horner to Ward, 24 May 1809, Homer Memoirs, I, 461-62.
289
extremes. He had spoken alongside Burdett at Westminster Hall and had 
bowed to the cheers of the same electors to whom Fox had bowed before 
him. At the Crown and Anchor tavern he had braved the abuse of both ex­
tremes by defending the Whig aristocracy and Britain's party system 
while championing a moderate reform of Parliament as a compromise be­
tween aristocracy and democracy.^ Such a stance had placed Whitbread in 
a most demanding position. Bedford had accused him of furthering the 
dissolution 'of that Party, the union of which poor Fox urged as his dy­
ing hope and left as his last legacy to his surviving friends'; Creevey 
had warned him to cling to peace and reform and 'to be cautious how you 
give your assent to a course of procedure which has no other object than 
a party one, that of putting upon their legs again ... the shabby lead­
ers of the Whig interest . ..'^
Whitbread had managed to resist both of these extremes and his 
behaviour had increased his influence in the Commons and brought to his 
side a number of men who in varying degrees looked to him for leader­
ship. This group, which had become known as the 'Mountain', was by no 
means a conventional party. Whitbread exerted personal influence over 
a larger but still narrow set of men who justifiably represented Grey 
as an apostate and who desired separation from the Grenvilles. These 
men were Creevey, Bennet , Folkstone, Maxwell, Owen Williams, Hutchinson, 
Ossulston, Lord Kensington, and probably Western. But this group had no 
strong extra-parliamentary connexions with the many more who supported 
its measures in the Commons.
Of those who divided with the Mountain from time to time t
^Grenville to T. Grenville, 31 Mar. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville).
^Bedford to Whitbread, 4 April, and Creevey to Whitbread, 4 April 
1809 (Whitbread), 2462, 373/13.
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'radicals' like Burdett, Brand, Cochrane, Wardle, and Madocks cham­
pioned peace and reform but refused to make common cause with Whitbread 
primarily because of his emphasis on moderation as a bridge to Whig 
unity. Others like Romilly, Horner, Ferguson, Calcraft, Abercromby, and 
Coke were restrained somewhat by the now confusing Foxite 'principle' of 
group loyalty: they desired cooperation with Grey and Grenville, they 
ridiculed Whitbread's bad manners and poor oratory, but invariably they 
found themselves in the division lobby with the brewer. 'For my own 
part,' wrote one Foxite, 'I know, if I should happen to be in Parlt. with 
Whitbread leading an opposition, I could not help being very soon one of 
his followers; with all his fatal defects of manner, there is no politi­
cian whom I find so often in the right
One cannot resist comparing the Mountain to the Foxite party of 
the latter 1790's. The Mountain's strength, though varying from division 
to division, was founded almost exclusively on loyalty to traditional 
Foxite causes, primarily peace and reform. Then, too, Whitbread was sur­
rounded by familiar faces. Coke, Smith, Byng, Western, Jekyll, Taylor, 
Adam, and Lord William Russell often divided with him. Moreover, as had 
been the case with Fox's opposition, young men flocked to Whitbread's 
standard. Whrd, WJLamb, Lyttelton, Brougham, Lord Archibald Hamilton, and 
even William Eden, Milton, A1thorp, and George Ponsonby, Jr. looked to 
Whitbread for leadership. The biographer of Althorp wrote:
Here alone he recognised the sentiments of Mr. Fox; and finding, as 
he thought, in Mr. Whitbread, during the proceedings against the 
Duke, many of the qualities which he admired in Mr. Fox and could 
see in no other living statesman, he determined to adopt him hence­
forth as his leader.^
Of course Whitbread's new stature threatened Grey, Grenville, and the
^Horner to Allen, 16 Jan. 1811 (Horner).
Le Marchant, Memoir of Althorp, pp. 11-12.2
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coalition's hierarchy. According to Glastonbury the events of the spring 
and summer had washed Grey clean of his 'Whitbread & other impurities' 
and had bound him to Grenville with a cement that 'will not be easily 
dissolved'.'*' This bond was under serious attack from quarters other 
than the Mountain. Both the Examiner  ^and the Independent Whig 3 slammed 
the union between Grey and Grenville and in all probability most of the 
former supporters of Fox in the country agreed with the assessment of 
the old Foxite Peter Payne:
If Lord Grey was to take a Minister's place without determining to 
be governed by principles more evidently Foxite than he lately dis­
played that place would kill him ... But how can the Foxites act 
under Lord Grenville unless Lord Grenville renounces those feel­
ings, which dictated that infamous letter to Bonaparte, which Mr 
Sherridan [sic] said ought never to be forgiven or forgotten ...
Grey faced the opening of the session of 1810 with little hope of hold­
ing the party in the Commons to his dictates. Lord King felt that the 
Foxite leader had lost all of his strength in the country^ and Horner 
observed on 28 September that 'The same persons, who never mention Mr. 
Fox's name but with reverence, speak of Lord Grey as a man only desirous 
of office; and the Grenvilles are still more unpopular.'^ Moreover, the 
failing health of Lansdowne raised the possibility that Petty, Grey's 
last hope in the Commons, would be elevated to the Lords before the end
^Glastonbury to T. Grenville, 30 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS.
41857 (T. Grenville).
^Examiner, 16 April 1809.
•^Independent Whig, 18 June, 17 Sept. 1809.
^Payne to Whitbread, 1 Oct. 1809 (Whitbread), 2483. Here Payne 
refers to Grenville's official refusal of a French offer of peace nego­
tiations in 1800.
^Ld. King to Holland, n.d. [June 1809?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51572 
(Holland), ff. 24-5.
^Horner to Allen, 28 Sept. 1809 (Horner).
292
of the year. In this situation the return of Holland from Spain had 
occupied the thoughts of practically every member of the coalition since 
the spring.
By mid-September there was ample reason to believe that Holland 
would abandon Grey and Grenville and join Whitbread in rallying his 
uncle's old followers. His differences with the leaders of the coali­
tion had been accented by the Duke of York affair. His friends in 
England had urged him to return and take the lead of the Foxites,^ and 
both he and Allen had criticized Grey and lauded the popular party in 
letters from Spain.^ As early as May there had been fear among 
Grenvillites that Holland would unite with Whitbread,^ and in June Grey 
had been glad that Holland was abroad.^ Holland's behaviour since his 
return had increased these fears. With the exception of one visit by 
Elliot* Lady Holland had entertained only devoted Foxltes between 12 
August and mid-September^ and, according to Whishaw, Holland and Allen 
admitted 'in their fullest extent, the party divisions which exist 
among the Whigs and the Grenvilles.'^  Grey complained later that Holland 
had stopped corresponding with him,^ and Fox's nephew was so adamant in 
his support for popular politics that Tierney became alarmed. 'My guess 
is that before the next Session is a month old he will be in the thick
%orner to Holland, 16 July 1809 (Horner).
^Holland to Caroline Fox, 12, 17 June 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51738 
(Holland).
^C.W.W. Wynn to H. Wynn, 14 May 1809, Lady Williams 
Wynn Correspondence, pp. 146-48.
^Grey to Tierney, 21 June 1809 (Tierney).
^Holland House Dinner Books, B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
^Whishaw to Brougham, 27 Aug. [1809], (Brougham).
^Grey to Tierney, 2 Dec. 1809 (Tierney).
293
of the reformers though without meaning the least hostility to his old 
Friends', Tierney reported. 'As a party he considers us as completely 
disbanded.
This situation rendered offensive operations in Parliament almost 
impossible. The right wing of the coalition was content to remain in­
active. Windham felt that Whitbread's behaviour threatened anarchy, and 
the old Burkian was so isolated from his political allies in the Commons 
that he opposed any serious attempt to unseat the government.^ The views 
of the Grenvilles were equally despondent. They affected to see in the 
'disasters' of Talavera, Wagram, and Walcheren the final ruin of the na­
tion. Discouraged by the situation in the Commons they chattered about 
the impossibility of any ministry resolving the dilemma.3 Grenville him­
self was absorbed in preparations as a candidate for Chancellor of 
Oxford University and apparently he had virtually stopped his political 
correspondence. Foxite leaders who continued to support Grey could only 
take a similar stand. Rosslyn noted that 'never was a time when Office 
would be less acceptable',^ and when Holland encouraged Grey to assert 
himself the latter expressed astonishment: you speak of a party,
as if there were still a party in existence', he wrote. 'It was by the 
events of last Session, completely broken up in the House of Commons, and 
I do not see the means, (more especially if your apprehensions concerning 
Lord Lansdowne are well founded) of forming it anew; not indeed do I 
feel any disposition to join in such an attempt. I shall therefore ... 
make my appearance at the opening of the Session, but as for a regular
^Tierney to Grey, 30 Aug. 1809 (Grey),
^Windham to Grey, 29 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 37847 (Windham).
^T. Grenville to Morpeth, 23, 30 Sept. 1809 (Carlisle).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 20 Sept. 1809 (Grey).
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Parliamentary opposition afterwards you must excuse me.'^
The problems of the coalition became clear in late September 
when Portland, Castlereagh, and Canning resigned from the Cabinet and 
Perceval applied to Grey and Grenville to join with him in forming a 
coalition government. Grey refused to come to London, and though 
Grenville displayed more interest, the thought of office disturbed him 
greatly.3 Both Foxites and Grenvlllites had had their fill of coali­
tions and, as Tom Grenville pointed out, the nation had too many trou­
bles and the Foxites in the Commons were too uncontrollable for party 
leaders to 'encounter all these dangers with a gag in one's mouth & 
with fetters on one's arms & legs Accordingly Perceval's ap­
parently sincere offer came to nothing. The leaders of the opposition 
were completely immobilized by the demands of their coalition. Both 
Grey and Grenville were depressed and unable to control the House of 
Commons. Petty was about to move to the Lords. Whitbread, whose in­
fluence undermined Ponsonby and Tierney, was nevertheless incapable of 
uniting Foxites without the sanction of the coalition's hierarchy. Men 
as well as measures were at the bottom of these problems and the public 
detested both. 'So,' wrote Cobbett, 'belike, the Whigs, the haughty 
Whigs, who licked the boots of the Grenvilles, will leave us to perish 
in the hands of the Walchereners, as a just punishment for our blindness
^Grey to Holland, 3 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
^For a thorough account of these negotiations see Roberts, pp.
347-59.
"^Holland to Grey, 28, 30 Sept. 1809, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51544 
(Holland). Grenville to T. Grenville, 21, 22, 23 Sept. 1809, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 41853 (T. Grenville). T. Grenville to Spencer, 25 Sept. 1809 
(Spencer).
^T. Grenville to Spencer, 3 Oct. 1809 (Spencer).
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in not being able to discover their superior patriotism. ' 1 Cobbett was 
wrong; in all probability Grey and Grenville would have been unable to 
form a government even if they had been offered carte blanche.
Holland found this situation intolerable. Though his sympathies 
were with the popular wing of the party he had returned from Spain de­
termined to reunite the coalition. He blamed Grey for the schism of the 
summer and he believed that the government's mismanagement of the war 
had given rise to a set of circumstances which could stimulate party har­
mony. 'Sir Arthur's situation is certainly very critical,' he had writ­
ten shortly after his return to England, 'but I own I have not a worse 
opinion of the condition of the combined armies there than I am inclined 
to form of those in the House of Commons - but time & chance ... may do 
much & at least we have no Bonaparte to contend with at St. Stephens.' 
During August and September Holland tried to soothe differences between 
Foxites. Like his uncle in 1804 he stressed that the Catholic question 
was 'at this moment particularly advantageous in a party view because 
one of the surest means of keeping our friends from starting questions on 
which they are likely to differ is to occupy them with those upon which 
they must of necessity agree. He was prepared to temper his opinions
on Spain to complement this effort and he set out in an attempt to buy an
3evening newspaper through which he could promote his views.
Initially Holland felt that a united party stand on the Catholic 
question could compensate for the lack of leadership in the Commons^
Political Register, XVI, 755.
2Holland to T. Grenville, 24 Aug. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
3Holland to Grenville, 19 Oct. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore, IX, 340-41.
^Holland to T. Grenville, 24 Aug. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville).
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but he was forced to reassess this opinion in October when it became 
clear that Lansdowne's rapidly failing health would soon elevate Petty.
The prospect of the loss of Petty stimulated serious debate within the 
party on the question of political alignment. Several Grenvillites and 
a small number of Foxites led by Sheridan and apparently Perry desired 
coalition with Canning, who had only recently resigned from the Cabinet.-* 
This group was motivated by both dislike of Whitbread and continuing sup­
port for the Peninsular War. On the other hand many M.P.'s favoured 
Whitbread. Grenville found that his opinions immobilized him in this 
matter because he despised Whitbread and yet opposed Canning's view of 
the war. He therefore supported the status quo: he wanted Petty to de­
lay his elevation (on the grounds of possible pregnancy in Lady 
Lansdowne), and he told his brother that he was 'far from sure that we 
shall not want Ponsonby in the H, of C. even if a new Govt, were formed.'2 
These were not the views of the party as a whole. Young men in the 
Commons refused to act under Ponsonby. For want of a better Foxite can- 
didate most of them favoured Whitbread. Holland also felt that the 
wholehearted support of either Canning or Whitbread was necessary. Ap­
parently, of the two i he leaned towards Canning, whose view of the 
Peninsular War and the Catholic question was similar to his own.
The prejudices of Lady Holland assumed importance at this point. 
Influenced by her burning hatred of Canning she pushed her husband to­
wards Whitbread. Her campaign stopped at nothing. Soon there were false
-*-The Morning Chronicle defended Canning's behaviour in the 
Walcheren fiasco throughout late September. Also see Grey to Holland,
5 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
2Grenville to T. Grenville, 27 Nov., 26 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 
41853 (T. Grenville).
^Lauderdale to Grey, 13 Oct. 1809 (Grey). T. Grenville to 
Grenville, '[!/*3nn. I# 10*} , H.M.C, Dropmore, X, 5.
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rumours circulating that Holland had met with Canning at St. Anne's Hill 
to discuss coalition, and loyal Foxites raised bitter objections.^ By 
early November Holland had seen the error of his ways. Creevey was 
astonished by the shift of opinion at Holland House. He reported to 
Whitbread:
Lord Grey & Mr. Whitbread are again precisely of the same opinion on 
every possible subject & of course the best friends possible, that 
this circumstance is to the greatest degree fortunate for that no 
government to be formed by Lords Grenville & Grey could have been 
carried in the House of Commons without the assistance of Mr. 
Whitbread, much less had he been opposed to it, that Lord Ponsonby 
is gone down to Southill to confirm this happy reunion & to feel 
how Mr. Whitbread is inclined on the Catholic question, that on 
Tuesday Mr. Tierney is to attend with the Duke of Bedford & Mr.
Giles with Lords Carrington & Essex & that the happiest political 
results are expected from these visits to Southill - don't laugh at 
all this, upon my life & soul every atom of it is true, that is 
such is the statement from Holland House, so I write to you to beg 
you will suit your deportment to your elevated situation
Creevey did not exaggerate. Whitbread entertained Bedford and several
Grenvillite peers on 8 November,-^ and on the 16th several of Whitbread's
admirers ate with Holland, Grenville, and Tierney at Derby's home.^
During December this activity increased. Holland planned a visit to
Southill; he encouraged the Grenvilles to conciliate Whitbread; and he
told Tom Grenville on 5 January that 'without Whitbread you will do
nothing for years in the Use of Commons.'5
The efforts of Holland and his wife disgusted the Grenville
■^ Ld. John Russell to Lady Holland, 19 Oct. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51678 (Holland). Lauderdale to Lady Holland, n.d. [Oct. 1809], B.M., 
Add. MSS. 51696 (Holland), ff. 113-16.
^Creevey to Whitbread, 8 Nov. 1809 (Whitbread), 373/15.
^Whitbread to Creevey, 8 Nov. 1809, Creevey Papers,
I, 99.
^Creevey Journal, entry of 16 Nov. 1809, ibid., 144.
5T. Grenville to Grenville, 27 Dec. 1809, H.M.C. Dropmore. IX, 
436-38. Holland to T. Grenville, 5 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41858 
(T. Grenville).
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brothers and frightened Grey, who had feared a Holland-Whitbread alli­
ance since October.'*' During December Tierney appraised Grey of Lady 
Holland's designs and when word broke that the Hollands would visit 
Southill he predicted sarcastically that 'a Treaty of Alliance will be 
signed and a grand scheme settled by which we are to be united and drive 
the world before us.' Grey and Tierney, however, were virtually alone 
among Foxites in opposing such a union. Lauderdale, like many others, 
was worried about the possibility of a coalition with Canning and he 
therefore encouraged Grey to visit Southill on his way to London.^ Many 
Grenvillites and Burkians also agreed with Holland. Young men like 
Milton, Althorp, the Edens, and Ebrington supported Whitbread; Essex ad­
mired the brewer; Carrington felt that he was the key to success in 
Parliament; and Auckland (probably influenced by his sons) told Grey 
bluntly that he would not hesitate to give Whitbread Cabinet off ice. **
This movement towards Foxite reconciliation became important at 
a time when Grey was beginning to show renewed interest in an attack on 
both the Walcheren expedition and British involvement in the Peninsula.
In mid-November he had felt that the public was not interested in these 
issues-* but the accounts of his military experts Rosslyn and W. Gordon
^Grey to Tierney, 10 Oct. 1809 (Tierney). Tierney to Grey, 26 
Oct. 1809 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 5, 9 Dec. 1809 (Grey). This visit was pre­
vented by a fever among Whitbread's servants. Whitbread to Lady Holland, 
13 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 (Holland).
'X Lauderdale to Grey, 26 Nov. 19 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
^Auckland to Grey, 26 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
•*Grey to Tierney, 17 Nov. 1809 (Tierney).
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raised his indignation by the end of the month.^ In early December he 
actually grew excited when Waithman and Combe pushed resolutions calling 
for enquiry into the failure at the Scheldt through London's Common 
Council. On the 9th he told Brougham that 'a motion for inquiry must be 
carried in the House of Commons, against the effects of which I think it 
will be very difficult to guard by the common expedients of delay, a 
multitude of documents and a garbled committee. ' * 2 This, of course, 
meant that Grey had to come to grips with the question of leadership in 
the lower house.
Encouraged by his friends, in late November he ended a long break 
in correspondence with Whitbread. The brewer's friendly reply delighted 
Grey. Immediately he asked Ponsonby if he would be willing to assume 
his old position as Irish Chancellor in the event of the coalition com­
ing to office. Concurrently he encouraged Tierney to placate both 
Whitbread and Ponsonby until his arrival in London. So as to dodge the 
controversial question of leadership in the Commons M.P.'s were summoned 
to Parliament by an anonymous circular letter. 2
Meanwhile in London the death of Lansdowne had stimulated new 
vigour in Holland. During the final two weeks of the year he worked to 
bridge the gap between Dropmore and Southill. In this effort he was 
guided almost exclusively by Fox's precedents of 1804 and 1805. He 
continued to contend that the Catholic question was the 'standard round
^At this time Grey received most of his pessimistic information 
about Portugal from Gordon. Rosslyn was considered as an authority on 
the Walcheren expedition. See the Grey Papers, boxes 19 (Gordon) and 
51 (Rosslyn). Also note the comments on this subject in Rosslyn to 
Brougham, 3 Jan. 1810 (Brougham).
2Grey to Brougham, 9 Dec. 1809 (Brougham).
•^ Grey to Holland, n.d. [Dec. 1809], B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 
(Holland), ff. 72-3. Grey to Tierney, 30 Nov. 1809 (Tierney), and 
Tierney to Grey, 9 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
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which we must rally the band'* and he stressed the similarities between 
the present foreign situation and that which had followed the battle of 
Austerlitz. He rose above his traditional blind support for the 
Spaniards, he accepted Grenville's emphasis on defensive warfare, and 
he told Whitbread on the 17th that he doubted 'that any peace will be 
or can be made & still less that Bonaparte would be at all disposed to 
conduct himself in a way that any government preserving the appearance 
of independence would be able to keep peace - but this is no reason for 
not trying. ' * 2 This small concession was all-important. The simple ex­
pression of a willingness to negotiate for peace in the Peninsula did 
much to facilitate cordial political relations with Whitbread.
Holland's efforts at compromise, however, secured only partial 
success. Whitbread was eager to cooperate with him and Grenville raised 
no objection when the two Foxites began deliberations on the subject of 
an amendment to the Address. But Holland soon found serious problems 
in his own backyard. Ponsonby had no intention of relinquishing the 
lead. He was sure that Walcheren and Talavera had formed a strong case 
against ministers; he was tired of compromises; and he was eager to 
assert himself on the opening day of Parliament.-* Consequently he re­
fused to give Grey a firm answer. This threw Grey into despair once 
again. He backed away from cooperation with Holland and Whitbread, a 
development which raised the ire of Lauderdale.^ Meanwhile it became 
obvious that Tierney was doing everything in his power to alienate both
^Holland to T. Grenville, 3 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. A1858 (T. 
Grenville).
2lle placed strong emphasis on Fox's precedent in the wake of 
Austerlitz in this letter. Holland to Whitbread, 17 Dec. 1809 
(Whitbread), 4208.
2Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam, n.d. [Nov. 1809], (Fitzwilliam/ 
Sheffield), 127/89.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 21 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
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Ponsonby and Whitbread in an attempt to claim the lead for himself.^
These problems were accompanied by serious disagreement on the 
issues of the day. Practically every member of the coalition was eager 
to attack the management of the Walcheren expedition, and opposition 
activity was beginning to centre at Rosslyn's London home, a virtual 
military headquarters complete with maps and indignant officers who 
posed as experts.2 The mode of attack, however, was a source of dis­
cord. Temple, Holland, Whitbread, and many young H.P.'s agreed with 
Tom Grenville that ’the old humdrum of candid enquiry' would 'serve for 
nothing but to give ministers time, & time will be strength.' They 
advocated a frontal assault, a direct motion of censure on opening day.
On the other hand Grenville and most of the older and more experienced 
politicians opposed a motion of censure and pointed out that such a 
course would 'lose some votes among the country-gentlemen & the Candids.'^ 
Then, too, controversy on the issue of the Peninsular War had been in­
creased by favourable reports from the lines of Torres Vedras. Bedford 
and Spencer had relatives in Wellington's army and both of them were ex­
periencing difficulty in containing their enthusiasm.^ Temple did not 
share Grenville's despondent view of Talavera,^ and Buckingham refused 
to sanction a parliamentary attack on his friend Wellington.^ In
^Whitbread had become furious with Tierney on this score as early 
as 13 November. Whitbread to Tierney, 13 Nov. 1809 (Tierney). Also 
note Lauderdale's sagacious analysis of this situation. Lauderdale to 
Grey, 22 Dec. 1809 (Grey). Also see Holland to T. Grenville, 3 Jan.
1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41858 (T. Grenville).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 31 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
-*T. Grenville to C.W.W. Wynn, 29 Dec. 1809 (Wynn).
^Bedford to Grey, 24 Aug. 1809 (Grey). Lady Lyttelton 
Correspondence, p. 71.
^Temple to Fremantle, 15 Aug, 1809 (Fremantle).
6Temple to T. Grenville, 24 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. 
Grenville).
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striking contrast the moderate Ponsonby labelled Talavera a defeat and 
was contemptuous towards Wellington's new title/ Creevey went further 
in his condemnation of Wellington and grew angry when Whitbread pro­
mised Holland that he would not attack the general/ Windham and 
Grenville clashed on the broader question of continental expeditions.
The former favoured the despatch of a larger army to Portugal while 
Grenville wanted to use Walcheren and Talavera as references in calling 
for the withdrawal of the army and the institution of marine warfare on 
the coasts. Disagreement on this head grew so violent that Sir John 
Hippisley wrote to Grey in alarm. * 3 Finally, Holland had been forced to 
abandon the controversial question of parliamentary reform in his plan 
for the session and even Horner was livid on this point/ 1
Notwithstanding these difficulties Holland managed to arrange a 
meeting at Ponsonby's house on 21 December. Apparently most of those 
present agreed fundamentally with the compromise amendment formulated 
by Holland and Whitbread. This amendment, which was to be moved by 
Lord Gower and seconded by Ward, included firm support for the Catholic 
claims and censure of both the Walcheren expedition and the management 
of the Peninsular War. Tierney, however, continued to resent Whitbread's 
role in the formulation of policy and he raised objections to both Gower 
and Ward. Consequently the meeting ended on a sour note. Tierney re­
fused to speak to Whitbread, and Creevey spread word that the proposed 
motion was not strong enough and that the Mountain would sponsor one of
•^ •Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam, n.d. [Nov. 1809], (Fitzwilliam/ 
Sheffield), 127/89.
^Creevey to Whitbread, 3 Jan. 1810 (Whitbread), 375.
3llipplsley to Grey, 7 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Horner to Allen, 28 Dec. [1809], Horner Memoirs, II,
16-17. Allen to Horner, 4 Jan. 1810 (HornerTT
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its own. Ward promptly refused to second the proposed motion without 
Whitbread's approval. C.W.W. Wynn, who agreed with Creevey that 
Wellington should be attacked, predicted an 'open rupture between the 
two parties in opposition.' Most significantly, Wynn did not refer to 
Grenvillites and Foxites but instead to those who supported Whitbread 
and those who did not. 'There never was such a set of fools as those 
we are connected with in the House of Commons, & I am seriously sick of 
the whole concern', wrote Lauderdale,
Dissension in the party led Holland to take yet another step to­
wards Whitbread. The two met at Amthill during the last week of 
December and devised a second amendment. On the 31st they presented a 
united front in calling for a motion which would pledge the House to en­
quiry into Walcheren, advocate punishment for the guilty parties, stress 
the need for retrenchment and economical reform, and champion the 
Catholic cause. Apparently they were prepared to dodge the question of 
the Peninsular War altogether so as to assure party harmony. Holland 
felt that both Grey and Grenville would accept this amendment, and both 
he and Whitbread saw it as a compromise between the aristocratic and 
popular wings of the coalition.^
The question of leadership in the Commons remained unclear. On 
1 January 18L0 Grey arrived a.t Southill and found his host ready to cooperate 
on every public issue.^ But Whitbread demanded de jure leadership as 
the price of his cooperation.^ After a two-day visit Grey travelled up *I,
1 C.W.W. Wynn to T. Grenville, 23 Dec. 1809, B.M., Add. MSS. 41857 
(T. Grenville). Lauderdale to Grey, 22, 23 Dec. 1809 (Grey).
^Whitbread to Tierney, 31 Dec. 1809 (Tierney).
-^ Grey to Lady Grey, 2 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Whitbread to Creevey, 7 Jan. 1810, -Creevev Papers,
I, 117-18.
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to London impressed by the brewer's cordiality, and the idea of an op­
position cabinet was revived in discussions at Holland House. According 
to Whishaw the objective of Foxite leaders was to conciliate Whitbread 
and 'leave Ponsonby the nominal leader without any substantial power.'^
At this point the Foxites were close to unity. Holland had 
managed to throw himself between Grey and Whitbread, and Grey was so 
excited about the strength of the case against ministers that on the 6th 
he told Fitzwilliam that with a good attendance 'we shall beat them at 
once.'^ Ponsonby soon brought things back to earth. Tom Grenville re­
ported on the 10th that 'Snouch' had 'suddenly sprung up in Arlington 
Street, with his sceptre in his hands, which he is ready to lay across 
the shoulders of any man who shall withhold all due allegiance.'^  
Ponsonby's unexpected refusal to share the lead in the Commons alarmed 
Foxite leaders. Embarrassed at the prospect of alienating his wife's 
uncle,Grey refused to promote Whitbread at the expense of Ponsonby. On 
the 1 1 th he abandoned the idea of a comprehensive amendment to the ad­
dress, agreed with Bedford and Holland that Grenville and Whitbread 
should move the Catholic petition simultaneously in the two houses of 
Parliament, and told the brewer that both he and Grenville would be 
'comparably injured if it is not done This appeal to a principle
upon which Foxites 'must of necessity agree' was no more than an attempt 
to force Whitbread to cooperate. On the following day, however, it be­
came clear that even the Catholic question was a source of discord.
^Whishaw to Lady Holland, 10 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51658 
(Holland).
^Grey to Fitzwilliam, 6 Jan. 1810 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
3T. Grenville to Buckingham, 10 Jan. 1810, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 417-18.
^Grey to Whitbread, 11 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
305
The behaviour of the democratic party in Ireland had embarrassed 
the coalition's leaders during the autumn. This, combined with 
Grenville's election to the chancellorship of Oxford University, had 
given rise to new considerations. During the campaign Grenville had 
tried to stifle his opponents' propaganda with assurances that his view 
of the Catholic claims did not endanger the security of the English 
Church.^ Such prudence, of course, had alarmed Foxites,~ and in early 
January Whitbread had told Grey that Grenville's success at Oxford would 
be seen as proof of the party's great change of opinion on Catholic 
emancipation.^ These fears were justified on 12 January when Grenville 
(who hitherto had had little to say on the question of tactics for the 
approaching session) suddenly told Grey that opposition could be suc­
cessful only if the party could be held to the questions of Walcheren 
and the Peninsular War/* Grenville's attitude towards the Irish Catholics 
was cool and he resented the fact that the uncooperative Irish had taken 
his support for granted. Moreover, he was being pressed by his friends 
to make his opinions on the issue public and he had already begun work 
on a pamphlet - A Letter to lord Fingal - in which he would decline to 
make any exertion in Parliament on behalf of the Irish Catholics until 
they should conform to his views as to what safeguards were necessary 
for the protection of the Establishment.J On the question of leadership 
in the Commons Grenville stood by Ponsonby.
This stance and Ponsonby's refusal to cooperate completely
^Roberts, pp. 67-8.
^S. Smith to Lady Holland, 8 Dec. 1809, Lady Holland, Sydney 
Smith, II, 65-6. Holland, Further Memoirs, p. 41.
^Grey to Whitbread, 12 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Grenville to Grey, n.d. [12 Jan. 1810], (Grey).
^Roberts, pp. 70-1.
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undermined Holland's campaign for Foxite unity, and soon the party was 
faced with another crisis. Petty (now Lord Lansdowne) agreed with 
Grenville on both the Catholic petition and the retention of Ponsonby 
but he was eager to include the question of India in an amendment to the 
Address. On the other hand Holland, Bedford, Spencer, and Fitzwilliam 
thought that an abandonment of the Catholics would be fatal to the coali­
tion.^ " The party in the Commons was equally divided. A majority of 
M.P.'s desired to support the Catholic petition (pointing to the fact 
that such support was a great part of what had been represented as the 
coalition's wartime strategy) but Abercromby and several others threat­
ened to desert if it were moved.2 Horner complained of 'temporising 
and balanced views'"3 and Windham backed away from an attack on the 
government. 'The great danger of the time,' he noted, 'great as the 
external dangers are, appears to me to proceed from within, & from 
causes that admit of no control, at least of none that we appear capable 
of applying, were we in office tomorrow.Obviously Tom Grenville 
agreed; on the 16th he applied for the Chiltern Hundreds."3
Seeing that Grenville had no intention of altering his views Grey 
revised his tactics accordingly. On the 11th he had lectured Whitbread 
on the importance of consistency on the Catholic question; at a meeting
•^Lansdowne to T. Grenville, 4 Jan., and Fitzwilliam to T.
Grenville, 14 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add, MSS. 41858 (T. Grenville). Spencer 
to T. Grenville, 11 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. Grenville). T. 
Grenville to Fitzwilliam, 12 Jan. 1810 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield). Grey to 
Lady Grey, 8 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Holland to Horner, 9 Jan. 1810 (Horner).
^Horner to Holland, 15 Jan. 1810 (Horner).
^Windham to T. Grenville, 4 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. 
Grenville).
5T. Grenville to Perceval, 16 Jan. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41858 
(T. Grenville).
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at Holland House on the 12th he wanted to drop the question from the 
proposed amendment. On the morning of the 12th Elliot told Fitzwilliam 
that Ponsonby would step down as leader in the Commons; on the 13th Grey 
confused the old Burkian by contradicting this report and asking for the 
support of Milton in reconciling the party’s young men to the retention 
of Ponsonby.^ Suddenly all emphasis was placed on a parliamentary cru­
sade against the management of the war; as Grenville pointed out, debate 
on other subjects would detract from the leading issues of the day. * 2 On 
the 15th Grey displayed alarming tactlessness in laying these views be­
fore Whitbread, explaining that the party was practically unanimous in 
favour of Ponsonby and that he had decided against the comprehensive 
amendment to the Address on opening day.
Whitbread must have been perplexed. Prior to this time he had 
resisted the radicalism of his admirers^ in favour of compromise with 
the leaders of the coalition. Now, however, he heard nothing from 
Holland; he saw in Grey and Grenville no sign of a willingness to com­
promise on the issue of economical reform; he suspected a complete 
abandonment of the Catholic question; and he knew that the party was not 
unanimous in desiring Ponsonby to retain the lead. Grenville's emphasis 
on a parliamentary attack exclusively on the wartime policies of minis­
ters was clearly an attempt to sweep party differences under the carpet 
until the government could be brought down. This approach was not novel 
to older Whigs but Whitbread's reputation in the country was based on
^Elliot to Fitzwilliam, 12 Jan., and Grey to Fitzwilliam, 13 
Jan. 1810 (Fitzwilliam/Sheffield).
2Grenville to Grey, n.d. [12 Jan. 1810], (Grey).
•^ Grey to Whitbread, 15 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Creevey to Whitbread, 3 Jan. 1810 (Whitbread), 375.
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considerably more than Grey and Grenville were willing to discuss. Not 
surprisingly he grew angry when Grey sent him an amendment to the 
Address which was based solely on censure of the Walcheren expedition 
and the management of the Peninsular War. 'in my opinion it does not 
contain half enough', he wrote angrily on the 16th. As for Ponsonby, 
Whitbread showed nothing but disgust. 'If Hr. Ponsonby can take the 
lead Nobody can prevent it. Neither can any body confer it upon him.'^
But still Whitbread was willing to compromise for the sake of 
party unity. On the 17th, when Grenville sent him a second amendment 
and requested his presence at Camelford House, the brewer departed for 
London immediately.  ^ On the 18th Grenville reported to Grey that 
Whitbread was 'extremely conciliatory & amiable jUn manner nor was there 
in substance anything that passed between us that marked strong dif­
ference of opinion.' Grenville obviously succeeded in convincing 
Whitbread that his stance on the Catholic question was tactical and not 
strategic. However, Whitbread was reluctant to compromise his views on 
economical reform and he refused not only to act under Ponsonby In the 
House but to attend a meeting which had been scheduled for the 22nd at 
Ponsonby's home.^
After talking with Grenville, however, Whitbread had second 
thoughts and discussed the question with his friends. Brand, who had 
never cooperated with Grey and Grenville, advised him to 'avoid anti­
cipating that which their conduct will ... ultimately force you to^viz. 
an avowed political separation', and he saw no harm in trying to in­
fluence the councils of the mainline party.^ On the other hand Creevey
^Whitbread to Grey, 16 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Grenville to Whitbread, 17 Jan. 1810 (Whitbread), 2499.
■^Grenville to Grey, 18 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Brand to Whitbread, [20] Jan. 1810 (Whitbread), 2500.
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desired a formal separation. It appears that Whitbread was indecisive 
at this point. His vanity had been injured greatly and he felt that 
his public reputation hinged on continued support for economical reform. 
However, his contempt for the government and his desire to attack its 
wartime policies were strong. Then, too, he probably saw wisdom in 
Grenville's contention that an amendment which included support for re­
form and the Catholic claims would weaken an otherwise firm case against 
ministers. Moreover, later developments suggest that Grenville had 
expressed a willingness to open negotiations for peace in the event 
that the coalition came to power. On the 20th, after two days of deli­
beration, Whitbread accepted Grenville's amendment. While refusing to 
attend Ponsonby's meeting himself,he encouraged his supporters to do 
so.*
Delighted by Whitbread's acquiescence, on the 21st the party 
hierarchy began efforts to rally support for an attack on the wartime 
policies of the government. In this they faced an important decision. 
Grenville and many of the more experienced politicians continued to feel 
that a motion for enquiry into the management of the war would best at­
tract independent voters. This opinion was confirmed when Sidmouth (to 
whom Grenville had sent a copy of the proposed amendment) Informed 
Grenville that he would support enquiry but vote against any measure 
which tended to prejudge the question of Walcheren.^ Then, too, the 
Peninsular War was so controversial that censure on this head would pro­
bably detract from the stronger case against the Walcheren expedition. 
Apparently, however, a great majority of Grenvillites and Foxites in the
*Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 20 Jan. 1810, Creevey 
Papers, I, 121.
2 Sidmouth Life, III, 20.
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Commons were eager for a direct motion of censure aimed at both theatres.
Against his better judgement Grenville gave way to this cry and Foxite
leaders set out to sell their product. At Brooks's Grey and Lansdowne
flashed smiles, slapped backs, cornered an incredulous Creevey, and
railed against the government's management of the war.^ On the 22nd
eighty M.P.'s, including most of Whitbread's friends, met at Ponsonby's.
Though the absence of Whitbread, Sheridan, and Brand disturbed at least
oone young politician a mood of confidence and harmony prevailed.
Parliament convened on the following day. In the Commons 
Castlereagh opened the debate with spirit but, according to Creevey,
'When he came to his expedition, he fell a hundred fathoms lower than 
the bogs of Walcheren.' Canning was also poorly received and the op­
position benches came to life when Whitbread delivered a stinging de­
nunciation of the government. In the Lords Grey concentrated on the 
Peninsula and was stout in calling on Lord Wellesley to justify his 
brother's ■’’victory' at Talavera. Nevertheless the divisions in both 
houses were disappointing. The government's majority in the Commons 
was a surprising 96 while Grenville, with the coalition fully mobilized, 
secured only 92 votes in the Lords. As Creevey observed, the opposition 
did not attract 'floating' votes. The reasons for this failure were 
obvious. The amendments which had been put forward had reprobated the
^Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 21 Jan. 1810. Creevey Papers, I,
121- 22.
2Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 22 Jan. 1810, ibid. , 122. W. Lamb to 
Lady C. Lamb, 23 Jan. 1810, Lady Bessborough And Her Family Circle,
pp. 201-02.
3Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 23 Jan. 1810, Creevey Papers, I,
122-23. According to Abbot the opposition had expected to divide 
200. Abbot Diary, II, 225, 230.
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Walcheren expedition and described the exploits of Wellington at Oporto 
and Talavera as 'marked only by a repetition of former errors'. A ma­
jority of M.P.'s had not agreed with these views. Sidmouth's entire 
party had voted with the government. Sidmouth told his brother that 
'had the amendment been worded with judgement and fairness, Opposition 
would have divided more than 100, instead of 92, in the House of Lords, 
and government would not have had even a majority of 50 in the House of 
Commons.'^
The loss of momentum occasioned by this setback on opening day 
was followed by a brilliant offensive on the part of ministers. Ob­
viously playing on the patriotism of the House, on 25 January Perceval 
gave notice of a vote of thanks to Wellington for his victory at 
Talavera. Opposition leaders saw immediately that this issue would 
split their ranks so they countered with a motion which experience had 
shown to be their strongest card. On the 26th they ignored the 
Peninsular War and moved for a committee of enquiry on the Walcheren ex­
pedition. This manoeuvre brought victory by a vote of 195 to 186 when 
Castlereagh and four of his supporters, anxious for the truth to be 
known, dramatically walked into the opposition lobby.”
Such an unexpected victory had a great effect on the sinking 
morale of the opposition. Fremantle reported that the division had 
united the coalition, and Grey told his wife that the young men who had 
been disillusioned and uncooperative were now ready to work with party
^Sidmouth Life, III, 20-1. For a good outline of opposition 
arguments see Abbot Diary, II, 230.
2Parl. Deb., XV, 161-210. Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 26 Jan. 1810, 
Creevey Papers,I, 124.
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leaders.'*' Of paramount importance in this development had been the 
stunning performance of Ponsonby. According to Lady Holland his extra­
ordinarily sharp and sarcastic speech of 26 January 'produced a consider-
12able effect and reconciled those who had snouched most at him.'
Party unity, however, was based solely on the question of 
Walclieren. The coalition was by no means united in opinion on the sub­
ject of the Peninsular War, and the proposed vote of thanks to Wellington 
caused utter confusion on the 28th. As a concession to the left wing of 
the party the coalition's leaders had agreed to strong censure of 
Wellington and his campaign in the amendment of 23 January. Ward had 
defied ministers 'to produce the name of a single officer of rank or 
character in the service who had advised the second campaign to Spain.' 
Other speakers had censured Wellington's operations, saying that in so 
doing they condemned ministers who, 'having awarded him with a Peerage, 
must stand or fall with him.' Moreover, they had asserted that his suc­
cesses 'resembled defeats' since they had been followed by retreats.^
This strong language had not been popular in the House and several key 
members of the opposition had disapproved of it. Holland and Fitzwilliam 
had remained quiet on the subject while Buckingham and Temple had ob­
jected strongly to personal attacks on Wellington. On the 28th, there­
fore, when Ponsonby sent around notes calling for a division on the vote 
of thanks Grenville instructed him to recall them. This raised the ire 
of Whitbread's set. On the 29th Creevey noted that 'Rank mutiny has 
broken out, and it is now said we are certainly to divide. Milton,
^•Fremantle to Buckingham, 29 Jan. 1810, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 420-21. Grey to Lady Grey, 26 Jan. 1810 (Grey). Also see 
Grenville to Grey, 29 Jan. 1810 (Grey).
^Ladv Holland Journal, II, 253-54.
^Abbot Diary, II, 230.
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Fol^tone, Lord J. Townshend, George Ponsonby, junr. - in short all the 
Insurgents.' Creevey and Milton went so far as to draw up an amendment 
and, in spite of Temple's threats, the Mountain decided to bring the 
question to a division.-^ Whitbread alone prevented an embarrassing 
scene. After discussing the matter with Grey and Grenville (and pro­
bably gaining concessions on economical reform) he set out to moderate
9the views of his friends and succeeded in preventing a division. 'All 
our indignation against Wellington ended up in smoak fsic]1, reported a 
disgusted Creevey. 'Opposition to his thanks was so unpopular, that 
some of the stoutest of our crew slunk away; or rather, they were dis­
persed by the indefatigable . intrigues of the Wellesleys and the tricks 
of Tierney ... In short he and our more ostensible leaders cut the 
ground from under our feet in deference to Lord Grenville.'
This crisis did not slow the opposition's momentum. Perceval was 
experiencing enormous difficulty in luring his supporters to the House 
and on 31 January he suffered three successive defeats in the selection 
of a committee to study offices in reversion/* On 3 February the 
Walcheren enquiry began. Porchester took the floor as the coalition's 
prosecutor, and his examination of witnesses during February was accom­
panied by events which stirred optimism. On the 16th the government 
carried a division on the appointment of a committee to consider a pen­
sion for Wellington by the breathlessly close vote of 213 to 206.“* Four *35
•^Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 29, 30 Jan. 1810, Creevey 
Papers, I, 125, 125-26.
^Fremantle to Buckingham, 29 Jan. 1810, Buckingham, Court and 
Cabinets, IV, 420-21.
3Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 1 Feb. 1810, Creevey 
Papers, I, 127.
^Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 31 Jan. 1810, ibid., 126.
Abbot Diary, II, 231.
5Parl. Deb. , XV, 467. Abbot Diary, II, 234.
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days later the opposition's morale reached a peak when Whitbread carried 
a motion for Chatham's narrative of the Walcheren expedition by 177 to 
171. It had been established that the commander had secretly submitted 
such a narrative to the king and that it had been returned to him for 
revision. Whitbread contended that such behaviour was unconstitutional, 
and his success made a great impression on the party.'*' Creevey was pro­
bably right when he observed that 'people did not consider the fatal 
blow it gave to the King, but they voted as against the rascality of 
Chatham and in favour of Strachan.' Whatever the motive, however, the 
victory brought wild rejoicing. St. James's Street and Pall Mall became 
the scenes of triumphal parades1 2 3and on 5 March Whitbread reopened the 
question by moving two resolutions, one declaring facts, the other cen­
suring Chatham's conduct. He carried the first resolution by a majority 
of 33, the second without a division after Canning had softened its lan­
guage.3
These successes gave rise to almost unbounded optimism. Grenville, 
who had been amazed by the strength of the case which had developed, felt 
that the division of 5 March 'put totally out of the question all idea of 
the continuance of the Government',^ and only the reluctance of Porchester 
discouraged him from initiating impeachment proceedings.3 As the final 
trial of strength in the Commons neared, however, opposition leaders be­
came daily more aware of a perplexing problem: their difficulties in
1Parl. Deb., XV, 587.
2Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 23, 24 Feb. 1810, Creevey 
Papers, I, 131-32.
3Parl. Deb., XVI, 7*. Abbot Diary, II, 238.
^Grenville to Auckland, 17 Feb., 6 Mar. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS.
34458 (Auckland).
^Grenville to Grey, 7 Mar. 1810 (Grey).
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forming an alternative government.
Windham had pointed to this dilemma as early as 4 January and 
party dissension on the vote of thanks to Wellington had made Holland 
conclude that the formation of a Whig government was both impossible 
and undesirable.^ The coalition was bound together most precariously by 
opposition to an unsuccessful military expedition. Party leaders had 
taken care to restrict the issue of Walcheren to one of - manage­
ment primarily because they could not hope for unity if they broached the 
broader question of wartime strategy. Both Grenville and Lansdowne had 
continued to advocate a ’defensive, husbanding system', a neat argument 
against continental expeditions which stopped short of direct censure of 
Wellington and his operations.* 2 Beneath them, however, party polariza­
tion on the issue of the Peninsular Vfarhad worsened daily. Whitbread 
had joined with Grenville and Lansdowne in reprobating continental ex­
peditions but his insistence on the necessity of concluding peace had 
set him aside from other party leaders.3 Then, too, many M.P.'s had con­
demned the Peninsular War on the basis of Moore's contention that Portugal 
was indefensihle,^ and the Foxite Left in the Commons had attacked 
Wellington so viciously that the Speaker had been appalled.3 Creevey and 
Waithman had drawn up a petition against Wellington's annuity which the 
latter had managed to carry in the Common Council, and which had been
^Holland to Caroline Fox, 30 Jan. 1810, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51739 
(Holland).
2Parl. Deb.. XV, 514, 532 (21 Feb. 1810).
3Ibid. , 84 (23 Jan. 1810).
^Note the comments of Roberts, pp. 141-42.
3Abbot Diary, II, 231.
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received by the House of Commons.* This activity had opened gaping 
holes in the ranks of the opposition. Ministeralists had put forward an 
accusation of unpatriotic behaviour against their antagonists, and the 
right wing of the coalition had stood by Wellington and his campaign 
stoutly as a result. Windham had gone so far as to compare Talavera to 
Crecy; pressure from Stowe had caused Grenville to swallow his opinions 
and voice a more modest tribute; Fremantle, who wanted to attack 
Wellington, had decided that his seat in Parliament was more important 
to the nation than criticism of the general.2 Temple and Buckingham 
were prepared to sanction a parliamentary attack on the meagre logisti­
cal support given to Wellington but they disapproved strongly of opposi­
tion to the war itself.'* Moreover, Sidmouth refused to cooperate with 
the opposition so long as an attack on the Peninsular War were bound to 
the question of Walcheren.^
All this had been accompanied by continuing divergence on the 
issues of economical reform and Catholic emancipation. Whitbread had 
refused to forget the former and party disharmony on the latter had been 
stimulated in late January by the publication of Grenville's A Letter to 
Lord Fingal.5 Steps had been taken to compromise on these issues. The 
party hierarchy had not resisted the Mountain's motion of 31 January
*Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 22 Feb. 1810, Creevey 
Papers, I, 130-31,
2B. Tarleton, Substance of a Speech intended for the Vote of 
Credit Bill for 1810 (London, 1810), pp. 15-16. W. H. Fremantle,
'Sketch of a Speech on the the Thanks to Sir Arthur Wellesley - very 
different from what I said-', (Fremantle), box 51.
^Buckingham to Grenville, 15 Feb. [1810], H.M.C. Dropmore. X,
11- 12.
^Sidmouth to Grenville, 18 Feb. 1810, ibid. , 12. Also see 
Sidmouth Life, III, 22-3.
-*Grey to Lady Grey, 3, 5 Feb. 1810 (Grey).
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against offices in reversion and Windham had presented the moderate pe­
tition of the English Catholics in late February.-*- But these measures 
had done little to relax tensions. Bitter animosity existed among 
Foxites in the House of Commons. Tierney would not speak to Whitbread; 
past differences between Grey and the brewer had left ugly scars; and 
the Walcheren enquiry had only delayed discussion on the dangerous ques­
tion of leadership in the lower house. These factors rendered a united 
stance on even the Walcheren expedition difficult: opposition leaders 
were experiencing great difficulty in agreeing on the mode of proceed­
ing in Parliament.2 ' I can hardly bring myself to wish for the success
of our labours', noted Grenville on 8 March.^
On the 24th, only two days before the conclusion of the Walcheren 
enquiry, Grenville received a 'reliable' report that he would be asked 
to form a government within a week.^ This intelligence filled him with 
uneasiness but on the morning of the 26th he met with his old friend 
Auckland and laid out a scheme which he thought capable of uniting the 
coalition. Grenville agreed with Holland that the formation of a govern­
ment would be impossible without the support of Whitbread. To gain this 
support, he concluded, a 'plain, simple, and very short proposition to 
Napoleon for peace' was necessary. Auckland supported this idea and 
felt that upon coming to office it should be announced distinctly in 
both houses of Parliament and justified by the expense of further war
•^Parl. Deb.. XV, 262. Grey, Life and Opinion^, p. 238.
^Auckland to Grenville, 5 Mar., and T. Grenville to Grenville,
[17 Mar. 1810], H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 17-18, 20-1.
^Grenville to Auckland, 8 Mar. [1810], B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 
(Auckland), ff. 51-2.
^Grenville to Auckland, 24 Mar. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 
(Auckland).
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and the hopelessness of continental alliances. If peace were obtainable 
it would be accompanied by fundamental changes in the British system of 
finance. These plans were moulded by three facts. Firstly, Grenville 
felt sincerely that the Peninsular War was hopeless. Undoubtedly he also 
felt that a negotiated settlement with France was less dishonourable 
than either defeat or a sudden withdrawal of troops. Secondly, experi­
ence had shown that united Foxite support was impossible unless party 
leaders were willing to endorse the principle of peace with Napoleon. 
Thirdly, the desire for office was strong. It is significant that 
Grenville concluded that such a stand on the war would be impossible 
if the few remaining Burkians were admitted to the proposed Cabinet. 
Fundamental in his plan was the retirement of Windham, who had shown on 
numerous occasions that he could not adapt his foreign views to the de­
mands of party unity.^ Grenville expected victory, and the foreign pol­
icy which he visualized for his new government was identical to that 
which he and Fox had embraced in 1806.
On the afternoon of 26 March Porchester rose before a packed 
House. His speech laid the failure of the expedition squarely at the 
feet of ministers who, he contended, had sent their servants on an im­
possible task. He showed that it was faulty and tardy planning instead 
of sluggish execution that had assured failure; he quoted the unfavour­
able opinions of five military experts consulted by the Cabinet; and he 
demonstrated that the campaign had lacked both rhyme and reason. He 
also pointed to the disgraceful lack of medical preparation and to the 
fatal delay in evacuating the Island of Walcheren. lie then moved two 
sets of resolutions - fifteen in all - each of which was of a declaratory
^Apparently Grenville did not discuss this arrangement with anyone
but Auckland. Auckland to Grenville, 26 Mar. 1810, II.M.C. Dropmore,
X, 23-4.
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nature except the last, which censured ministers. His speech was a 
complete expose of the factors which had caused the disaster, and when 
he took his seat it was clear that the opposition had almost everything 
in their favour: an enthusiastic party, strong allies in Parliament, 
even stronger support outside of it.1 Moreover, on the main question 
of culpability Porchester had laid out an impregnable case. Not 
Strachan, not Chatham, but the men who had planned and despatched the 
expedition alone were to blame. During the next four days, however, 
opposition leaders looked on helplessly as their hopes evaporated.
When the crucial divisions were taken on 30 March they were beaten by 
majorities ranging from 51 to 23.2
The factors behind this extraordinary development require exami­
nation. Opposition to the wartime policies of government (even when 
those policies are poor ones) is always difficult, and by the spring of 
1810 the nation probably looked on the opposition as a whole as Lady 
Bessborough looked on the editorials of Perry. The Morning Chronicle, 
she noted, 'too dull to be read at other times, expands at the prospect 
of any disaster; give but the hope of failure in an expedition or any 
army being lost, and it sparkles with wit from one end to the other
Even if this assessment were unfair it must be admitted that the 
opposition's tactics during the Walcheren enquiry had done little to in­
spire confidence. Frontbenchers had been unable to hold the party be­
hind manageable, clearly-defined objectives. Catholic petitions and mo­
tions for economical reform had probably disgusted many of those who
^Parl. Deb., XVI, 79. Also see Roberts, pp. 145-46.
2Parl. Deb., XVI, 421-22.
^Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, [Sept.?], 1809,
Granville Correspondence, II, 347.
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wished to censure the management of the expedition. Moreover, the con­
troversial question of the Peninsular War had surfaced in practically 
every debate, and undoubtedly many M.F.'s had identified censure of the 
Walcheren expedition with an attack on the more popular operations of 
Wellington. This had been assured by the game of party generals played 
by most opposition spokesmen. The ability to dodge commitment on con­
troversial issues - the goal of every opposition - was therefore lack­
ing from beginning to end.
There was also ample reason to charge the opposition with a lack 
of patriotic spirit. The language of the Independent Whig probably 
mortified more than a few M.P.'s, and the imprudent personal attacks on 
the popular Wellington which Creevey and Ward in the Commons and 
Waithman in the Common Council had been unable to resist had raised a 
cry of treason. Whithread, whose moderation was admirable, had been 
compared to Hanno attacking Hannibal in one pamphlet'*' and the entire 
party had been accused of harbouring treasonable designs by another 
writer.^ This charge had been given additional credibility by the be­
haviour of the Foxite Left during February and March on the question of 
John Gale Jones's commitment to Newgate for contempt. On 24 March, only 
two days before Porchester's resolutions, Burdett had attacked the gov­
ernment on the question of parliamentary privilege in a letter to the 
Political Register. Many Foxites had agreed with his controversial argu­
ments and this issue had hung over the divisions of the 30th.3 *2
-^-'BRITANNICUS', Letter to Samuel Whitbread, upon the military 
conduct of Lord Wellington (London, 1810).
2The Patriots and the Whigs, the Most Dangerous Enemies of the 
State (London, 1810).
The Morning Chronicle, 28 Mar. and 5 April1810, accused ministers 
of using this issue to hinder the enquiry. For an account of these 
events see Roberts, p. 265.
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On the other hand Ward felt that the opposition had not proved 
its case, and Holland, pointing to mismanagement, agreed.'*' hut Holland 
was wrong in placing the blame on leaders in the Commons. Neither 
Porchester's poor oratory nor Ponsonbv's absurdity nor Brougham's schem­
ing had seriously handicapped the cause. The problem had come with the 
fact that the ground upon which the Walcheren expedition was being at­
tacked had not been made clear prior to the time of Porchester's reso­
lutions. The resignation of both Castlereagh and Canning before the 
opening of the enquiry had placed opposition leaders in the unenviable
position of attacking ministers who had played only small roles in the 
odisaster. Indeed the opposition would not have carried the vote for 
enquiry in the first place without the support of Castlereagh, the 
guiltiest of the guilty. Whitbread's successful motion for Chatham's 
narrative in late February had aided government indirectly by making the 
commander a target for abuse. Foxites had enjoyed discomforting Pitt's 
brother, and Canning and Castlereagh had joined this cry as a means of 
covering themselves. Perry had stressed the facility and certainty with 
which Antwerp might have been taken under a more capable commander.
This, as Brougham had pointed out, was an argument which both lightened
the charges against ministers and confused the members of the coalition.i ' h i • v -  1 nc;>tu i s r I t : c . K .-di8?«r* c a r r ie d  the day on mr:- tlm r t h e i r
'The attacks of the M. Chronicle are really not indifferent', Brougham
had written in early March. 'I find they induce a general belief among
our friends of the party, especially in the country, that that is the
line to be pursued - & accordingly they make up their mind & commit
themselves.'
II 'j. y *'■ (.  ^y  / H. i ■. J . t  »Q"?
^Ward to Helen Stewart, [31 Mar. 1810], Letters to 'Ivy', 
pp. 95-100. Holland, Further Memoirs, p. 47.
2Horner to Murray, 4 Dec. 1809 (Horner).
^Brougham to Allen, Mar. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
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It was probably significant that the ministerial press had run 
circles around the few newspapers which were identified with the opposi­
tion. Anchored by the Courier and the Morning Post »Perceval's govern­
ment had fairly good journalistic machinery behind it. On the other 
hand opposition leaders had little influence with newspapers indeed. Of 
the prints who opposed the government on the question of Walcheren the 
Political Register, the Examiner, and the Independent Whig also opposed 
Grey and Grenville; the Globe and the Statesman were timid; and the 
Morning Chronicle, which had been Fox's mouthpiece, was now the mouth­
piece of Perry and Perry alone.
Somehow overconfidence had emerged from all this and very little
had been done to attract 'floating' votes. Whitbread and Tom Grenville
had been insistent that the resolutions should not be 'pared down to
try to catch votes',*  and party leaders had Ignored Sidmouth's feelings 
oaltogether. But in the final analysis Horner probably summed up the 
primary reason for failure:
In the late vote on the Walcheren question, there were many members, 
I doubt not, who voted with ministers, though they condemned the 
whole of their conduct in that fatal expedition, yet from a sincere 
conviction of the superior fitness & excellence of the present set 
of ministers for holding the government in the present circum­
stances above any other set of public men.3
This was incontestible. Ministers had carried the day on neither their
public record nor their personal popularity but because they represented
*Whitbread to Creevey, 7 Jan. 1810, Creevey Papers, I, 117-18.
T. Grenville to Grenville, [17 Mar. 1810], H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 20-1.
^Auckland to Grenville, 25 Feb. and n.d. [24 Mar. 1810], H.M.C. 
Dropmore, X, 14, 22-3. Buckinghamshire to Auckland, 29 Feb. [1810],
B.M., Add. MSS. 34457 (Auckland), ff. 396-97.
*Horner, 'Note of April 3, 1810', Horner Memoirs, II, 36-8.
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the lesser of two evils. All the bickering, all the compromises, and 
all the vague generalities on the question of the war which had charac­
terized the opposition's activities had not gone unnoticed by the inde­
pendent members of the House. Ward tried to push the blame on the un-
Grenvillites had the confidence of a majority of M.P.'s. Their views 
on the leading issue of the day were unpopular and, as the Independent 
Whig once pointed out, the work sheet of the Ministry of All the Talents 
was the greatest ally of Pittite ministries, ^ 'I am sorry that 1 must
continue to vote in hostility to you,' an unidentified peer had written 
to Auckland on 19 January, 'but I think it a sacred duty to protect our 
venerable monarch against a combination of men who would avail them­
selves of public misfortunes not justly attributable to his present
The defeat of March 1810 produced overwhelming disappointment. 
Some saw it as the nadir of the party. Others were inclined to re­
assess their views. The vast majority of Foxites, however, considered 
their defeat as disgraceful to the House of Commons. Even before the 
question had been decided the Edinburgh Review had judged that a govern­
ment victory would tarnish the reputation of Parliament.^ Of course the 
extreme reformers had embraced this view. After the division, when the 
arrest of Burdett led to violence in the streets, many moderates agreed 
with Holland that the defeat of the opposition 'was the strongest
^Ward to Helen Stewart, [31 Mar. 1810], Letters 
to 'Ivy', pp. 95-100.
^Independent Whig, 17 Sept. 1809.
■^Auckland to Grenville, [19 Jan. 1810], H.H.C. Dropmore, X, 5-6.
^Roberts, p. 147.
popular Grenvilles but he was deluding himself.'' Neither Foxites nor
bind him in chains.
practical argument ever furnished for a reform of Parliament; for the 
House of Commons ... spoke neither the sense of the people whom it re­
presented, nor even of the individuals who composed its body.'^ This 
shallow assessment, which helped produce the surprisingly popular reform 
bill of May, reopened deep wounds in the party because the cry for re­
form brought the entire structure of not only government but opposition 
into question. The Independent Whig and the Examiner had long contended 
that the aristocratic character of the Foxite-Grenvillite coalition re­
sisted the demands of the nation but now the more reputable and widely- 
read Edinburgh Review encouraged opposition leaders to join with mode- 
rate reformers against the Court. As in the previous year Whitbread 
acted on this advice, and his activity in the City was so strenuous that 
the Grenvilles became alarmed.  ^ Apparently Auckland was the only friend 
of Grey and Grenville who had learned from experience. He stressed the 
importance of moderation to his superiors and he warned Grenville that 
it was 'bad generalship to leave an army in a state of inactivity after 
a great and unexpected check.'^* But Grenville had had enough. In late 
April he delivered ultimatums to Foxite leaders,Prudently Grey de­
cided that the true policy of opposition was 'to watch the acts of 
Government rather than to originate any measures of our own.'^ Again 
the coalition was immobilized.
1Holland, Further Memoirs, p. 47.
^Edinburgh Review, XV, 504.
^T. Grenville to Grenville, 20-23 April 1810, H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
26.
^Auckland to Grenville, 5, 12 April 1810, ibid., 24, 25-6.
5Grenville to Grey, 27 Aprill810 (Grey).




Developments in the Peninsula during the summer were almost more 
than Grey and Grenville could bear. Wellington's campaign of 1810 
marked what was probably the nadir of British fortunes in Portugal. In 
May there was a great feud between Perceval and Wellesley because 
Wellington was not getting the financial support his brother considered 
essential. Then, too, reports of the consolidation of French troops 
under Massena were very disappointing to those who followed the progress 
of the campaign on a map,-*- and in June rumour held that the British army 
would be withdrawn. Grenville was seriously ill and had little to say 
about all this but Grey, tormented by the behaviour of the reformers 
and outraged by the situation in the Peninsula, became convinced that 
the leaders of the coalition 'should mark by some distinct and intelli­
gible measure the principles on which we act' so as to distinguish 'be­
tween us and the Ministers on the one hand, and those who are urging 
these popular questions ... on the other.
On 14 June he closed the session with a strong speech supporting 
the 'husbanding, defensive system' which he and Grenville held out as 
their alternative to the wartime policies of the government. Wellington 
was not censured but continental expeditions were denounced vigorously, 
Most significantly, all present prospect of peace was deemed illusory. 
And to this was attached strong censure of the reformers of the day/' 
Undoubtedly a concise statement of policy was needed, but Grey's atti­
tude on the war is astonishing.
■*-Note Grenville's comments on this subject. Grenville to 
Auckland, 16 Oct. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 (Auckland).
^Roberts, pp. 149-50.
-*Grey to Grenville, 26 April 1810, H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 27-8.
4Parl. Deb., XVII, 535.
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The events of the spring had shown clearly that the party could
not unite in opposition to the Peninsular War; indeed party leaders had
done everything in their power to avoid the question. While Grenville
and Grey continued to oppose the presence of a British army in the
Peninsula, Buckingham, Spencer, Temple, Holland, and Bedford now looked
on Wellington's operations with favour and Fitzwilliam had never wavered
in his opinion that the Peninsular War would lead to Napoleon's fall.^
Moreover, it appears that Holland's friends were once again beginning
to rally behind the Spanish cause by the time of Grey's speech. Allen's
interest in Spanish politics was reviving and Horner was only months
2away from calling for larger armies and greater efforts. Pilgrimages 
to Spain had again become popular. Adair was in Cadiz and his favour­
able reports on the proceedings of the Cortes were beginning to make an 
impression on Whig opinion.3
On the other hand Grenville had already seen the necessity of 
carrying his isolationistic views to their logical conclusion of a nego­
tiated peace with Napoleon and both he and Grey were fully aware that 
cooperation with Whitbread depended on such a view of affairs. More­
over, Grey's declaration against peace is the more surprising when one 
considers that outside Parliament the agitation for peace, which had 
died down in 1809, was reviving alongside reform. Jeffrey, Brougham, 
and Thanet could not separate these two causes.^ Roscoe, who had
^Fitzwilliam to Grey, 25 Sept. 1810 (Grey).
2Allen to Lady Holland, 28 July [1810], B.M., Add. MSS. 52172 
(Allen), ff. 17-18. Horner to Jeffrey, 18 Jan. 1811, Horner 
Memoirs, II, 68-75.
3Adair to Holland, 25-27 Sept. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51609 
(Holland).
^Lord Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey (Edinburgh, 1852), pp. 189- 
92. Roscoe to Brougham, 6 Oct. 1810 (Brougham).
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supported Holland's definition of the Spanish Revolution until the turn 
of the year, had been collecting tracts which he had published at diffe­
rent times since 1793 on the subject of the war and he was about to pub­
lish a pamphlet supporting peace when he learned of Grey's speech.^ 
Grey's comments sent a wave of shock through Foxite circles. 
Lansdowne and Lauderdale supported them stoutly but apparently they were 
alone among party leaders. Erskine condemned Grey on the floor of the 
House; Lord Douglas and Gloucester refused to vote; and Holland, in Tom 
Grenville's opinion, was 'not above half right upon the q u e s t i o n . O n e  
old Foxite assured Whitbread that he now had 'the honestest part of the 
Foxites sincerely attached to you', and Creevey probably summed up the 
views of the left wing of the party when he wrote that Grey was 'bona 
fide Insane'. Young Whigs were badly disillusioned by Grey's perform­
ance. Lord John Russell, a devoted student of Foxite theory, made no 
effort to hide his feelings. From Woburn Abbey he wrote to Holland:
I am now in great doubt what to believe of Lord Grey, for he still 
seems to think himself a Whig, & I am afraid the Tory Opinions which 
he wears under that cloak will bring the name into great discredit. 
The more I reflect on his speech, the more I \ionder at, both at the 
aristocratical notions & vague arguments which it abounds with ... 
They say Ld Grey has made Ld Grenville a Whig, but it seems to be a 
Whiggy-Toryish mixture between them.^
Reformers were outraged. Attacks on Grey were so serious that the
Morning Chronicle undertook a defence and it rapidly became clear that
few Foxites were prepared to follow the dictates of their ostensible
1Roscoe to Erskine, 26 Aug. 1810 (Roscoe), 1455.
2T. Grenville to Grenville, [16 June 1810], H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
44-
"^ P. Payne to Whitbread, n.d. [July-Aug. 1810?], (Whitbread), 2522. 
Creevey to Roscoe, 14 Sept. 1810 (Roscoe), 1057.
^Ld. John Russell to Holland, 7 Aug. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51677
(Holland).
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leader. Grey found solace in the fact that Milton and several
Grenvillites supported his views on reform, but he could not claim the
affection of even moderates like Holland. Jeffrey, Whitbread, Coke,2Creevey, Horner, and William Smith disagreed with him completely.
Grey's overall view of the war was contested effectively from 
both right and left in the months which followed his speech. Roscoe 
was positively indignant and his pamphlet, Brief Observations on the 
Address to His Majesty proposed by Earl Grey on 14 June 1810, thoroughly 
denounced the British government's wartime objectives in the Peninsula, 
argued convincingly for a negotiated peace assuring Spanish territorial 
sovereignty, and skilfully refuted Grey's logic. Of importance was the 
fact that Roscoe's arguments closely paralleled those which Whitbread 
had put forward in 1808 in his pamphlet, A Letter to Lord Holland. Ap­
parently Roscoe's work was widely read. He sent copies of it to most of 
his colleagues and received a favourable response;"* even Sir Walter 
Scott read it and asked Southey for his opinion.^ Of course the 
Independepfc Whig was always ready to join a cry for peace"* and Leigh 
Hunt endorsed Roscoe's arguments in the Examiner.^  By the end of the 
year the Foxites were once again hopelessly divided on the issue of the 
war. The peace party was far from Insignificant and Holland was deterred
^Morning Chronicle, 29 June 1810.
2Roberts, pp. 276-79, gives an excellent account of Foxite views 
on reform at the end of the session.
•^Gloucester excepted. Gloucester to Roscoe, 23 Aug., Er9kine to 
Roscoe, A Sept., Creevey to Roscoe, 1A Sept., Francis to Roscoe, 27 Nov. 
1810, and G. Hibbert to Roscoe, 22 Mar. 1811 (Roscoe), 1768, 1A57, 1057, 
1587, 2011.
^Scott Letters, II, 17A.
^Independent Whig, 15 June 1810.
^Examiner, 7 Oct. 1810.
1
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from championing the war in Parliament only by the fear of falling under 
'the great Sledge hammer of Ld. Grenville's eloquence'Grey,
Grenville, and the mercurial Horning Chronicle stood somewhere between 
the two, watching their strength slowly evaporate. Not surprisingly, 
there would be no more frontal attacks on the military policies of the 
government.
After the session of 1810 opposition to the war was factious.
Little was said about military strategy in Parliament and the trickle of 
criticism which came from the opposition benches centred on details. The 
conflicting views of opposition leaders, however, go far in explaining 
their continuing discomfiture as a party. Holland and his friends dis­
played almost comical Inconsistency. Holland simply did not know what 
to think after Grey's forceful statement of policy in June 1810, and for 
several months he had little to say on the issue of the war. His stand 
on the question of peace was curious indeed. In August he defended Grey 
by arguing that war with France had 'nothing to do with the principles 
of general liberty or the tenets of the Whig party in England.' In the 
same letter, however, he cited his uncle's theories and eventually re­
affirmed his support for peace.3
The meeting of the Cortes late in the summer of 1810 revived inter­
est in Spanish political fortunes and Lady Holland dared to send an ac­
count of the proceedings to Grey.^ Holland House regulars, however, 
were having second thoughts on the political implications of British 1*4
1Lady Holland to Grey, 24 Dec. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland).
^Morning Chronicle, 14 Feb. 1811 (hankering for sugar islands).
^Holland to Ld. John Russell, 13 Aug. 1810, Rollo Russell, ed., 
Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell (London, 1813), I, 131-39.
4Lady Holland to Grey, 26 Oct. [1810], B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland), f. 114.
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policy in Spain. The formation of the Spanish regency reopened contro­
versy and as early as July Allen expressed an opinion that the Cortes 
would never thrive under Ferdinand.-^ The policies of the British govern­
ment and the mood of the public also caused concern. Late in the year 
one of Holland's friends concluded that there was considerable disparity 
between the views of Holland and those of others who supported war in the 
Peninsula.2 This tardy but valid conclusion, of course, did not stimu­
late support for the war and the Holland House circle became furious in 
the autumn when the Cortes made it clear that the movement for independ­
ence in Spanish South America would be resisted with force. 'I suppose 
you have seen the rash decree of the Regency against the Caraccas', wrote 
Allen's friend Blanco White. 'It appears to me almost evident that they 
will be guilty of exciting a civil war in the American Colonies, which 
will end in favour of Bonaparte. What can be done in favour of a country 
committed into hands so ignorant and so violent, not to say, wicked?'’* 
This opinion was shared by others. Charles Vaughan, hitherto a firm sup­
porter of Spanish liberties, became cold in his opinion of the Cortes.^ 
Allen, who feared the Independence of Spain's colonies, lost much of his
5faith in the political future of Spain.
In September Miranda and several newly-elected South American
deputies were honoured at a dinner in London which was attended by at
6least one of Allen's friends. The democratic doctrines which were
Allen to Lady Holland, 28 July [1810], B.M. , Add. MSS. 52172 
(Allen), ff. 17-18.
2C. Vaughan to Allen, 19 Dec. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 (Allen).
3B. White to Allen, 5 Sept. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 (Allen).
4Vaughan to Allen, 2 Aug. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 52193 (Allen).
3Allen to Horner, 22 July 1810 (Horner).
6B. White to Allen, 19 Sept. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 52194 (Allen).
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associated with the revolutionary cause presented a striking contrast 
with the drift of the Cortes and conversation at Holland House centred 
on this subject in late 1810. Holland was prepared to raise the question 
in Parliament and in September he speculated on a Foxlte coalition with 
Wellesley, who shared his opinion on South America. ' A visit from the 
widely acclaimed Spanish commander the Due d'Albuquerque probably added 
to the already foul taste in the mouths of Holland's friends. 'If he is 
a fair specimen of the rest, nobody need wonder that the Spaniards have 
not made a better figure', wrote one of Lady Holland's dinner guests.
'It was quite ridiculous to hear a little fellow (less than Monk Lewis) 
talking of the ... courage & strength required in a Bullfight 6 then 
State with an affected air "qu'il avait fait cette folie."'^
During 1811 and early 1812 Foxites found themselves the victims 
of contradiction. The accomplishments of Wellington and the Spanish 
armies virtually silenced the cry for peace. Holland and his circle were 
delighted by these military victories but their joy was neutralized by 
steadily increasing disaffection with political developments in Spain.
Of course this confused the Foxite view of the war considerably. At 
Devonshire House in early 1811 Sheridan and Whitbread perplexed the 
Cavendishes with paradoxical assessments of the value of the Spaniards as 
allies. Lady Bessborough noted afterwards that 'both seem'd to me to 
argue in contradiction to the conclusions they meant to draw ...' But 
the views of Whitbread and Sheridan could have been no more confusing 
than those which Horner expressed to Jeffrey in January 1811. He praised
^Holland to Fitzpatrick, 23 Sept., and Fitzpatrick to Holland, 30 
Sept. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51799 (Holland).
„> if
^Grey to Lady Grey, 26 Nov. 1810 (Grey).
3Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, [Mar.] 1811, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 386.
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Whitbread's last peace motion and yet claimed that Spain had given him 
a 'warlike disposition'; he proclaimed peace with Napoleon impossible 
and yet advocated a continental settlement based on France's retention 
of her satellite kingdoms; and he concluded with a call for the rein­
forcement of Wellington's army.’*'
Though Grey's opinions fluctuated with events, he generally clung 
to Grenville's pessimistic view of the war. From the beginning Grey had 
placed faith in the opinions of disgruntled 'Whig' officers. Moore had 
convinced him that Portugal was indefensible and the accounts of Gordon 
and Rosslyn had given him an overly pessimistic picture of Wellington's 
campaign. In the autumn of 1810 the dismal reports of Sir Robert Wilson 
began to arrive at Howick with astonishing frequency. These reports, 
which were given credence by the fact that the author had actually com­
manded in the Peninsula, included meticulously drawn maps of Portugal
2designed to prove that the Torres Vedras position was a poor one.
Wilson shared his wisdom with other opposition leaders. Holland and 
Gloucester were on his mailing list** and by October Grey was enjoying the 
exchange of indignant remarks with a variety of interested parties. A 
low opinion of Wellington and the Spanish soldier, an Inflated one of 
Massena, and a conviction that guerilla warfare was the only solution 
characterized the opinions of Wilson's audience.^
British public opinion had little patience with the view of the
^Horner to Jeffrey, 8 Jan. 1811, Horner Memoirs, II, 68-75.
^See this Wilson-Grey correspondence in the B.M., Add. MSS. 30118 
(Wilson).
■^Gloucester to Grey, 5 July 1813 (Grey). Lady Holland to Grey, 7 
Oct. 1811, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 (Holland).
4Grey to Holland, 8, 19 Oct. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). 
Gceioviu-e \o , 1 Nov. 1810, H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 61-2. Lauderdale to
Lady Holland, 25 Oct. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51697 (Holland).
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war which was associated with the coalition. At best one could assess 
the situation like one independent gentleman of Lower Berkeley Street, 
Manchester Square: 'Every prediction on the part of the Opposition with 
respect to the issue of the campaign - that we should lose our whole 
army, be obliged to embark in six weeks, etc., etc., - said much too 
heedlessly and too frequently, has been successively refuted by the 
event, and given people a poor opinion of their sagacity ...' Ministe­
rial and even independent writers accused the opposition of considerably 
more than a lack of foresight. Coleridge baited them unmercifully in the 
Courier. He charged them with rejoicing at British reverses in Spain and 
he once remarked that the Morning Chronicle 'seems never to conceive the 
possibility of any accidents occurring to Buonaparte, as thinking him, 
perhaps, especially entitled to.the favour and protection of Providence.' 
Cruikshank's caricatures suggested that the opposition was eager to sacri­
fice British interests for the sake of peace, and anonymous pamphlets 
like The French Spy (1808) and The Patriots and the Whigs the Most 
Dangerous Enemies of the State (1810) were unscrupulous in their accusa­
tions of treason.1
Young Foxites, of course, were unhappy with the stance of Grey and 
Grenville. There was considerable fear during late 1811 that the young 
Duke of Devonshire would attach himself to Sheridan, Adam, Taylor, 
Yarmouth, Moira, Norfolk, and the Prince for by that time Carlton House 
had established a Foxite-oriented political identity of its own.^ Harry, 
Erskine's youngest son, also caused concern among his elders. He was 
vocal in his support of peace, and at a party dinner of late 1810 he
1Roberts, pp. 151-52, 168-69.
^Brougham to Allen, 14 Aug. 1811, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
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raised eyebrows with an unexpected toast to Burdett.* William Lamb 
refused to accept Bedford's generous offer of a seat in Parliament on 
the grounds that none of the coalition's leaders seemed to allow 'for 
the exigency of the time and state of Europe, but are all guided by the 
regular old rules and tacticks from which they would not depart one 
tittle to save the Empire . ..'^ Ward, a traditional supporter of peace 
who by 1812 saw no alternative to endorsing Wellington's campaign, an­
nounced his desertion of Grey and Grenville. He felt that the 'only 
reasonable choice' on the question of the war was between Canning and 
Whitbread. In joining Canning he explained that the Pittite 'was not a 
greater warrior than Lord Grey', only a more efficient one. To Ward it 
seemed that Grey and Grenville were contending for 'an unseasonable and 
unattainable object’.^  'Our friends, as might be supposed, are much 
divided - but suspicions and fears predominate', wrote Brougham. 'Indeed, 
do all one can, there are such staggering circumstances as make it very 
difficult to continue in the faith.
These problems were not restricted to the Foxite wing of the coali­
tion. The Grenvillite and Burkian parties never had been large but by 
mid-1812 they had almost lost their Identities. Young men like Milton, 
Althorp, Ebrington, and the Wynns were closely aligned with the popular 
politics of the Mountain, and Temple refused to attend Parliament. 'I 
positively will not come up merely because Tierney or Mr. Ponsonby wish 
to see the Opposition benches crowded, to cry 'hear, hear' to detestable 12
1Allen to Lady Holland, n.d. [17 Aug. 1811?], B.M., Add. MSS.
52172 (Allen), ff. 47-8.
2Lady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 29 Sept. 1812, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 462-63.
%ard to Brougham, n.d. [July 1812?], (Brougham).
ABrougham to Grey, 23 Dec. 1811 (Brougham).
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speeches, and then to be sent back again with a further adjournment far 
my pains', he explained.*' Windham died in late 1810; Carlisle grew 
angry with Grenville and refused to leave Yorkshire; Spencer announced 
his retirement;'* Elliot disclaimed all interest in a return to office in 
1811;^ and Fitzwilliam, who never had agreed with Grey and Grenville's 
view of the war, avoided Parliament, became interested in local politics, 
and used his borough patronage to return personal friends who offered the 
party nothing. Buckingham, who would die in 1813, found the trip up to 
London too demanding as early as 1810 and Tom Grenville, who would out­
live everybody, was such a hypochondriac that he had little to do with 
politics after the Walcheren enquiry. As early as June 1811 Grenville 
noted that his interest in politics was 'completely dead'.6
By mid-1812 the once powerful coalition had practically ceased to 
exist. During the spring and summer Grey and Grenville discussed the 
formation of a ministry with first Wellesley and then Moira without being 
sure that they could depend upon the support of a party in the House of 
Commons. Finally when they took a stand on their traditional view of the 
war the possibility of office vanished and the few remaining peers who 
supported them raised objections. Bedford practically begged Grey to 
adopt a more realistic view7 and Buckingham, arguing on Grenville's
*"Temple to T. Grenville, 28 May 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 (T. 
Grenville).
Carlisle to T. Grenville, 24 Jan. 1811, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 
(T. Grenville).
3Grenville to Spencer, 11 Jan. 1811 (Spencer).
^Grenville to Grey, 28 Jan. 1811 (Grey).
^Note Brougham's interesting comments. Brougham to Allen, 28 
Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
^Grenville to Temple, 4 June 1811, H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 145.
7Bedford to Grey, 26 May 1812 (Grey).
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terms, stressed that 'art offensive war on the Peninsula saves Ireland & 
perhaps our own coast as well as our Colonies all which would be. imme­
diately & heavily endangered by the French occupation of the Spanish & 
Portuguese Ports.' ^ But Grey and Grenville refused to bend. They had 
stood by the unpopular foreign policy of a rejected ministry almost con­
stantly for six years; they would cling to the 'husbanding, defensive 
system' until Wellington's guns drove Soult across the Pyrenees.
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THE FALL OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE 
1812 - 1815
In the autumn of 1812 several Foxite leaders momentarily grew 
excited about the prospects of success on the Catholic question. Lady 
Oxford, who seldom minced words, found this development amusing. '... I 
am sincerely sorry the Catholics have succeeded so ill for two reasons', 
she wrote to Holland. 'First because it is melancholy to see the majo­
rity on the side of prejudice and illiberality ... and [secondly] be­
cause if this Catholic business were once over, you Whiggs [sic] would 
have nothing to do, but to dispose your minds to stronger measures of 
Legislation.'-^ This was not an isolated opinion. In a series of abor­
tive negotiations for office which had stretched over the first half of 
the year Grey and Grenville had displayed that they were incapable of 
coming to grips with the political world around them. Once again the 
demands of coalition had prevented them from putting forward a realistic 
alternative to the foreign policy of the government. Dating from 1807 
they had harped, they had spoken vaguely of a need to conserve the re­
sources of the nation, but never, even in office, had they embraced an 
identifiable philosophy on thé leading issue of the day. Their widely 
ridiculed pessimism had sprung as much from fear of each other as from 
fear of French power and their every effort had gone towards neutralizing




the internal disagreements which had arisen with the ups and downs of 
the struggle on the Continent. Fully aware of their differences on the 
war, Grey and Grenville had never discussed European politics fully; 
while opposing peace they had studiously avoided commitment on the all- 
important question of wartime objectives. During the period which began 
with Wellington's victory at Salamanca and ended with the battle of 
Waterloo the coalition was rocked by crisis as this question was forced 
on them.
Throughout the spring of 1812 the attention of the nation was 
focused on the unprecedented march of Napoleon's army towards Russia and 
as early as July the ministerial press reported confidently that logis­
tical weaknesses would force the Grand Army into a disastrous retreat 
from the north of Europe. Simultaneously Wellington was making rapid 
strides in the Peninsula and in late July word of his blow at Salamanca 
reached London. These events perplexed several important Foxites. 'I 
am ... rather alarmed for our friend Napoleon', Thanet wrote to Holland. 
'I think he must have a tumble from too much confidence some day or 
other. The reestablishment of Poland is a capital job which 1 hope he 
will accomplish before his fall.'1 Others were less fatalistic. On 21 
July when Sheridan applauded ministers for shunning Napoleon's peace 
overtures of April Whitbread and Hutchinson found it necessary to re­
emphasize the necessity of a European settlement based on the recogni­
tion of Napoleon's government. The brewer censured Castlereagh's refus­
al to negotiate, questioned the wartime objectives of ministers, and 
warned that if the spirit of British foreign policy remained unchecked, 
'it would be impossible even to treat for peace between the two coun­
tries as long as Buonaparte lived.' Hutchinson was more specific. 1
1Thanet to Holland, July 1812, B.H., Add. MSS. 51571 (Holland).
He pointed to the lessons of the past in outlining the folly of 
British cooperation with continental powers and he rose in defence of 
Napoleon's right to the French throne. 'No conquerer', he observed, 
'had ever established a better, or to all appearance, a more secure 
one.''*' A week later Burdett expressed similar sentiments in the House. 
Whishaw, alarmed by the warlike views of the Morning Chronicle, en­
couraged Perry to display more moderation.^
These views were unpopular among party regulars during the sum­
mer but by autumn Lord Cathcart's reports of French difficulty in 
Russia had joined with the news of Salamanca to increase the cry for a 
negotiated European settlement. Alarmed by the warlike mood of the 
British public, Holland suspected that the Cabinet aimed at the restora­
tion of the Bourbons in France. 'The offer of moderate terms of peace 
in concert with the Spaniards would in my opinion be the wisest meas­
ure', he wrote to Grey. '... I suspect that the Prince is as warlike 
as his father & has very little notion of the moment of victory being 
the season of m o d e r a t i o n . B y  6 September Whitbread and Holland had 
discussed the matter fully and they agreed that the time had come for 
Franco-British negotiations based on the independence of Spain.^
However, the Foxites were still far from unity on the question 
of the war. Salamanca caused Grey to embrace an unmistakably warlike 
view of affairs in late August and Perry's editorials in the Morning 1
1Parl. Deb.. XXIII, 1124-46.
2Ibid., 1266-67.
3Whishaw to Brougham, 28 July [1812], (Brougham).
^Holland to Grey, 26 Aug. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Whitbread to Holland, 18 Aug., 6 Sept. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51576 (Holland).
340
Chronicle continued to echo the language of the ministerial press.^ 
Lansdowne and Bedford would not commit themselves. Other Foxlte lead­
ers saw no reason to abandon the call for a defensive system. Though 
Wilson reported that Napoleon would have his hands full in Russia,Adair 
was certain that the French would carry all before them and Rosslyn 
felt that it would be wise 'to back the Veracity of the French bulletin 
agt the Russian Acct.'^ Even after Salamanca Gordon furnished 
party leaders with preposterous overestimates of French strength, and 
the dismal performance of Spanish troops in the battle did not go un­
noticed.^ Lauderdale, who had spent the last year writing articles on 
the economic ills of the country, was certain that 'our Glorious exer­
tions may without much difficulty be shewn to be the direct cause of 
our misery.'^ Rosslyn made excuses for Marmont, criticized Wellington, 
and, while stating that Salamanca would be of no consequence, rejoiced 
that the victory would 'strengthen the Ministers & keep Canning down a 
little.'5 Erskine was vehement in denouncing Cathcart's 'lies', and 
Tierney was sure that Napoleon would soon dictate a peace from Moscow.*’ 
Of importance in the formulation of these opinions was the fact that 
ministerial writers used Russian successes to attack the timid foreign
■^Grey to Holland, 19 Aug. 1812, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). 
Morning Chronicle, 17, 18 Aug. 1812.
^Grey to Holland, 5 Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). 
Grey to Adair, 9 Sept. 1812 (Grey). Rosslyn to Brougham, 9 Oct. 1812 
(Brougham).
•^Gordon to Grey, 27 Sept. 1812 (Grey). Thanet to Grey, 23 Aug. 
1812 (Grey).
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, n.d. [Aug. 1812], B.M. , Add, MSS. 
51698 (Holland), ff. 207-14.
^Rosslyn to Grey, 6, 17 Aug. 1812 (Grey).
6Erskine to Holland, n.d., B.M., Add. MSS. 51533 (Holland). 
Tierney to T. Grenville, 19 Sept. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 41858 (T. 
Grenville).
341
policy of the Ministry of All the Talents.^ Then, too, Salamanca hardly 
vindicated the 'husbanding, defensive system', and Yarmouth's stinging 
denunciation of the Talents' peace negotiations in a pamphlet of August 
threw a wet blanket on the hopes of those who wanted the coalition to 
rally around a motion for an immediate European settlement. Moreover, 
the stubborness of Grenvillite leaders discouraged enthusiasm for both 
war and peace. Grenville had little to say on the subject of the northern 
war but he insisted that Salamanca would only delay the expulsion of the 
British army from the Peninsula. Eden was not only sure of the defeat of 
Russia but excited that Poland would get her independence. Tom Grenville 
was equally pessimistic and Auckland found Cathcart's glowing reports
0comical. Predictably, by October Grey had despaired of success in both 
Spain and Russia but he said nothing of peace.^ All this was nothing new. 
however, there were now currents beneath Grey that could not be ignored.
Ilenry Brougham's successful campaign against the long-contested 
Orders in Council had coincided with the unsuccessful efforts of Grey 
and Grenville to form a ministry earlier in the year. Though devoid of 
any immediately recognizable political result^it had nevertheless been 
an important triumph. Castlereagh, whom Brougham had backed to the wall 
with the threat of a division, noted astutely that the defeat of the 
Orders in Council was the first victory of the industrial interests over
1Adair to Grey, 22 Dec. 1812 (Grey).
21 have been unable to locate this pamphlet but Grey refers to it
in his letter to Holland of 29 August 1812. B.M., Add. MSS. 51551
(Holland).
■^Grenville to Grey, 23 Aug. 1812 (Grey). Eden to Auckland, 30 
July [1812], B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 (Auckland). Auckland to Grey, 1 Nov. 
1812 (Grey).
^Grey to Brougham, 20 Oct. 1812 (Brougham).
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the government and that further instances of their growing supremacy 
over the landed aristocracy could be expected.^ Others had been im­
pressed by Brougham's brilliant personal performance on the floor of 
the House. Horner, who detested Brougham, nevertheless felt that his 
performance had been 'unexampled in the modern history of Parliament' 
and Ward noted that the young man had been hailed as one of the greatest 
parliamentarians in English history. But above all else Brougham's 
victory was important because it had been a clear departure from the 
parliamentary tactics of the past. He had relied on a well organized 
press campaign, firm contacts In the country at large, and a wave of 
petitions to bring great pressure on a weak government. Significantly, 
he had received little support from the leaders of the Whig coalition. 
Grey had opposed the campaign from the start; Bedford had shown no in­
terest; and Holland had gone fishing on the day of the crucial divi- 
sion. Tom Grenville had refused to be led by what he saw as the left 
wing of the party; Thanet had thought that Whitbread was drunk when the 
brewer suggested that the issue could unite the party; and the Speaker 
had been struck by the absence of Ponsonby, Tierney, and all of the
4Grenvillites on an important division. Moreover, Brougham recalled 
that Tierney and many others had resented his exertions.'’ But he had
^Aspinall, Brougham and the Whig Party, p. 25.
2Horner to Brougham, 25 July 1812, Brougham, Life and Times, II, 
23. Ward to Helen Stewart, July 1812, Letters to 'Ivy", p. 167.
Also see Chester New, Life of Henry Brougham to 1830 (Oxford, 1961),
pp. 60-8.
^Grey to Brougham, 20 Oct. 1812 (Brougham). Bedford to Grey, 23 
Feb. 1812 (Grey). Holland House Dinner Book entry of 15 June 1812,
B.M., Add. MSS. 51951.
^T. Grenville to Lady Grenville, 24 April 1812, H.M.C, Dropmore, 
X, 240-41. Thanet to Holland, 9 June 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51571 
(Holland). Abbot Diary, II, 369.
■’Brougham to Allen, 28 Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
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succeeded in pulling the mainline party behind him and in the process 
he had proved clearly that well organized movements out of doors could 
promote a great deal of unity among Foxites in Parliament.
Roscoe, whose pen had been employed in the pursuit of this ob­
jective since 1807, was greatly impressed by Brougham's ac­
complishment, as was Brougham himself.* In the wake of the repeal of 
the Orders these two men visualized a second campaign, a campaign which 
would unite the Foxites behind their old principles of peace and par­
liamentary reform. With the aid of Roscoe's political machinery 
Brougham and Creevey would challenge Canning and the incumbent Gascoyne 
in the Liverpool election of October.
Roscoe had high hopes of reuniting the former supporters of Fox. 
He realised from the start that Grey would be a tough nut to crack and 
that in all probability the support of other Foxite peers would depend 
entirely on Grey's approval. For these reasons he pushed the idea that 
the campaign would not give way to 'every popular impulse' because such 
a course would do 'essential injury to the c a u s e . He felt that an 
endorsement of moderate reform was necessary to achieve his ends but, 
as Creevey told one radical, it would be unwise to represent a reforma- 
tion of Parliament as the cure for all the country's ills. Support 
for the conclusion of a general peace would be the leading plank of the 
campaign. War with America had broken out during the summer and this 
had alarmed the trading interest in Liverpool. Moreover, the conflict 
on the Continent was growing more expensive daily and those who were 
not concerned over the war's political implications were certain that
^•Brougham, Life and Times, II, 1-23.
Roscoe to Brougham, n.d. [Sept. 1812], (Brougham).
^Creevey to Rev. William Shepherd, 17 Sept. 1812 (Roscoe), 1064.
British finance could not stand the strain. Quoting Fox verbatim,
Roscoe, Brougham, and Creevey represented a general peace as the pre­
requisite of reform. '... if peace comes', wrote Brougham at a later 
date, 'reform must sooner or later come with it - for there is an end 
of the gag that has been used since 1793 to stop our mouths - viz - 
don't talk of changes while the enemy is at our gates.'1 Gloucester 
endorsed this concept and, at Roscoe's suggestion, encouraged Grey and 
Grenville to follow suit. This, in Roscoe's opinion, would conciliate 
'the great body of the people with their natural leaders, the nobility 
& proprietors of the land; the union of whom is indispensably necessary 
to resist the influence of the crown ,..'2
Madison's unrealistic demand for British abandonment of the right 
of search as the price of peace crippled the campaign from the start.^ 
Canning was quick to point out that even the Ministry of All the Talents 
had stoutly refused a similar demand in 1806 and Brougham got nowhere in 
his feeble attempt to rally Foxite leaders against impressment.^ The 
net result was that the Foxite candidates were forced to concentrate 
heavily on the European war in an attempt to emphasize their differ­
ences with Canning. On 4 September a dinner in honour of Brougham was 
attended by a large group of supporters including Bennet, Stanley,
Derby, and even Sefton. Brougham's speech set the stage for his cam­
paign:
^Brougham to Roscoe, 30 Nov. 1813 (Roscoe), 505.
2Roscoe to Gloucester, 17 Sept, draft, and Gloucester to Roscoe, 
14 Nov. 1812 (Roscoe), 1781, 1783.
^Brougham to Roscoe, n.d. [Aug. 1812], (Roscoe), 524. Brougham 
to T. Thornley, 1 Aug., and Brougham to Grey, 9 Sept. 1812 (Brougham).
^Abercromby to Brougham, 1 Aug. 1812 (Brougham). Brougham to 
Allen, 25 Sept. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen). Allen to Brougham, 
29 Sept. 1812 (Brougham).
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A general peace is our true policy: upon a general peace the 
actual prosperity of the kingdom must be speedily placed...
It is in this light that, with joy and expressions of sincere 
congratulation, I mention the late glorious victory of Salamanca.
In that victory ought to be placed an earnest expectation of 
peace... We may now ask what are our real interests and those of 
Europe; for the false delicacy of concession is completely obli­
terated; because after this victory, who shall say that we cannot 
concede with honour? Glorious in many ways - in this it is truly 
advantageous, that it offers us the means of peace.*
In London Hunt's Examiner endorsed these sentiments and soon Hutchinson,
who was considered to be an authority on foreign affairs, was at
Brougham's side with dismal accounts of the northern war which contra­
dicted those of Canning.^ Even old Major Cartwright came to Liverpool 
and campaigned for Brougham and Creevey.^
By late September it was clear that Roscoe's attempt to unite 
the Whigs with 'the people*behind Fox's standard was meeting with a great 
deal of success. Astonished by this spectacle,Brougham reported to 
Allen that the love of Fox, 'even among the most violent Burdettites 
(of whom there are swarms) has never for a moment wavered - in so much 
that at all their large & violent reform meetings, his memory is uni­
formly among the first toasts.'^ Of course Canning met all this by 
raising the standard of Pitt against both peace and reform, and 
Liverpool rapidly became a battleground for the politics of the 1790's. 
The cry for peace was loud among the supporters of Brougham and Creevey,
and Brougham did everything in his power to use it as a bridge to the 
reconciliation of the party. He flattered and reported his progress to 1
1Examiner, 20 Sept. 1812«
O^Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 11 Oct. 1812, Creevey 
Papers, I, 170.
^Brougham to Grey, 9 Sept. 1812 (Brougham).
^Brougham to Allen, 25 Sept. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen).
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Grey almost daily'*' and he tried to induce Whitbread to come north by 
assuring him that he was seen by the public as Fox's successor 
in foreign politics.^ Finally, after losing a close election, Brougham 
closed his campaign with a tribute to Fox, to the great Whig families, 
and to the principles of peace and reform which, according to Greevey, 
'shook the very square and all the houses in it from the applause it 
met with.'"* After defeat was known 'an immediate and cordial reunion 
took place ... [in Liverpool] between the high & low W h i g s . T h i s  re­
union was based primarily on a common opinion of the desirability of an 
immediate continental peace. From it sprang an agreement to prepare 
petitions and to solicit Holland and Whitbread to lay them before 
Parliament.
The campaign at Liverpool aroused great controversy within the 
ranks of the party. Perry refused to print Brougham's speech. Allen, 
too, was displeased and in a gross violation of confidence he circulated 
among outraged party leaders one of Brougham's letters which expressed a 
desire to cooperate with radical organizations in the north.^ Grey 
looked on Brougham's flirtation with the reformers most suspiciously 
and, though he was prepared to sanction a simple expression of a wish 
for peace, he continued to oppose any attempt to force it on the govern­
ment. Moreover, he was not happy about the open confrontation between *3
^Brougham's correspondence with Grey during September and 
October is in the Brougham Papers.
2Brougham to Whitbread, n.d. [Sept. 1812], (Whitbread), 1954.
3Creevey to Mrs. Creevey, 17 Oct. 1812, ’Creevey.
Papers, I, 172. This speech was printed in the Liverpool Mercury, 16 
Oct. 1812.
^Brougham to Grey, Nov. 1812 (Brougham).
■’Brougham to Allen, 28 Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen). 
Lansdowne to Allen, 1 Nov. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 52174 (Allen).
Foxite and Pittite 'principles'.1 Grenville's prejudices were at the 
bottom of this. The old Pittite remained pessimistic about the war; he 
felt that peace was desirable but unobtainable; and he wanted to avoid 
the extremes of both Whitbread and Canning. He made it clear that he 
would expect Foxite leaders to resist a motion for peace and as a pre­
caution he mobilized his own forces in the Commons.2 3 By the middle of 
November Grey and Bedford were once again frantic with fear that 
Whitbread would divide the party with a motion for peace.-1 Lansdowne, 
who also felt that such a motion would be embarrassing, wanted to avoid 
foreign politics in favour of redoubled exertions on the Catholic ques­
tion.^
This was now the opinion of a minority of Foxites. Whitbread, 
of course, was trying desperately to transfer the spirit of Liverpool to 
Westminster. His own contacts in the north were splendid and he was 
utilizing them fully to encourage petitions. He was also trying to stim 
ulate support in the City of London. The Examiner and the Independent 
Whig were behind him completely and Rosslyn had set out 'to put Perry 
upon a proper footing . ..'3 In mid-November (to the horror of Tom 
Grenville) Whitbread carried his plea to the Crown and Anchor.*’
^rey to Holland, 25 Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). 
Rosslyn to Grey, 1 Jan. 1813 (Grey).
2Grenville to Holland, 12 Nov., n.d. [1A Nov.], and 17 Nov. 1812, 
B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 (Holland). Grenville to Grey, 10 Nov. 1812 (Grey) 
Grenville to T. Grenville, 13 Nov. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. A1853 (T. 
Grenville).
3Grey to Holland, 1A Nov. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland). 
Bedford to Holland, 22 Nov. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51662 (Holland).
^Lansdowne to Holland, 16 Nov. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A 
(Holland).
3Examiner, 1, 8, 22 Nov. 1812. Independent Whig, 15, 22 Nov.
1812. Rosslyn to Brougham, 9 Oct. 1812 (Brougham).
**T. Grenville to Grenville, 15 Nov. 1812, H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
309-11.
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Whitbread aimed at forcing Grey's hand. He was already certain of a 
great deal of support in the Commons and like Roscoe he felt that the 
active cooperation of Holland (which had been promised) would enable him 
to break the iron grasp of Grey and Grenville.
While Whitbread laid the ground work Holland attempted to bring 
the other leaders of the coalition around. As early as 6 October he 
told Grey that Foxite M.p.'s were pressing hard for the adoption of a 
definitive stance on the war and that he saw no alternative to clinging 
to peace.^ Receiving little encouragement from Grey>he concluded that 
the endorsement of Grenville was the key to success. In early November 
he boldly put his views before his incredulous ally. Holland felt that 
there was ample reason for the party to advocate the immediate opening 
of Anglo-French negotiations. In the event of victory, he argued, the 
enemies of France would almost certainly imitate Napoleon and act on 
principles which would destroy the independence of nations. Had they 
not partitioned Poland? Had not a desire to partition France motivated 
them in the early stages of the French revolutionary wars? Could 
British interests be served through total victory in concert with such 
powers? Could Britain participate in forcing a new monarch on the French 
people? The only point in question was the moment when peace should be 
offered and there was ample cause to suspect that the government would 
push too far. Why not advocate peace now? The tide of battle could 
turn any day. Wellington's victories were confirmed and if Cathcart's 
reports were even remotely accurate Napoleon had lost much of his mili­
tary reputation. The time was therefore ripe for a settlement guaran­
teeing the reestablishment of a European balance of power. These views, 
which by implication argued for the acceptance of the French revolutionary
^•Holland to Grey, 6 Oct. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
349
government, were identical to those which Fox had voiced during the 
1790's as well as to those which had recently been put forward at 
Liverpool. Of course Grenville disapproved violently.*
Grey was perplexed by the currents which were moving beneath 
him. Whitbread's supporters were increasing in number dally and it 
looked as though Holland would join them in raising a cry for peace in 
Parliament. Derby, Thanet, Sefton, and probably Albemarle and Coke 
were cooperating with the peace faction and Bedford was wavering.
Rosslyn, one of Grey's closest friends, was also in the thick of it 
and even the reliable Ponsonby had caught the infection. In the House 
on 1 December the hitherto timid opposition floor leader caused quite a 
stir when he stated bluntly that if he had been in Parliament in 1793 
he 'would have voted for Mr. Fox's motion to send an ambassador to 
Paris, to prevent the breaking out of war ... because the whole question 
was, whether the government of France, as then constituted, was fit to 
be treated with ...' With a reference to the present conflict he con­
cluded by voicing the opinion that 'one independent state should not 
interfere in the government of another . ..'1 2 Ponsonby was right. This 
was the question and its reemergence threw party leaders into disarray. 
Horner, who was inspired by the 'nationalistic rise' of the Muscovite 
people, nevertheless felt that Whitbread was the only 'asserter of Whig 
principles' and he warned that a break with the brewer on the question 
of peace would be 'dividing with him the popular adherents of the party
"Ithroughout the country.' In viexj of the importance which Grey attached
1Grenville to [Holland], n.d. [14 Nov. 1812?], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51530 (Holland), f. 8.
2Parl, Deb. XXIV, 131-32.
^Horner to Allen, n.d. [Nov. 1812], (Horner), V, 389-90. Horner 
to Murray, 8 Dec. 1812, Horner Memoirs, II, 135-8.
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to the connexion with Grenville and Fitzwilliam there is little mystery 
about why he wanted to retire in favour of Holland at this time.
Alarmed by the situation in London, he refused to come to the meeting of 
Parliament.3
The confirmation of French disasters in Russia during December 
had an enormous effect on the growing movement for peace. By the 11th 
even Thanet admitted that Napoleon was in trouble and both Grey and 
Holland felt that Grenville's pessimistic speech in the Lords sounded 
foolish.^ Whitbread grew extremely emotional, opposed the Russia sub- 
sidy, and blatantly praised the valour of French troops. Ponsonby and 
Burdett also spoke against the subsidy, and Holland, while voting for 
it, preached moderation and discouraged attacks on French territory.1^ 
Brougham refused to attend the great public rally in support of the war 
because he thought it 'would look like acting by the Party a la Sheridan1, 
and Grey's great hope,Mackintosh, who had recently returned from India, 
abandoned the middle ground on the 25th.
Mackintosh was looked on as a sorely needed intellectual leader 
by many Foxites and by December he had devised a scheme for the resettle­
ment of Europe. Poland would be placed under a Russian king, Norway 
would go to Sweden as compensation for Finland; Denmark would be compen­
sated by the annexation of Westphalia; Tirol and Venice would compensate
^-Grenville to Grey, 10 Nov. 1812 (Grey). Grey to Grenville, 17 
Nov. 1812, H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 311-14.
2Holland to Grey, 10, 11 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 
(Holland). Grey to Holland, 13 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
3Parl. Deb. XXIV, 213, 332 (7 and 18 Dec. 1812). Whitbread to 
Lady Holland, 27 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 (Holland).
^Parl. Deb. XXIV, 328-30 [Ponsonby], 334 [Burdett], 322-23 
[Holland], 18 Dec. 1812. Holland to Grey, 19 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51545 (Holland).
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Austria for the loss of Gal» cia; Prussia would get nothing; and France
would retain Italy, the petty German states, and the Low Countries.
>
'If wishes were Dictatory, added Mackintosh, 'I should unite the
Peninsula into one Monarchy & give a great South American Monarchy to
the Braganzas.' Apparently his only sine qua non was the independence
of Spain and Portugal; he wished to send a declaration to Russia
and Austria of the British desire to negotiate a general peace and he
was anxious to encourage petitions in Britain. Such a preposterous plan
for the reorganization of Europe sprang from peculiarly Foxite dogma:
Will our Ministers offer peace [he asked Grey], There are rumours 
that they will - It is a favourable moment & it may be the only 
moment - For he [Napoleon] may quickly retrieve his Fortune - & if 
he were to be crushed a series of Counter revolutionary Convulsions 
may ravage the World for twenty years - From this Moment to the 
opening of the Campaign in Spring may be the only Period during 
which it will be possible to give a chance of repose to Europe. - 
The very next steps of the Russian army bring them into independent 
Poland. They must frighten Denmark & alarm Sweden which cannot 
wish them to be too successful. Every step of their progress will 
kindle some new jealousy if not dissension.*
Apparently these opinions were put forward In conjunction with Holland.
Grey began to weaken as early as 10 December when he told 
Auckland that it was 'morally impossible' to legislate new taxes for the 
continuance of the war. He pointed out that the American war and British 
'reverses' in Spain neutralized the effects of French losses In Russia 
and he maintained that Napoleon was far from beaten.-* This was double- 
talk. According to Rosslyn, Grey was convinced by 30 November that the 
French army was in danger of destruction on all fronts. Apparently the
^-Mackintosh to Grey, 25 Dec. 1812 (Grey).
^Mackintosh to Holland, 27 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51653 
(Holland).
^Grey to Auckland, 10 Dec. 1812, B.M,, Add. MSS. 3M58 (Auckland). 
^Rosslyn to Grey, 30 Nov. 1812 (Grey).
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would be 'a premature and improper interference with the discretion 
which must be allowed to the Executive Government.’1 In the final 
analysis such a motion could be justified only by the weight of peti­
tions but in January Whitbread and Holland were deserted by many of the 
petitioners upon whom they had depended. Feeling that the momentum of 
the Russian army had reduced the popularity of a campaign for peace,the 
influential Josiah Wedgewood asked Whitbread to discourage petitions.^ 
Richard Spooner, a Liverpool merchant who had taken a leading role in 
Roscoe's campaign, confessed that the war interest in Liverpool was now 
too strong.The industrialists of Northamptonshire suddenly refused 
to let Whitbread present their petitions and those in Birmingham soon 
followed.^ The British government apparently was instrumental in this 
development. One Birmingham industrialist claimed that the government 
had threatened that petitions for peace would insure the renewal of the 
East India Company's charter. Another maintained that after Loughborough 
industrialists had adopted resolutions and a petition for peace thousands 
of copies of the government's threat were distributed by means of a 
frank. In London Leigh Hunt was thrown into Newgate prison on a con­
viction for libel.°
These blows were accompanied by Adair's highly regarded decision 
that Russia was incapable of assuming offensive military operations and
^Grey to Holland, 3 Jan. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
^Wedgewood to Whitbread, 29 Dec. 1812 (Whitbread), 4231.
■^Spooner to Whitbread, 9 Jan. 1813 (Whitbread), 4235.
4D. Griffiths to Whitbread, 20 Jan. 1813 (Whitbread), 4239.
■’Webster to Whitbread, 23 Jan., and E. Higginson to Vihitbread, 1 
Mar. 1813 (Whitbread), 4232, 4257.
^Examiner, 3 Jan. 1813.
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Foxite leader was still trying to strike a balance between the rapidly 
developing divisions in the coalition. While approaching the issue of 
war and peace on financial grounds in his correspondence with the pes- 
simistic but warlike Grenvillites he reassured the Hollands that 
Napoleon's armies remained strong enough to force negotiations.^
Grey's game was up by the end of the month. New reports of 
French disasters stimulated a passionate plea from Holland on the 27th 
and this joined with the almost universal cry of the Foxite front bench 
to weaken Grey's resolve. * 2 On 1 January 1813 he told Adair that he 
favoured a negotiated European settlement because the Liverpool ministry 
had 'no settled view or system ...' '... even if at this moment they
desire Peace,' he wrote, 'I can have no security that some new specula­
tion, founded on nothing better, perhaps, than idle rumour of some dis­
turbance in France, wd. not entirely alter their inclination.'^ A day 
later he applauded Whitbread's resistance to the Russian subsidy and 
told Lady Holland that a motion for peace would have a favourable effect 
on the European situation.^ By the 7th Holland stood as a bridge be­
tween the long-estranged Grey and Whitbread.5
At this juncture Foxite leaders were undermined by developments 
in the industrial north. Though Grey was worried about continental 
developments and willing to be led by his colleagues in London he con­
tinued to agree with Grenville that a motion calling for negotiations
^Grey to Holland, 14 Dec., and Grey to Lady Holland, 27 Dec. 1812, 
B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
2Holland to Grey, 27 Dec. 1812, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Grey to Adair, 1 Jan. 1813 (Grey).
^Grey to Lady Holland, n.d. [2 Jan. 18137], B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 
(Holland).
^Holland to Grey, 7 Jan. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
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that therefore a Franco-Russian treaty could be expected any moment. 1 
Tierney, who had earlier supported Whitbread and Holland, now opposed 
a motion for peace. He called for a public declaration that peace and 
not the destruction of Napoleon's government was the goal of the party, 
'and there, for a time, leave it.'^ Under new pressure from Grey, 
Holland concluded that silence would best deter Grenville from sounding 
a 'war whoop' in Parliament and in late January he laid his views before 
Whitbread:
If I thought there was the slightest reason to imagine that the 
Court entertained any romantic & impracticable projects of wresting 
all of her conquests from France & were preparing to enter into 
negotiations for that purpose I would then move for an address to 
negotiate a general peace; still more, if any project so wicked & 
absurd as well as impracticable was suspected to be conceived here 
as that of altering the Government of France I should think it my 
duty to rouse the attention of Parliament & the Country to so 
ruinous & preposterous an undertaking but till I believe such 
notions to be entertained I think a Parliamentary resolution for 
peace might be productive of more mischief than good.^
Here it ended. Holland's opposition could not be resisted. In early
1813 he feared a schism with the Grenvillites; he was afraid that a cry
for peace would adversely affect negotiations already under way; he had
faith in the moderation of Sidmouth, Liverpool, and Castlereagh; and he
felt that his exertions could possibly strengthen the war faction in
the Cabinet.^
Throughout 1813 Foxlte leaders studied European developments 
closely. The absence of reliable information continued to discourage 
activity in Parliament but fears for the ultimate outcome of the war 
were ever-present. In January Whitbread succeeded in reestablishing a
^Adair to Grey, 20 Jan. 1813 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 28 Jan. 1813 (Grey).
^Holland to Whitbread, n.d. [late Jan. 1813), (Whitbread), 4250.
^Holland, Further Memoirs, pp. 169-81;
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relationship with Sheridan and the following month found him at 
Tierney's house soliciting support for a peace motion.* By late March 
Whitbread had succeeded in gathering enough petitions to reopen the 
question. On the 30th he reported his intentions to Holland House, sug­
gested that he and Holland should present the petitions to Parliament on
2the same day, and even expressed a desire to cooperate with Grenville. 
Holland, who was alarmed by Joseph's unexpected evacuation of Madrid, 
agreed once again to cooperate. Apparently with the tacit approval of 
Grenville, on 2 April the two Foxite chiefs presented their petitions 
and warned against [as Holland put it] a 'chimerical notion of wresting 
from France what she had acquired during the last twenty years, or of 
humiliating the great prince who now ruled that country.'A
These views, however, were pushed in neither House. Foxite leaders 
were now fully aware of the real nature of the coalition's internal 
divisions. Notwithstanding Holland's moderation Grey had to use great 
diplomacy in calming a ruffled Fitzwilliam and in May, when Grey sounded 
Dropmore on the wisdom of a moderate proposal for negotiations, Grenville 
tactfully discouraged the idea.’ In response to Holland's request for 
support Lauderdale cited the lack of reliable information as a reason to 
maintain silence on foreign politics and Tierney agreed,^ Then, too, *9
*Whitbread to Holland, 30 Jan. 1813, B.M., Add, MSS. 51576 
(Holland). Tierney to Grey, 11 Feb. 1813 (Grey).
2Whitbread to Holland, 30 Mar. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 
(Holland).
Holland, Further Memoirs, p. 180.
AParl. Deb., XXV, 517-18 (Holland), and 533-34 (Whitbread).
^Fitzwilliam to Grey, 4 April 1813 (Grey). Grey to Fitzwilliam,
9 April 1813 (Fitzwilliam/Northants). Grenville to Grey, 28 May 1813 
(Grey).
^Lauderdale to Holland, 7 April 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51698 
(Holland). Tierney to Lady Holland, n.d. [1813], B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland), ff. 111-13.
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personal animosities discouraged the cooperation of Foxite peers and 
the more active members of opposition in the Commons. Burdett drove 
away even the members of the Mountain with his intemperate remarks on 
the war and in mid-May when A1thorp and Bennet organized a 'party* din­
ner to celebrate a good division on the Catholic question most Foxite 
peers apparently agreed with Lauderdale that Whitbread's supporters were 
not 'the people by whose determination it is fit that my conduct shall 
be regulated.''*'
Long-standing faith in the military skill of Napoleon also dis­
couraged activity in Parliament. Grey was extraordinarily rigid in his 
opinion that the French would reverse the tide of battle.  ^ in early 
April he noted that a man's schemes of invading France had to 'rest on 
calculations equally erroneous both of the means which this country has 
at its disposal, & those which he supposes to be left to the enemy.'^  
Indeed in May Grey was so sure of his sagacity that he distributed maps 
which depicted the superiority of the French positions.^ Initially even 
Wellington's victory at Vittoria failed to awaken most Foxite leaders. 
Both Holland and Grey felt that the victory would facilitate the opening 
of negotiations, and the French performance at the battle of Lutzen, 
which roughly coincided with Vittoria, was hailed as a major step to­
wards a European settlement.^ Deluded by sadly exaggerated accounts
^"Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 25 May [1813], B.M., Add. MSS. 51697 
(Holland).
^Tierney to Holland, [May] 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51584 (Holland),
f. 42.
^Grey to Adair, 4 April 1813 (Grey).
^Gloucester to Grey, 3 May 1813 (Grey).
Holland to Grey, 19 May 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland). 
Gloucester to Grey, 5 July 1813 (Grey). Grenville to Holland, 25 July 
1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 (Holland).
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from Wilson and Douglas Kinnalrd, Lansdowne interpreted the battle as 
being conclusive proof 'of Bonaparte's superior skill if any were want­
ing' and Grey was extravagant in his praise of Napoleon.-^ According to 
the Duchess of Devonshire the Foxites were betting on Napoleon during
Othe spring.
When faith in French arms wavered the void was filled by faulty 
intelligence, old prejudices, and an inclination to believe the worst.
In early July Liverpool told Lauderdale that financial considerations 
would eventually dictate a European settlement. Within two weeks this 
disclosure had mushroomed into strong rumours at Holland House that 
ministers were deterred from concluding peace only by the Regent.-* In 
August Rosslyn reported authoritatively that Wellington had been stopped 
in his tracks by Soult's reinforced army and by mid-September Brougham 
was predicting that the British army would be forced to retreat and that 
a separate Anglo-French treaty would be concluded by Christmas.^* Confi­
dential reports from the north of Europe were also astonishingly inac­
curate. Rosslyn was confident on 31 July that the 'Basis & most essen­
tial points' of a European settlement had been agreed upon. He founded 
this opinion on the nomination to the Austrian Cabinet of a man who was 
'notoriously devoted to the French interests.'-* Wilson's reports con­
firmed that Austrian jealousy of Russia would lead to a Franco-Auatrian
^Lansdowne to Holland, 25 May 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland). Grey to Holland, 25 May 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 
(Holland).
^Stuart, Dearest Bess, p. 194.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 10 July 1813 (Grey). Holland to Grey, 23 
July 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 2 Aug. 1813 (Grey). Brougham to Creevey, 15 
Sept. 1813. Creevey Papers, I, 10«>,
-*Rosslyn to Grey, 31 July 1813 (Grey).
358
alliance and they convinced Gloucester that the Poles would join 
Napoleon en masse.^  On the other hand Roscoe was led to believe that 
Russia and France would sign an arrangement similar to the treaty of 
Tilsit.2 The experiences of the Ministry of All the Talents, which had 
formed a poor opinion of the northern powers, were also of Importance. 
Whitbread, who apparently searched for signs of Allied dissension, was 
very critical of the Russians.-* Gloucester refused to attend a chapter 
of the Knights of the Garter because the Regent was going to extend the 
honour to the Czar.^ '... we should never forget of what materials the 
confederacy is composed', wrote Grey in late September.-*
This pessimism for the cause of the Allies facilitated continued 
cooperation with the Grenvillites for a considerable period of time be­
cause few in the old war party thought that there was a chance of total 
victory. During the spring and summer Grenville had no faith in either 
Wellington or the possibility of Allied cooperation in the north. In 
June he was sure that a treaty would be signed and as late as 31 August 
he complained bitterly of Perry's support for the war in the Peninsula.&
In July Tom Grenville lamented that the 'drunken and inflamed enthusiasm 
of London is at this moment for eternal war' and the following month 
found him laughing at the thought of invading France. 7 Auckland, who
^-Gloucester to Grey, 26 July, 13 Sept. 1813 (Grey).
^Roscoe to Gloucester, 10 Aug. 1813 (Roscoe), 1784.
-^Whitbread to Holland, 8 Aug. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 
(Holland).
^Gloucester to Grey, 26 July 1813 (Grey).
5Grey to Holland, 24 Sept. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
^Grenville to Wickham, 11 June 1813 (Wickham). Grenville to 
Auckland, 6 July, 31 Aug., 28 Sept. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 (Auckland).
7T. Grenville to Grenville, n.d. [July 1813], and 4 Aug. 1813,
H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 348, 349.
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agreed with the Foxite interpretation of Lutzen, was certain as late as 
20 September that Englishmen were being 'comforted and encouraged by 
lying reports and absurd misrepresentations.
Of course the drift of events on the Continent daily increased 
animosities within the coalition. In June Holland saw Castlereagh's 
treaty with Bernadotte as a step towards an odious 'continental system' 
and even Grey felt that the British guarantee of Norway announced views 
'which make one look with absolute terror at the continuance of a war 
audited by such men ...'^ But when Holland and Whitbread advocated a 
broad attack on British foreign policy Grenville balked and Grey re­
vised his views. 3 The result was a poorly managed motion of censure 
which failed miserably.^ Grattan, Newport, and many others refused to 
attend; opposition leaders failed to coordinate the motion with the con­
siderable number of independent voters who disliked the treaty; and 
Ponsonby (according to Ward) read the motion from what was obviously a 
hastily prepared draft that was 'so blotted and interlined that poor 
Snouch blundered in every other sentence as he read it ...' In addi­
tion the motion was 'insufferably long, utterly despicable in point of 
composition, and full of propositions to which no man playing a great 
game in politics could be expected to assent This was the result
^"Auckland to Grenville, 21, 30 May and 20 Sept. 1813, Ibid., 338- 
39, 342-43, 350-51.
^Holland to Grey, June 1813, B.M., Add. MSS, 51545 (Holland).
Grey to Adair, 4 April 1813 (Grey).
3Grenville to Grey, 12, 13 June 1813 (Grey). Grey to Holland,
16 June 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
4Parl. Deb., XXVI, 715-42, 746-82 (18 June 1813).
^Horner to Holland, [22 June ] 1813 (Horner), V. 399-400. Ward 
to Helen Stewart, [24 June 1813?], Letters to 'Ivy',
pp. 206-08.
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of compromise between Holland and Grenville, and it left a bad taste in 
the former’s mouth. From June 1813 Holland and Grenville found it in­
creasingly difficult to be rational when discussing foreign politics.
In early June the two opposition leaders clashed on the issue of 
South American independence. 3 Shortly after the motion on the Swedish 
treaty Lauderdale and Holland ignored Grenville's objections, demanded 
negotiations, and accused the government of acting 'as recruiting ser- 
jeant to the emperor of the French . ..'^ Whitbread duplicated this per­
formance in the Commons, claiming that the Allied powers did not have at 
heart 'the real benefit of mankind, or a sincere desire to establish 
peace on the continent.' Of importance was the fact that Tierney's 
friend Abercromby supported Whitbread in debate.3 By early July Holland 
made no secret of his support for any settlement which would guarantee 
the security of Austria and the independence of Spain and the Baltic. 
When Grey tried to moderate these views by expressing a simple wish for 
Allied victory in Germany he learned that Holland would no longer bend. 
'On the whole', wrote Fox's nephew, 'I am satisfied that Bonaparte's 
resistance & successes in Germany are more favorable to the conclusion 
of peace than if he had been beat & war carried to the frontiers of 
France.' In mid-August Holland felt that any peace with Napoleon would 
bring Britain more security than continued war.**
In late September word reached London that the fragile armistice 123
1Grcnville to Holland, 11 June 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland).
2Grenville to Holland, 20 June 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51530 
(Holland). Pari. Deb., XXVI, 956-58.
3Parl. Deb.. XXVI, 999-1002 (30 June 1813).
^Holland to Grey, 3, 6 July and 13 Aug. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51545 (Holland).
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between the combatants In Germany had been broken by the Allies' rejec­
tion of a French proposal for peace. This news sent Holland into a fit 
of rage against Alexander and Frederick William. 'I heartily hope they 
may be damnably beaten', he exclaimed on the 27th.1 Lansdowne, too, was 
disturbed and he admitted that he was 'almost glad our victories are so 
expensive to us, as it may incline [us] to be satisfied with a few of 
them & leave off. ' 2 Once again M.P.'s demanded an Intelligible party 
stance on the war. Mackintosh, who was greatly alarmed, probably out­
lined consensus opinion in a letter to Grey on 1 October:
The Question must substantially arise on the very first day of the 
Session whether the War ought to be supported with vigour. Perhaps 
either Subsidies or another measure proposed for that end may be 
... resisted. I am disposed to think that you will consider the 
worst of all Parts for the Whig Party on such an occasion to be 
silence, faint support or timid resistance. It is true that by no 
conduct they can gain any present object. Rut general reputation, 
public confidence, internal union & Spirit, the authority of lead­
ers in short all the means of future strength seem to me to depend 
upon our appearing to have a system adopted to so great an occasion 
& upon our acting upon that system with boldness, concert & (as a 
natural consequence I hope) with unanimity. All long silence on 
great subjects accustoms the Public to look to others. On this 
occasion it might be maliciously misrepresented in various forms.
It might be ascribed to a plan of lying in wait for the errors & 
misfortunes incident to extensive operations. It dispirits all the 
followers of a Party & tends gradually to alienate them. It appears 
to be an abdication of the functions of an opposition ... Seces­
sion in Principle may be justifiable in extraordinary Circumstances 
as the most vigorous means of protesting against a pernicious sys­
tem. But this is no reason why the Leaders of a great Party should 
sink into activity through weariness & disgust. Least of all would 
this be wise when their antagonists appear to be truimphant.^
In effect Mackintosh argued for Grey to assert himself against Grenville.
In London party leaders argued vehemently. On 5 October Whithread 
sounded Holland on the question and later in the day Holland called for *2
Holland to Grey, 27 Sept. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
2Lansdowne to Lady Holland, 28 Sept. [1813], B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
^Mackintosh to Grey, 1 Oct. 1813 (Grey).
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public meetings, petitions, and motions for peace and reform in 
Parliament.'*' Morpeth, to whom Holland applied for support, resisted 
his opinions stoutly.^ Horner, who had recently been returned to 
Parliament through Grenville patronage, argued that the 'insurrection 
of national spirit' in Germany formed 'a new conjuncture, in which the 
Whigs ought to adopt the war system upon the very same principle which 
prompted them to stigmatise it as unjust in 1793 and as premature in 
1803.'-* Controversy on this issue permeated Whig society. Madame de 
Stael, the celebrated authoress of De l'Allemagne, became the
figure upon whom this debate centred,
Madame de Stael's arrival in London had been widely publicized. 
Having recently returned from the courts of Alexander and Bernadette, she 
was entertained lavishly by ministers and members of the royal family. 
Soon after her arrival the publisher John Murray parted with 1,500 
guineas to obtain the manuscript of her book, and its publication in 
early October made her the rage of the day. Madame de Stael's political 
views instantly made a great impression on Whig society. According to 
Byron 'she interrupted Whitbread [a daring move] ... she misunderstood 
Sheridan's jokes for assent; she harrangued, she lectured, she preached 
English politics to the first of our English Whig politicians, the day 
after her arrival in England ...' At Bowood Foxite peers and their 
ladies climbed on tables and chairs to see her. What was her charm?
First and foremost she was a bitter enemy of Napoleon who could not
^Whitbread to Holland, 5 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51576 
(Holland). Holland to Morpeth, 5 Oct. 1813 (Carlisle).
^Morpeth to Holland, 7 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51577 (Holland).
^Horner to Allen, 25 Oct. 1813, Horner Memoirs, II,
157-58.
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understand why many men who professed loyalty to Whig principles identi­
fied their own cause with that of Bonaparte. She clashed with Godwin, 
who defended Cromwell while championing Napoleon.*- Holland was forced 
to forbid his wife to see her because Lady Holland grew violent in her 
presence.^ Bedford wrote her a long defence of peace with Napoleon only 
to be refuted.3 she had no patience with traditional Foxite views on 
the war; she praised Burke; and one observer noted that nobody's ideas 
could 'move at the rate of her tongue.' She uonnAed -ft» discuss politic* uJrR 
Dugald Stewart, and Ward saw her as a 'jealous Pittite' who had set out 
to convert Grey.^
On the other hand, while Madame de Stael's hatred of Napoleon put 
her at variance with those Foxites who could support their traditional 
view of the war with no intellectual criteria, her defence of French 
liberties gave her much in common with many party leaders. Sheridan, 
Lansdowne, Brougham, and Mackintosh saw in her a reflection of their own 
frustrations; the las"i reported that she was upset because the war 
'was a contest between a man who was the enemy of liberty, and a system 
which was equally its e n e m y . M a d a m e  de Stael soon understood the in­
tellectual grounds upon which Fox had called for peace and her deep dis­
cussions with Foxite leaders undoubtedly were important. Soon they
*\J. Christopher Herold, Mistress to An Age (London, 1959), pp.
427-30.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 17 Oct. 1813 (Grey).
^Lansdowne to Lady Holland, 26 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
^Maria Stewart to Mrs. D. Stewart, 2 Nov. [1813], and Ward to 
Helen Stewart, [24 June 1813], Lette'rs to 'ivy', pp.
219-21, 208.
^Robert James Mackintosh (ed.), Memoirs of the Life of Sir James 
Mackintosh (London, 1835), II, 267.
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combined with word that Wellington was on French soil to determine 
policy. 1 By mid-October Whitbread was preparing yet another motion 
for peace and other Foxite leaders were ready to confront Grenville.
Holland asked Grenville if he would support a settlement which
would leave Napoleon in possession of the Low Countries, Italy,
Switzerland, and Germany. Grey, who for five months had been afraid to
mention the war to Grenville, asked him if he would endorse a motion for
immediate negotiation. These proposals spread alarm in the Grenvillite
camp. Fitzwilliam told Grey flatly that the party should support the
government's foreign policy.  ^ Hearing rumours that Whitbread and
Holland would move for peace regardless of his opinion,Grenville pre-
pared a speech and asked Wynn to contest the Foxites in the Commons.
On the 16th he was moderate in telling Holland that a peace leaving
French power intact would not 'last so long as that of Amiens did. ' ^1
After conferring with Fitzwilliam, however, he sent a wave of shock
through the coalition with his reply to Grey:
... when we advised a defensive & husbanding system it was not be­
cause we had reconciled our minds to give Europe over to the des­
potism of France. It was because we wished to reserve our exertions 
for that period which we were confident must arrive when the in­
solence of France would unite against Her all the Powers by whose 
disunion alone she had triumphed. That period has now arrived.
These remarks were accompanied by a promise to speak in Parliament
against peace, and several days later Grenville emphasized that it was
absurd for the party to encourage moderation because the Allies 'stand
^Rosslyn to Grey, 19 Oct. 1813 (Grey).
^Fitzwilliam to Grey, 17 Oct. 1813 (Grey).
^Grenville to Wynn, 16 Oct. 1813 (Wynn).
^Grenville to Holland, 16 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51827 
(Holland).
^Grenville to Grey, 21 Oct. 1813 (Grey).
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even yet ... much more in need of the spur than of the bridle .
These views angered the Holland House circle considerably. Allen 
wailed about contradictions in Grenville's opinions. 'He is against any 
overtures for peace and yet seems not sanguine about the success of the 
war. He rejoices over the advantages that have been lately gained over 
France & yet laments over the sacrifices made in support of Spain . ..'^ 
Primarily through pique the Hollands took a diametrically opposing view 
and Lady Bessborough was astonished to find that Holland ’would defeat 
Buonaparte in Spain, and let him defeat the allies in Germany. ' 3 On the 
28th Lady Holland warned that Grenville was scheming to 'drag all the 
Whigs after him again to support his old rants in favour of the cause of 
Monarchs On the 30th Holland, for the first time since the forma­
tion of the coalition in 1806, questioned the wisdom of further coopera­
tion with Grenville.
All the ravings of Holland House, however, could not disguise the 
fact that Grenville's warning had proved amazingly effective in checking 
the aggressiveness of Foxite leaders. Lansdowne had had enough. After 
receiving Tom Grenville's threat 'to buckle on ... parliamentary armour' 
he decided that the war had been 'placed on the very best foundation by 
the Christian manifesto [Declaration of Frankfurt], & there I think we
■^Grenville to Grey, 1 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
^Allen to Horner, 20 Oct. 1813 (Horner).
OJLady Bessborough to Ld. G. L. Gower, [24 Oct. 1813], Granville 
Correspondence, II, 485.
^Lady Holland to Grey, 28 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland).
^Holland to Grey, 30 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
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should do well to leave it.1' Grey also retreated. On 24 October lie 
had argued strongly for a parliamentary resolution in favour of peace; 
on the 27th, after hearing from Dropmore, he spoke of Grenville's rea­
sonableness and congratulated himself or 'qualifying at least the lan­
guage which he seemed disposed to hold, and in preventing his speaking 
as he has written . ..'^ Holland, too, grew timid. On the 30th he con­
fessed to Grey that 'the nearer the time comes the less inclination X 
feel to speak - for I do not see what I can say that will assist my 
friends & if I said all 1 think on Germany & Spain I should say much 
they would disapprove.'^ By the end of the month it appeared that 
Grenville's firmness had carried the argument.
News of Leipsic reached London on 3 November, the eve of the 
meeting Parliament. Such an extraordinary turn of events had not 
been anticipated by Foxite leaders. Convinced that they had succeeded 
in moderating Grenville's viewsj* Grey, Lansdowne, Lauderdale, and 
Bedford had seen nothing to be gained by an amendment to the Regent's 
Address and consequently they had not come up to London. The net result 
was that Holland found himself confronted by a fully mobilized 
Grenvillite party. In spite of prior Foxite timidity Leipsic had 
prompted Tom Grenville to 'buckle on his parliamentary armour' and he 
had come to the Commons with Elliot, Wynn, and Fremantle hoping that 
Whitbread's pacifism would give him the opportunity to bring matters to 
an open rupture. Lord Grenville was swelled with pride because of what
^•Lansdowne to Lady Holland, 26 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 
(Holland).
2Grey to Holland, 24, 27 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 
(Holland).
^Holland to Grey, 30 Oct. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Mackintosh to Holland, 3 Nov. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51653 
(Holland).
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he saw as a victory for his and Pitt's wartime system, and to Holland's 
chagrin he had the draft of a speech in his pocket. In the Commons 
Castlereagh's moderate speech prevented a nasty scene on the opposition 
benches for Tom Grenville actually expressed disappointment when 
Whitbread gave the government his support. In the Lords, however, 
Grenville and Holland were at daggers drawn. Seeing an explosive situ­
ation, other opposition peers wished to be as brief and unprovocative as 
possible. Sussex led off with a perfectly harmless speech but Wellesley, 
who spoke second, gave the eager Grenville an opening by mentioning the 
desirability of a speedy negotiated peace. When Wellesley sat down 
Grenville told him that such pacific language forced him to speak. At 
this Holland threatened to contest Grenville or to leave the House in 
protest. This threat had little effect. Grenville promptly took the 
floor, stated that the independence of Holland should be made a British 
sine qua non, and concluded with a cry for war which placed him far to 
the right of ministers. Poor Holland found that he was faced with the 
unenviable task of speaking for ministers in opposition to the views of 
his ally. To avoid such an appearance he gave a silent vote for the 
Address and left the House.^
Grenville's speech rapidly became the talk of London. Upon read­
ing it Lady Bessborough thought that she had 'blunder'd upon a Minister 
instead of a discontented Lord ...' 'Nothing', she wrote, 'can be 
wiser than his Speech, nothing ... sounder policy, but surely It is new 
language, or rather returning to old language, for him. ' 1 2 Others agreed
1 Holland, Further Memoirs, pp. 183-84. For 
Grenville's apparently poorly-reported speech see Pari. Deb., XXVII, 
13-19, (4 Nov. 1813).
2Lady Bessbcrough to Ld. G. L. Gower, 5 Nov. 1813,
Granville Correspondence, II, 489« r
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with this assessment. Holland was mortified because Grenville 'took to 
himself & Pitt's Government the merit of having always maintained the 
system he was recommending.' He also disapproved of Grenville's con­
tention that (because of the initial attack of the French revolutionary 
armies) British honour demanded the expulsion of the French from Holland 
Rosslyn was also greatly disturbed by the speech and Lauderdale was furi 
ous because nobody had contested Grenville's endorsement of subsidies. 
From Northumberland Grey practically scolded Holland for walking away 
from a fight and stated menacingly that if he [Grey] had been present he 
could not have avoided 'throwing a little water in Grenville's wine.'-* 
Grenville's reference to the issues of the 1790's, he told Adair, was 
the real point of contention:
I am not sorry that I was not present on the first day. For I 
should no doubt have been thought too pacific; & if I had spoken,
I should have been under the necessity not only of putting some 
guards on what Grenville said about Holland, but of disclaiming 
the support of the present Confederacy, as being the result of the 
policy of Pitt's Gov't in the original war against France. Per­
haps if I had heard Grenville I might not have felt the difficulty 
which appears in the report of his Speech, but if we are to talk 
about the questions of 1792, I must shew that the present Alliance 
ip supported by me upon the ground that it is directly contrasted 
with the Coalition of that period. The fact is, that the Allies 
have now been placed by France in the situation in which France 
was originally placed by the Allies. The success of both has been 
occasioned by the spirit of resistance produced by injury & op­
pression; & my great hopes of the present Confederacy were chiefly 
derived from this, that it has arisen rather from the feeling of 
the People than [from] the policy of the Govt which it embraces.
Grey, then, was prepared to support the war but unwilling to tolerate
Grenville's frame of reference. He, like Horner, would support the
^■Holland to Grey, 5 Nov. 1813, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland). 
Also see Grenville to Newport, 6 Jan. 1814 (Newport).
(Grey).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 27 Nov., and Lauderdale to Grey, 8 Nov. 1813
i
%rey to Holland, 8 Nov. 1813, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland). 
^Grey to Adair, 11 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
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"risen people" of Russia and Germany as he had Initially supported 
those of France and those of Spain at the time of their revolutions. He 
would never accept a thesis that Pitt's foreign policy had produced posi­
tive results in Europe.
Grey's indignation on this question is perfectly understandable. 
Placing the maintenance of the coalition above all other political con­
siderations, Grey had for years turned a deaf ear to Whitbread's de­
mands that the party should return to the principles of old. Grey, like 
Fox in 1806, had been willing to disregard such a demand for the sake of 
what he thought was the greater consideration: coalition. Through 
thick and thin he had tried to neutralize the prejudices of the 1790's 
and now Grenville himself had violated the agreement of 1806! Even 
while laying his foreign views before Adair he requested the strictest 
confidence and expressed fear that Grenville's speech would dispose many 
Foxites 'to mark & to widen any difference which there may be between 
Ld. Grenville & me.' Feeling betrayed,the Foxite leader sounded his 
ally on this subject. Grenville's reply cleared the air considerably:
With respect to former opinions about the origin of the War I can 
only say that I wish you had heard what I did say on the first day. 
But I ought on every account to be explicit on that subject. When 
it was first considered between Fox & myself whether the public cir­
cumstances of the Country, & the state of our opinions as to future 
measures would admit of our cooperation, the most distinct reserve 
was expressed on both sides as to former opinions to which we still 
adhered respecting past transactions. And if any necessity for such 
discussions should have arisen (as might easily have happened when 
we were nearer to those times) I should have felt as little hurt my­
self by his expressing his adherence to his opinions, as I should 
have thought he could be, if I declared, as I ever must, when called 
upon to speak at all upon the subject, that my original opinions in 
favour of the necessity & wisdom of the measures of 1792 & 3, have 
been confirmed by every succeeding event.
But while I acted with him, the esteem & respect with which his 
character inspired me, & since his death the cordial friendship 
which I hope 1 may say has been established between yourself & me 
has made me desirous of avoiding to the utmost of my power every 
subject or topic on which it was probable we might differ. On the
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particular point of the origin of the War my own personal character 
& conduct are in a most essential manner involved . ..^
Grenville's candour left Grey with a simple decision. It x./as established 
that he and Grenville could not agree on foreign politics. The question 
was whether this difference of opinion should be allowed to dissolve 
their union. In office it would demand a formal separation. At the mo- 
ment, however, there was no reason for alarm. The Regent's speech had 
been moderate, the public declarations of the allied powers had ex­
pressed a willingness to negotiate with Napoleon, and Grenville was as 
incapable of promoting war as were the Foxites of promoting peace. More­
over, Parliament would soon be prorogued. For these reasons Grey con- 
eluded that inactivity was the best policy.
Meanwhile in London the search for a party stance on the war con­
tinued to frustrate Foxite leaders. Jersey scolded Grey for his in­
activity and promoted a motion calling for negotiations. Francis was in­
clined to agree and though he felt that the Bourbon family x^ as 'burnt 
into the socket' he feared that the allies wanted to 'feed the lamp...' 
Even Adair was unnerved by the thought of a passage of the Rhine and the
i l l ; ’  1 ' i i  1 '  t -  . cu. f  1 ■' * ' '  • „
Hollands were alarmed by reports that a British expedition to Antwerp was 
under foot. The Holland House circle was in disarray. The news of 
Leipsic had been entered in the dinner books as a guest and thereafter 
the ledger had fallen into confusion. Both Lord and Lady Holland pre­
ferred to believe that all was well with Napoleon. They assured their 
friends that the Emperor had survived Leipsic with his strength unim­
paired and in mid-November Holland dampened the spirits of everyone at
^•Grenville to Grey, 24 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
2Jersey to Grey, 27 Nov. 1813 (Grey). Francis to Ld. Bristol, 
7 Nov. 1813, Francis Memoirs, II, 376-77. Adair to Grey, 5 Nov. 1813 
(Grey). Lord and Lady Holland to Grey, 13 Nov. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51545 (Holland).
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a garden fete in Chiswick by belittling the successes of the allies.^
Notwithstanding these opinions it is clear that the vast majority 
of party leaders were averse to a confrontation with either Grenville or 
the government. Adair argued that there had been nothing in Grenville's 
speech 'at variance with the sentiments which we have all heard Fox a 
thousand times repeat as his own.' 'I confess', he wrote to Grey, 'that 
I wish you had made that speech (with some alterations) or that the gen­
eral sense of it had been supported by some of the Fox part of the 
Union.'^ Horner was equally displeased with the 'reserve' shown by 
Foxite leaders and told Murray that 'the opposition ought to have 
adopted the war of the allies, and to have marked on the first day the 
sentiments which belong to the new conjuncture in which affairs are 
placed.'’* According to Marsh, Napoleon's speeches to the French Senate 
made even the Holland House circle grow cold on the Emperor.^ Holland 
lamented that Napoleon preferred 'the cant & nonsense of a regular sov­
ereign to the language which would become the military chief of a free 
Nation' and he was especially dismayed 'to hear him whose power grew out 
of the revolution ... describe the rights for which Frenchmen fought in 
92 & 93 as Anarchy & misery.' 'I feel like Madame de Stahl [sic] 1 , he 
wrote dejectedly, it is difficult to know what to wish - I hate & 
detest Bonaparte more than ever & yet I am not sure if he were to fall 
that the legitimate sovereign would not be restored & that in my mind is
1 Stuart. Dearest Bess, p. 202. Holland to Caroline Fox, n.d.
[Nov. 1813?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51739 (Holland), ff. 161-62.
^Adair to Grey, 8 , 21 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
^Horner to Murray, 5 Nov. 1813 (Horner).
Slarsh to Morpeth, 21 Feb. 1814 (Carlisle).
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the last of misfortunes
Grey's studied inactivity, Holland's intellectual confusion, and 
the warlike views of the Grenvillites and many Foxites rendered a united 
front in Parliament impossible. Other circumstances checked the enthu­
siasm of those who were willing to support resolutions for peace. 
Brougham was correct when he observed that Leipsic had made the govern­
ment so 'nearly absolute' that there was 'no one measure that might not 
be carried thro' both houses by acclamation.'^ Rosslyn, who was eager 
to challenge ministers, nevertheless admitted that French disasters ap­
peared 'to support and justify every thing that could be said [by min­
isters]; & the tide seems to set in with such violence that it is impos­
sible to speculate upon what will be the State of Europe in a few weeks 
... Foxite leaders were on the defensive and many of them felt that 
they could best promote a negotiated settlement by applauding the mode­
rate language of ministers while at the same time recommending that 
peace should be concluded at the first opportunity. This opinion sprang 
from strong rumours that the Cabinet was divided on the question of the 
war. It was supposed that a peace faction composed of Liverpool, 
Sidmouth, and Castlereagh was opposed by a war faction led by Eldon and 
the Regent. 'I suspect a large portion of the Ministry are clearly 
peaceable', wrote Holland. 'As a party measure is it not judicious to 
foment their differences by expressing our ... opinions? And In justice 
to the country is it not right to shew the peaceable what support they
■^Holland to Roscoe, A Dec. 1813 (Koscoe), 2098. Holland to 
Caroline Fox, n.d. [Dec. 1813?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51739 (Holland), ff. 
222-23.
^Brougham to Roscoe, 30 Nov. 1813 (Roscoe), 505.
^Rosslyn to Grey, 27 Nov. 1813 (Grey).
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are likely to find in Parliament?'^  So strong was this feeling that 
Holland actually speculated that Liverpool would resign.^ Later Tierney 
predicted a negotiated settlement and a subsequent realignment of poli­
tical factions similar to that which had existed at the time of the 
Peace of Amiens: Castlereagh, Sidmouth, and the bulk of the Foxites op­
posed by Canning, Grenville, Fitzwilliam, Eldon, and the Regent,-*
The last week of the session found Foxite leaders hopelessly 
divided on the stance to be taken in Parliament. Holland, Lansdowne, 
Horner, Tierney, and Whitbread's friends were determined to support 
ministers.^ On the other hand Grey, who felt that parliamentary exer­
tions of some sort were necessary, was eager to assault ministers on 
grounds that Grenville would endorse. After gaining the tacit approval 
of Grenville, Grey and Mackintosh tried to raise support for a resolu­
tion censuring ministers for their role in the revolution which had re­
cently expelled the French from Holland and placed the Prince of Orange 
on the Dutch throne. This led to violent disagreement. Holland and 
Grey exchanged heated arguments on the question of opposing ministers. 
Lauderdale, who wanted to attack the government, nevertheless felt that 
Grey's arguments against the Prince of Orange would place Castlereagh
^Holland to Grey, 11 Dec. 1813, B.M. , Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Grey to Holland, n.d. [Jan. 1814?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 
(Holland), ff. 12-15.
-*Tierney to Grey, 3 Mar. 1814 (Grey).
^Tierney to Lady Holland, 20 Nov., and n.d. [Dec. 1813], B.M.,
Add. MSS. 51585 (Holland), ff. 97-8, 103-04. Horner to Mrs. D. Stewart, 
n.d. [Nov. 1813], (Horner), V., 404-05. Lansdowne to Holland, 10 Dec. 
1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 (Holland). Creevey to Whitbread, 14 Dec.
1813 (Whitbread), 5725.
^Holland to Grey, 4, 11, 13, 18 Dec. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 
(Holland). Grey to Holland, 8 , 22 Dec. 1813, and Grey to Lady Holland, 
10, 15 Dec. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
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'upon the Whig ground, & the Opposition may be held to maintain the 
wildest of Tory doctrine - That a People & a Sovereign cannot alter the 
form of a Government.13 Grenville, who wanted to cooperate with Grey, 
retreated from fear of 'objecting to the details of measures when I ap­
prove the general course pursued.'Finally, on the last day of the 
session when Mackintosh brought the issue before the Commons,Tierney re­
fused to vote, Whitbread sided with the government, many members of the 
Mountain displayed their general contempt for the maiden speech of Grey's 
friend by walking out of the House, and Perry almost attacked Mackintosh 
personally in the Morning Chronicle.3
Holland closed the session by applauding the government's conduct 
of the war. At the same time he stated the doctrine which had been at
the bottom of his conflicts with Grenville:
... who can rationally dispute the sacred truth, that a government 
is not made for its own Interest, but for that of the governed; and 
that it is contrary to the laws of God and nature for any power to 
interfere with the arrangements which a people may think proper to 
make for their own government. The utmost, therefore, which any 
foreigner can legitimately do to such arrangements, is to offer ad­
vice or to express regret ...^
This statement, which went to the heart of the traditional Foxite inter­
pretation of the French Revolution, did not arouse party leaders in 
December 1813. Many of them were captured by the momentum of the allied 
push towards the Rhine; some continued to place unrealistic faith in the
3Lauderdale to Grey, 18, 21 Dec. 1813 (Grey).
^Grenville to Auckland, 15 Dec. 1813, B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 
(Auckland). Grenville to Grey, 24 Nov., 15 Dec. 1813 (Grey).
3Parl. Deb., XXVII, 303-22 (20 Dec. 1813). Mackintosh to Grey, 
28 Dec., and Tierney to Grey, 14 Dec. 1813 (Grey). Ward to Helen 
Stewart, 8 [Jan. 18141. Letters to 'Ivy', pp. 230-33. Morning 
Chronicle, 21 Dec. 1813. Mackintosh to Allen, Jan. 1814, B.M., Add.
MSS. 52182 (Allen), ff. 53-4.
4Parl. Deb., XXVII, 293-94 (20 Dec. 1813).
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French armies; others were afraid of a rupture with Grenville; and 
still others were anxious to undermine Grenville by supporting what they 
thought was a peace faction in the British Cabinet.^
There is little doubt that the extended prorogation of Parliament 
during the early months of 1814 prevented an open rupture between the 
Foxite and Grenvillite wings of the coalition.2 Within days after the 
prorogation in late December Grey grew uneasy about the progress of the 
allies and sounded Tierney and Ponsonby on the possibility of moving 
resolutions for peace as soon as Parliament reconvened. He later made 
similar proposals to both Auckland and Lauderdale, and by 6 February he 
had decided that Castlereagh was 'the most profligate and unenlightened 
politician that I ever read or heard of ...'^  On 1 March he was so en­
raged that he prepared to join Holland in London for an attack on 
British foreign policy and he wrote emotionally that he would 'be stout 
against the War-Makers, be they who they may.'"*
Of course the Hollands endorsed Grey's views completely. The 
passage of the Rhine convinced Holland that his confidence in ministers 
had been misplaced and on 24 January one observer reported that Fox's 
nephew was accusing the allied powers of bad faith 'upon no other ground 
than because Buonaparte accused them of having refused to treat
'''Note the interesting comment of the Examiner, 5 Dec. 1813.
ZAustin Mitchell, The Whigs in Opposition, 1815-1830 (London, 
1967), p. 81.
^Tierney to Grey, 5, 13 Jan., and Ponsonby to Grey, 23 Jan. 1814
(Grey).
^Grey to Auckland, 11 Jan. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 34458 (Auckland). 
Lauderdale to Grey, 8 Feb. 1814 (Grey). Grey to Holland, 6 Feb. 1814, 
B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
^Grey to Holland, 1 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
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upon the basis they had themselves proposed . ..'^ Fearing a Bourbon 
restorationjHolland searched for contacts in Paris to allay his fears.^ 
Lady Holland wished for the rout of the Allied armies in the presence 
of ten people and she became so frantic that she injured herself by 
'jolting over the streets' spreading malicious gossip. 5 Holland's 
views caused him great frustration. *1 cannot but hate Bonaparte but I 
cannot but admire him', he wrote to Grey in early March. 'Oh, that he 
would but coalesce with the old constitutionalists & republicans ...'^
But though Holland could not decide which combinations of French politi­
cal factions could best serve the country he was vehement in his denun­
ciation of the Allied powers. Tom Grenville found Holland House 'unap­
proachable' by mid-March because it was 'the only house in London where 
our success is disparaged and our allies abused.'"’
The politics of Holland House were too unpatriotic to appeal to 
the bulk of the party** but after mid-January very few Foxites would have 
voted against a resolution calling for peace. Brougham, who initially 
felt that reports of a passage of the Rhine were no more than a 'stock- 
jobbing trick' by the ministerial press, noted after the passage was con­
firmed that 'the notion of saving F.urope by such means is a neat kind of
*T. Grenville to Grenville, 24 Jan. 1814, H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
371. .
^Grey to Lady Holland, 3 Feb. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
3T. Grenville to Grenville, 5 Feb. 1814, H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
38O. Holland to Grey, 2 Feb. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
^Holland to Grey, 5 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51545 (Holland).
3T. Grenville to Grenville, Mar. 1814, H.M.C. Dropmore, X, 384.
**Lady Holland to Grey, 4 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51549 
(Holland).
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Bull.'^ Jersey was also vocal in his denunciation of the violation of
2French territorial sovereignty; Ponsonby was extremely displeased by 
what he saw as Allied duplicity; and Hobhouse noted that several Foxites 
were delighted when Napoleon temporarily gained an advantage over 
Blucher.^
Aversion to the restoration of the Bourbons was almost universal. 
Horner, who was most warlike until the Allied armies were on French soil, 
defended Napoleon's reign passionately in mid-February.^ Bedford op­
posed a Bourbon restoration in both France and Spain.•* Rosslyn was ap-
f ipalled when the Regent voiced support for the deposed royal family.
'It will be a melancholy end of the Revolution that promised so much to 
see the Bourbons returned', wrote Thanet.^ The most indignant Foxites 
were those who had joined Holland in praising ministers during December. 
Whitbread was 'full of indignation against the Allies' in late February.8 
Creevey praised Napoleon's 'glorious' struggle for survival and was quite 
emotional in wishing for a successful defence of Paris.^ Horner and 
Bennet, both of whom had placed faith in the moderation of the Austrian
^Brougham to Grey, 5, 15 Jan. 1814 (Brougham).
^T. Grenville to Grenville, 24 Jan. 1814, H.M.C. Dropmorc, X,
371.
■^Ponsonby to Grey, 3 Jan. 1814 (Grey). Broughton 
Recollections, I, 87.
^Horner to Jeffrey, 12 Feb. 1814 (Horner).
^Bedford to Lady Holland, 3, 20 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51665 
(Holland).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 3 Feb. 1814 (Grey).
^Thanet to Holland, 14 Jan. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51571 (Holland). 
** Whitbread to Creevey, 23 Feb. 1814 (Creevey).
^Creevey to Whitbread, 21 and [27] Mar. 1814 (Whitbread), 416,
417.
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and British Cabinets, felt betrayed by both.^
The Foxite press united behind similar language. The Independent
Whig never wavered in its abuse of the Allies. After the passage of the
Rhine Perry reversed engines and called for peace with Napoleon's gov-
2ernment so firmly that Tom Grenville expressed concern. The Examiner. 
too, railed against a Bourbon restoration, and the Statesman, which 
hitherto had been comparatively timid on the subject of the war, cham­
pioned Foxite dogma of the 1790's. On 2 February it censured Pitt; a 
day later it branded Burke a 'renegade of liberty'; and on 30 March it 
compared the mayor of Bordeaux (who had recently announced his support 
of the Bourbons) to Benedict Arnold.
An extraordinary number of Fox dinners were held during January 
to celebrate the birthday of the Whig champion and these meetings in­
variably produced unanimity of opinion on the war. The Bristol dinner 
was probably typical. A Mr. Elton, who disclaimed any connexion with 
Grey's party, censured the old Bourbon court of Louis XVI and observed 
that, 'It was in the downfall of this system, that Mr. Fox rejoiced, and 
honoured be his name.' Of course this led to personal attacks on Pitt, 
and one gentleman took pride In pointing out that the dead Prime 
Minister's views on European affairs 'were as regularly falsified, as 
the predictions of Mr. Fox were regularly fulfilled.' 'Gentlemen', he 
concluded, 'all that we have attained, we might, in fact, have possessed 
if we had followed the advice of Mr. Fox, and not gone to war at all.
We have returned precisely to the point from which we set out ...'3 *
*Horner to Murray, 13 Mar. 1814 (Horner). Bennet to Whitbread, 
Feb. 1814 (Whitbread), 5728.
2T. Grenville to Grenville, 24 Jan. 1814, H.M.C. Droptnore, X,
370-72.
^Examiner, 6 Feb. 1814.
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Grey's supporters paid a more modest tribute. In mid-January many 
Foxite leaders including Lansdowne (who opposed political dinners in 
principle) hailed Fox <xnc\ Wws psainc\p\ts at the British Coffee
House.^ The members of the Mountain, who were excluded from this func-
Otion, held their own Fox dinner on 26 March and Holland attended.“
The Grenvillite reaction to continental developments was dia­
metrically opposed to that of the Foxites. Like Fitzwilliam most of 
them found great pleasure in the 'whining of Bonaparte', and Wynn noted
that the entire party was 'in the dumps' in late February when rumours
3spread that the allies would come to terms with Napoleon. Of course 
they were not happy about the views of their Foxite allies, and Tierney, 
looking ahead to the meeting of Parliament, became alarmed. 'If I could 
conceive the possibility of war being of much longer continuance, I 
should prepare for a return of the scenes in 93', he wrote on 13 
February.^
Much of this tension eased with the conclusion of peace. London 
was alive with excitement. White cockades, tokens, and flags of the 
Bourbons were displayed everywhere. Fleurs d_e Lys sprouted all over 
Carlton House when Prinny Invested fat, old Louis with the Order of the 
Garter and on 20 April The Times lauded the efforts of Louis and Prinny 
by claiming that each had 'done their duty before God and man.' There 
was wild rejoicing from Windsor to the Crown and Anchor; parade after *24
^Romilly Memoirs, III, 126. Lansdowne to Holland, 16 Jan. [1814],
B. M., Add. MSS. 51686A (Holland), ff. 84-5.
2Brougham to Creevey, [7] Feb. 1814 (Creevey). Holland House 
Dinner Book entry of 26 Mar. 1814, R.M., Add. MSS. 51952.
•^Fitzwilliam to Sidmouth, 9 Jan. 1814, Sidmouth Life. Ill, 13 5.
C. W.W. Wynn to H. W. Wynn, 28 Feb. 1814, Lady Williams Wynn 
Correspondence, pp. 168-69.
4Tierney to Grey, 13 Feb. 1814 (Grey).
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parade brought thousands to Hyde Park; and when Louis departed for Paris 
half the rank and fashion of England followed him.1 Byron's Ode to 
Napoleon, a bitter denunciation of the emperor's failure to commit sui­
cide, gained instant popularity; the new gods of the day were Wellington 
and Alexander, the 'Czar Philosophe' who had seen the hand of God at 
work on the blood-stained fields of Russia.
This spirit was difficult to resist. 'Whether one likes Bourbons 
or not', wrote one Foxite, 'it is impossible not to rejoice at the les­
son which conquerors have received ...'2 others were astonished by the 
liberality of the allies, and even Wilson confessed that he had not for- 
seen 'so glorious a triumph for the Welfare & liberty of France . ..'3 
Possibly the most curious development was the stance taken by Whitbread. 
At a meeting of the Artists Benevolent Society several days before the 
abdication the painter Farington was puzzled when he heard Whitbread 
praise Wellington for restoring to the nations the art works which the 
'usurper of France' had seized.^ On 10 April the brewer explained his 
views to Sheridan:
A Limited Monarchy in France, with Religious Liberty, a Free Press 
and Legislative Bodies such as have been stipulated for before the 
Recognition of the Bourbons, leave their Restoration without the 
possibility of Regret in the Mind of any Man who is a Lover of 
Liberty and a friend to his kind. Paris safe, Bonaparte suffered 
to depart, after the experiment had been fully tried of effecting 
a Peace with him, upon terms such as he was mad to reject - 'Tis 
more than 1 dared to hope!-’ *23
^J. B, Priestley The Prince of Pleasure and His Regency, 1811-20 
(London, 1971), 114-16.
2J. N. Fazakerly to Lady Holland, 1 May 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51576 (Holland).
3Wilson to Grey, 16 ApriH814, B.M., Add. MSS. 30120 (Wilson).
^Lean, p. 101.
f--’Whitbread to^Sheridan, 10 April 1814, Creevey Papers.
I, 19).
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Whitbread's political colleagues agreed. Creevey and Bennet were de­
lighted by the liberality of Alexander and they hailed the Restoration 
as a blessing for Great Britain. Brougham, of course, was more speci­
fic. He saw the removal of the crippling issue of war and peace as the 
first step towards Whig unity and he was certain that peace would end 
the long reign of political reaction which had stifled the movement for 
parliamentary reform. 'No murders, no Torture, no conflagration. How 
will the pretty women of London bear it', wrote Whitbread.^
The leaders of the Mountain were willing, indeed eager to forget 
the past. Their emphasis was on the political advantages of peace: a 
return to normalcy and a subsequent restoration of constitutional bal­
ance in Britain. Early in the summer an address was proposed in the 
House of Commons which congratulated the Regent on 'the restoration of 
so many ancient and legitimate authorities on the continent ...' Most 
Foxite8 absented themselves on this occasion but Whitbread could not be 
kept away from the House. He admitted that ministers had pursued a 
system superior to his own in obtaining his goal of peace. He spoke as 
if he were talking to himself. He asked whether he could 'tamely submit 
to it as a fact* that all which had been 'said or thought, and still 
thought' was founded in error. He praised Castlereagh for his part in 
the negotiations with Napoleon; he hailed the restoration of the 
Bourbons; and he accepted the Treaty of Paris completely. He twice
called Napoleon a madman and when fr 50,000 was proposed for Wellington2Whitbread called for more.
Other Foxite leaders refused to go this far but most of them were
^Creevey to Whitbread, 12 April 1814 (Whitbread), A18. Bennet to 
Creevey, n.d. [Aprlll814], and Brougham to Creevey, 15 April [1814], 
(Creevey). Whitbread to Sheridan, 10 April 1814 (Creevey).
2Lean, p. 101. Pari. Deb., XXVIII, 454-57 (29 June 1814).
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pleased by the turn of events on the Continent. Lansdowne was espe­
cially delighted and both he and Lady Lansdowne attended the coronation. 
Bedford, who was ecstatic about the 'triumph of the Spanish Whigs', had 
'no fears of Kings and Princes being tempted to oppress their subjects 
or betray their trust.' But Grey, who had seen the issue of the war 
tear his party apart since 1806, was the happiest of them all. He was 
eager to strengthen his bond with Grenville and in mid-March, when it 
was clear that Napoleon would be beaten, he compromised his views to such 
an extent as to call for the restoration of the Bourbons on the ground 
that 'it would probably disable France for the next 20 years at least.''
Grenville was also anxious to cooperate with Foxite leaders, and 
an extraordinary development had made him willing to dodge the contro­
versial issues of the past. While favouring the restoration of the 
Bourbons between January and March he had become greatly frustrated by 
the thought of foreign powers forcing a monarch on the French people. 
Apparently his pessimism had formerly prevented him from fully evaluating 
the difficulties inherent in this development for on 22 March he confided 
to Auckland that 'how Ld. Castlereagh & Ld. Wellington are to settle 
which Gov't they acknowledge in France I leave to other politicians to 
decide - to me it seems a little [absurd?] to treat with the Emperor & to 
proclaim his rival.' The whole scene sickened him; he was relieved that he 
was not in office; and he had no desire to discuss the issue in Parliament.3
1Bedford to Holland, 25 May [1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51662 (Holland).
2Grey to Holland, 12 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
Also note Grey's comments in the Lords of 19 April 1814. Par!. Deb.,
XXVII, 454.
3Grenville to Auckland, 19, 22 Mar. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 34459 
(Auckland). Grenville to Wickham, 12 Mar. 1814 (Wickham). Tom Grenville 
also had qualms. T. Grenville to Grenville, Mar. 1814, H.M.C. Dropmore.
X, 383.
This shabby acknowledgement of the wisdom of traditional Foxite argu­
ments troubled Grenville greatly for he slowly realized that the success 
of what he considered to be his own foreign policy pushed him away from 
Whig ground. Clearly his past arguments had implied support for peace­
time policies which he could not approve: the taxation of British sub­
jects for the purpose of maintaining a standing army on the Continent.
Of course a contented French public would remove this difficulty, he 
speculated, and during April he displayed a marked shift to the left in 
disagreeing with Auckland on the wisdom of retaining the revolutionary 
legislative bodies and all the titles, commissions, grants, and pen­
sions of Napoleon's government.* Reports of discontent in France natu­
rally mortified Grenville and in early May he expressed alarm at seeing 
unhappiness 'in a country so recently delivered from so terrible a 
scourge.' 'It is as if these Emperors & Kings had conspired to impose
impossibilities upon us', he told Grey Indignantly.
These views facilitated a certain degree of cooperation between 
the hitherto divided wings of the coalition. Whitbread approved of the 
Treaty of Paris but was anxious to oppose ministers on specific ques­
tions related to the final settlement of Europe. With some embarrass­
ment Grenville was prepared to cooperate with the Foxites in opposing 
the maintenance of a peacetime army on the Continent but he insisted 
that this theme had to be 'most carefully seperated [sdcl from all dis­
putable points of P o l i c y . T h e  only disputable point was the
*Auckland to Grenville, 12 April [1814], H.M.C. Dropmore, X,
38b-fc, Grenville to Wickham, 19 April 1814 (Wickham).
^Grenville to Buckingham, 9 May 1814, Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos, ed., Memoirs of the Court of England During the Regency, 1811- 
1820 (London, 1856), II, 74-6.
•^Grenville to Grey, 10 June 1814 (Grey).
^Grenville to Lansdowne, (copy) n.d. [June 1814?], B.M., Add.
MSS. 51686A (Holland), ff. 92-3.
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restoration of the Bourbons, and Grey, Lansdowne, and Bedford (all of 
whom were anxious for party unity) were fully prepared to dodge a ques­
tion which parliamentary opposition could not alter. It was therefore 
with some wisdom that most Foxite leaders buried the hatchet and looked 
towards the difficulties which would face Castlereagh at Vienna as a 
result of his successful foreign policy. Grey was delighted that 'the 
nature of the times & correspondence of sentiment would make Whitbread 
more accommodating ...'* Holland and Erskine, who were more anxious to 
attack Castlereagh than to please Grenville, agreed that 'Nothing could 
be better timed than to stop all considerations of difference of opinion
n
in other times upon subjects to be agitated shortly.'
During the spring and summer months the party presented a united 
front in opposing the continuing British blockade of Norway. The inde­
pendence of Poland, a subject which had its roots deep in Foxite dogma, 
was also agitated,^ and Whitbread spoke against the rumoured transfer of 
Genoa to Sardinia stoutly enough to earn a letter of thanks from the 
Genoese mayor.J Then, too, opposition leaders were so eager to ride 
Wilberforce's cry for a general abolition of the European slave trade to 
political advantage that the 'Great Emancipator' grew alarmed. Norfolk 
presided and Grey, Holland, Lansdowne, and Whitbread spoke alongside
^Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 13 Sept. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51698 
(Holland).
^Erskine to Holland, n.d. [May-June 1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51533 
(Holland), f. 44.
3Parl. Deb., XXVII, 768-807 (10 May 1814); 835-64 (12 May 1814).
4Ibid., 455 (Grey, 19 April 1814); 860-61 (Ponsonby, 12 May 1814); 
XXVIII, 453 (Ponsonby, 29 June 1814).
5Serra to Whitbread, 26 Oct. 1814 (Whitbread), 5742. Pari. Deb.. 
XXVIII, 454-57 (29 June 1814).
Wilberforce at the great public meeting at Freemason's Hall on 17 June. 
An attempt to bind Castlereagh on this point continued until the end of 
the session in July.^
Lady Holland's dinner book suggests that peace in Europe also 
facilitated a great deal of social intercourse among the various wings 
of the opposition. On 23 April Rennet, Jersey, Mackintosh, King, and 
Lord William Russell dined with Tom Grenville, Elliot, Ebrington, and 
Eden. On 2 May Fremantle and Dudley North sat at the same table; on the 
8th Erskine, Creevey, and the Whitbreads were entertained; and in an 
astonishing development on the 21st Coke of Norfolk put aside his dis­
taste of Lady Holland long enough to dine with Hardwicke, Newport, and 
Fitzwilliam, the latter of whom had avoided Kensington since Fox's death.
Finally, on 26 May Elliot and young Henry Wynn dined with the old Foxites
2Adair, Jekyll, and Byng.
Underlying this facade of unity, however, were fundamental weak­
nesses. Party leaders continued to be frustrated in their attempts to 
formulate identifiable stands on issues. The conclusion of peace had 
undermined the grounds on which the opposition had traditionally sup­
ported Catholic emancipation and the coalition was therefore stripped of 
what had hitherto been its only unifying cause. Lauderdale, in arguing 
against the promotion of the Catholic claims, outlined the opinion which 
eventually prevailed:
... we were then at war: - Bonaparte was known to have designs upon 
Ireland: Grattan had stated that ... there was a French party in
1 Parl. Deb., XXVII, 570 (28 April), 637-42 (2 May), 656-62 (5 May), 
1078-84 (6 June); XXVIII, 55 (10 June), 267-97 (27 June), 299-351 (27 
June), 365-71 (28 June), 384-413 (28 June), 437-66 (29 June), 466-70 (30 
June), 655-58 (11 July), 803 (20 July), 846-47 (26 July). Wilberforce 
Life, IV, 186-213. Romllly Memoirs, III, 138-40. Gloucester to Roscoe.
15 May 1814 (Roscoe), 1789. Grenville to Holland, 22 May 1814, B.M. ,
Add. MSS. 51530 (Holland).
2Holland House Dinner Books, B.M., Add. MSS. 51952.
385
386
Ireland who were in constant correspondence with France; under such 
circumstances such a measure surely might be right which cannot be 
indicated now that we have obtained peace . ..^
Upon this logic Donoughmore, 'with a reluctance, not over well acted',
abandoned the idea of bringing on the question.^
Easily the most ominous consideration, however, was the fact
that several important Foxites were unwilling to accept the restoration
of the Bourbons. Leigh Hunt probably outlined the primary reason for
this in an editorial of 10 April:
It is not for this man or the other that they [the allies] are con­
cerned, whatever may be their personal dislike to Bonaparte as an 
enemy; it is for the re-establishment of an old dynasty ajs an old 
one, - for the restoration of the old priviledged classes and the 
high aristocratic race, - for the return of prejudice, and medio­
crity, and all sorts of dull super eminences, which are once more 
to consider themselves as taking natural place of desert; - in 
short, for the few as distinguished from the many, - for the family 
of crowned heads as opposed to the infinitely greater family who 
ought to have the disposal of crowns, - for power as opposed to the 
people. It is upon this point that we make our stand against mere 
restoration. If Bonaparte be allowed by the French people to re^~ 
tain the throne, he will exhibit to posterity the spectacle of a 
private gentleman raised to sovereign power in consequence of the 
corruption of a former dynasty; and the people, in consequence, will 
feel a degree of self-respect, and will recollect the power they 
possess where they chuse to exercise it.3
Hunt's view of affairs hardly coincided with the explosion of romanti­
cism which was sweeping through Europe. His was the language of the 
Enlightenment - unpopular language in the spring of 1814 - but language 
which struck a chord in some of Fox's old friends. From the first Wilson 
was adamant in opposing British cooperation with 'legitimates' and he 
took care to stress that post-war Europe was a political vacuum in which 
the 'partial interests of thrones' could not be pushed to 'justifiable
^Lauderdale to Grey, 8 July 1814 (Grey).
2Wynn to Grenville, 26 May 1814 (Wynn). Grenville to Grey 30 
May 1814 (Grey).
^Examiner, 10 April 1814.
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pretensions.' Thanet saw the restoration of the Bourbons as the first 
step in a journey towards feudal darkness. Sussex amused Bennet at a 
political dinner by comparing the Bourbons to the Stuarts. Madame de 
Stael delighted Dugald Stewart's daughter with a tirade against the 
Bourbons. Old Philip Francis was eager for the Foxltes to embrace the 
cause of the deposed emperor, and Rosslyn, who predicted the total de­
struction of French liberties, fell prey to the Napoleonic Legend. 'He 
[Napoleon] has no road to fame open but excessive Devotion and I do not 
despair of his being a candidate for canonization', he wrote upon hear­
ing of the abdication. 'He has at least done right in taking Elba rath­
er than Corsica for I think his Country men would have murdered him from 
shame at his meanness.' Even Lansdowne, who applauded the restoration,
reported dejectedly from Paris that 'Whigs are as much out of fashion
2here as elsewhere.'
Holland House was the centre of disaffection during the spring
and summer. Holland had been incapable of decisiveness while the result
of the war remained in question but the Bourbon restoration eased much
of his intellectual confusion. He was unbending in his views at Ossory'a
home on 20 April, opposing the Restoration and remarking that it would be
a comfort to him if the French king were forced to take the title of
3Louis XVII and to declare 1814 the first year of his reign. Later he *2
^Wilson to Holland, n.d. [April 1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51617 
(Holland), ff. 124-27. Wilson to Grey, 14 May 1814, B.M., Add. MRS.
3012 (Wilson).
2Thanet to Holland, n.d. [April 1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51571 
(Holland), ff. 42-3. Bennet to Creevey, n.d. [April-May 1814],
Creevey Papers, I, 191-92. Maria Stewart to Mrs. D. Stewart, 7 April 
1814, Letters to 'Ivy', pp. 236-37. Francis to Whitbread, 12 May 1814 
(Whitbread), 2576. Rosslyn to Grey, 10 April 1814 (Grey). Lansdowne 
to Lady Holland, 15 May [1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51689 (Holland).
T. Grenville to Spencer, 21 April 1814 (Spencer).
388
vented his frustrations by trying to undermine a motion by C.W.W. Wynn. 
Grenville, feeling that other Foxite leaders supported Holland, actually 
asked Lansdowne 'whether any change had taken place in his general dis­
position to adhere to former connections. ' 1 *3 In all probability Holland 
would have looked on such a separation favourably during April and May.
Other Holland House regulars shared these opinions. Elizabeth 
Vernon censured the Parisian press for attempting 'to persuade a per-
9verse public that the peace is not worse than might have been expected. 
Whishaw was also very critical. In late April he wrote that the 
Restoration was 'a conquest, and that there is a considerable anti- 
Bourbon party [in Paris].' When one of Lansdowne's letters contested 
this opinion he noted that Lansdowne had 'received his impressions from 
Talleyrand and the Corps diplomatique, and has been too much employed in 
going about with Lady Lansdowne to see sights, than in making inquiries 
and observations during the short time he has been there.' Later when 
Jeffrey printed an optimistic account of the state of Europe Whishaw 
observed that it was 'too favourable to the present order of things, and 
far too complimentary to the Ministers ...'^
Lady Holland promoted these feelings. She bet Lansdowne ten 
guineas that within five years the Bourbon king would dispossess 
Frenchmen of their property, and when Tierney praised the new French 
constitution she treated him as a dupe. 'All a humbug, my dear Tierney', 
she said authoritatively.^ Lady Holland actively tried to Influence her
1Grenville to Grey, 17 May 1814 (Grey).
^E. Vernon to Lady Holland, 30 May [1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51800 
(Holland), ff. 166-69.
3Whishaw to S. Smith, 30 April, 1 9 May, and 9 Aug. 1814, Lady 
Seymour, ed., The 'Pope' of Holland House (London, 1906), pp. 55-6, 57, 
59-60.
^Lansdowne to Holland, Aprill814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A 
(Holland), f. 86. Stuart, p. 204.
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husband's political colleagues. She treasured Creevey's report that
French soldiers were still loyal to Napoleon, and in June she told
Allen that Austria and Russia regretted the restoration of the Bourbons
and that a French regiment on review had recently cried out 'Vive
L 'Empereur'.  ^ Lansdowne grew so disgusted by her malicious exaggera-otions that he protested to Holland.
The views of the Hollands and the small number of Foxites who 
agreed with them would have meant little if Grey and Grenville had been 
capable of taking a firm stance on European politics. They were not.
The coalition's leaders began to wrestle with the formulation of policy 
in early October. From the first it was obvious that there was a great 
divergence of opinion as to what language should be employed when 
Parliament convened. Understandably Grenville and Fitzwilllam were not 
eager to agitate on European affairs. Their plan for the session ig~ 
nored the Continent altogether. While timidly referring to the need for 
a low peacetime establishment both Grenville and Fitzwilliam placed 
great emphasis on the folly of continuing the expensive American war.-*
On the other hand, though a number of Foxites expressed interest in the 
American question few of them were willing to dodge the interesting 
developments on the Continent.^ This was owing largely to the 
lingering effect of former opinions. Bedford found delight in
the suspicion that Castlereagh was 'no match for either Talleyrand or 
Metternich and he will be tossed to and fro like a shuttlecock ...'
^Lady Holland to Allen, 25, 26 June 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 52172 
(Allen).
^Lansdowne to Holland, 13 May [1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A 
(Holland).
^Grenville to Grey, 13 Oct., and Fitzwilliam to Grey, 22 Oct.
1814 (Grey).
^Tierney to Grey, 15 Oct. 1814 (Grey).
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Grey doubted whether the Congress of Vienna would get off the ground and
Lauderdale felt that war would result if it did. 1 2 Foxite leaders simply
could not ignore the fact that they had predicted such a dilemma since
1792. Grey called for 'the hottest Opposition that has been made for
years' and he reminded those present at a Fox dinner in Newcastle that
his former opposition to the war had been founded on a belief that the
2European monarchs were incapable of peaceful co-existence.
The differences within the coalition had Tierney in despair by 
mid-October and even Lauderdale saw the need for 'a quiet performance 
of our duty without any over strained activity.' Though Brougham re­
garded the closure of Holland House as a plus (the Hollands went abroad 
in early August) he felt that nothing good could come from continued 
cooperation with Grenville.-^ The bond was too weak. Opposition based 
on financial considerations was a good idea but the party could accom­
plish nothing without pointing to Castlereagh'a foreign policy as the 
source of the country's woes. Moreover, the American war was popular. 
Rosslyn offered a temporary solution. The party should delay parlia­
mentary activity until Castlereagh returned from the Continent with a 
'settled peace' in his hand, he argued. Only then could party leaders 
fully discuss an avenue of attack.^ Grey reluctantly agreed to this 
strategy and stayed in Northumberland. Grenville came up to London
1Bedford to Lady Holland, 4 Sept. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51665 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Holland, n.d. [Aug. 1814], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51691 (Holland), ff. 208-13.
2Morning Chronicle, 30 Sept. 1814. Lauderdale to Lady Holland,
30 Sept., and 30 Oct. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51698 (Holland). Edward 
Hughes, ed., The Diaries and Correspondence of James Losh (London,
1962), I, 40.
^Tierney to Lady Holland, 11 Oct. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 30 Oct. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51698 (Holland). Brougham to Creevey, n.d. [Oct. 1814?], (Creevey).
^Rosslyn to Grey, 2, 20, 28 Oct. 1814 (Grey).
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full of bluster on the American question but found so little support 
that he returned to Dropmore. Meanwhile Tierney harassed ministers and 
speculated on the chances of success after Christmas.^
Developments on the Continent did nothing to facilitate harmony 
within the coalition. The French opposition party was small but ex­
tremely active. At its head was the talented Benjamin Constant; behind 
it was the social and intellectual power of Lafayette, Madame de Stael, 
Madame de Coigny, Madame d'Aquesseau, Sebastiani, Maubourg, and Madame
2de Souza, a group which one English visitor saw as 'the Whigs of France'. 
According to Mackintosh, the most agreeable rendezvous for Bonapartists 
was at Madame de Souza's, and Captain Gronow reported that Lady Oxford's 
hotel in the Rue de Clichy was a haven for Orleanists. But it was 
Madame de Stale's salon at Clichy which most attracted visiting Foxites. 
Her Considerations on the Principal Events of the French Revolution had 
become the bible of French liberals, and her soirees were attended by 
Lafayette, Constant, and the dashing Flahaut.^ Francis noted that 
Englishmen flocked to her chambers 'as if she were a boa constrictor, or 
an orang-outang, whose antics they watched, to make a story of them for 
the next company.' 'How profound! How true! How fine! How original!', 
cried the awed spectators as the oracle s p o k e . A n d  the oracle was not 
happy with the state of France. She agitated for the abolition of the 123
1Grenville to Grey, 21 Oct., 4, 23 Nov., and Tierney to Grey, 12 
Nov. 1814 (Grey). T. Grenville to Spencer. 8 Nov. 1814 (Spencer).
Tierney to Lady Holland, 4 Nov. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 (Holland).
2Ld. G. L. Gower to Lady Bessborough, 28 Sept. 1814, Granville 
Correspondence, II, 500.
3Mackintosh to Lady Holland, 6 Feb. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51654 
(Holland). The Reminiscences and Recollections of Captain Gronow 
(London, 1900)* I, 91.
^lierold, pp. 438-39.
^Francis Memoirs, II, 405.
slave trade, she criticized Wellington and the armies of occupation, and
she secretly intrigued with Murat.
The clique which had surrounded Madame de Stael in England had
followed her to Paris. Horner, Ward, Kinnaird, Rogers, and Mackintosh
were at her side constantly and they were deeply Involved with Constant
and the French opposition in agitating for the freedom of the press.
Constant actually used Mackintosh's name in one of his pamphlets, and
in all probability the pens of Foxites were employed in producing the
wave of propaganda against the slave trade which poured from Clichy.^
The Hollands, too, were on the scene during August and September, and 
*their soirees became famous for politically-oriented decorations. Stone 
lions of different sizes - an obvious reference to their own stature as 
British liberals - stood in their salon; Lafayette and Talleyrand, of
Odifferent sizes themselves, attracted curious visitors.
Though Holland was pleasantly surprised by the liberties which 
Frenchmen had gained with the Restoration he encouraged his friends in 
London to visit Lafayette, xAwm he described as 'truly a Veteran of the 
good old cause . Other veterans of the old cause were present.
Kosciusko moved from salon to salon with his pleas for Polish independ­
ence and the Due d'Orleans resumed his role of the early days of the
revolution. Brougham moved in these circles during October. Not sur-
✓prisingly he returned to England convinced that the new regime in France 
could not last, and he encouraged Grey to go to Paris and see for him­
self. Holland contended that every time a 'legitimate' king was *2
^Mackintosh Memoirs, II, 296. Mackintosh to Horner, 12 Dec.
1814, Horner Memoirs, II, 220-24.
2Tierney to Grey, 26 Sept. 1814 (Grey).
II, 194.
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in
restored 'every sprig of RoyaltWbecomes more insolent and insufferable1 *5. 
'The hostility of the parties grows visible, and the party of Napoleon 
certainly gains strength', wrote an excited Mackintosh late in the year. 
'Some sort of catastrophe seems to be approaching ... The recall of 
Buonaparte is not so improbable an event, as it seemed when 1 came here 
in August.'^
Other centres of political disaffection in Europe attracted 
Foxites. Bedford and his sons had gone to Spain in the spring and by
autumn they were spreading dismal accounts all over Europe. Creevev was
■)in Brussels and his cause was Belgian independence.“ Anstruther, Ward, 
Somerset, Byng, Rogers, Bedford, Lord John Russell, Allen, and the 
Hollands meandered through Italy en route to Murat's Naples late in the 
year. In Florence Lady Holland found a way to send Napoleon a consign­
ment of newspapers and in return she received specimens of iron ore from 
Elba. In Rome Lucien Bonaparte sent her poetry, and soon the Hollands 
moved into Louis Bonaparte's mansion on the Corso. Ebrington, Vernon, 
Fazakerly, Frederick Douglas, and Lord John Russell visited Napoleon on
Elba and returned to Rome with glowing reports of his liberality and
3wisdom. >• < i t . ' i ' . ■ t ' »  i ■ ■
Holland tried to project a semblance of patriotism in his cor­
respondence of the autumn. At first he denounced both Napoleon and 
'legitimates'. Next lie expressed excitement for the cause of Italian
1 Brougham to Grey, 1 Nov. 1814 (Brougham). Holland to Creevey,
17 Oct. 1814, Creevey Papers, I, 206. Mackintosh Memoirs, XI, 324.
^Bedford to Holland, 5 June 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51662 (Holland). 
Holland to Morpeth, 26 Nov. [1814], (Carlisle). Creevey to Whitbread,
5 Nov. 1814 and 3 Feb. 1815 (Whitbread), 430, 433.
\ady Holland to Whishaw, 17 Dec. 1814, The 'Pope'of Holland 
House, pp. 75-80. Allen to Horner, 17 Jan. 1815 (Horner). Lean, pp. 144- 
48.
independence and noted that Napoleon had done less harm than might have 
been expected.* Finally he openly expressed the feelings of those 
around him:
Travellers are hardly impartial judges of Bonaparte's government, 
but the excellence & magnificence of the roads, the abolition of 
turnpikes, & the various publick works which attract their atten­
tion must put them in some sort of good humour with him to whom they 
owe them - & those who have listened to the lying exaggerations of 
our newspapers, Ministers & chief [illegible], after ceasing to consider 
him as a Monster begin to ascribe to him virtues he did not possess & to 
his government those benefits which flowed rather from the events 
which preceeded him than from the system which he established. 2
Holland was still experiencing difficulty in separating his beloved
French Revolution from Napoleon. His assessment, however, went far in
explaining the criteria behind the blossoming Napoleonic Legend. In
January the English colony in Rome moved to Naples; Holland and Allen
immediately rose in defence of King Joachim.^
Correspondence from Foxites on the Continent reached politicians 
in England at a time when reports from Vienna were most disheartening.
Wilson remained Grey's primary source of information. Beginning in 
August, when he predicted a counter-revolution in France, the disaffected 
general exerted powerful influence in the moulding of Foxite opinion.
Wilson detested Metternich and championed the independence of Norway,
Poland, Belgium, Italy, and Saxony. At first he aligned with the 'Czar 
philosophe'. After Alexander disappointed him he embraced France as 'the 
advocate of independent states.' From first to last Wilson was posi­
tively vicious in his criticism of the British government and its repre­
sentatives in Paris and Vienna. He reported that Castlereagh was the
^Holland to Caroline Fox, n.d. [Aug. 1814?], 20 Sept. 1814, B.M.,
Add. MSS. 51740 (Holland), ff. 14-15, 18-19. Holland to Morpeth, 10 
Oct. 1814 (Carlisle).
^Holland to Grey, 20 Sept. 1814 (Grey).




guiding force behind the annexation of Saxony by Prussia; he blamed 
Wellington for the overthrow of the Spanish constitution; he ridi­
culed Liverpool; he criticized the manners of Lady Castlereagh and Lord 
Stewart; and on one occasion he reported that Stewart had been whipped 
by a coachman, jailed, and released on a plea of drunkenness. In 
December, when word broke that Soult had assumed the supreme command of 
the French army, Wilson told Grey that French soldiers were being re­
called from leave and that France and Russia would cooperate in a French 
seizure of Belgium.^-
Wilson's alarming intelligence was accompanied by the equally 
dismal reports of Adair and by the gossip of Foxites on the Continent.
Of course the vindictive spirit which had been largely dormant in the 
spring and summer blossomed with every report. Norfolk publicly toasted 
'the success of the Spanish Insurgents', and Whitbread prepared to at­
tack the British government for arresting Spanish 'patriots' who had 
escaped to Gibraltar and returning them to the agents of Ferdinand.^ 
Criticism of Wellington was almost universal and rumours concerning his 
conduct at Paris spread rapidly. Lauderdale was sure that the field 
marshal's unpopularity with the French people was worse than was re­
ported, and Foxite ladies censured his want of decisiveness and morals.^ 
Castlereagh was also greatly abused. Whlshaw spread rumours that the
^Wilson to Grey, 1, 10, 13, 22 Aug., 31 Oct., 5, 9, 14, 17, 21,
26 Nov., and 1, 11, 12 Dec. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 30120 (Wilson).
^Adair to Grey, 1 Jan. 1815 (Grey).
^Mrs. A. Romilly to Caroline Fox, Nov. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS.
51965 (Holland). See Whitbread's copy of The Times, 28 Feb. 1815, in 
the Whitbread Papers.
^Lauderdale to Grey, 10 Dec. 1814 (Grey). Caroline Fox to 
Holland, 24 Nov. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51740 (Holland). Mrs. A. Romilly 
to Caroline Fox, 21 Nov. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51965 (Holland).
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Foreign Secretary had been turned against the abolition of the slave 
trade by one of his aides. A large gathering at Jersey's home censured 
the British stand on Poland and Saxony, and Lady Jersey noted contemp­
tuously that 'Castlereagh makes success very unpopular.' Lauderdale 
predicted immediate war in Germany.^
Bonapartist sympathies mounted with this growing disenchantment. 
The Hollands and their circle of friends in Naples openly compared the 
blessings of Napoleon's reign with the wickedness which had followed 
the abdication. In England Elizabeth Vernon, whose son had recently 
visited Elba, described the deposed emperor as 'a most wonderful per­
son.' Lauderdale and Grey exchanged enthusiastic accounts of Ebrlngton's 
conference with Napoleon, and at Woburn Whitbread spoke warmly of the 
emperor's character and genius. 'Napoleon has lost his empire but I 
continue his friend and admirer as before', wrote Whitbread's neighbour 
Peter Payne. 'He is great in his fall. Posterity will benefit by him, 
both in what he intended good and in the bad which was forced upon him. ' * 2
Reports from the Continent stimulated a great deal of conversa­
tion about Fox and his concept of foreign politics. The Bishop of 
Chester told Caroline Fox that if her uncle had ever been in office 
under a wise and honest king 'the English statesman & the French 
Conquerer would have done better for Europe than the Ambassadors & 
potentates will do at the Vienna Congress.Noting the appearance of
^Whishaw to Lady Holland, 12 Oct. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 51658 
(Holland). Lady Jersey to Grey, Dec., and Lauderdale to Grey, 5 Dec,
1814 (Grey).
2E. Vernon to Lady Holland, 5 Jan. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51800 
(Holland). Lauderdale to Grey, 24 Dec. 1814 (Grey).
Broughton Recollections, I, 175-77. Payne to Whitbread, 6 Jan. 1814 
[sic 1815], (Whitbread), 2569.
^Bishop of Chester to Caroline Fox, 29 Jan. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 
51968 (Holland).
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a weekly newspaper entitled The William Pitt, Henry White envisaged a 
rival print, The Charles James Fox, through which the wisdom of Fox's 
foreign views could be promoted. During the summer and autumn he 
failed in his efforts to secure the financial aid of Foxite leaders but 
in November he opened shop with the support of Grey, Coke, Albemarle, 
and probably Whitbread and Bedford. * 3 It was difficult to avoid Fox's 
predictions. At a dinner at Douglas Kinnaird's house Peter Moore, 
Scrope Davies, Perry, and the poet Edward Smedley were entertained by 
Sheridan's anecdotes about his old leader. Midway through the evening 
the old Foxite's nostalgic mood ended abruptly. Rising from his chair 
with uncharacteristic energy he inveighed in strong terms against the 
Vienna Congress: 'crowned scoundrels cutting up Europe like carcass - 
butchers, and cruelly maltreating their subjects who rescued them from 
Napoleon, and silencing us by the dirty bribe of the crown of Hanover 
... ' 3 This was strong language for a Carlton House man, but it was 
echoed by other Foxites who had something to lose. 'I never expected 
anything from this congress of sovereigns but the plunder of Europe: 
they have exceeded all my expectations in the shameless effrontery of 
their proceedings', wrote Horner (who sat for one of Buckingham's 
boroughs) . 3
Great interest was shown for Fox's old cause of Polish independ­
ence and probably for the same reason: Poland stood as a symbol of the 
power politics of the European monarchs. As early as June Polish lead­
ers had encouraged Foxites to embrace their cause. Prior to the
3White to Grey, 24, 31 Aug., 16, 27 Sept., 3, 10 Oct., n.d. [late 
Oct. 1814], and Grey to White, 4, 10, 21 Sept., 18 Nov. 1814 (Grey).
^Broughton Recollections, I, 198-206.
3Horner to Auckland, 17 Nov. 1814 (Horner).
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quent guests at Holland House, and Lady Holland was quite interested in 
their pleas. 1  *3 Apparently Brougham was the warmest advocate of a'aem'i'inde­
pendent Poland. During the summer he wrote a pamphlet, An Appeal to 
the Allies and the English Nation on Behalf of Poland, and then heaped 
lavish but anonymous praise on it in the Edinburgh Review.^  Brougham 
corresponded regularly with Prince Slerakowskl (who was anxious to unite 
the Foxite press behind the cause) and he arranged meetings between 
Poles and Foxites. Both he and Bennet encouraged Whitbread to step for­
ward as the leader of a national movement, and on one occasion Brougham 
actually succeeded in bringing Grey together with Whitbread, Bennet, 
Romilly, and Ossulston to meet Sierakowski and Radzivil. 5 Grey, who 
doubted whether an independent Poland could emerge from the Congress of 
Vienna, was nevertheless active on the question. Mackintosh corresponded 
with Kosciusko; Romilly encouraged Ponsonby to speak on the subject in 
the Commons; and Wilson's prolific correspondence probably helped defeat
Castlereagh's plans for Poland at Vienna.^ Through Sierakowski Bennet
✓obtained the memorials of Fouche, a letter from Alexander to Pozzo di 
Borgo which censured the French Bourbons, and other suppressed documents 
which illustrated Castlereagh's folly. 5 Later these became a large part
1Lady Holland to Allen, 24 June 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 52172 (Allen).
^Edinburgh Review, XX11, 293 -331. Taylor, The Trouble-makers, p. 33.
3Sierakowski to Brougham, 31 July, Aug., and 31 Aug. 1814 
(Brougham). Brougham to Grey, n.d. [June 1814], (Brougham). Brougham to 
Whitbread, June 1814, and Bennet to Whitbread, 19 July 1814 (Whitbread), 
3323, 5739. Romilly Memoirs, III, 141.
^For Grey's views on Poland see the Grey Papers, box 47, file 7.
Grey to Adair, 19 Jan. 1815 (Grey). Kosciusko to Mackintosh, 14 Aug.
1814, Mackintosh Memoirs, II, 273-74. Romilly Memoirs, III, 143. Wilson 
to Grey, 10, 13 Aug., 21, 29 Oct., 5 Nov. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 30120 
(Wilson).
5Brougham to Grey, n.d. [late 1814], (Brougham).
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of the opposition's attack on the Foreign Secretary.
As a result of all this there was a considerable cry for an at­
tack on the European politics of the British government during the early 
months of 1815. Grey was very eager 'without seeming to have any dis­
tinct notions of what ought to be done.'^ Out of deference to Grenville 
he had discouraged activity earlier in the year. In June he had stopped 
Adair from publishing a concise statement of traditional Foxite dogma on 
European affairs but now he regretted his timidity. 'We would have 
formed an excellent record to which we might have referred with the 
greatest advantage', he lamented. But Grey was still anxious to coop­
erate with Grenville, and Adair himself saw 'no reason why an opposition 
might not be formed upon the old plan, and with the old v i e w s . W h e n  
Grey's son became desperately ill in January the father refused to leave 
Northumberland, and Grenville assumed the direction of policy.
Grenville was not a happy man in early 1815. Every report from 
the Continent suggested that his and Pitt's concept of wartime objec­
tives had been poorly-developed from the start. He undoubtedly felt 
Castlereagh's pains, and he was not anxious to give Foxite leaders a 
free hand In Parliament. He saw the appointment of Soult as a 'bad 
omen'; he feared that Belgium would be ceded to France; he doubted if 
Great Britain could retain Hanover; he was disturbed because a British 
army remained in the Netherlands; and all the while he knew that he 
could do no better if the reins were in his hands.3 His fundamental
^"Lauderdale to Lady Holland, 6 Feb. [1815], B.M., Add. MSS.
51698 (Holland).
^Grey to Adair, 19 Jan. 1815 (Grey). Adair to Lady Holland, 7 
Jan. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51611 (Holland).
^Grenville to T. Grenville, 10 Dec. 1814, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville). Grenville to Grey, 12 Dec. 1814 (Grey),
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concept of foreign politics did not differ from that of Castlereagh and 
yet not only his political allies but also many of the younger members of his 
family were eager to attack the entire structure of British foreign 
policy. Ebrington was in Naples discussing Napoleon's attributes with 
Holland; Wynn was ridiculing Castlereagh and Stewart; Buckingham was 
questioning the advantages of Napoleon's fall; and even Tom Grenville 
agreed with the Foxites on the subject of Poland.'*' Meanwhile Grenville 
was doing everything in his power to avoid embarrassing discussions.
In mid-January he met with Tom Grenville, Buckingham, Elliot,
Newport, and Ponsonby at Stowe and emphasized that the recently- 
concluded treaty of Ghent was the subject upon which the coalition 
should concentrate in Parliament. Several days previously Grenville had 
lamented that the conclusion of peace with America had disarmed the 
party. Now he was emphatic in calling for an attack on the management 
of the American war and a motion for parliamentary enquiry so as to 
determine why the conflict had been prolonged at such enormous expense 
if ministers were to be content with status quo ante bellum. Grenville 
succeeded in carrying this point, and Ponsonby asked Horner (who was 
known to be hot about the Congress of Vienna) to open the American ques-
Otion in mid-February.
With it firmly established that the treaty of Ghent would be the 
first priority of the coalition it was decided that specific questions 
relating to Europe would be dodged in favour of general comment on the 
necessity of a low peacetime establishment. According to Tom Grenville
^Wynn to Grenville, 28 Dec. 1814 (Wynn). Buckingham to Wynn, 13 
Nov. and 14 Dec. 1814 (Wynn). T. Grenville to Spencer, 12 Dec. 1814 
(Spencer).
^Buckingham, Memoirs of the Court, II, 107. Grenville to T.
Grenville, 3 Jan. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 (T. Grenville). Ponsonby 
to Homer, 25 Jan. 1815, Horner Memoirs, II, 225-26.
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the plan was ’to refer to Pitt's peace establishment of 1791, & to re­
quire from his friends now in office either to adopt that, or to justify 
in detail the points in which they propose to exceed it.'* In addition 
Grenville wanted the party to oppose the retention of the property tax. 
As one Foxite observed incredulousLy, the battle plan which was adopted 
evaded foreign politics and simply called for opposition to the taxes 
which would be required to enforce the Vienna settlement.^ Apparently 
Foxite leaders appreciated Grenville's difficulties and were willing to 
work around them. Grey approved the plan; Lauderdale told Lady Holland 
that Grenville's views were adopted 'for the sake of mere display'; Tom 
Grenville assured Tierney that the only real point of difference was the 
restoration of the Bourbons; and Mackintosh, though pessimistic, ex­
pressed hope that the opposition could avoid disagreement in Parliament 
by using different language but dividing together on motions of a gen- 
eral nature.
In early March Napoleon landed on the beach of the Gulf of Juan 
near Cannes. As the world watched in stunned silence the French Emperor 
marched north unresisted and entered Paris at the head of 40,000 men on 
the 20th. Bourbon attempts to rally the western provinces failed; the 
people of Bordeaux and Auvergne rose en masse; the tricolour was hoisted 
in the communes of Dauphlne; and the Bourbon army at Marseilles broke 
rank in disorder and wept for joy at being captured. The Due d'Angouleme
*T. Grenville to Wynn, 25 Jan. 1815 (Wynn).
^Mackintosh to Holland, 6 Feb. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51653 
(Holland).
^Grenville to Grey, 31 Jan. 1815 (Grey). Lauderdale to Lady 
Holland, 6 Feb. [1815], B.M., Add. MSS. 51698 (Holland). Tierney to 
Lady Holland, n.d. [Feb. 1815?], B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 (Holland), ff. 
134-35. Mackintosh to Lady Holland, n.d. [Feb. 1815], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51654 (Holland), ff. 27-9.
402
was captured outside Valence; Louis XVIII, the Duke of Bourbon, 
Talleyrand, and the royal train departed for England; and Massena raised 
the tricolour in Provence after a short civil war. On 20 April 100 guns 
from Les Invalides announced to Paris and salvoes from the coastal bat­
teries and frontier fortresses announced to foreign nations Napoleon's 
almost bloodless reconquest of France. Trying desperately to contrast 
his behaviour with that of the European sovereigns,Napoleon magnani­
mously freed Angouleme, accepted the territorial settlement of the 
treaty of Paris, employed Benjamin Constant to draft a constitution, 
abolished the French slave trade, and despatched overtures for peace to 
Great Britain.
These events brought an explosion of Foxite passions. 'Vive 
L'Empereur', wrote Lady Holland while her husband predicted that Murat 
would 'set Italy in a flame'. 'As an Englishman one must wish him to 
fail', observed Ward as he witnessed the mobilization of Murat's spir­
ited Neapolitans. 'And yet the actions of the greatest captain that 
ever lived have been so glorious and astonishing, and the traces of his 
power, directed to objects of the highest public ulitity ... are so much 
more striking than those of any other Individual that ever lived ... 
that I cannot help harbouring some feelings with respect to him which 
are neither very reasonable nor very patriotic. ' * 2 Romilly was captured 
by the contrast between Napoleon and the Bourbons; Horner found the 
spectacle 'wonderful and frightful'; Bedford immediately planned to re­
turn to England and raise a cry for peace; and Thanet, who was bedridden
^-Somerset De Chair, ed., Napoleon's Memoirs (London, 1858), pp.
475-77.
2Holland to Caroline Fox, 5 Mar. [1815], B.M., Add. MSS. 51740 
(Holland). Ward to Helen Stewart, 24 and 27 Mar. 1815,
Letters to 'Ivy', pp. 278-83.
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with the gout, wrote to Grey:
Gout in the hand but Napoleon for ever. No interference in the 
affairs of France, no continental alliances. Napoleon will revolu­
tionize the World if attack'd upon the horrid barbarous principles 
of the Declaration of Congress; if such a congress is to govern or 
Napoleon, my choice is made in an instant. Beasts Brutes & Savages 
overjan Austria, Prussia & Russia ... What better practical appli­
cation of our Principles, than the result of the March to Paris?
I would not give up one Iota of those principles on any account, or 
for the sake of any support. They are as strong & well-grounded in 
policy as in honesty ... Save us from War if you can, but if not 
let us have a good & sound exposition of our Principles. Why are 
we to be the paymasters of all the Russian Banditti in the world?
Who can be elected King if Napoleon is not?"*-
Several Foxites saw the hand of the supernatural at work. Henry 
Thompson contended that Grey felt strongly that Napoleon was 'formed for 
great purposes' and that he considered the emperor 'as Being of a nature 
above the general standard of mankind, as one in great degree above com­
parison.'^ Whitbread was deeply moved. 'Learn Justice, and do not de­
spise the Gods', he cried in the Commons.-^
Initially many Foxites felt that Grenville's language of late 
1814 and early 1815 indicated that he would not look unfavourably on 
developments in France. Then, too, Tierney was certain that Englishmen 
would not support a war to restore the Bourbons and that therefore the 
coalition was safe. As late as 21 March Whishaw told Sydney Smith that 
both Grey and Grenville were 'entirely averse to any interference in the 
internal government of France, or even to a war for the possession of 
Belgium ...' In mourning for the death of his son and convinced from 
recent conversations that Grenville would concur in a policy of
Romilly Memoirs, III, 161. Horner to L. Horner, 17 Mar. 1815 
(Horner). Bedford to Lady Holland, 18, 24 April [1815], B.M., Add. MSS. 
51665 (Holland). Thanet to Grey, 31 Mar. 1815 (Grey).
^Farington Diary, VIII, 12.
Lean, p. 103, has interesting comment.3
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non-interference Grey remained inactive.*
Until 20 March Ponsonby managed to hold the line in the Commons. 
On the 10th tempers flared when Whitbread and Tierney demanded informa­
tion but the opposition front bench did not push the issue. On the 16th 
Whitbread warned against 'any measure which might implicate Great 
Britain in the civil war which might now have begun in France' but 
Ponsonby discouraged a motion. On the 20th, however, Whitbread opened 
the door to party friction with a defence of Napoleon, an attack on 
British policy at Vienna, and a motion for official papers. Grenville 
did everything in his power to cooperate with the Foxites. Grey arrived 
in London on the 21st, and after lengthy discussions at Camelford House 
he joined with Grenville, Buckingham, and Wellesley in demanding offi- 
cial correspondence on the proceedings at Vienna. Tension mounted as 
reports of Napoleon's progress reached London. On the 26th, when word 
of the emperor's entering Paris arrived, Grenville drew the line. 'His 
[Napoleon's] Government is military', he wrote to his brother. 'He can 
maintain it only by feeding his troops with conquest & plunder ...
With such a man we must be at War, & if we can now unite with us the 
rest of Europe I had much rather take that chance now, inconvenient as 
it is, than wait till he has again by partial intimidation & by corrup­
tion disunited them from us & each other ...? Late in the afternoon he 
met with Grey and got nowhere with this argument. 'There is no hope of 
bringing him to view this matter in this light', he lamented. 'It 
clashes too much with old opinions & prejudices. I grieve for this,
^Tierney to Lady Holland, 27 Mar. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51584 
(Holland). Whishaw to S. Smith, 21 Mar. 1815, The 'Pope 
of Holland House, pp. 96-7. Grey to Holland, 2(Tjune 1815, B.M., Add. 
MSS. 51552 (Holland).
2Parl. Deb., XXX, 114-15, 229-31, 265-305.
3Ibid., 305-06 (21 Mar. 1815).
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|but after all I must act from my own conclusions.
In letters of 28 and 30 March Grenville told Grey that the ex­
perience of twenty years had convinced him that real peace with Napoleon 
was impossible and that the continental alliance of 1814 had to be re­
surrected to remove the French Emperor from his throne. Grey was stout 
in his reply. He stated that the behaviour of the allies at Vienna and 
the obvious attachment of Frenchmen to Napoleon led him to other conclu­
sions. As in 1792 he argued that military cooperation with the continen­
tal allies should be purely defensive, that Britain had no right to im­
pose a government on the French people, and that attacking France for the 
avowed purpose of altering her government was not only unprincipled but 
impolitic, as past events clearly showed. He expressed faith in the pos­
sibility of peace but he stressed that if Napoleon wanted war another 
crusade of kings would only give him the means to wage it. 'As to the 
Bourbons,' he concluded, 'if it is to them you look ... can you believe 
that all Europe, cordial and united, could replace them on the throne of 
France; or if it could, that it would maintain them there? A family 
which in the whole country could not muster a dozen musquets in its de­
fence! ' ^
For the first time Grey tried to rally the Foxites at the expense 
of the coalition. In late March he circulated copies of his corre­
spondence with Grenville among Fox's oldest colleagues, encouraged them 
to come to London, and requested help in the formulation of policy. The *1
^•Grenville to T. Grenville, 26 Mar. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS, 41853 
((T. Grenville). Also see Grenville to Newport, 28 Mar. 1815, copy 
(Horner), and Grenville to Wickham, 20 Aprill815 (Wickham).
^Grenville to Grey, 28, 31 Mar., and Grey to Grenville, 30 Mar.,
1 April1815 (Grey). Copies of this correspondence are in the Holland 
House Papers, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551, ff. 1-25.
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response was astonishing. Lansdowne had no faith in Napoleon but he was 
ready to break with Grenville before supporting a war to restore the 
Bourbons. Horner, Tierney, and Whitbread's friends felt that a schism 
with Grenville would be unavoidable. A group of 'honest Whigs' met at 
Lord King's house and were 'gloomy' because of what was seen as a second 
disintegration of the party.^ On the other hand there was a great deal 
of excitement about a reunion of Fox's old colleagues around the prin­
ciples of the 1790's. I try to flatter myself there can be no de­
fection of any considerable name from the old Fox party', wrote Horner, 
'and if they keep together, they know what it is to maintain a high name 
with small minorities in parliament.' Fox's oldest friends were most 
enthusiastic. William Pcyntz,who was crippled by old age, wanted to 
leave his bed and travel up to London; Coke, Thanet, Lord Robert Spencer, 
Lord William Russell, Norfolk, Tierney, Western, Byng, Taylor, William 
Smith, and Whitbread were also eager; and Francis encouraged Grey to ig­
nore Grenville. Lord John Townshend, who was too ill to attend 
Parliament, gave Grey an enthusiastic vote of confidence. 'I quite 
agree with you that the absence, that is to say the wilful [sic] absence 
of one of Fox's oldest personal friends wd. be terrible, but I am too 
old & steady a Foxite to fear the possibility of misconstruction.'i
F.ditors who had agreed with Fox during the 1790's rallied around 
the standard of peace enthusiastically. The Horning Chronicle led this 
crusade, and one must suspect that Perry leaned heavily on his editions
'LLansdowne to Grey, April Horner to Grey, 28 Mar. 1815 (Grey). 
Caroline Fox to Holland, 23 Mar. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51740 (Holland).
^Horner to Grey, 2 April Thanet to Grey, 2 April, Ld. William 
Russell to Grey, 28 Mar., 6 April, Francis to Grey, 31 Mar., and Ld. John 
Townshend to Grey, 21 May 1815 (Grey). Bennet to Creevey, 3 April 1815, 
Creevey Papers,I, 215-16.
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of the 1790's in writing his editorials of the spring and early summer. 
The Independent Whig also revived the arguments of the 1790's, and the 
Globe and the Oracle cried for peace with uncharacteristic firmness.
The Examiner called for British neutrality, and as the country moved to­
wards war Hunt joined other Foxite editors in praising Napoleon and his 
ally Murat. It was the Statesman, however, which put forward the most 
truly Foxite arguments for peace. The spirit of a risen people could 
not be resisted, it maintained. Napoleon might well be a militarist but 
the context of European affairs was such that the emperor stood as the 
defender of British constitutional principles. Consequently,
He is the best friend to the House of Brunswick who cautions them 
to avoid that rock on which the Stuarts split, and which we now be­
hold covered with the wreck of the Bourbons. On the contrary, he 
is their most dangerous enemy who seeks to entangle them with that 
sinking Monarch, whose destruction is inevitable, and whose cause 
is foreign to England. - Let it be well considered that to make 
common cause between the House of Bourbon and the House of Brunswick 
might involve both in one common fate.^
These arguments were not unreasonable, and they had a considerable effect 
on those who had heard Fox's passionate speeches. They were accompanied 
by the letters of private citizens to Foxite editors. Capel Lofft de­
scribed Napoleon as the sole defender of the principles of the 
Enlightenment in a series of letters to the Statesman, and Godwin sent 
two letters to the Morning Chronicle.“* 'In a question like this,' wrote 
Godwin, 'I feel that we cannot succeed and indeed I frankly confess I do 2*5
■^Asquith, p. 371, has brief comment.
2Independent Whig, editions of mid-March to early June, especially 
that of 2 April 1815. Globe, 4, 7 April, 3, 8 , 26 May 1815.
Farington Diary, VIII, 10.
^Examiner, 12, 19 Mar., 30 April, 7, 14 May 1815.
^Statesman. 24, 25, 28, 31 Mar., 1, 3, 26 April 1815.
5Ibld. , 26, 27 April 1815.
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not even wish we should succeed.'
Waithman managed to carry resolutions through the Common Council 
which censured the allied powers, British involvement in the affairs of 
Europe, and any attempt to interfere in the internal politics of France.- 
The electors of Westminster met in Palace Yard and applauded as Burdett 
and Cartwright raised Fox's banner. Cartwright argued that France was 
'endeavoring to transplant a scion from our tree of liberty', and 
Burdett slammed the enemies of Napoleon. According to the Independent 
Whig only two or three electors opposed the petition which was adopted. 
The electors of Southwark also adopted resolutions against the war.
The naked question of war and peace tore at the political fac­
tionalism which had divided Fox's old party since 1807. Never before 
had Grey found his views endorsed unanimously by the Foxite press; by 
Waithman and the Common Council; by Burdett, Brand, and Cartwright; by 
Whitbread and his friends; and by Foxites in the country at large. Even 
the Regent was having trouble holding his Foxite friends in line. Peter 
Moore and Taylor refused to support Prinny's call for war; Yarmouth 
preached peace all over London; Adam, Moira, and Sheridan (who could not 
afford to disagree with Prinny) remained prudently silent. Only Erskine 
contended publicly that Fox would have supported war in the present cir­
cumstances.^ Other old friends of Fox were confused by the question, 
and several of them went to St. Anne's Hill to seek Inspiration. Grattan 
reminisced with Mrs. Fox for two days in late March, and Fox's wife must 
have been astonished when Lord and Lady Fitzwilliam and Lady Milton
^Lean, p. 65.
Political Register, XXVII, 566-75.
^Independent Whig, 21 May 1815.
4Erskine to J. Wright, 1 May 1815, Fox Speeches. I, v-xlviii.
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called for the first time since Fox's death. She soon grew accustomed 
to such surprises. Coke, who had never acknowledged her existence, 
visited the shrine with Albemarle and the confused Adair. 1
Notwithstanding acknowledged disagreement on the question of war 
and peace the effects of a decade of political cooperation exerted a 
powerful influence on both Foxite and Grenvillite leaders. After his 
strong stand of late March Grey grew timid in early April and tried 
desperately to temper Grenville's views in an effort to weather the
storm. Grenville, too, was anxious to avoid an open break, and he en-
ocouraged his supporters to be moderate. Apparently both men felt that 
once war was declared the coalition could unite to support it.
Grenville noted that both he and Grey were anxious to preserve their 
bond: a formal separation would become necessary only through the 'zeal 
and intemperance of others' and 'if we can avoid it I think we shall.'J 
Accordingly every effort was made to delay a confrontation in Parliament.^ 
On 6 April Grenville brought his entire family to a meeting at Ponsonby's 
house, expressed a willingness to cooperate and compromise for the sake 
of the coalition, and joined with Ponsonby in discouraging a division on 
the Regent's call for military preparations. The following day saw 
Ponsonby, Elliot, Plunket , and Newport argue that a vote for military 
preparations was not a vote for war, and they stood on this ground in 
resisting an amendment for peace which was supported by every Foxite on
^Elizabeth Fox Journal, entries of 28, 29 Mar., 16, 29 April, and 
2 May 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51481 and 51482.
2Grey to Holland, 26 June 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland). 
Grenville to Fitzwilliam, 30 Mar. 1815 (Fitzwillian/Sheffield).
•^Grenville to Wickham, 19 Apr 111815 (Wickham).
^Horner to his father, 10 April1815, Horner Memoirs, II, 245-46.
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the opposition front bench. Afterwards Grey and Grenville assumed the 
offensive with motions in both Houses which were designed to hold the 
opposition together. On the 12th Grey and Rosslyn joined with Grenville 
and Buckingham to censure the lack of precaution shown by the British 
government, and three days later Abercromby, Mackintosh, Elliot,
Ponsonby, and even Whitbread cooperated on the same subject in the 
Commons. Then in rapid succession the opposition divided 94 in resist­
ing the proposed civil list, 58 against the income tax, and 62 against 
the transfer of Genoa to Sardinia. Every effort was made to promote 
harmony. Horner, the only Foxite who sat for a Grenville borough, of­
fered to vacate his seat because of his support for peace. Buckingham 
promptly refused to hear of it, and his kind reply reflected the spirit 
which the coalition's leaders were trying to project.'*
These efforts only delayed the inevitable. The Allied proclama­
tion calling for the dethronement of Napoleon caused Whitbread to in­
clude a vicious denunciation of Wellington in his attack on the 'foul 
crusade of despots', and the Foxite press rose in defence of the brewer.^ 
Lafayette and probably Madame de Stael tried to rouse the Foxltes 
through the medium of the American minister William Crawford. Hobhouse,
*-Romilly Memoirs, 111, 161-62. Horner to his father, 18 April 
1815, Horner Memoirs, II, 246-49. Grey to Wellesley, 6 April 1815, B.M., 
Add. MSS. 37297 (Wellesley). Statesman, 8 Aprill815, for a division 
list and a report of the debate.
^The Statesman was excellent in its reports of debates and divi­
sion lists during the Hundred Days. See the editions of 13, 17, 20, 28 
April1815.
Horner to Buckingham, 28 April, Buckingham to Horner, 29 April, 
and Horner to his father, 3 May 1815, Horner Memoirs, II, 251-54.
^Independent Whig, 9 April, Examiner, 2, 9 April, Statesman, 5 April, 
Morning Chronicle, 5, 6 , 7 April 1815. Lean, p. 104.
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who was in Paris, sent back highly emotive letters to his colleagues.^ 
Holland and Allen (who allegedly wrote a constitution for Murat which 
was intercepted by the Austrians) encouraged their friends in England
Oto stand firm. Then, too, Whitbread was undoubtedly infuriated by the 
nationalistic chauvinism of the ministerial press and by the accusations 
of treason from the pen of Cruikshank. But with all this aside few 
Foxites could ignore the striking parallel between present events and 
those of the early 1790's. 'The times too sadly remind me of 1793', 
wrote Caroline Fox. ’London is as full of Europeans as it was in 1792, 
all holding the same language & actuated by the same motives & the same 
extravagant hopes ...' Yes, replied her brother. '... the French will 
beat them all as they did in 1793 - have they not the same c a u s e ? N o t  
surprisingly, in late April Whitbread ignored Grey, moved for peace, and 
secured 73 votes, not including two tellers and five M.P.'s who paired 
of f.
By early May Grey and Grenville could no longer restrain their 
supporters. Lady Jersey had replaced Lady Holland as the Foxite hostess 
and her home was the scene of great political activity. One observer 
noted on 9 May:
At present there is an armistice and a constant interchange of 
Civilities between the two divisions of the Opposition Forces, but
1 Herold, p. 449. Broughton Recollections. I, 256.
^T. Grenville to Grenville, 3 July 1815, H.M.C. Propmorc, X, 
403-04. Holland to Grey, 12 June 1815 (Grey).
3Lean, pp. 104-05.
^Caroline Fox to Holland, 24 April1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51740 
(Holland). Holland to Caroline Fox, 14 June 1814 (sic, 1815], B.M. ,
Add. MSS. 51739 (Holland), ff. 229-30.
Political Register, XXVII, 564-74, for the debate and division
list.
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each Party is busied in beating up for recruits against the day of 
attack. Reinforcements however come in but very slowly to the War 
Standard. In the Lords GenL Lord Grenville will not muster more 
than seven or ten at the utmost, and in the Commons Brigadiers 
Elliot & Plunket will not command a detachment of above twenty- 
two or three.* 
The Foxites were indeed capturing the coalition's ranking members. They 
scored a major victory when Spencer, influenced by Althorp and his brother- 
in-law Lyttelton, came out for peace.^ He was followed by Grenville's 
kinsmen Ebrington and Nugent, and by Essex, Sussex, Newport, and 
Macdonald, Stafford's nephew.  ^ But easily the most rewarding accession 
was the unexpected support of Lord George Cavendish and the young Duke 
of Devonshire, who hitherto had shown no interest in politics. Deser­
tions were few. Of those who were generally considered to be aligned 
with the Foxite wing of the coalition only Erskine, Ossory, Grattan, and 
the Barings leaned towards the war party. Though Lord George Cavendish 
failed in an attempt to lure Fitzwilliam from the Grenvillite standard 
Grenville was reduced to a party which was smaller than that which had 
divided against the peace of Amiens. This was galling to the family, 
and rumour held that Tom Grenville would come out of retirement so as to 
give the party more character in the Commons.^*
Grey and Grenville held an austere silence in the Lords until 22 
May when the announcement of the renewed coalition against France forced 
activity. Grenville almost backed down. On the 18th he retreated and
*A. Raymond to Lady Holland, 9 May 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland).
*Grey to Spencer, [April] 1815, and Grenville to Spencer, 7 April 
1815 (Spencer).
^Whishaw to S. Smith, 18 Feb. 1816, The 'Pope' of 
Holland House, pp. 142-43.
^A. Raymond to Lady Holland, 9 May 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51585 
(Holland). Ld. G. Cavendish to Fitzwilliam, 31 Mar. 1815 (Fitzwilliam/ 
Sheffield).
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confided to his brother that he could never agree with the Allied de­
claration which made peace depend on the exclusion of Napoleon and his 
descendants from the French throne. But Grenville had gone too far: 
a refusal to take a distinct line in favour of war would be a 'betrayal 
of the cause', he added almost whimsically. Grey was also very reluc­
tant. He professed that he was overpowered by the prospect of the ap­
proaching debate; he told Spencer that he would remain silent without 
his support; and it was only when Spencer sent Cowper his proxy that 
Grey regained a semblance of composure. •*■
At the last minute Ponsonby stepped into the Foxite camp and de­
livered letters summoning M.P.'s to a meeting at Devonshire House.^
Over seventy politicians answered this call.^ An amendment was adopted 
which urged concert with the European powers on a defensive basis and 
condemned a war for proscribing the ruler of France. Enthusiasm was 
high when this was moved by Grey on 23 May, but the Foxite leader lost 
his nerve when he took the floor. Gone was the fire, the firmness, the 
commitment to fixed intellectual principle which had characterized his 
correspondence with Grenville of late March. His defence of the doc­
trine of national self-determination was so weak that Caroline Fox found 
it 'destitute of argument'.^ However, Grey did succeed in tempering 
Grenville's speech for the old Pittite announced his support for minis­
terial policy and said little else. Each echoed the other in lamenting
1Grenville to T. Grenville, 18 May 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 41853 
(T. Grenville). Grey to Spencer, 22 May 1815 (Spencer). Spencer to 
Grey, 22 May 1815 (Grey).
^Stirling, Coke of Norfolk, II, 107.
3Horner to Murray, 24 May 1815 (Horner).
^Caroline Fox to Holland, 26 May 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51470 
(Holland). Later Grey denied this charge. Grey to Holland, 23 Dec. 
1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51552 (Holland).
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their differences. In the division the Foxites counted 44 and were 
beaten by 112. In this majority were Grenville, Buckingham, Stafford, 
Carrington, Cassilis, Bullceley, Erskine, Ossory, and St:. Vincent. The 
vote was most notable for the absence of opposition peers.'*
In the Commons ministers sat by and watched opposition spokesmen 
disagree. Stating firmly that Fox himself would never support the pro­
posed amendment, Grattan absolutely dominated the debate. His remarks
silenced the House to such an extent that the Speaker almost called for 
2a vote. The replies of Burdett, Ponsonby, and Tierney made no impres­
sion; Whitbread did not even take the floor; and Milton, whom most M.P.'s
associated with the Mountain, concluded the debate with a convincing 
3argument.for war. Notwithstanding this debacle; the presence of many 
Foxites on the Continent; the ill-timed Epsom races; the refusal to vote 
by Grenvillites who disagreed with Grenville; the prudent absence of 
Sheridan, Mackintosh, and Adam; and the loss of every floating vote and 
the borough strength of Fitzwilliam, Stafford, and Buckingham the amend­
ment secured 92 votes. According to Bennet only 19 M.P.'s followed 
Grenville.^ This in itself was a tribute to the continuing hold of 
Fox's fixed intellectual principles on the Whig party. 'Perhaps our
•^Horner to Murray, 24 May 1815 (Horner). Examiner, 28 May 1815, 
for the debate, i
2Farington Diary, VIII, 3. Caroline Fox to Holland, 16 June 
1815, B.M., Add. MSS 51470 (Holland).
3Examiner, 28 May 1815, for the debate.
4A. Baring, Sir T. Baring, Balem, Calvert, Carew, Fremantle, 
Gower, Grattan, Knox, Lewis, Mallem, Milton, Pelham, Plunket , Smith,
S. Smith, Wrottesley (II), C.W.W. Wynn, and W. Wynn. Bennet to Creevey, 
31 May 1815, Creevey Papers, I, 215-16. It is worth noting that Grattan 
had never agreed with Fox on the war, and that Plunket was soon to be 
made Chief Justice of the Court of the King's Bench in Dublin.
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opposition to the war was too much delayed & weakened by a hope of some 
accident which might hide our difference with the Grenvilles & by con­
sideration in itself largely due for Lord G [renville]'s honourable con­
duct’, recalled Mackintosh.^ This consideration had been largely re­
sponsible for the discomfiture of the party since 1806.
The days which preceded the final collapse of Napoleonic France 
represented the nadir of Whig hopes. The divisions of 23 and 25 May had 
given Fox's reconstructed Whig party a death-blow, and great animosity 
existed between Foxites and Grenvillites. Moreover, Grey's hedging and 
Grattan's mastery in the Commons had practically extinguished enthu­
siasm. Most Foxites left London, and those who attended Parliament 
should have gone home. Four days before Waterloo Tierney lectured the 
House on the impossibility of victory, and on the night that the news of 
Wellington's great victory reached London Grey and Wilson were pointing 
out to an audience at Brooks's that Napoleon had 200,000 men across the 
Sambre. Just as Wilson was reading a report that the English were filing 
out of Brussels a shout drew the crowd to the windows. 'Horrible news!', 
exclaimed Sefton. 'They have gained a great victory.'* 2
Even after Waterloo many of those who had voted for peace could 
not believe that the war would end. Whitbread was not among this group. 
During the Hundred Days he had delivered over one hundred speeches in 
defence of the principles of his lifetime. 'My public life is extinct', 
he said upon hearing of Waterloo. On a trip to the Vauxhall pleasure
^Mackintosh to Allen, 9 June 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 52182 (Allen).
2Parl. Deb., XXXI. 815 (14 June 1815). Bennet to Creevey, July 
1815, Creevey Papers, I, 24Q. Fulford, p. 249.
■^Spencer to T. Grenville, 23 June 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 41854 
(T. Grenville). Derby to Grey, 27 June 1815 (Grey).
gardens he thought a group of footmen were jeering him. 'They are 
hissing me', he told his wife. 'l am become an object of universal 
abhorrence.' On the opposition front bench he bent forward and nodded 
his head as ministeralists taunted him. On 5 July news arrived that 
Paris had fallen. The next morning Whitbread cut his throat. As 
Hazlitt noted, the brewer's fortitude failed him 'when the last fatal 




The striking feature of most Whig politicians during the final 
decade of the Napoleonic wars was loyalty to the principles and memory 
of Charles James Fox. This reverence for a dead statesman was nothing 
new for the Whig. A vague sense of intellectual continuity, a sense of 
loyalty to the principles and wronged patriots of days gone by had been 
the outstanding generalization of intellectual Whiggism since the 
Glorious Revolution. Never before, however, had a generation of Whigs 
been more retrospective, indeed more timid to step forward without a 
glance over the shoulder. This development is understandable. Never 
before had young men come up through the ranks under the guidance of a 
statesman more intelligent, more charming, more loveable, more dominant, 
and more opinionated than Charles Fox; never before, It was said, had 
young minds fallen under the sway of such a 'magician'.
Fox was peculiarly adept at awing young men, and the image he had 
laboured to project during the 1790's had had an enormous impact. Young 
Whigs had felt the sense of martyrdom inherent In the. old Whig creed; 
they had identified with the spirit of Hampden and Sydney; and it had 
been the wronged Fox, the last of the Romans, who had pointed the way 
through it all. Fox's 'principles' had therefore become the political 
frame of reference for the generation of Whigs which succeeded him, and 
Leigh Hunt was correct when he observed in April 1809 that the word Whig 
was little more than the name of the Foxite party.^ In many ways this 
accounts for the party's dismal performance between the death of Fox in
^Examiner, 16 April 1809.
1806 and the abdication of Napoleon, for the closely-guarded 'Foxite 
Creed' was riddled by contradiction.
The formation of the Ministry of All the Talents in January 1806 
was a new departure for the Foxites. It was part of an extraordinary 
effort by Fox to restore the Whig party to the position of power it had 
enjoyed during the 1780's. In this he was guided by what he felt were 
the principles of Whiggism. On the one hand was Fox's continuing loyalty 
to the Whig myths of the early part of the reign. These called for 
systematic opposition to the evils of a renascent 'Toryism' which was 
said to lurk behind the throne. After 1784 personal opposition to Pitt 
the Younger had been added to this dogma for it was maintained that the 
Prime Minister had gained power on the strength of this evil force. To 
effect systematic opposition great emphasis was placed on the maintenance 
of a group of loyal and honest politicians who could steadfastly oppose 
both men and measures in Parliament. As Lord Archibald Hamilton's pam­
phlet , Thoughts on the Formation of the Late and Present Administrations 
(1804), pointed out, Fox alone among the eighteenth-century Whig chiefs 
had remained loyal to this concept of political manoeuvre. Indeed it was 
the raison d'etre of his political life.
On the other hand was Fox's devotion to the concept of foreign 
affairs which he had formulated during the debate on the French 
Revolution. This concept, too, was deeply-rooted in what Fox saw as Whig 
theory of the early part of the reign, and it could not be separated from 
his emphasis on systematic opposition. Standing squarely between the 
excesses of royal power and the rashness of an unenlightened public, Fox 
had always seen the Whig as a guarantor of English liberties, as a pro­
tector of the Contract Theory, indeed as a reflection of the Constitution 
itself. Parliament had been his fortress, a bastion of strength for the
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cause of constitutional balance. On several occasions he had advocated 
its sovereignty, unfettered by the extremes of the world outside, and 
Burke himself had maintained that the first duty of the Whig was to 
stand by the balance of the Constitution in all weather. It was there­
fore with a certain degree of intellectual consistency that Fox had re­
sisted Burke's clarified definition of Contract as well as England's 
commitment to a European struggle the context of which he felt was 
responsible for the subversion of not only English constitutional liber­
ties, but also the Whigs' crusade against Pitt and the Crown. A firm 
'northern man' prior to 1789, Fox had totally realigned his concept of 
European politics in defence of what he saw as Whiggism. As during the 
American Revolution he had argued that a war necessarily waged against 
the principle which had placed William and Mary on the English throne—  
the principle that a people were free to choose their own ruler— would 
fail miserably and in the process upset the precarious theory of Contract 
in England. A defence of the Low Countries, indeed a check on the ex­
pansion of republican France was not worth such a price.
These concepts— systematic opposition to the Crown and personal 
opposition to Pitt and his wartime policies— were the twin pillars of the 
Foxite Creed of the 1790's, and this creed was never stronger than during 
the opening years of the nineteenth century. The fact was, however, that 
Fox's views continued to separate him from the nation, and even the most 
loyal Foxite was forced to admit that the two fundamental tenets of his 
political creed had proved woefully incompatible since 1794. In follow­
ing the theory of systematic opposition to its logical conclusion Fox 
had fallen prey to a conflict between Whig theory and what were seen as 
Whig interests. His definition of the French Revolution and his cry for 
peace (accompanied by the intemperence of his young admirers) had led to
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the desertion of the landed element of the party, and consequently Fox 
had found himself incapable of challenging the Crown with any hope of 
success. In desperation he had turned to the people for support. This, 
too, had proved ineffectual. From the vantage point of the early nine­
teenth century Fox could see clearly that a serious flaw had formerly 
plagued his concept of politics. Above all else the Ministry of All the 
Talents was important as Fox's attempt to remedy this flaw and lead the 
Whig party out of the abyss into which the debate on the French Revolution 
had cast it.
Behind Fox's brilliant political manoeuvring between 1803 and 1806 
had been a desire to reestablish a strong party acting in systematic op­
position to the Crown. In this he had been successful. One by one Pitt's 
traditional supporters had found themselves cooperating with Fox at cru­
cial moments, and by the time of Pitt's death the king had been discon­
certed to learn that the Whig leader had cornered the market in the 
country's professional politicians. Upon entering office, however, Fox 
was the first to realize that his efforts had secured no long-range bene­
fits for his concept of Whiggism. His coalition with Grenville and 
Fitzwilliam placed men before measures; the rock upon which the Whig 
party had split in 1794— the question of the war— remained clearly visi­
ble. The removal of this barrier had been a leading aspect of Fox's 
scheme from the first. The reestablishment of a systematic opposition 
had been necessary for a successful assault upon the Closet, but office 
alone gave Fox the tools by which he could deliver his 'good, stout blow 
to the influence of the Crown'. These tools were the Foreign Seals.
Fox's conversation with Napoleon in late 1802 had convinced him that he 
could secure a lasting peace with France. Such a peace would end the 
reign of reaction in Britain, he speculated, and it would restore the
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long-departed balance of the Constitution. Consequently it would also 
bring de facto unity to the Whig party; it would rob the Crown of the 
national chauvinism which had hitherto assured its supremacy; and it 
would open the door to constitutional improvement, specifically Catholic 
emancipation and parliamentary reform, causes to which Fox was committed 
through his former flirtation with the 'people'.
Fox's campaign was launched most successfully. He had no diffi­
culty obtaining the Foreign Office, and he secured a majority for peace 
in the Cabinet by luring Sidmouth and Ellenborough into the government. 
Then, too, Pitt's policies had received a serious setback on the field 
of Austerlitz and in the vacuum Fox was able to carry through the Cabinet 
a scheme of foreign policy which was prerequisite to meaningful negotia­
tion with France. The policy of goading European powers to war by means 
of subsidies was abandoned. Emphasis was placed on a 'husbanding defen­
sive system' which at once conciliated warriors and guaranteed a British 
withdrawal from European affairs. And as a final coup Fox secured the 
approval of Fitzwilliam and Grenville for the opening of Anglo-French 
negotiations. Of course beneath these decisions was a great deal of 
disagreement on questions which went back to 1792 and 1793. The war 
faction in the Cabinet visualized an armistice by which Britain could 
conserve her strength until a new opening appeared. Fox felt that he 
could lay a foundation for peace firm enough to overcome the prejudices 
of his colleagues. He approached Napoleon's government promptly and 
cordially, and he went to great extremes to add a personal touch to his 
diplomacy. Fox was confident that the context of Anglo-French relations 
in the wake of Austerlitz and Trafalgar could bring him the treaty he so 
desperately wanted.
Simultaneously the Foreign Secretary began discussions of a
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conciliatory nature with the American minister, James Monroe, This was 
a secondary aspect of his broader objectives. Firstly, from the early 
years of his political career Fox had felt that he personally had a 
stake in the success of what he saw as a nation founded on the best of 
Whig principles. Consequently he had championed Anglo-American accord 
consistently since 1783, contending that American political independence 
had not altered firm economic and social bonds and that therefore ground 
existed for a 'natural alliance'. These feelings had assumed political 
significance during the 1790's when Fox represented the economic pros­
perity and political stability of the United States as being a direct 
result of her isolationistic policies, policies which he advocated for 
England. Moreover, as Fox's arguments on European affairs led him to­
wards the cause of republican France he had defended himself by pointing 
out that America was living proof that a republican government could 
prosper and remain at peace with the world. Secondly, since the source 
of his views was the Whig interpretation of the American Revolution—  
an interpretation which had preceeded the rupture of the 1790's— Fox was 
by no means misguided in feeling that American affairs represented a 
potential source of harmony for his coalition government of 1806. Both 
Grenville and Fitzwilliam looked towards the reestablishment of a firm 
Anglo-American bond with great favour, and it is not insignificant that 
this was a point which separated Grenville from his old Pittite col­
leagues. Thirdly, Fox undoubtedly felt that a rapprochement with re­
publican America would facilitate a relaxation of his countrymen's pre­
judices against accord with republican France. He therefore represented 
American friendship as a major aspect of his 'husbanding, defensive 
system' and he pursued negotiations with both Washington and Paris relent­
lessly until sickness forced him to his deathbed in late June.
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It is idle to speculate on whether a healthy Fox would have been 
able to secure meaningful treaties. Great allowances must be made for 
his powers of persuasion and his reputation abroad but one may state 
without reserve that the Whig leader was pursuing an unobtainable object 
during the last years of his life. On the one hand his foreign policy 
rested on a contention that the accomplishments of the French Revolution, 
good and bad, could not be destroyed by the force of arms; that steel 
could not suppress ideas; that European affairs could not be restored to 
their context of 1788; and that therefore an Anglo-French settlement 
recognizing these realities would be in the best interest of all con­
cerned. On the other hand Fox's party politics aimed at overcoming the 
results of the political revolution in England which had coincided with 
events in France; at restoring British politics to their context of 1788; 
and at overturning an existing political structure for the sake of a 
concept of Whiggism that was at best questionable. As during the 1790's 
these contradictory goals were most elusive. Fox deserves credit for 
trying to resolve the dilemma which plagued his concept of Whiggism.
But his objectives ignored the world around him; they were clearly beyond 
his reach in 1806.
The timing of Fox's death only compounded the problems of his 
party. A vacuum— a total absence of intellectual leadership— quite 
naturally followed the death of such a man. This situation was worsened 
by the contradictions inherent in Foxite dogma and by the unbecoming 
political situation which Fox willed to his successors. Disagreeing 
fundamentally on European politics, the rump of Fox's government was in­
capable of coming to grips with European affairs. Fox's death hardened 
both the British and French governments; Grenville assumed the direction 
of foreign policy; and the peace negotiations were mismanaged to such an
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extent that both pacifists and warriors rose in opposition to the 
government. Primarily because they wished to avoid disagreement on 
European politics the British ministers stood by idly as Napoleon punished 
Prussia at Jena and Russia in Poland. For the same reason wild schemes 
of conquest in South America were formulated and pursued half-heartedly. 
And as a result of this confusion Fox's promising rapprochement with the 
United States was compromised to such an extent that it fell to the 
ground. Talleyrand ran circles around the divided British ministry. 
Finally the government fell in a manner altogether undignified when it 
attempted to conciliate Fox's disenchanted followers with a foolishly 
compromised concession to Roman Catholics.
From the fall of the Ministry of All the Talents in March 1807 
until the collapse of revolutionary France in the summer of 1815 the 
large Foxite party, a party which was for all practical purposes synony­
mous with Whig, remained frustrated by the same contradictory theories 
which had frustrated it since 1794. Fox's emphasis on a united Whig 
party pursuing systematic opposition to the Crown had been the leading 
aspect of his politics between 1803 and his death. In pursuing this ob­
jective he had given new impetus to the sagging myths of eighteenth cen­
tury Whiggism, and the circumstances in which the government fell— a 
direct confrontation with the Crown— entrenched them. It is therefore 
not surprising that most Foxite leaders regarded the preservation of the 
union which had been effected with Grenville and Fitzwilliam as the first 
priority of Whig politics.
Led by Fox's acknowledged successor Grey, who had learned to 
pledge himself 'to as little as possible whilst in opposition', the 
ostensible leaders of the party stood firm on the fundamental Whig maxims
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of the pre-1790 era.'* This assured a concept of men before measures or, 
more accurately, a concept by which measures were moulded from the con­
sensus opinion of the group. Unable to agree on anything else Grey, 
Grenville, and Fitzwilliam embraced Catholic emancipation as the beau 
ideal of their coalition. It was a tribute to the myths of eighteenth 
century Whiggism. It directly challenged the king and, as the question 
on which the Talents had fallen, it was the only acceptable emotional 
issue— the only parallel to Fox's old India Bill— capable of facilitating 
the maintenance of a group of honest, loyal, wronged politicians acting 
in systematic opposition to the evils which lurked behind the throne.
The assault on the king was weakened considerably by questions 
relating to foreign politics. In office the coalition had been largely 
united behind Fox's concept of Anglo-American relations but in opposition 
the question was by no means a source of harmony. This was owing greatly 
to the behaviour of the American government. Washington's rather foolish 
refusal to concede that the Talents had been more reasonable than Pitt's 
former governments joined with Jefferson's diatribes against the British 
practice of impressment to alienate even the warmest supporters of Anglo- 
American accord. Then, too, support for a policy of American concilia­
tion did not have a broad base among those Whigs who did not qualify as 
professional politicians. This Btemmed from a distrust of democracy, a 
feeling that Jeffersonians were pro-French, American attacks on the 
Navigation Laws, reluctance to cooperate in promoting the interests of 
the rising merchant classes, and probably a certain degree of enmity 
which dated from 1783. Though Grenville, Fitzwilliam, Auckland, Holland, 
and Erskine continued to advocate the conciliation of the United States,
^rey to Holland, 19 Mar. 1811, B.M., Add. MSS. 51551 (Holland).
426
Grey and Windham usually opposed agitation on the subject, and motions 
in Parliament seldom secured good divisions. By the spring of 1809 the 
question had completely lost its utility as a bridge to unity within the 
coalition.
The question of European affairs, of course, was not easily com­
promised. Fitzwilliam and Windham were firm in feeling that European 
stability was impossible without the total destruction of everything 
which stemmed from the French Revolution. From the first they made it 
clear that their object was the overthrow of the 'usurper' Napoleon and 
the restoration of France's 'legitimate' monarch. Grenville's views, 
which were less identifiable, were a lasting tribute to the weaknesses 
of Pittite foreign policy. As the former Foreign Secretary of Pitt, 
Grenville was very concerned for the reputation of his political con­
sistency. The fact was, however, that Grenville had lost faith in Pitt's 
system of saving Europe by British example. Personal experience had con­
vinced him that Russia, Prussia, and Austria could not be helped; 
Austerlitz had caused him to conclude that Britain had her own interests 
to consider. Moreover, there is ample reason to believe that cooperation 
with Fox had led Grenville to suspect that his traditional concept of 
foreign politics had been geared to secure a questionable object. It is 
clear that he had serious doubts about a crusade to force a monarch on 
the French people and that he was none too eager to cooperate with the 
courts of Europe. These, however, were admissions that he would make 
neither to the public nor to his traditional allies and supporters. 
Grenville was no leader; his foreign politics were compromised; and it 
was almost whimsically that he wrote after the war:
The opinions of those who supported the War [in 1793] led I think by 
inevitable consequence to a most earnest desire that its result 
should be the restoration of Louis 18.— Not actually as a sine qua
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non of Peace in extreme, & even in supposable cases, but on that 
which, fairly speaking, could alone have given one any satisfaction 
in success, or any confidence in Peace.^
Thus in effect Grenville and the Burkians stood as one on the fundamental 
issue. Grey, who diametrically opposed their reasoning, had nevertheless 
had a bad experience with Napoleon while in office, and a well-documented 
charge of mismanagement (if not apostasy) had been raised against him by 
many who continued to feel that peace had been obtainable. It was there­
fore impossible for the Foxite leader to attack ministers for refusing 
to do what he and his colleagues had proved incapable of doing. On the 
other hand his traditional concept of foreign policy and the views of the 
Foxites as a group prevented his endorsement of the war. Added to these 
considerations were the opinions of Fitzwilliam and Grenville, men tilth 
whom Grey was determined to cooperate. It was therefore with a great 
deal of prudence that Grey wished to neutralize the question of foreign 
politics. Motivated by innate pessimism, no small degree of intellectual 
confusion, and a sincere desire to maintain the coalition, Grenville 
quickly echoed this wish.
Some stance on the war was of course necessary for, after all, it 
was the leading question in British politics. In this Grey and Grenville 
were ever aware of their fundamental disagreement— disagreement which was 
accented by the Burkians— and the leaders of the coalition were therefore 
loathe to fully discuss the issue. Instead they drifted back to the 
agreement which had formed the coalition in early 1806. This was the 
pursuit of a 'husbanding, defensive system', a system which renounced 
continental expeditions and subsidies as concessions to the Foxites and 
left open the more important question of wartime objectives as a
•^Grenville to Grey, 10 Feb. 1816 (Grey).
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concession to the Grenvillites ami Burkians. Formed in the days which 
immediately followed the battle of Austerlitz (when the prospects of 
ultimate victory were poor),this system advocated neither war nor peace­
ful co-existence with Napoleon. It had been the product of Fox's tactics 
designed to placate everyone by delaying discussions until the government 
could be committed to a treaty of peace. Though a compromise, it tms 
ill-suited for the purposes of the coalition after 1806. Firstly, the 
period in which it had been formulated had been one in which military 
and diplomatic activity were practically non-existent. Accordingly its 
greatest weakness after 1806 was its inability to bend with the ups and 
downs of developments on the Continent. Secondly, the 'husbanding, de­
fensive system' had been designed by Fox as a preliminary to negotiations 
with France. Therefore, by following the tenets of the system (retrench­
ment, military and financial reform, no subsidies, purely defensive war­
fare, and withdrawal from Europe) point by point to a logical conclusion 
it was impossible not to argue that a negotiated peace was in the best 
interests of the country. This the coalition's leaders could not do: 
from the first they were doomed to cut a miserable picture.
Unable to advocate either offensive war or the opening of nego­
tiations for peace,Grey and Grenville could support the 'husbanding, 
defensive system' only on the uniquely Foxite contention that British 
financial and military involvement on the Continent was pointless so long 
as the monarchs of northern Europe remained divided and incapable of 
meeting France with her own weapon of nationalism. In itself this was by 
no means an unreasonable theory and, while stimulating a certain degree 
of unity within the coalition, it provided a potentially firm base for 
opposition to the tactics of ministers until the close of the session of
1808. During this period, however, the coalition’s leaders aroused the
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ire of many Foxites by refusing to carry their cry for defensive warfare 
to its logical conclusion of peace with France.
Fox's concept of the war had been seen by many Foxites as the 
raison d'etre of systematic opposition to the Crown during the 1790's, 
and though Grey and his colleagues rejected this view of affairs there 
can be no doubt that between 1806 and 1815 support for a negotiated peace 
with revolutionary France was the common denominator of the political 
views of most of those who had formerly supported Fox. In this the 
'party' alignments of the period mean little. The radical leaders of the 
City— Cartwright, Waithman, John Gale Jones, Cochrane, and Burdett— had 
no patience with Whig leaders (or with Fox's behaviour in office for that 
matter) but to a man they stood by Fox's concept of the war. The same 
was true of every London editor who opposed the government except Cobbett. 
The old Foxite Perry remained a great friend to Fox's foreign politics, 
as did Leigh Hunt and Henry White, both of whom were in other respects 
critical of Fox and the Whig leaders. Old supporters of Fox in the 
country— Capel Lofft, Christopher Wyvill, Peter Payne, Thomas Belsham, 
Samuel Parr, Dugald Stewart, William Roscoe, and even Hazlitt and Godwin—  
echoed these sentiments. In the Commons Coke, Byng, Western, Francis, 
and most others who had stood with Fox in 1794 consistently supported the 
foreign politics of old, as did the younger generation of Whigs, pro­
minently Althorp, Brougham, Creevey, Ossulston, Bennet, Lord Archibald 
Hamilton, Lambton, Ward, and Lord John Russell. Many Whig peers shared 
these views, especially Albemarle, Bedford, Derby, Douglas, Bessborough, 
Erskine, Jersey, Lansdowne, Lauderdale, Norfolk, Sefton, St. John,
Thanet, and Holland. Then, too, of primary importance was the strong 
emphasis placed on peace by the resolutions of the. Whig Club and the 
Common Council and by the petitions which were adopted in Fox's old
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constituency of Westminster.
In the opinion of these men the context of European affairs was 
unaltered by the appearance of Napoleon for the war continued on the 
same fundamental basis as before. There was something peculiarly 
Whiggish about supporting a military genius who had risen to power on 
the strength of the French people, who was opposed by the forces of abso­
lutism, and who carried the tricolour and the principles it represented 
to the darkest corners of feudal Europe. In addition it was difficult 
to escape from a feeling that Napoleon, whether good or evil as an indi­
vidual, was the child of the Revolution, the man who had consolidated its 
principles, and as such the last defender of the Enlightenment on the 
Continent. Moreover, an unbalanced hatred of the British government 
stemming from the 1790's led several important men towards blatant 
Bonapartist loyalties. Many old Foxites felt that France's revolutionary 
armies were invincible.
Beyond these generalities, however, alignments within the Whig, 
or more accurately among the opposition forces, on the issue of the war 
were at once determined and confused by the contradictions inherent in 
Foxite dogma. Two extremes existed. The first of these was represented 
by Grey and by those who firmly supported his contention that measures 
should be sacrificed to the maintenance of a united Whig party acting in 
systematic opposition to the Crown. The second embraced the 'radicals' 
of the period who argued that in sacrificing measures to men Whig leaders 
were sacrificing the principal to the accessory. At the bottom of 
'radical' opinion was continuing faith in Fox's theory that peace was a 
necessary prerequisite to reform. Based on Foxite dogma of the 1790's 
neither group stood on middle ground. Young Lord John Russell, a serious 
student of Fox's views, captured this ground in a letter to Holland of
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August 1810:
It seems to me that a long war is of all things the most favourable 
to arbitrary power, & to it I chiefly attribute the great increase 
of the influence of the Crown. When there is no danger of encroach­
ment from the King, a Whig may safely go to war, but with so hard­
ened a K[ing] & so large an Expenditure I think a Whig would be 
very cautious how he gives his vote ... As it is not the K[ing]'s 
interest to make peace so it cannot be the Minister's.1
Peace, then, continued to be an inseparable part of systematic opposition
in Foxite dogma.
The history of the Whig party between 1806 and the summer of 1808 
is therefore at once a comedy and a tragedy with Grey resisting a demand 
for peace by men who were in fundamental agreement with his emphasis on 
maintaining a strong systematic opposition. Grenville and Fitzwilliam, 
ornaments who collectively mustered less than twenty votes in the 
Commons, were important in the production only for the check they placed 
on the unity of the large Foxite wing of the coalition. Holland, Fox's 
nephew and the most popular man in the party, bounced back and forth be­
tween the extremes, and most of Fox's highly-respected older friends 
bounced with him. The man whose misfortune it was to divide Foxite theory 
with Grey was the brewer Samuel Whitbread, who at once became Fox's suc­
cessor in foreign politics and an apostate of Whiggism,
In this situation success was possible for neither extreme. Fear 
of a schism on the issue of peace led Grey and Grenville to erect every 
possible barrier. In January 1807, when Whitbread censured the Talents' 
peace negotiations with France, Grey went so far as to state publicly that 
the nature of the French government rendered peace impossible. Later in 
the year, after the government had fallen, Grey joined with Fitzwilliam, 
Windham, and the Grenvillites to stifle a movement for peace in the indus­
trial north. Finally, in February 1808, when the British government
1Ld. John Russell to Holland, 7 Aug. 1810, B.M., Add. MSS. 51677 
(Holland).
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rejected a French overture for negotiations, the coalition's leaders 
went to ridiculous extremes to head off Whitbread's threatened motion 
of censure- Measures designed both to placate Whitbread and undermine 
his support in the Commons (motions of censure on the Copenhagen 
Expedition, the management of Anglo-American relations, and the govern­
ment's inactivity on the Catholic question) were agitated. Ironically 
even these compromised measures gave rise to great dissension while fall­
ing to produce the desired result. In late Febrmiry Whitbread sent an 
embarrassed Grey scurrying home to Northumberland by carrying the Foxite 
centre in the Commons with him on a direct motion for negotiations. Sad­
ly, all this occurred while the 'husbanding, defensive system' was in its 
heyday, before prospects on the Continent improved.
The outbreak of the Spanish Revolution in the spring of 1808 de­
stroyed any chance that might have existed of Foxltes uniting behind 
either men or measures. Napoleon's attempt to place Joseph on the 
Spanish throne was a gross violation of the doctrine of national self- 
determination, the very doctrine upon which Foxites had formerly sup­
ported the 'legitimacy* of the French revolutionary governments. Led by 
Holland and Sheridan, many Foxites therefore drew the line and supported 
the British government's commitment to war in the Peninsula. This group 
displayed remarkable shortsightedness, if not a desire to escape from 
former opinions. Concerned only for Spanish liberties, they ignored the 
broader context of the European war, a war which was being waged to 
destroy revolutionary France. Alarmed by the cries of the British public 
for Napoleon's throne and by official proclamations calling for the 
restoration of 'legitimate' monarchs, other Foxites remained true to the 
policy of isolation and peace. Whitbread was the only party leader who 
took a realistic view of affairs based on traditional Foxite dogma. He
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advocated war in the Peninsula for the clearly defined objective of re­
storing to the Spanish people the right to choose their own form of 
government, and he was eager to negotiate with Napoleon on that basis. 
Unfortunately this view of affairs was not endorsed by other party lead­
ers .
After a brief spurt of enthusiasm in the summer of 1808 Grey and 
Grenville enbraced a concept of the Peninsular War which amounted to 
nothing but blind pessimism. In this Grenville was apparently guided by 
both extraordinary hardheadedness and a sincere belief that the British 
army had no hope of success in the Iberian Peninsula. On the other hand, 
it is safe to say that Grey's foreign views were moulded primarily to 
facilitate agreement with Grenville. On numerous occasions between 1808 
and 1814 he wrote letters which reveal that he knew better, but he sti­
fled these opinions by surrounding himself with 'Whig' generals who for 
various reasons maintained that Wellington was incompetent and doomed to 
destruction. The defeat and death of the 'wronged' General Sir John 
Moore and the publication of the misguided military opinions of this mar­
tyred 'Whig' general undoubtedly had an enormous impact on Grey's concept 
of operations in the Peninsula (for all the wrong reasons). But the 
warped views of Grey's later correspondents— Rosslyn, Wilson, and Gordon—  
were important primarily because they furnished the Foxite leader with 
Information that he wanted to believe. Grey built what he saw as an im­
pregnable case against the war. He built it on faulty information. He 
built it because of his passionate desire to agree with Grenville. All 
the while he refused to commit himself on the fundamental question of war 
and peace.
These views were maintained as part of what Grey regarded as the 
'fixed principles of the Constitution' in the face of mounting unpopularity
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both within the ranks of the coalition and in the nation.'*’ Beneath Grey 
the Foxite party was torn by intellectual contradiction. Young men 
joined with ’radicals' to raise a serious cry for both parliamentary and 
economical reform during 1809 and 181.0 and this led, as the inevitable 
result of the restraint imposed by party leaders, to the formation of a 
splinter group of Foxites in the Commons which became known as the 
Mountain. There was striking similarity between this group and the small 
Foxite party of the 1790's. Led by Whitbread, the Mountain championed 
peace and reform; it secured roughly forty votes on most divisions; and 
those who formed it were old Foxites and young Whigs who professed loyalty 
to Fox's 'principles'. However, while the Mountain greatly discomforted 
Grey's men in the Commons, few of those who supported its measures were 
willing to do so at the expense of their relationship with the Foxite 
hierarchy. Whithread himself continued to place great emphasis on the 
importance of cooperation with the Whig aristocracy. Moreover, he backed 
away from parliamentary reform, arguing that peace was its antecedent. 
These views cost the brewer the steady support of men like Burdett and 
Brand, both of whom advocated a clear distinction between measures and men, 
and a political division on that basis. in the final analysis the 
Mountain never developed a meaningful political identify; it was neutral 
ground where pressure was released, ground where measures came before men 
but never at the expense of men.
The coalition's failure to carry resolutions censuring the manage­
ment of the Walcheren expedition in the spring of 1810 was an Important 
juncture. The disaster at the Scheldt created a clear-cut case against 
the wartime policies of ministers. At the same time the expedition was
1Parl, Deb., XVII, 504 (13 June 1810).
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in itself unrelated to the coalition's difficulties on foreign policy.
It was therefore a situation similar to that of January 1806, a situation 
conducive to cooperation in advocating a defensive wartime system. Grey 
and Grenville at once concluded that the event was one capable of re­
storing their power of 1806, and this optimism produced an enormous ef­
fort to bring the united weight of opposition to bear on the government. 
Catholic emancipation, hitherto the beau ideal of the coalition, was 
neutralized so as to attract votes; party leaders did not resist motions 
for economical reform in the Commons; and, in a tribute both to his aware­
ness of Whig problems and to the absurdity of his former opinions,
Grenville secretly planned to buy Whitbread by including negotiations for 
peace in the defensive scheme of foreign policy which he visualized for a 
new Whig government! What was seen as an identical situation to that of 
1806 therefore led to the formulation of identical policies. These poli­
cies alone could secure unity; the divisions on Walcheren represented the 
last attempt to overcome the contradictory maxims of Foxite dogma.
It was too late. The campaign in the Peninsula had captured the 
imaginations of many important men. Fitzwilliam, Windham, many Grenvillite 
peers, and even Grenville's brother, Buckingham, thought that the concept 
of defensive warfare was now absurd. Holland, Sheridan, Horner, and many 
other Foxites who were excited about the 'risen people' of Spain agreed 
with this assessment. On the other hand, those Foxites who were upset by 
the crusade to restore Ferdinand imprudently criticized Wellington, and 
Whitbread, who tried to be reasonable, nevertheless mortified everyone by 
emphasizing the wisdom of a negotiated peace. Consequently it became 
clear to a majority of M.P.'s that the opposition had no clear-cut alter­
native policy, and an impregnable case against the management of the 
Walcheren expedition fell to the ground.
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The defeat had enormous repercussions. Firstly, it seriously weak­
ened the concept that measures should be secondary to men in Whig politics 
because it was now obvious that measures alone could promote any semblance 
of effective opposition to either the king or his ministers. Arguing on 
this basis Jeffrey pointed out that Grey and Grenville stood 'without 
popularity, power or consequence of any sort; with great talents and vir­
tues; but utterly inefficient ...' This was undoubtedly true. After the 
vote on Walcheren measures surged to the front and Whig leaders stood by 
helplessly as 'radicals' ran amok during the remainder of the session. 
Economical reform received steady support from Foxites who had hitherto 
been inhibited by the views of Grey, and on 21 May Brand's uniquely 
Foxite motion for parliamentary reform— the first of its kind since 1797—  
secured an astonishing 115 votes. For all practical purposes this vote 
was a rally of the men Grey would have been able to unite had he chosen 
the measures of the 1790's instead of the men who had come together in 
1806. Together in the division lobby were Whitbread, Tierney, and 
Burdett, each of whom had represented separate divisions of Foxite opinion 
between 1807 and 1810; remaining outside were Milton and Wynn, whose 
Burkian and Grenvillite origins are incontestable. This clear division 
of the opposition on the basis of a measure of the 1790's would have been 
impossible a year earlier. Well might Jeffrey have concluded that there 
was no hope for the Whigs so long as their ostensible leaders continued to 
'maintain themselves at an equal distance from both the prevailing par­
ties ...
What effect did these developments have on the more controversial 
question of foreign politics? The defeat on the question of Walcheren
1Edinburgh Review. XV, 504.
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altogether undermined the 'husbanding, defensive system'. It therefore 
undermined the only means by which Grey and Grenville could prevent an 
open confrontation between their respective parties on the issue of the 
war. How, then, did Whig leaders delay this confrontation? Firstly, the 
popularity of Wellington's operations in the Peninsula and the support of 
many Foxites for war to reestablish Spanish liberties frustrated serious 
movements for peace at least until the time of the battle of Salamanca. 
Activity in Parliament amounted do no more than grumbling. There were no 
more assaults on ministers, and the only semblance of policy came with 
the absurd but infrequent arguments of Grey and Grenville that success 
was impossible. Secondly, when movements for peace developed (as during 
the Liverpool election of October 1812 and immediately after the battle 
of Leipsic) they were discouraged by Grey, Holland, and Whitbread because 
of a lack of information on foreign developments, the popularity of the 
war, confidence in ministers to resist the reactionary demands of the 
European monarchs, faith in the military skill of Napoleon, and a linger­
ing desire to cooperate with Grenville and Fitzwilliam If at all possible. 
Though these factors discouraged activity in Parliament long enough to 
see the restoration of the Bourbons go unchallenged, one thing became 
increasingly clear after the unsuccessful divisions on Walcheren: the 
concept of men before measures had been given a fatal blow, and Grey 
stood virtually alone among Foxites with his emphasis on eighteenth cen­
tury maxims of political manoeuvre.
The schism in the coalition during the Hundred Days was therefore 
the logical conclusion to an irrepressible conflict which had raged within 
Fox's reconstructed ’Whig' party since 1806. It was the direct result of 
a contradiction in Foxite dogma which had developed during the debate on 
the French Revolution and which could not be remedied until the conclusion
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of the French revolutionary wars. This contradiction pitted Fox's con­
cept of political manoeuvre— the basis of Whig theory of the early part 
of the reign of George III— against the fundamental maxim of Lockian 
theory: the right of even the people of England's 'natural enemy' t:o 
choose their own form of government.
One historian has observed correctly that the Foxite concept of 
foreign politics was a factor in Whig affairs until well into the nine­
teenth century.1 2 This was owing greatly to considerations which were 
distinctly practical. Firstly, after the departure of Grenville Whig 
leaders represented traditional Foxite dogma as a fixed code and used 
vague references to it as a means of regulating the conduct of the party's 
rank and file. This appeal to tradition (the absence of which had under­
mined Whig leaders during the decade which followed Fox's death) was the 
surest way of justifying any action whenever questions of orthodoxy 
arose, and Fox Clubs were organized on a large scale throughout the coun­
try. ^  Secondly, the isolationistic drift of British public opinion after 
1815 enabled Whig spokesmen to appear sagacious, consistent, and fully 
justified in attacking Castlereagh with arguments that had been politi­
cally suicidal so long as Napoleon had been at the gate.
Continuing loyalty to Fox's foreign views, however, was probably 
determined by considerations which were more theoretical than practical. 
William Lamb was wrong when he implied in late 1815 that the foreign 
views of Foxite leaders were a 'heap of modern additions, interpreta­
tions, fancies, & fictions' which departed from the 'Whig principles of 
the revolution . ..'3 Though Fox was always handicapped by his ill-conceived
1L. G. Mitchell, Charles James Fox and the Disintegration of the 
Whig Party, p. 265. ' ~~..... .. .....  ...
2A. Mitchell, The Whigs in Opposition, pp. 44, 54-5, 128.
3Lamb to Holland, 10 Dec. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51558 (Holland).
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maxims of political manoeuvre, it is safe to say that the common denomi­
nator of his general concept of politics was an exaggerated emphasis on 
the 'lessons' of the Glorious Revolution. Furthermore, though one can 
argue that Fox abandoned the Whig tradition in foreign affairs in 1789, 
and even that his foreign views were to some extent geared to facilitate 
systematic opposition to Pitt and the king, it is difficult indeed to 
contend that his concept of foreign politics abandoned the principles 
which were associated with the accession of William and Mary. In large 
part this explains the magic of Foxite dogma after 1815.
It was not practical for Fox's successors to challenge the funda­
mentals of Castlereagh's foreign policy during the parliamentary session 
of 1816. Whig leaders made every effort to silence old arguments about 
the origin of the war; emphasis was placed on financial considerations; 
and, as Tierney noted, the amendment which was proposed left 'room enough 
for every man to run in any direction he likes best ...'* Consequently, 
Whig language in Parliament seldom reflected the fact that many important 
men continued to identify Fox's foreign politics with the most elementary 
tenets of Whiggism, and that they objected to Castlereagh's foreign pol­
icy on that basis.
Generally Fox's views had been international to the extent of 
seeing in a foreign struggle for liberty a parallel to the struggle of 
the Whig in England. Moreover, he had argued that English cooperation in 
the suppression of such a struggle by a foreign people could only result 
in a catastrophic political backlash at home. In this light it is hardly 
surprising that in 1816 many Whigs were horrified by a treaty which they 1
1Lansdowne to Holland, 19 Dec. [1815], B.M., Add. MSS. 51686A 
(Holland). Brougham to Grey, 11 Jan. 1816 (Brougham). Brougham to 
Allen, Nov. 1816, B.M., Add. MSS. 52178 (Allen). Tierney to Grey, 22 
Jan. 1816 (Grey).
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felt was designed to rally the monarchs of Europe against popular expres­
sion.
'It is not a mere interference of a Conquerer with the affairs of 
the Conquered country', wrote Holland, 'but it is, disguise it as they 
will, a conspiracy of the Governments of Europe against the people, an 
agreement to render the Kings the sole judges of other Kings ... & to 
deprive the governed of that Right which nature & reason have given them, 
the choice by whom they will be governed.'"*' 'In the former age,' added 
Horner, 'this was called divine right; the world has somehow or other got 
into a state of thinking, that will not admit of that particular mode of 
expression; but ... the principle, seems to be just the same.'“ Other 
old Foxites shared these views. Dugald Stewart asserted that the Vienna 
settlement expelled Locke from the English Constitution, and Grey argued 
that it was an admission that the family on the English throne 'sat 
there by a usurped title. ' Even the moderate Lansdowne embraced these 
opinions; Lauderdale reported that Whitbread's death had not altered the 
foreign politics of his friends; and Lord Douglas, who distrusted Grey, 
warned that his proxy could be used only 'upon the thorough Foxite prin­
ciples. Fox's every word had opposed British Involvement in such a 
treaty, and Bedford undoubtedly summed up the opinions of most of his 
colleagues when he attributed both the treaty and all of the country's 
ills to a short-sighted 'system' which had originated with Pitt's initial
^Holland to Grey, 9 Jan. 1816 (Grey).
2Horner to Ld. W. Seymour, 18 July 1815 (Horner).
^Stewart and Grenville sparred on this point. Grenville to Horner, 
6 Dec. 1815, Horner Memoirs, II, 280-81. Grey to Grenville, 14 Feb. 1816 
(copy), B.M., Add. MSS. 51531 (Holland).
^Lauderdale to Holland, 16 May [1816], B.M., Add. MSS. 51691 
(Holland). Douglas to Holland, 2 Mar. 1816, B.M., Add. MSS. 51828 
(Holland).
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decision to enter the war.
Though Foxite views on foreign affairs sprang from a concept of 
Whiggism, party leaders by no means felt that their theories were incon­
sistent with the traditional Whig concept of European affairs. They 
equated popular revolution with progress by defining it as the natural 
and inevitable response of men to the abuses of arbitrary power. As 
such many Whigs felt that European concert on the principle of legitimacy 
destroyed the ancient balance of power. Under the old system, they 
argued, nations were aligned by mutual political interest, and peace 
was preserved by the maintenance of two equal, or nearly equal parts.
But under the new system, peace depended on the union of Europe and on 
the continuance of that union in spite of diverging political interests. 
Robert Adair despaired of peace. He wrote: 'Formerly it depended on the 
territorial ascendancy aimed at by an ambitious monarch; now, it depends 
on the reformation or improvement which may be attempted by a People 
within their own boundaries. To the Foxites this threat of eternal war 
was guaranteed by the sacrifice of national self-determination at Vienna. 
They regarded Irance, Spain, Italy, Greece, Poland, Norway, and Belgium 
as suppressed states, and they pointed out that Castlereagh's policy 
called for British cooperation in the suppression of European nationalism. 
With memories of the 1790's still afloat the Foxites concluded quickly 
that suppression in Europe would lead to suppression in Britain. They 
maintained that the European settlement assured Britain of large standing 
armies in time of peace— always a threat to English liberty— and in time 
of war, a return to the reactionary policies of Pitt's day, for every war
■’Bedford to Grey, 2 Jan. 1816 (Grey).
2Adair to Holland, 29 Jan. 1815, B.M., Add. MSS. 51609 (Holland).
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would be a revolutionary one.
The general feeling was that Castlereagh's foreign policy was 
narrow; that it ignored twenty-seven years of European history; that it 
was inconsistent with the English Constitution; that it destroyed the 
European balance of power and assured universal war; and that it was a 
serious threat to English liberty. These views, which sprang not only 
from traditional Foxite dogma but also from the most fundamental tenets 
of intellectual Whiggism, guaranteed no small amount of loyalty to the 
foreign politics of the martyred Fox during an era when the world was 
rocked by revolutionary movements.
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the private correspondence of key men for the years 1806 and 1807.
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professional politician associated with the Whigs. Of secondary but 
still considerable importance have been the papers, memoranda, and cor­
respondence of other influential Foxites, particularly the Whitbread 
Papers at the Bedfordshire Record Office; the Roscoe Papers in the Picton 
Library at Liverpool; the Brougham Papers and the Creevey Papers at 
University College, London; the Tierney Papers at the Hampshire Record 
Office; the Horner Papers at the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science; and the Allen Papers, the Wilson Papers, and of course 
the Fox Papers in the British Museum.
The unpublished correspondence of Grenvillites and Burkians has 
also contributed greatly. The Auckland Papers and the Thomas Grenville 
Papers in the British Museum have been of enormous importance, and the 
Spencer Papers at Althorp, the Carlisle Papers at Castle. Howard, the 
Fremantle Papers at the Buckinghamshire Record Office, the Wickham Papers 
at the Hampshire Record Office, the Wynn Papers at the National Library 
of Wales, the Fitzwilliam Papers at both the Sheffield Central Library 
and the Northamptonshire Record Office; and the Windham Papers in the 
British Museum have been most useful. I have also seen several smaller
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collections (notably the Newport-Grenville Correspondence at the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford) which have been less important.
I was not permitted to see the Devonshire Papers at Chatsworth 
or the Lansdowne Papers at Bowood. The first of these collections is 
not of great importance to my study for the Cavendishes drifted away 
from active politics after the death of Georgiana in 1806, and it was 
not until after the. war that interest revived. A failure to see the 
Lansdowne Papers is probably more lamentable, though Lansdowne did not 
assert himself politically until after the battle of Waterloo.
Primarily because I feel that the editorial comment of the Morning 
Chronicle (1790-1816), the Independent Whig (1807-1815), the Edinburgh 
Review (1808-1816), the Examiner (1808-1816), The Charles James Fox 
(1814-1815), and the Statesman (1807, 1808, 1814, and 1815) is an impor­
tant reflection of Foxite views on foreign politics, I have examined 
these sources closely. In some cases The Times, the Political Register, 
the Horning Post, the Courier, the Liverpool Mercury, and contemporary 
magazines have also been useful. Pamphlets written by leading Foxites 
such as Adair, Lord Archibald Hamilton, Brougham, Roscoe, Francis, 
Whitbread, and Waithman have contributed greatly. Finally, the conclu­
sions which I have drawn from a thorough examination of The Parliamentary 
History (Cobbett and Hansard) for the years 1806 to 1815 have been of the 




SPENCER MSS.: Papers and Correspondence of George John, 
Second Earl Spencer. This collection is important primarily 
for the large number of politically-oriented letters from 
Thomas Grenville. Other major correspondents are Lords 
Grenville, Grey, Erskine, and Cassilis.
Bedfordshire Record Office, Bedford
WHITBREAD MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
Samuel Whitbread, M. P. Whitbread's political correspondence 
is disappointing. It is said that Grey was allowed to destroy 
those letters which he felt were incriminating shortly after 
the death of his brother-in-law. If so he failed to destroy a 
great deal of valuable correspondence between Whitbread and 
his lieutenants in the Commons, primarily Creevey and Bennet. 
Several of Grey's letters remain and other important corre- 
dents are Holland, Tierney, Brand, Belsham, Folkstone,
Ossulston, Horner, Ward, Payne, and Foxites throughout the 
country who looked to Whitbread for leadership after 1806.
Press clippings, petitions, official proclamations, pamphlets, 
and drafts of speeches with Whitbread's notations are plenti­
ful. Many of these relate to foreign affairs, especially to 
Anglo-American relations.
Blair-Adam, Fife
BLAIR-ADAM MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence 
of William Adam, M.P. This collection is important primarily 
for the letters of Fox and his colleagues in the pre-1806 
period. Adam's drift towards Carlton House after Fox's death 
weakened his relationship with his old friends. Consequently, 
with the exception of several letters from Bedford, Adair, and 
Lord Grenville the collection is disappointing for the pur­
poses of this study.
Bodleian Library, Oxford
BURDETT MSS.: Correspondence of Sir Francis Burdett, Bart., 
M.P. Except for a curious poem by Erskine relating to the 
battle of Waterloo and several letters of a very general nature 
this collection has been of little importance.
NEWPORT-GRENVILLE CORR.: Correspondence of Sir John 
Newport, M.P., and William,Lord Grenville. This small col­
lection is important primarily for Grenville's comment on 
Irish affairs and an occasional reference to the war.
IIEBER LETTERS: General Correspondence of Richard Heber.
This small collection contains letters from Mackintosh and 
Lords Grenville, Grey, Milton, and Holland. There is very 
little political comment.
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British Library of Political and Economic Science, London
HORNER MSS.: Papers, Correspondence, and Memoranda of 
Francis Horner, M.P. Of those who qualify as political phi­
losophers, Horner was easily the most devoted supporter of 
Foxite theory on foreign politics. Consequently this large 
collection, which contains not only correspondence from Horner's 
important friends but also many letters written by Horner him­
self, has been absolutely essential for the purposes of this 
study. Major correspondents are Lord and Lady Holland, Mr. and 
Mrs. Dugald Stewart, Lord Webb Seymour, James Lock, Jeffrey, 
Murray, Allen, and members of the Horner family. Horner's 
political papers, many of which record unbiased opinions on 
events, are also most useful.
British Museum
ALLEN MSS.: Add. MSS. 52172, 52177-80, 52182, 52193-94, 
52204A-I. Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of John Allen. 
This large and important collection is temporarily catalogued 
with the Holland House Papers but I am assured that soon it 
will be given a separate identity. Major correspondents are 
Abercromby, Brougham, Lauderdale, Lock, Lady Holland, Horner, 
Mackintosh, Sydney Smith, and Whishaw. Of particular interest 
is Allen's journal which sheds light on the Cabinet delibera­
tions of 1806 and 1807, the negotiations for office in 1812, 
and the opinions of key politicians.
AUCKLAND MSS.: Add. MSS. 34457-59. Correspondence of 
William Eden, First Baron Auckland. Major correspondents are 
Bulkeley, Carlisle, Buckinghamshire, Grey, Lord Grenville, 
Holland, Temple, and Auckland's sons William and George Eden.
The collection is of primary importance. It contains valuable 
material relating to the American negotiation of 1806 as well 
as a large number of most revealing letters from Lords Grey, 
Grenville, and Buckinghamshire, the latter being the coali­
tion's best contact with Sidmouth.
BROUGHTON MSS.: Add. MSS. 47222-26. Correspondence and 
Memoranda of John Cam llobhouse, later First Lord Broughton.
Major correspondents are Burdett, C. P. Mathews, D. Kinnaird, 
and others who were identified with the Foxite Left. The col­
lection is important primarily because of correspondence which 
reflects Foxite opinion in the country at large.
FOX MSS.: Add. MSS. 47564-66, 47575, 47578, 47581. 
Correspondence and Papers of Charles James Fox, M.P. Though 
this collection contains a great deal of Fox's correspondence 
with Grey, Lauderdale, O'Brien, and Holland it is generally 
disappointing. Fox simply did not write many letters during 
the last three years of his life (especially after coming to 
office) and most of those which he wrote have been published.
HARDWICKE MSS.: Add. MSS. 35394, 35424, 35646-49. General
Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Third Earl of Hardwicke. This
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collection is of minimal importance in this study. It contains 
some correspondence of Grenvillites but little of it is of a 
political nature.
HOLLAND HOUSE MSS.: Add. MSS. 51476-83, 51524-26A-C, 
51528-34, 51544-45, 51549-52, 51558, 51561-62, 51566, 51570-74, 
51576-77, 51584-85, 51593-95, 51609, 51611, 51617, 51639,
51641, 51644, 51651-54, 51656-58, 51661-62, 51665-66, 51676-78, 
51686A, 51689, 51691, 51695, 51697-99, 51723-24, 51728, 51738- 
40, 51745-46, 51796, 51799, 51800, 51811, 51813, 51820, 51823- 
28, 51847-48, 51894-95, 51917-19, 51933, 51950-52, 51965,
51968, 52311C. Memoranda, Papers, Journals, and Correspondence 
of the Fox Family; particularly Henry Richard, Third Baron 
Holland, his wife Elizabeth, and his sister Caroline. Major 
correspondents are Adair, Auckland, Bedford, Brougham, Erskine, 
Fitzpatrick, Fitzwilliam, Thomas Grenville and William, Lord 
Grenville, Horner, King, Lansdowne, Lauderdale, M. G. Lewis, 
Mackintosh, Morpeth, Parr, Lord John Russell, Sheridan, Thanet, 
Tierney, Whishaw, and Whitbread. Holland's general corre­
spondence reflects Foxite opinion throughout the country; his 
Cabinet notes of 1806 and 1807 are most revealing; and his 
notes and various projets from the American negotiation of 1806 
are invaluable. The Holland House dinner books and the diaries 
and journal of Mrs. Charles James Fox are important in identi­
fying men with events. Holland's notes on Spain and his cor­
respondence with Jovellanos and other Spanish leaders are sig­
nificant, and Mackintosh's MS. history of Holland House may be 
the best of its kind. Notes of the conversations of Ebrington, 
Lyttelton, and Hall with Napoleon on Elba are interesting, and 
poetry relating to Fox and Napoleon is plentiful.
HUNT MSS.: Add. MSS. 38108-11. Correspondence of Leigh 
Hunt. This collection is important as a reflection of the dis­
enchantment of men who had championed Foxite dogma of the 
1790's. No man was more devoted to Fox's concept of the war 
than Hunt. Of special interest is the correspondence of 
Brougham and Hunt.
IIUSKISS0N MSS.: Add. MSS. 38738. Correspondence of 
William Huskisson, M.P. This collection is useful because it 
contains the comments of Canningites on Whig affairs. Of 
special interest are the letters of Canning, Wellesley, and 
Arbutlmot.
MACKINTOSH MSS,: Add. MSS. 52436-45, 51451-52. Cor­
respondence of Sir James Mackintosh, M.P. Mackintosh was ever 
devoted to the Foxite concept of foreign politics and his cor­
respondence with party leaders throughout the French wars is a 
good chronicle of Foxite opinion. He became important In the 
formulation of policy only after his return from India in 1812, 
and his correspondence with both Grenvillite and Foxite leaders 
between 1813 and 1816, though not plentiful, is worthy of note.
PELHAM MSS.: Add. MSS. 33112. General and Official
Correspondence of Thomas Pelham, Second Earl of Chichester.
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This collection is significant only for the comments of those 
who observed the behaviour of Whig leaders.
THOMAS GRENVILLE MSS.: Add. MSS. 41851-54, 41856-58, 
42058. Correspondence and Papers of Thomas Grenville, M.P.
This is a large and important collection. Major correspond­
ents are Buckingham, Carlisle, Lord Grenville, Fox, Spencer, 
Temple, and Windham. Of equal importance is Thomas Grenville's 
general correspondence which includes highly valuable letters 
from Bedford, Braybrooke, Elliot, Fitzwilliam, Fremantle, 
Benjamin Garlike, Glastonbury, Grey, Holland, Lauderdale, 
Morpeth, G. Ponsonby, Stafford, Tierney, and the Wynns.
WELLESLEY MSS.: Add. MSS. 37295-97. Correspondence of 
Henry Colley, First Marquess Wellesley. This collection is of 
secondary importance but it contains several interesting let­
ters from Grey, Grenville, and Holland relating to Catholic 
emancipation and foreign affairs.
WILSON MSS.: Add. MSS. 30108, 30118-21, 30129, 30136, 
30141. General Correspondence, Political and Military Papers 
of General Sir Robert Wilson, M.P. This collection is of the 
first importance primarily because of the large number of let­
ters from Wilson to Grey on the subject of European affairs. 
Also of interest are Wilson's papers relating to Spain and 
South America.
WINDHAM MSS.: Add. MSS. 37842, 37846-49, 37886-88, 
37906-09. Papers and Correspondence of William Windham, M.P. 
Though much of Windham's private correspondence has been pub­
lished, many important letters remain in MS. only. Of special 
interest is Windham's correspondence with Elliot, Fitzwilliam, 
Fox, Grenville, and Grey.
Buckinghamshire Record Office, Aylesbury
FREMANTLE MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
Sir William Henry Fremantle, M.P. Major correspondents are 
Buckingham, Temple, Thomas and William, Lord Grenville. 
Financial accounts, interlined press clippings, and drafts of 
speeches are of great importance.
GRENVILLE MSS.: General Correspondence of the Grenville 
Family. This small collection is of minor importance because 
most of the correspondence dates from 1816. However, letters 
from Buckingham and Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville contain 
interesting retrospective comment.
Castle Howard, Yorkshire
CARLISLE MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
the Howard Family; particularly Frederick, Fifth Earl of 
Carlisle and his son, George,Viscount Morpeth. This enormous 
collection is arranged awkwardly in boxes by correspondent, and 
letters are sometimes misfiled. This does not diminish the
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importance of the papers of a family which had excellent con­
nexions with the Cavendishes, the Lambs, the Foxes, the. 
Grenvilles, and also with the Canningites. Major correspond­
ents are Thomas Grenville, Fox, Holland, and Canning; there is 
a great deal of correspondence from the pens of Whig ladies, 
especially Lady Morpeth; and letters relating to Morpeth's ill- 
fated diplomatic mission to Germany in late 1806 are of the 
first importance.
Durham University Library, Durham
GREY MSS.: Correspondence and Papers of Charles, Second 
Earl Grey. This large collection is second in importance only 
to the Holland House MSS. It is arranged in boxes by cor­
respondent, and Grey's papers relating to Spain, South America, 
Portugal, the United States, and Poland are filed separately. 
Major correspondents are Adair, Bedford, Erskine, Francis, 
Gloucester, Gordon, Lord Grenville, Holland, Lansdowne, 
Lauderdale, Rosslyn, Tierney, and Whitbread; but practically 
every important M.P. corresponded with Grey from time to time. 
Of secondary importance is the correspondence of old Foxites 
like Adam, R. Colbourne, Derby, Jersey, Lord Robert Spencer,
M. A. Taylor, Thanet, and Lord John Townshend as well as that 
of non-Foxite allies like Auckland, Carlisle, Fitzwilliam, 
Newport, Spencer, and Windham. Grey's extensive correspondence 
with his wife (who was ever kept in Northumberland by illness 
and pregnancy) is possibly the single most important source for 
evaluating his views, his character, and his political role 
when Parliament was in session. Very little from this col­
lection has been published.
Hampshire Record Office, Winchester
TIERNEY MSS.: Correspondence of George Tierney, M.P. 
This collection contains the remnants of Tierney's valuable 
correspondence with Gordon, Grey, Grenville, Sir Thomas 
Maitland, Sussex, George Prince of Wales, and Whitbread. Many 
letters are badly damaged, and one must suspect that several 
of them have disappeared over the years.
WICKHAM MSS.: Diplomatic and Political Papers of William 
Wickham. Wickham was probably Lord Grenville's most treasured 
friend, and the collection contains several letters from 
Grenville relating to foreign affairs and political alignments 
which are of the first importance. Other correspondents are 
Hardwicke, Mahon, and Plunket. Unaccountably there is a good 
deal of rare printed material relating to the death of 
Whitbread.
Liverpool Central Library, Liverpool
ROSCOE MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
William Roscoe, M.P. Roscoe was a bridge between the various 
factions of the old Foxite party. Important correspondents are 
Brougham, Coke, Creevey, Derby, Erskine, Francis, Gloucester,
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Holland, Lofft, Parr, McCreery, and leading Liverpool merchants 
who paid lip service to Fox's principles and memory.
National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth
SOUTHEY MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
Robert Southey. This collection is of little political impor­
tance except for Southey's correspondence with Sir Walter 
Scott, which contains political comment of a general nature.
WYNN MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of 
Charles W. W. Wynn, M.P. This collection is large and impor­
tant. Wynn received valuable letters from his uncles Thomas 
Grenville and William, Lord Crenville, from his cousin Temple, 
and from Spencer. Wynn's own letters detail interesting events 
in the Commons, as does his ill-kept diary notations. Letters 
from Peter Elmsley are important for comment on Irish affairs.
North Riding Record Office, York
WYVILL MSS.: Papers and Correspondence of Christopher 
Wyvill. With the exception of several key letters from Fox and 
Lofft relating to parliamentary reform at the time of the 
formation of the Talents little of importance exists.
Northamptonshire Record Office, Northampton
FITZWILLIAM MSS.: Correspondence and Papers of William 
Wentworth, Second Earl Fitzwilliam and His Son, Charles Lord 
Milton, M.P. Major correspondents are Carlisle, Carysfort, 
Grenville, and Grey. Letters to Milton from Foxltes residing 
in his constituency of Yorkshire are Interesting.
Public Record Office, London
DACRES-ADAMS MSS.: 30/58/4 and 30/58/5. Correspondence 
of William Pitt, M.P. This collection contains several letters 
from William,Lord Grenville to Pitt which are of importance in 
assessing Grenville's motives In drifting towards coalition with 
Fox.
FOREIGN OFFICE MSS.: All countries, Feb. 1806 to May 1807.
Sheffield Public Library, Sheffield
FITZWILLIAM MSS.: Correspondence of William Wentworth, 
Second Earl Fitzwilliam. Important correspondents are Lord 
George Cavendish, Elliot, Thomas Grenville and William, Lord 
Grenville, Holland, G. Ponsonby, and Windham. Of special 
importance are the letters of opposition leaders during the 
Hundred Days which go far in depicting the division of opinion 
on the question of war and peace.
University College Library, London
BROUGHAM MSS.: Memoranda, Papers, and Correspondence of
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Henry Lord Brougham. Brougham was a prolific writer, an extra­
ordinarily perceptive young politici;m, and an intriguer of the 
first order. His correspondence is therefore of enormous im­
portance. His extensive correspondence with Grey is easily the 
most important part of the collection. Other valuable letters 
are those from Abercromby, Allen, Alexander Baring, Creevey, 
Jeffrey, Roscoe, Rosslyn, Sefton, Ward, Whishaw, the Polish 
leader Count Joseph Sierakowski, and several northern mer­
chants. The collection has suffered in the past from faulty 
cataloguing, and one must suspect that many key letters have 
been misplaced. Particularly lamentable is the absence of 
Lauderdale's extensive correspondence with Brougham.
CREEVEY MSS.: Correspondence of Thomas Creevey, M.P. 
(microfilm). Many important unpublished letters are available. 
Major correspondents are Bennet, Folkstone, Ossulston, Roscoe, 
Whitbread, and others associated with the Foxite Left in the 
Commons.
B. BIOGRAPHIES, AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, AND PRINTED DIARIES, JOURNALS, MEMOIRS, 
AND LETTERS.
ABINGER, LD.
A Memoir of the Right Hon. James, First Lord Abinger, by 
P. C. Scarlett, London, 1877.
ALBEMARLE, EARL
Fifty Years of My Life, by George Thomas, Earl of 
Albemarle, London, 1876.
ALTHORP, VISC.
Memoir of John Charles Viscount Althorp Third Earl Spencer, 
by Denis Le Merchant, London, 1876.
AUCKLAND, LD.
The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland, 
ed. by the Bishop of Bath and Wells, London, 1862.
BESSBOROUGH, LADY
Lady Bessborough and Her Family Circle, ed. by A, Aspinall 
and the Earl of Bessborough, London, 1940.
BONAPARTE, NAPOLEON
Napoleon's Memoirs, ed. by Somerset De Chair, London, 1958.
BROUGHAM, H.
Brougham and His Early Friends: Letters to James Lock, 
1789-1809, ed. by R. H. M. B. Atkinson and G. A. Jackson,
London, 1908.
Historical Sketches of Statesmen Who Flourished in the 
Time of George III, by Henry, Lord Brougham^ London, 1839.
Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, by Chester New, Oxford,
1961.
456
Lord Brougham, by G. T. Garrett,, London, 1935. 
Lord Brougham and the Whig Party, by A. Aspinall,
1927.
London,
The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham, by himself, 
Edinburgh and London, 1871.
BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS, DUKE OF
Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third, ed. 
by the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, London, 1853-55.
Memoirs of the Court of England During the Regency, 1811- 
1820, ed. by the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, London, 1856.
BURDETT, SIR F.
Sir Francis Burdett and His Times, 1770-1844, by M. W. 
Patterson, London, 1931.
The Public Career of Sir Francis Burdett, 1796-1815, b y 
Joseph S. Jackson, Philadelphia, 1932.
CANNING, G.
The Political Life of George Canning, by Augustus G. 
Stapleton, London, 1831.
CARTWRIGHT, J.
The Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright, ed. by 
F. D. Cartwright, London, 1826.
CASTLEREAGH, VISC.
Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount 
Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry (second series) , 
ed. by Charles William Vane, Third Marquess of Londonderry, 
London, 1851.
COCKBURN, LD.
Henry Lord Cockburn, Memoria1s of His Time, London, 1909,
COKE, T.
Coke of Norfolk and His Friends, by A. M. W. Stirling, 
London, 1912.
COLCHESTER, LD.
The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord 
Colchester, ed. by his son, "London, 1861.
CREEVEY, T.
The Creevey Papers, ed. by Sir Herbert Maxwell, London,
1904.
Creevey'a Life and Times, by John Gore, London, 1934.
CREWE, LD.
Lord Crewe, by James Pope-Uennessy, London, 1955.
457
CR01CER, J. W.
The Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker, ed. 
by L. J. Jennings, London, 1885.
CURRAN, J.
Recollections of Curran and Some of his Contemporaries, by 
Charles Phillips, London, 1818.
DEVONSHIRE, DUKE OF
A Sketch of the Character of the Late Duke of Devonshire, 
by R. Adair, London, 1811.
DEVONSHIRE, GEORGIANA DUCHESS
Georgiana: Extracts From the Correspondence of Georgiana, 
Duchess of Devonshire, ed. by the Earl of Bessborough, London, 
1955.
DUDLEY, EARL
Letters to 'Ivy* From the First Earl of Dudley, ed. by 
S. II. Romilly, London, 1905.
DURHAM, LD.
Life and Letters of Lord Durham, ed. by Stuart J. Reid, 
London, 1906.
ELDON, LD.
The Public and Private Life of Lord Chancellor Eldon, by 
H. Twiss, London, 1844.
FARINGTON, J.
The Farington Diary, ed. by James Greig, London, 1924.
FOSTER, LADY ELIZABETH
Dearest Bess, by D. M. Stuart, London, 1955.
FOX, C. J.
Characters of Charles James Fox, by S. Parr, London, 1809.
Charles James Fox, by J. H. Hammond, Clifton, N. J., 2nd 
Ed. 1970.
Charles James Fox: A Man for the People, by L. Reid, 
London, 1969.
Fox, by Christopher Hobhouse, London, 4th Ed. 1964.
History of the Political Life and Public Services of the 
Rt. Hon. C. J. Fox, by Dr. F. Lawrence London,’ 1783 .
Life of Charles James Fox, by Edward C. Lascelles, New 
York, 1936.
Life of the Late Charles James Fox, by J. Cundee, London.
1807.
458
Memoirs of the Late Years of the Rt. Hon. C. J. Fox, by 
his private secretary, J. R. Trotter, London, 1811
Memorials and Correspondence of Charles James Fox, ed. by 
Ld. John Russell, London, 1853.
The Life and Times of Charles James Fox, by Lord John 
Russell, London, 1859-66.
The Speeches of the Right Honourable Charles James Fox in 
the House of Commons, ed. by J. Wright, London, 1815.
FRANCIS, SIR P.
Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis, ed. by Joseph Park.es and 
Herman Merivale, London, 1867.
The Francis Letters, ed. by B. Francis and C. F. Keary, 
London, n.d.
FRERE, J.
The Works of John Hookham Frere. London, 1874.
GEORGE III.
The Later Correspondence of George III, 1783-1810, ed. by 
A. Aspinall, Cambridge, 1962-6TI
GEORGE IV.
The Correspondence of George. Prince of Wales 1770-1812, 
ed. by A. Aspinall, London, 1963-71.
The Letters of King George IV. 1812-1830, ed. by A.
Aspinall, Cambridge, 193SL
GLENBERVIE, LD.
The Diaries of Sylvester Douglas, Lord Glenbervie, ed. by 
F. Bickley, London, 1928.
The Glenbervie Journals, ed. by Walter Sichel, London,
1910. ...
GODWIN, W.
William Godwin, his Friends and Contemporaries, by Paul C. 
Kegan, London, 1876.
GRANVILLE, LD.
Lord Granville Leveson Gower Private Correspondence, 1781 
to 1821, ed. by Countess Granville, London, 1916.
GRANVILLE, LADY
Letters of Harriet CounteaB Granville, 1810-1845, ed. by 
F. Leveson Gower, London, 1894.
GRATTAN, H.
Henry Grattan, by J. G. MacCarthy, Dublin, 1886.
Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Rt. lion. Henry Grattan, 
by his son, Henry Grattan, London, 1849.
459
GRENVILLE, LD.
Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortesque Esq., 
Preserved at Dropmore, ed. by Walter Fitzpatrick, Historical 
Manuscripts Commission, IX and X, London, 1908.
GREY, EARL
Life and Opinions of Charles, 2nd Earl Grey, ed. by C . 
Grey, London, 1861.
Lord Grey of the Reform Bill, by George M. Trevelyan, 
London, 1920.
GR0N0W, CPT.
The Reminiscences and Recollections of Captain Gronow, 
London, 1900.
HAZLITT, W.
The Works of William Ilazlitt. ed. by P. 0. Howe, London, 
1930-40.
HOBIIOUSE, J. C.
Letters written by an Englishman resident in Paris during 
the last reign of the Emperor Napoleon, by J. C. Hobhouse”, 
London, 1816.
Recollections of a Long Life by Lord Broughton, ed. by 
Lady Dorchester, London, 1909.
HOLLAND, LD.
Foreign Reminiscences, by Lord Holland, London, 1850.
Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1807-1821, by Henry 
Richard,Lord Holland, Ed. by Lord Stavordale, London, 1905.
Memoirs of the Whig 1 atty Dur 1 nj_Mv Time bj_ Henry Richard 
Lord Holland, ed. by his son, London, 1852. ~
HOLLAND, LADY
Elizabeth, Lady Holland to her Son, 1821-1845. ed. by the 
Earl of Ilchester, London, 1946~.~
The Journal of Elizabeth Lad^ Holland, ed. by the Earl of 
Ilchester, New York, 1908. ...
The Spanish Journals of Elizabeth Lady Holland, ed. by the 
Earl of ilchester, London, 1910.
HORNER, F.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, M.P., ed. by 
L. Horner, Boston, 1853. . ...
HUNT, L.
Leigh Hunt, by E. C. Blunden, London, 1930.
The Autobiography of Leigh Hunt, ed. by J. E. Morpugo, 
London, 1949.
460
Tlie Correspondence of Leigh Hunt, ed. by Thornton Hunt, 
London, 1862.
IIUSKISSON, W.
The Iluskisson Papers, ed. by Lewis Melville, London, 1931 
JACKSON, SIR G.
The Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, K.C.H., ed. 
by Lady Jackson, London, 1872.
The Bath Archives. A Further Selection from the Diaries 
and Letters of Sir George Jackson, 1809 to 1816, ed. by Lady 
Jackson, London, 1873.
JEFFERSON, T.
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. by A. A. Lipscomb 
and A. E. Bergh, Washington, 1903-04.
JEFFREY, LD.
Life of Lord Jeffrey, by Lord Cockburn, Edinburgh, 2nd Ed
1952.
KNIGHTON, SIR W.
The Memoirs of Sir William Knighton, ed. by Lady Knighton, 
London, 1838.
LEINSTER, DUCHESS OF
Emily, Duchess of Leinster, by B. Fitzgerald, London,
1949.
LENNOX, LADY S.
The Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, 1745-1826, ed. 
by the Countess of Ilchester and Lord Stavordale, London, 1901
LEWIS, M. G.
Life and Correspondence of M. G. Lewis, London, 1939.
L0SH, J.
The Diaries and Correspondence of James Losh, ed. by 
Edward Hughes, London, 1962.
LIVERPOOL, EARL OF
Memoirs of the Public Life and Administration of the Rt. 
Hon, the Earl of Liverpool, London, 1868.
Life of Lord Liverpool, by C. D. Yonge, London, 1868.
LYTTELTON, LADY
Correspondence of Sarah Spencer Lady Lyttelton, 1787-1870, 
ed. by Mrs. Hugh Windham, London, 1912.
MACAULAY, Z.
The Life and Letters of Zackery Macaulay, ed. by his 
grand-daughter, Viscountess Knutsford, London, 1900.
A 61
MACKINTOSH, SIR J.
Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, ed. by Robert 
James Mackintosh, London, 1835.
MALMESBURY, EARL OF
Diaries and Correspondence of John Harris First Earl of 
Malmesbury, ed. by the third Earl of Malmesbury, London, 1844.
A Series of Letters of the 1st Earl of Malmesbury, his 
family, and friends, from 1745 to 1820, ed. by his grandson, 
London, 1870.
MELBOURNE, VISC.
Lord Melbourne's Papers, ed. by L. C. Sanders, London,
1889.
Memoirs of the Right Honourable William Second Viscount 
Melbourne, ed. by W. Torrens, London, 1878.
The Young Melbourne, by David Cecil, London, 1939.
MELVILLE, VISC.
The Life of Henry Dundas, first Viscount Melville, by C. 
Matheson, London, 1933.
MILES, W. A.
The Correspondence of William Augustus Miles on the French 
Revolution. 1789-1817, ed. by C. p. Miles, London, 1890.
MINTO, EARL
Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot First Earl of 
Mlnto, ed. by the Countess of Minto, London, 1874.
MIRANDA, FRANCISCO DE
The Life of Miranda, by William S. Robertson, Chapel Hill,
1929.
MOORE, SIR J.
The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, by J. C. 
Moore, London, 1834.
NOLLEKENS, J.
Nollekens and His Times, by Wilfred Whitten, London, 1829. 
PALMERSTON, VISC.
Lord Palmerston, by Herbert C. F. Bell, Hamden, Conn.,
2nd Ed. 1966.
The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, by Sir 
Henry Lytton Bulwer (Lord Dialing), London, 2nd Ed. 1870.
PARR, S.




Spence r_ Perceval , The Evangelic al _Pr ine M inis ter 176 2- 
1812, by Denis Cray, Manchester, 1963.
PLACE, F.
The Life of Francis Place, 1771-1854, by Graham Wallas, 
London, 4th Ed. 1925.
PLUNKET, LD.
The Life, Letters, and Speeches of Lord Plunket, ed. by 
David Plunket, London, 1867.
ROBINSON, H. C.
Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of Henry Crabb 
Robinson, ed. by T. Sadler, London, 1869.
The Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson with the 
Wordsworth Circie, 1808-1866, ed. by Edith J. Morlev, Oxford, 
1927.
ROGERS, S.
Recollections of the Table-Talk of Samuel Rogers, ed. by 
Rev. Alexander Dyce, London, 1856.
Rogers and his Contemporaries, by p. w. Clayden, London,
1889.
ROMILLY, SIR S.
Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, ed. by his son, 
London, 1840.
Romilly, by Patrick Medd, London, 1968.
R0SC0E, W.
The Life of William Roscoe, by Henry Roscoe, London, 1904.
ROSE, G.
The Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George 
Rose, ed. by Rev. Leveson Vernon Harcourt, London, 1860.
RUSSELL, LD. JOHN
Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell. 1805-40. ed. by 
Rollo Russell, London, 1913.
Lord John Russell, by J. Prest, London, 1972.
Recollections and Suggestions, 1813-1873. by Lord John 
Russell, London, 1875.
SCOTT, SIR W.
The Letters of Sir Walter Scott, ed. by II. J. C. Grierson, 
London, 1932.
SHELLEY, LADY F.
The Diaries of Francis Lady Shelley, 1787-1817, ed. by 
Richard Edgecumbe, London, 1912.
463
SHERIDAN, B.
Betsy Sheridan's Journal, ed. by W. Lefanu, London, 1825. 
SHERIDAN, R.
Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. lion. Richard Brinsley 
Sheridan, by Thomas Moore, London, 1825.
Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. R_._JB_. Sheridan T ed. by J. Watkins, 
London, 1817.
Sheridan, by Walter Sichel, London, 1909.
The Letters of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, ed. by C. Price. 
Oxford, 1966.
The Works of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, ed. by F. 
Stainforth, London, 1879.
SIDMOUTH, VISC.
Addington, by Philip Ziegler, London, 1965.
Ihe Life and^  Ogj^respondence_of the Right Hon^fe Henry
Addington, First Viscount Sldmouth, ed. by George Follow, 
London, 1847.
SINCLAIR, SIR J.
The Correspondence j>f_the_Righ,^jjpnourable Sir John 
Sinclair, London, 1831. ------- ---- -— -
SMITH, S.
With A ' r'f'he' rfV~irend^ dney Smlth . By lady Holland.With a Selection from hijsJLettei^ edT'by Mrs. Austin, London,
SPENCER, EARL
m v a t e  Papers of G e o r ^  Second Earl Spencer. ed. hv i. « 
;tt and H. W. Richmond, L o Æ i r T T 9 T P 2 Î T ~ ~Corbet
SPENCER-STANHOPE, LADY E.
■T.tle.Pf LadJjUzabeth Spencer-Stanhope, ed. bvA. M. W. Stirling, London, 1913. y
STANHOPE, EARL
, The L--fe -°f charJ:^-i,Jhi_rd Earl Stanhope, by G. Stanhope and G. P. Gooch, London, 1814.
ST. VINCENT, EARL
Life and Correspondence pf John, Earl of St. Vincent, ed. by E. P. Brenton, London, 1838. ----
TIERNEY, G.
peorj.e.jr^rney, by H. K. Olphin, London, 1934.
WARD, R.
J.,0/. t^ .9_Pgf.itical and Literary Life of Robert Plumer 
Hâ-Fli Ega,». ed. by E. Phipps, London, 1850. --- “------
464
WELLESLEY, MARQUESS
The Marquess Wellesley, by W. Torrens, London, 1880. 
WHISHAW, J.
The 'Pope' of Holland House. Selections from the 
Correspondence of J . Whishaxvr and His Friends, 1813-40, ed. by 
Lady Seymour, London, 1906.
WHITBREAD, S.
Samuel Whitbread, by Roger Fulford, London, 1967.
WHITE, J. B.
The Life of J. Blanco White, ed. by J. H. Thom, London,
1845.
WILBERFORCE, W.
Private Papers of William Wllberforce, ed. by A. M. 
Wilberforce, London, 1897.
The Life of William Wilberforce. by Robert Isaac 
Wilberforce and Samuel Wilbcrforce7~ London, 1838.
Wilberforce, by R. Coupland, London, 1945.
WILSON, SIR R.
Life of General Sir Robert^jJilson, ed. by Rev. Herbert 
Randolph, London, 1862.
Private Diary ... of ... sir Robert Wilson, ed. by H. 
Randolph, London, 1861
WINDHAM, W.
Some Account of the Life of the Right Honourable William 
Windham, by Thomas Amyot, London, 1812,
ghej)iary^f._the Right jton. William Windham, 1784 to 1810, 
ed. by Mrs. Henry Baring, London7~l866.
The Windham Papers, London, 1913.
WYNN, LADY W.
Correspondence of Charlotte Grenville, Lady Williams Wynn, 
ed. by Rachel Leighton, London, 1920.
C . PAMPHLETS
Adair, R., A_Whig jj...Apology for His Consistency, in a Letter From a 
Member of Parliament, London, 1795.
______ _» The Letter of the Rt. Hon. C. J. Fox to the Electors of
Westminster, With an Application of its Principles to Subsequent 
Events, London, 1802.
Alley, Jerome, A Vindication of the Principles and Statements
Advanced In the Strictures of the Right Hon. Lord Sheffield, 
London, 1806.
465
Anonymous [an Elector of Westminster], Adultery and Patriotism, 
London, 1811.
_____ A Letter to Sir Francis Burdett, Bart., with a Criterion
proposed to ascertain his Patriotism, and some Reflections on 
the Subject of Reform; by a Country Gentleman, London, 1810.
_______, A Plain Statement, London, 1808.
[Scrutator), All the Talents in Ireland] A satirical poem 
with notes, London, 1807.
______ ., Brief Memoir of the Life of Mr. Whitbread, London, 1815.
__ ____, Fox Against Fox; Or Political Blossoms of the Rt. Hon.
C. J. Fox, London, 1788.
_______, Fox's Martyrs or a New Book of the Sufferings of the
Faithful, London, 1784.
______ , History of the Westminster and Middlesex Elections in the
month of November 1806, London, 1807.
_______» Anonymous ['BRITTANNICUS' ], Letter to Samuel Whitbread,
upon the military conduct of Lord Wellington. London, 1810.
______ > Letter to William Roscoe, Es<|.f containing strictures on
his late publication, etc., Liverpool and New York,HL808.
_______> Mr. Pitt, the ¿reat political delinquent, London, 1812.
______ » Notice of the In the Committee of the House
of Commons, during the Inquiry into the Condner~ nnTlvriTrv~f 
the late Expedition to the River Scheldt; with Observations, 
London, 1810.
______ t 0bservationg__on the System of War of the Allies in the
Spanish Peninsula, London, 1811.
_____ _» OperatIons _pJLJ:jle British Army in Spain, involving Broad
Hints to the Commissariat; by 'an Officer of the Staff. “ London, 180g. —  ' '
______ » Parallel_Between the 0pjnduct_ of Mr. Burke and that of Mr.
Fox, in their lat^F^liaj^jitary Contest, London, 1791.
_____ _» Plain Facts; or a Review o^ the Conduct of the late
Ministers, London, 1807. ’ .
______.» Short Remarks on the State of Parties at the close of the
year 1809, London, 1809.
_______> Speech of the Rt. Hon. C. J. Fox Containing the Declaration
of his Principles Respecjtfnjf the~ Present Crisis of Public^ 
Affairs, and on Reforming the Representation of the People. 
Spoken at the Whig Club, London, 1792.
_, ['Mentor'], The Dangers o£ the 'Edinburgh Review'; or a
brief Exposure of its Principles in Religion, Morals, and 
Politics, London, 1808.
___ , The Faction Petected_and Despised, London, 1810.
______ , The French Spy; or, Five Original Letters found in the
Bureau of a Foreigner, London, 1808.
_______, The Patriots and the Whigs, the Most Dangerous Enemies
of the State, London, 1810.
_______» The State of the Case. Addressed to Lord Grenville and
Lord Howlck, London, 1807.
_______, [A True Englishman], The War As It Is, and the War As
It Should Be, London, 1806.
Atcheson, Nathaniel, American Encroachments on British Rights, 
London, 1808.
Baring, Alexander, An Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of 
the Orders in Council; and an Examination of the Conduct of 
Great Britain towards the Neutral Commerce of America,
London, 1808.
Belsham, Thomas, A Discourse, occasioned by the death of the Right 
Hon. Charles James Fox, delivered-at the Unitarian Chapel in 
Essex Street, London, 1806.
Brougham, H., An Appeal to the Allies and the English National on 
Behalf of Poland, London, 18i4.
_______> An Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of Continental
Alienation, London, 1808.
_______> Orders in Council; or, An Examination of the Justice,
Legality, and_Policy^_of__tjhe^ Jlg?t_J>ystem of Commercial 
Regulations, London, 1808.
Cartwright, J., The State of the Nation; in a series of letters to 
the Duke of Bedford, Harlow, 1805.
Combe, W., A Letter from a Country Gentleman to a Member of
Parliament, on the Present State of Public Affairs, London,
1789. ~
Courtenay, Thomas P., Observations on the American Treaty, London,1808.
_______» Additional Observations on the American Treaty ... ,
London, 1808.
Dinwiddy, J. R., Christopher Wyvlll and Reform, 1790-1820, 
Borthwick Papers, 39, York, 1971.
467
Francis, Sir Philip, Letter From Sir Philip Francis, K, B. to Earl 
Grey, London, 1814.
Green, W., Portraits of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, etc., London, 1808.
Grenville, Lord, Letter From ... Lord Grenville to the Earl of 
Fingall, London, 1810.
_____> Substance of a Speech delivered in the House of Lords,
March 26, 1807, on the change on Ministry, London, 1807.
Hamilton, Ld. Archibald, Thoughts on the Formation of the Late and 
Present Administrations, London, 1804.
Jones, J. G., Five Letters to the Right Honourable George Tierney, 
including reflections on his political character and conduct, 
London, 1806. ' .
Leckie, G. F., An Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great 
Britain; Parts I and II, London^~1808.
Marryat, Joseph, Concessions to America the Bane of Britain, etc., 
London, 1807.
_______» Hints to^Both Parties; or Observations on the Proceedings
in Parliament^J^o_n_the Petitions against the Orders in Council, 
London, 1808.
Medford, Macal1, Oil Without Vinegar, and Dignity Without Pride; 
or, British^ ,. American, and West India Interests, considered. 
London, 1807.
Milburne, H., A_N a r _ r ~ ° /_ _tj ie_ Gircumstances attending the
.Jjgdgy the Command of the late 
Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Moore. London, 1809.
Phippen, F., An^uthentic Account of the late Mr. Whitbread, etc., 
London, 1815.
[Place, Francis and Richter, J« ], An Exposition of the Circumstances
V-M -P-ll.-figyjLJTj-AP-Ji°.J-jlg. Election of Sir Francis Burdett, Bart., 
for the City of Westminster. London,' 1807.
Ranby, John, An Inquiry into the_supposed Increase of the Influence
of the Crown, London, 1811. ~  ~
Romilly, S., MgmoijL„qL.t.he Life of that Illustrious Patriot Sir 
Samuel Romilly, London, [1818].
Roscoe, W., Brief.Ob_servations^ op the Address to His Ma]esty pro-
EQggjJ^}LJtg£i-g£gy. to the llou.se of lords 7m  TuTre 13, 1810, ~  
Liverpool, 1810.
_______» Con^iA^toXl°iiS__o^_tJie_ Causes, Objects, and Consequenc.es of
the Present War; and on theExpediency, or the Danger of Peace 
with France, London, 1808. * ' ' " ..~ ~
468
Rose, George, Observations Respecting the Public Expenditure and 
the Influence of the Crown, London, 1810.
Sayers, J., Hints to J. Nollekens, Esq., R, A ., on his modeling a 
Bust of Lord "G*****~**e, London, 1808.
Sheffield, Earl of, Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably 
Maintaining the Navigation jmd Colonial System of Great 
Britain, London, 1806.
Stewart, Rev. Charles, Charles's Small Clothes: A National. Ode, 
London, 1808.
Tarleton, B., Substance of a Speech intended for the vote of Credit 
Bill of 1810, London, 1810.
Waddington, S. F., Three Letters to that greatest of political
Apostates, the Right Honourable George Tierney , London, 1806.
Waithman, Robert, War Proved to be the Cause of the present 
Scarcity, and enormous high Price of every Article of 
Consumption, with the only radical remedies, London, 1800.
Whitbread, S., Substance of a Speech delivered in the House of 
Commons, on Monday, January 5, 1807, London, 1807.
D. GENERAL STUDIES
Adams, E. D ., The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 
1787-1798, Washington, 1 9 0 4 ~ ~  ~  ~ ~ J
Airlie, Mabel1 Countess, In Whig Society, London, 1921.
Alger, John G., Englishmen in the French Revolution, London, 1889.
_______, Napoleon's English Visitors. New York, 2nd Ed., 1970.
Anonymous, Historical Sketches of Politics andJPublic Men for the 
Year 1812, London, 1813.
_______, The British Cabinet of 1806. Liverpool, 1807.
_______, The Whig Club Rule Book. London, 1784.
Ashton, John, Social England under the Regency. London, 1899.
______The Dawn of the 19th Century in England. London, 1886.
Aspinall, A., Politics and the Press. London, 1949.
Bemis, Sanuel Flagg, Jay's Treaty. A Study in Commerce and 
Diplomacy, New York, 1923.
469
Blease, W. L., A Short History of English Liberalism, London, 1913.
Brougham, Henry Lord, Aristocracy, Democracy and Mixed Monarchy, 
London, 1844.
Brown, P. A., The French Revolution In English History, London, 3rd 
Ed., 1965.
Bullock, Alan and Shock, Maurice, The Liberal Tradition from Fox to 
Keynes, London, 1956.
Butterfield, Sir Herbert, Charles James Fox and Napoleon. The 
Peace Negotiations of 1806, London, 1926.
Cecil, A., British Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916, London, 1927.
Chardon, A., Fox et la Revolution Française, Paris, 1918.
Christie, Ian R., Myth and Reality in Late Eighteenth Century 
British Politics and Other Essays, Berkeley, 1970.
Clive, J., Scotch Reviewers; The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1815, 
London, 1957.
Cobban, A. (ed.), The Debate on the French Revolution, 1789-1800, 
London, 1950.
Cone, Carl B., The English Jacobins, New York, 1968.
Coquelle, P., Napoleon and England, 1803-1813, London, 1904.
Crouzet, Francois, L1Economic Britannique et le Blocus Continental, 
1806-1813, Paris, 1958.
Deschamps, Jules, Les Iles Britanniques et al Revolution Française, 
Paris, 1949.
Eeles, Henry S. and Spencer, Earl, Brooks's 1764-1964, London, 1964.
Eyck, E., Pitt versus Fox, London, 1950.
Felling, Sir Keith G., The Second Tory Party 1714-1832, London,
1938.
Foord, A., His Majesty's Opposition, 1714-1832, Oxford, 1964.
Fortesque, Sir J. W., British Statesmen of the Great War, 1793-1814. 
London, 1911.
Fox, C. J., A History of the Reign of James the Second, ed. by 
Henry, Third Lord Holland, London, 1808.
Grego, J., History of Parliamentary Elections, London, 1886.
Herold, Christopher, Mistress to An Age» London, 1959.
470
Harris, W., History of the Radical Party in Parliament, London,
1885.
Hecksher, Eli F., The Continental System, Gloucester, Mass., 1964.
Hudson, Derek, Holland House in Kensington, New York, 1967.
Hutcheson, William, Whigs and Whiggism, London, 1913.
Ilchester, Earl of, Chronicles of Holland House, London, 1937.
_______, The Home of the Hollands, 1605-1820, London, 1937.
Kaufmann, William W., British Policy and the Independence of Latin 
America, 1804-1828, New Haven, 1951.
Kebbel, T., A History of Toryism, London, 1886.
Lamb, Lady Caroline, Glenarvon, London, 1817.
Lean, E. Tangye, The Napoleonists, London, 1970.
Leichtenstein, Princess Maria, Holland House, London, 1874.
MacCunn, F. J., The Contemporary English View of Napoleon. London, 
1914.
Mahan, A. T., Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and 
Empire, 1793-1812. London, 1893.
Meikle, II. W., Scotland and the French RevolutionGlasgow, 1912.
Mitchell, A., The Whigs in Opposition, 1815-1830, Oxford, 1967.
Mitchell, L. G., Charles James Fox and the Disintegration of the 
Whig Party, 1782-1794, London, 1971.
Moore, J., A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army In Spain. 
London, 1809.
Mowat, R. B., The Diplomacy of Napoleon, New York, 2nd Ed., 1971.
Nicholls, J., Recollections and Reflexions on Public Affairs During 
the Reign of George III, London, 1820.
Noble, Iris, Rivals in Parliament:_William Pitt and Charles James
Fox, New York, 1970.
O'Gorman, F., The Whig Party and the French Revolution, London, 1967
Oman, Sir Charles, A History of the Peninsular War, London, 1902-1930
Pares, R., George III and the Politicians, London, 1953.
471
Parkinson, C. Northcote (cd.), Trade Winds, A Study of British
Overseas Trade Darin;; the French Wars, 1793-1815, London, 1948,
Perkins, Bradford, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 
1805-1812, Berkeley, 1961.
, The First Rajpprochement: England and the United States^ 
1795-1805, Philadelphia, 1955.“
Priestley, J. B., The Prince of Pleasure and His Regency, 1811-20, 
London, 1971.
Read, Donald, Press and the People, 1790-1850, London, 1961.
Richardson, James D. (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, Washington, 1897.
Roberts, Michael, The Whig Party, 1807-1812, London, 1939.
Sanders, Lloyd, The Holland House Circle. London, 1908.
Seton-Watson, R. W., Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, London, 1937.
Smith, Sydney, The Letters of Peter Plymley, ed. by C. G.
Heseltine, London, 1929.
Stout, George D ., The Political History of Leigh Hunt’s Examiner,
St. Louis, 1949.
Taylor, A. J. P., The Trouble Makers; Dissent over Foreign Policy, 
1792-1939, London, 1957."
Temperley, H. W. V. and Penson, Lilian M. (eds.), Foundations of 
British Foreign Policy from Pitt, 1792, to Salisbury, 1902, 
London, 1938.
Thistlethwaite, Frank, The Anglo-American Connection in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, Philadelphia, 1959.
Trevelyan, G. M., Clio A Muse and Other Essays, London, 1949.
Villiers, Marjorie, The Grand Whiggery, London, 1939.
Ward, Sir A. W., Great Britain and Hanover, London, 1899.
Ward, Sir A. W. and Gooch, G. P. (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, (Vol. I, 1783-1~815) ~ 
Cambridge, 1922.
Webster, Sir Charles, British Diplomacy, 1813-15, London, 1921.
, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, London, 1925-31.
Williamson, Victor A., Memorials of Brooks's From The Foundation
Of The Club 1764 To The Close Of The Nineteenth Century Comp tied
From The Records Of The Club. London, 1907.
472
Willson, Beckles, America's Ambassadors to England, 1785-1928, 
London, 1928.
E. ARTICLES
Aspinall, A., 'The Canningite Party', Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, xvii, 4th series (1934”).
_______ , 'The Cabinet Council, 1783-1835', Proceedings of the
British Academy, xxxviii (1952).
Bulloch, John M., 'James Perry, our greatest bibliophile', Aberdeen 
University Review, x (1923).
_______, 'James Perry, Editor', Aberdeen Book Lover, v (1927).
Butterfield, Herbert, 'Charles James Fox and the Whig Opposition 
1792*, Cambridge Historical Journal, ix (1949).
Christie, Ian R., 'Charles James Fox', History Today, viii (1958).
Daniels, G. W., 'American Cotton Trade with Liverpool under the
Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts', American Historical Review, 
xxi (1915-16).
Davies, Godfrey, 'The Whigs and the Peninsular War, 1808-1814',
Royal Historical Society Transactions, 4th series, ii (1919).
Dinwiddy, J. R., 'Charles James Fox and the People', History, Iv 
(1970).
_______, 'Charles James Fox as Historian', The Historical Journal,
xii (1969).
_______, l!"The Patriotic Linen-Draper": Robert Waithman and the
Revival of Radicalism in the City of London, 1795-1818' , 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xlvi (1973).
Fetter, Frank W., 'Authorship of Articles in the Edinburgh Review', 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xxx (1957).
George, Mrs. E., 'Fox's Martyrs: the General Election of 1784', 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, xxi 
(1939).
Harvey, A. D., 'The Ministry of All the Talents: The Whigs in
Office, February 1806 to March 1807', The Historical Journal, 
xv (1972).
Hilt, Douglas, 'Madame de Stael: Emotion and Emancipation', History 
Today, xxii (1972).
Hughes, E., 'The Scottish Reform Movement and Charles Grey, 1792- 
1794', Scottish Historical Review, xxxv (1956).
473
Kern, J. D., 'Brougham's Early Contributions to the Edinburgh 
Review: a new list', Modern Philology, xlii (1945).
, 'Early Edinburgh Reviewers', ModernPhilology, xliii (1946).
Parker, R. A. C., 'Coke of Norfolk and the Agrarian Revolution', 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, viii (1955).
Main, J. M., 'Radical Westminster, 1807-20', Historical Studies, 
xiii (1966).
Mohl, Raymond A., 'Britain and the Aaron Burr Conspiracy', History 
Today, xxl, (1971).
Sellers, Ian., 'William Roscoe, the Roscoe Circle and Radical 
Politics in Liverpool, 1787-1807 , Transactions of the 
Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, cxx (3 968).
Smith, E. A., 'The Yorkshire Elections of 1806 and 1807: a study 
in electoral management', Northern History, ii (1967).
Steel, Anthony, 'Impressment in the Monroe-Pinckney Negotiations', 
American Historical Review, vii (1954).
Willis, Richard E., 'Fox, Grenville, and the Recovery of Opposition,




Globe, 1808, 1810, 1815
Liverpool Mercury, 1814-1815 
Morning Chronicle, 1790-1816 
Morning Post, 1806-1815 
Statesman, 1806-1807, 1814- 
1815
The Times, 1806-1815
British Studies, xi (1972)
WEEKLY AND PERIODICAL
Annual Register, 1806-1815 
Cobbett1s Political Register. 
1806-1815
Edinburgh Review, 1808-1816 
Examiner, 1808-1816 
Gentlemen's Magazine, 1806-1815 
Independent Whig, 1807-1815
The Charles James Fox, 1814-1815
G. REFERENCE MATERIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SOURCES
A Biographical Index to the House of Commons, by J. Wilson, 
London, 1808.
A Full View of the British House of Commons as Constituted in 
the Nineteenth Century of the Christian Era. London, 182f.
Catalogue of Parliamentary Papers, 1801-1900, by H. Vernon 
Jones, London, 1901.
Dictionary of National Biography. Revised edition, London, 
1908-09.
Encyclopedia Brittanica.
Protests of the Lords, ed. by J. T. Rogers, Oxford, 1875.
47 A
The Complete Peerage, ed. by V. Gibbs and others.
The Elector's Remembrancer, or a Guide to the Votes of Each 
Member of the House of Commons, London, 1822.
The Parliamentary History (Parliamentary Debates), ed. by W. 
Cobbett to 1812 and by T. C. Hansard thereafter.
The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period 
to the Year 1803, ed. by W. Cobbett, London, 1819.
H. UNPUBLISHED STUDIES
Asquith, Ivon, 'James Perry and the Morning Chronicle, 1790-1821', 
University of London, PhD. thesis, 1973.
Brunsdon, P. J. 'The Association of the Friends of the People, 
1792-1796', University of Manchester M. Phil, thesis, 1961.
Dinwiddy, J. R. 'Parliamentary Reform As An Issue in English
Politics, 1800-1810', University of London PhD. thesis, 1971.
Elkins, Wilson H. 'British Policy in its Relation to the Commerce 
of the United States of America From 1794 to 1807, Oxford 
University M. Phil, thesis, 1936.
Fraser, Peter. 'The Conduct of Public Business in the House of
Commons, 1812-1827', University of London M. Phil, thesis, 1927.
Horsman, Reginald. 'British Opinion and the United States of
America, 1806-1812', University of Birmingham M. Phil, thesis, 
1955.
Oxley, J. E. 'English Political Satire, 1800-1830', University of 
London M. Phil, thesis, 1941.
